THE VIOLENT DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
causes, dynamics and effects
Collection of Papers
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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I GENERAL CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF LOCAL AND INTERNAL WARS</strong></td>
<td>Ditrih Jung</td>
<td>THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN WARS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Håkan Wiberg</td>
<td>FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN 1990: WHY IT HAD A BAD PROGNOSIS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA</strong></td>
<td>Alpar Lošonc</td>
<td>INVITING VIOLENCE AND FRAGILE MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ivan Vejvoda</td>
<td>WHY DID THE WAR HAPPEN?</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonči Kuzmanić</td>
<td>DISINTEGRATION OF THE SFR YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS LEGACY: POPULISM – NOT NATIONALISM</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carl-Ulrik Schierup</td>
<td>NATIONALIST RESURRECTION AND ITS GLOBAL CONTINGENCIES</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA</strong></td>
<td>Latinka Perović</td>
<td>THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND THE ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milan Vukomanović</td>
<td>THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICTS</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Miroslav Hadžić
THE MODERATORS OF VIOLENCE
– THE HIDDEN SIDE OF THE YUGOSLAV WAR.............. 133

Vlasta Jalušič
GENDER AND VICTIMIZATION OF THE NATION
AS PRE- AND POST-WAR IDENTITY DISCOURSE........... 145

Mihajlo Basara
THE FIGHTING MORALE OF NATIONAL ARMIES
IN THE BREAKUP OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA............ 167

IV PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION
AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SECURITY

Milan Podunavac
WAR AND THE SYSTEM: THE CASE OF SERBIA............. 179

Mojmir Križan
POST-YUGOSLAV STATES: JOINING THE EUROPEAN
UNION BY DEVELOPING POLITICAL CULTURE.............. 193

Vojin Dimitrijević
SERBIA: TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
WITH THE BURDEN OF THE PAST? ......................... 211

Jasmina Glišić
PUBLIC OPINION IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
ON INTEGRATION INTO THE EURO-ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY .................................................. 217

Kruno Kardov
SILENCING THE PAST: VUKOVAR BETWEEN
THE PLACE AND SPACE OF MEMORY ..................... 227

About the Centre .............................................. 239
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Without a public, open and expert debate about the recent war legacy, the complete establishment of security and cooperation in the area of former Yugoslavia will not be possible. Local scholars still argue over causes, substance and consequences of the Yugoslav wars. Only a few of the research findings so far, have been generally accepted. This is in large part due to the fact that during the wars, professional cooperation among scholars of the newly emerging states was ruptured. Thus, some of them were deprived, in addition to other things, of the opportunity to compare Yugoslav wars with similar domestic wars in other parts of the world.

As much as it seemed necessary to get an insight into research results on the causes and origins of contemporary domestic wars, it was even more important that the introduction of comparative results into discussions occur in order to gain a better understanding of the nature of domestic wars but also to contribute to going beyond fragmentary interpretations of the Yugoslav wars. Also, discussion about synthesized knowledge of developments of contemporary domestic wars can offer a more reliable theoretical and methodological basis for further research and interpretation of Yugoslavia’s wars.

All the more so that a serious debate about the role and contribution of every actor in the Yugoslav wars is of great significance for all newly established countries, and especially for Serbia and Montenegro on its way toward economic transformation. Such a debate can also be an introduction into a critical reappraisal of its part in the Yugoslav wars.

Participants of the Conference were expected to offer, inter alia, an innovative and modern theoretical and methodological framework for further research into the socio-political and military nature of the Yugoslav wars. It was the idea to encourage, within that framework, further discussion and make an initial list of possible criteria for evaluation of research into the Yugoslav wars to date. This was a comparison of former and current, local and domestic wars in the world aimed at detecting both the similarities and particularities of the Yugoslav wars.

For that purpose, a critical review of research on general causes and dynamics of contemporary local and domestic wars had to be made. At the same time, different interpretations of the role of the ethno-religious factor in contemporary local and domestic wars, and in the Yugoslav wars in particular, were cross-validated. Also, differing approaches to and interpretations of the gist, causes and particularities of the Yugoslav wars were compared. Main patterns of violence in Yugoslav wars were presented and comparison was made of different interpretations of the role of the military and other (paramil-
itary) forces. Analysis was also made of different interpretations of the role of the state and nation in the Yugoslav wars, and of the Serbian one in particular. All this was conducive to examining the prospects for achieving a stable peace and lasting reconciliation of the nations and states in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

The intention of the organizers was at the same time to contribute, with the support of media, democratic political parties, NGOs and other agents of the critically-minded public, to a process of individual and collective soul-searching, potential catharsis and reconciliation as an essential precondition for a more successful democratisation and establishment of responsibility in the states and societies that have been created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

It is the Centre’s pleasure to offer to the professional and broader public, for their critical consideration, the findings of participants of the Conference. Texts in the Collected Papers were edited and prepared for printing by Miroslav Hadžić.

Belgrade, 15 November 2004.
I

GENERAL CAUSES AND DYNAMICS
OF LOCAL AND INTERNAL WARS
Ditrich Jung*

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN WARS

Introduction

There are three tendencies that characterize wars waged after the Second World War. First of all, there is an evident and clear change in the form of war. Today there are almost no (interstate) wars between countries. Most remain within the borders guaranteed by international law. War opponents can be states, but also actors that aren’t states. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia served as an empirical example in the long lasting debate on the transformation of war, which because of this change in the form of war began back in the nineties of the last century. Secondly, the battlefield, with the exception of Yugoslavia, moved from the center of Europe to the outskirts of the former Third World. Today, wars rage mainly within post-colonial states such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East or, are waged among these states. Finally, different war statistics show that wars within state borders in post-colonial states last much longer than wars waged between two separate states. Good examples of these wars are Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cashmere, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and the Phillippines.2

Dealing with the political economy of contemporary wars, we are now joining a new trend in researching wars, one that questions the previous dominance of ethnic-cultural hypotheses in explaining wars. Therefore, our aim in the research is to determine the extent that the three aforementioned empirical tendencies in waging war are actually a reflection of economic circumstances. In order to answer this question, we will begin by briefly listing the key assertions that presently set the tone for the debate on the economic background of the transformation of war. In this debate that began after the Cold War, two directions were determined in the research of the conflicts. On the one hand, there is the previously mentioned economic approach, which actually uses the model of

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* Dietrich Jung is an advanced researcher in the Department for Development Studies of the Danish Institute for International Research in Copenhagen and a visiting professor at the Institute for Sociology at the University of Copenhagen. This text is a revised and shortened version on this theme published in the Collection: Astrid Sahm, Egbert Jahn und Sabine Fischer (eds): „Die Zukunft des Friedens weiterdenken“. Perspektiven der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (2004).

2 Regarding this trend, up. Collier et al. (2001); Fearon (2002); Gleditsch et al. (2002); Jung/ Schlichte (1999); Jung et al. (2003).
instrumental rationalism oriented towards profit, a model belonging to the theory of action. On the other hand, representatives of the paradigm “new war” define the change in the form of war violence by claiming that the participants in the war made a radical turnaround and renounced rational political aims. However, in the end, these two paradigms have come to the same conclusion. They renounce the political character of contemporary wars and reduce it to a certain form of organized crime. The wars that took place on the former Yugoslav territory served often as an excellent example of this conclusion.3

In this text, we oppose such a de-politicization of war. Namely, the so-called transformation of war can be correctly understood – and this is the basis of our thesis – only in the case that we introduce another political dimension, and that is a modern /state power. The focus of the explanation referring to the changes in the form of war violence should not be on the economy, rather on the political economy of violent conflicts and its relation to the post-colonial process of building the state. Therefore, the international framework is of central importance, which is primarily, a subject of debate regarding globalization issues. This framework looks at the way that this process of post-colonial state formation differs from the same process in Europe. Within this framework, disintegration and rebuilding state structures are two sides of the same coin. In the constellation that it creates, the political economy of contemporary war cannot be limited only to the area within the state; rather it is tightly intertwined with formal, informal, and criminal economic transactions that fall under the rubric “shadow globalization”.

When we begin presenting different economic approaches, and then the debate on transformation, we will try to confirm our thesis in two further steps. We will first, by analytical sketches on the characteristic forms of contemporary war economies, show how a closed war economy becomes open and how in the global market, it becomes an integrated war economy. On the basis of this, we will then more precisely determine the relation between war, politics and economy. We will show that economic hypotheses belong to the important and complementary function of explaining contemporary war developments. In addition, because of the more general level of issues that we have dealt with in this text, we shall not go into greater detail in the case of the former Yugoslavia. Rather we recommend that the readers use general views on the political economy of contemporary wars presented here as a theoretical parameter for understanding the studies that in this book are dedicated exclusively to the case of Yugoslavia.

The “Depolitization” of War and Economic Logic of So-Called New Wars

Methodical, theoretical and completely heterogeneous approaches in researching war from the point of view of economics extends, more simply said, to a position in between two opposite poles. On one pole, the transformation of war is interpreted based upon the theory of action, where the motives of the parties at war do not lie within political ideologies rather in the

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3 A good survey of this heterogeneous debate can be found in the first chapter of: Münkler (2002). Regarding war developments in Yugoslavia see: Andreas (2004).
form of instrumental, profit directed action. Physical violence in this purposeful-rational aspiration for economic profit appears as a means that does not even require legitimacy. On the other pole, hypotheses of structural theoretical approaches were put in the foreground, where the phenomenon of a new war is explained through economic integration of local war economies into the global market. The more dominant the economic variable in the explanation, experts then have a tendency to reduce contemporary wars to a form of organized crime and to assert that participants of the conflict are not driven by political motivation. We will try to clarify this process of reducing war to criminal acts by making a short review on the four representatives of economically oriented research projects. In these papers it can be shown how this explanation of war is turned away from giving precedence to politics and giving precedence to economic factors.

This pioneering contribution to this change of paradigm, from ethnicity to economy, was presented in the 1996 collection titled *Economie des guerres civiles*, editors Francois Jean and Jean-Christopher Rufin. They included a number of well-researched cases of analyzed economic strategy and interests of participants in war and showed how these strategies and interests are closely linked to global economic processes. The complex entwining of local wars and global processes is especially manifest in the four tested fields: international embargo, organized crime, and the diaspora, that acts through state borders and the distribution of international aid. These international, or transnational aspects of contemporary war are a trait of the dynamic connection and characteristic of the relation between various forms of local war economies and the phenomenon of globalization. In these instances, relatively isolated war economies that rely on natural resources can be transformed into “open war economies” in such a way that it will, to a greater or lesser degree, integrate into global economic exchange.4

Most credit can be given to the aforementioned authors for dealing with the issue of the conditions under which a civil war becomes a process with its own dynamics. Studies of individual cases showed which path of development of local wars can transform into relatively complex systems of violent accumulation of capital, which in turn enters the global market. Therefore, editors of this collection, already in the preface, warned that the significance of economic factors in understanding violent conflicts should not be overestimated. They see this economic dimension as important but not in any case as a dominant factor in the explanation of civil wars. Contrary to this, despite focusing on the economic background of war developments, these authors, as earlier discussed, reassure that when referring to the interpretation of the causes of breakouts of war, one should give precedence to politics. Economically oriented analysis of war explains the causes of war to a lesser extent, but helps in the understanding of specific forms of processes that are characteristic of contemporary violent conflicts.

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4 Jean-Christopher Rufin has already in his two earlier texts (1994; 1995) given a persuasive analysis of the development of different forms of war economies.
It is this precedence of politics that Jean and Rufin adhere to, and that is scrutinized in the papers of David Keen, Georg Elwert, and Paul Collier. Paraphrasing the saying of Clausewicz, David Keen proposes that we understand civil wars as “a continuation of economy by other means”. This point of view is supported by the argument that participants of violence in many armed conflicts actually have one common interest, and that is, not to win at war but to maintain the state of a violent conflict. Keen puts an accent on the overall assessment that war economies develop in such a way that they have their own dynamics. His concept of “economic violence” opposes the point of view that in war a total disintegration of social order ensues. In the structural theoretical sense, today’s “civil wars” are not unrestrained violent conflicts of two or more political factions; rather they are wars in which an alternative power structure, protection system, and profit-making environment is built (Keen 1998: 11).

In the order conditioned by war, physical violence, on the one hand, takes on the role of an economic instrument in the hands of rationally active contractors (top-down violence). On the other hand, it is a basic resource for survival by which the population satisfies direct material needs (bottom-up violence). From the perspective of the theory of action, Keen shows that behind both forms of economic violence are rational strategies of social actors, who, through their actions, contribute to maintaining a state of war. In his analysis on the actions of the parties at war, Keen uses a utilitarian model homo economicus and maintains the system of war economies which in essence still supports the model of isolated war economy. However, neither Keen, nor Jean and Rufin dare to explain the causes of war as only economic interest, rather they point out that the behavior of the participants in war partially reflects the culture of indirect political and social hardships, where a political solution represents one of the conditions for ending the war (up. Keen 1998: 2000).

These cultural and political aspects of behavior in war that Keen mentions, are however, attributed by the anthropologist Georg Elwert to be as a complete instrumental character which intensifies the impression that analysis of contemporary wars gives precedence to the economy. Elwert sees his concept of “market violence” as an explicit critique of cultural theorems with the root of violence in culture, and therefore explains it as a lack of cultural homogeneity. According to Elwert’s argumentation, the causes of civil wars in Asia and Africa do not lie within culture; rather their main features are actually in the strategy of earning profits. Within these strategies, referring to cultural contradictions, traditional or religious symbols are only part of the strategic resources in primary economically motivated conflicts. Elwert, above all, focuses on the relation between local war economies and the global principle of market economy. “Market violence” is one type of an open war economy, discussed by Jean and Rufin, and emerges in a specific environment of economically organized economies with conditions of free violent competition. The global structures of liberal economy enter a symbiotic relationship with local violent structures and in this way, self-serving “market violence” is built.

The most radical representative of the thesis on the precedence of economy in contemporary wars, British economist Paul Collier, headed a research project under the World Bank called *Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence*. Even if he agrees with certain theses of the aforementioned researchers – above all the thesis on the relation of economic interests, on the one hand, and also the continuation of its own dynamics of war conflicts, on the other - Collier has a research plan that in a theoretical and methodological way differs from the research of the other authors. He employs econometric methods and uses the theory of probability. Examining records from 47 wars fought between 1965-1999, Collier comes to the conclusion that they can more so be explained as a lust for profit than social political misfortune. His research focused on the conditions that lead to a revolt. Therefore, he addressed issues of financing, expenses, and military movements. Collier attributes greater explanatory power to these variables rather than attributing it to indicators such as, social inequality, political participation, and ethnic differences (Collier/Hoeffler 2001). Considering that Collier sees the significance of his analysis in that many predictions can rely on it, traditions, of scientific naturalism obligate him to make a kind of estimate on the risks of a civil war breaking out in the future. This risk is first of all related to several macro-economic conditions such as how dependent the given state is on the export of primary raw materials, how low the per capita income is, as well as how low the economic growth is. Connecting the causes of contemporary wars predominantly with the possibility of a material realization of an armed uprising, Collier concludes that these wars should not be viewed as political disputes rather as new forms of organized crime (Collier 2000a; 2000b).

The research results of Jean and Rufin were supported by a theoretically broad set of case studies. Economic motives for taking further steps played only a supplemental role, while in the center of argumentation of Keen and Elwert was the ideal type — *homo economicus*. However Collier did not need a model of explanation based upon the theory of action or, even some sociological theory. Equalizing war and organized crime is based upon the utmost simplified review of circumstances in which there is collective violence. In this review, he does not give much importance to social-structural aspects or even the thoughtful orientations in the actions of social actors. We will not go into a further detailed critique here on different economically oriented models of explanations dealing with the phenomenon of war. Regarding data and simplified premises that the analysis of Paul Collier is based upon, we will forward a critique directed to Roland Marchal and Kristina Messiant (Marchal/Messiant 2002). In any case, it is interesting that many researchers

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5 Nevertheless, Collier researched the motivation of only so-called rebels; thus of those who did not recognize the state monopoly on using force. That is why his analysis of the rest of the eventual economic interests of the state actors is out of range, as certain structures of the state administration.

6 For Collier’s critique on the economist stand directed from the perspective of quantitative research: Sambanis (2001).
of war in this third wave, in spite of different theoretical and methodological approaches, all agreed that war is a certain kind of crime.

As was mentioned at the beginning, in equalizing war and organized crime, there is an overlapping of economic trend in researching conflicts and in those trends that deal with the theory of the transformation of conflicts. For the latter, a general direction is shown in the book by Martin van Crevelds, *The Transformation of War*, published in 1991. Van Crevelds claims that today, there is no room for Clausewicz’s trinity definition of war based upon differentiating government, military, and people; instead a new form of non-trinitarian war of low intensity (low intensity conflict) should be discussed. In the future, according to Van Crevelds, wars will not be waged by states, but by terrorists, guerillas, bandits and robbers (1991: 197). War will in the future be freed of the plethora of rational demands of a strategic conflict between states and will return to its underlying objective, which cannot be found in political logic but in a fight where the fight becomes the purpose. In this way, war is once again becoming “great theater” (1991: 171).

Scientists and analysts readily accepted the thesis that classical and purposeful wars no longer exist, and its center lies within the state and is based upon political power. For example, Robert Kaplan made a parallel between Van Crevelds’ argumentation and his own experience on the battlefields in Africa and Asia. In one frequently quoted article, he predicted the emergence of anarchic wars where no rules exist and that are spreading in all place where resources are deficient and where there is an overpopulation, tribalism, crime and epidemics (Kaplan 1994). As for the field of academic research, Mary Kaldor, heading an entire team of researchers, placed contemporary war developments under the rubric “new wars”. Using the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia as an example, Kaldor affirmed that a new form of war had come into the picture, radically different from the ideological mediation of the “old” wars that had rational political aims. She believes that global processes are in effect that allegedly dispose of previously valid categories of political order, and the new type of war is determined by revoking the existing differences between war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights (Kaldor 1999:70).

Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel rightly criticized that in this debate on the transformation of war there is a dangerous tendency of mystifying war (Gantzel 2002: 25). Claims of many of her supporters point out, to say the least, that the alleged irrational feature of collective violence and in this way actually questions the possibility of analytical, universally-rational categories of mediated approaches to the phenomenon of war. Therefore, the difference between new and old wars is often uncritically placed on the side of the research object even if there are many who do not see the source of these differences in empirical war developments rather than in patterns of our subjective observation. In this

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7 As for literature in German, one should look at the book by Herfried Münkler, which does not adhere to the tendency to de-politicize war (Münkler 2002). For a reliable review and critique on the way that war violence is thematicized in international relations see Schlichte (2002).
sense, today’s obsession with “new” perceptions of war violence also indicates the self-referring nature of these debates on the transformation of war.8

Theoreticians of the new war, with their inclination to the mystification of war make a clear distinction from those that economically profane war violence (for example, as in the case of Keen, Elwert, and Collier). While econometric analysis suggests that in contemporary wars we are dealing with very rational actors looking out only for their economic and not political interests, many advocates of the new war offer a picture where the reasons for conflict breakouts slip further away from the rational model of explanation. Systemic linkage of global economy and local violent orders opposes the new war that represents a statement of unstructured global anarchy. Apart from this, in the argumentation of theoreticians of the transformation of war, a key role is played by ethnically mediated resistance of identities. Thus, they then rely on this paradigm of ethnic conflicts, not taking the political model into consideration that could help in resolving these ethnic conflicts without violence. However, it seems that in studying peace, it is of central importance that in this debate, both research paradigms do not attribute contemporary wars to political character. They share this view of the de-politicization of war. Although certain points in their models of explanation are diametrically opposite, they come to the same conclusion in making a parallel between war and organized crime. Nevertheless, questions are posed on whether the war actually differs from criminal acts and whether the fine line in-between war and organized crime has in fact worn off to the point that it can no longer be distinguished. It is enough to glance at the different forms of economic relations that can be seen in war, in order for it to be immediately clear to us that there is something more there that we should focus our attention on.

**War Economies - From Thievery to Political Rent**

In his analysis of war economy, Peter Lock proposes that we look at an armed conflict as an economic process in which there are three asymmetric mutually connected spheres of circulation – formal, informal, and criminal economy (Lock 2002: 281-283). Previously discussed economic approaches to researching war, as well as the debate on the new war indicate the complex composition in which global structures and processes intertwine with local war economies. If liberal dreams of the global development of democracies and market economies make up one side, and the daily nightmare of war on the periphery make-up the other side of the same coin, then there is evidently another side to these processes that has been incompletely marked with the modern term of “globalization”.

Shadow globalization is, however, a term referring to a deep temporal disproportion that characterizes international political economy. What can be historically and conceptually separated precisely appears in the process of creating a global society, which on the whole, is full of contradictions. For “suc-

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cessful crisis control”, it is not necessary to only precisely economically analyze the conflicts (Lock 2002: 270), but carry out the analysis with the awareness that today, in the global society of “original accumulation” of capital (Marx 1867: Kapitel 24), and relying on violence, it overlaps with peaceful exchange within a highly developed capitalist order. In order to explain this, it is sufficient to make a very superficial typology of economic processes and structures, which we will do now, that are usually assigned to the general concept of war economy. According to this typology, we are able to follow how isolated war economies are, step by step, developing into open war economies and can see how market oriented economies encounter self-serving “market violence” (this was Elwert’s theme).

**Thievery, banditry, and extortion**

These forms of violent acquisition of economic property existed and exist wherever war is waged. In this sense, today’s wars in Afghanistan, Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, or Sierra Leone do no differ at all from a bandit campaign in the age of the Thirty Years War or from European civil wars at the beginning of the modern age. It is back then and even now that members of the police or a part of the population that do not have an opportunity for an alternative way of reproduction, used these primitive forms of acquisition in order to survive. In this sense, this refers primarily to Keen’s concept of *bottom-up violence*, and only exceptionally in this economy does theft and robbery lead to accumulation and reinvestment of capital. Nevertheless, these primitive economic interests then posses “regulated” channels and it appears that participants in the conflicts succeed reaching at least temporary treaties with them. For example, in the civil war in Lebanon (1975 – 1990), it proved that treaties were possible despite all political, ethnic, and ideological differences. Because all stores were robbed behind the front line, the police at war in Beirut called truces many times which, amongst other things, enabled them to, according to an agreement reached in advance, rob the rest of the stores located between the line of separation. (Messara 1989: 86).

**Blackmail, Racketeering, and War Taxation**

The erosion of individual and collective assurance in armed conflicts leads to a kind of interdependence between the local police and civilian population that it controls. This dependence ranges widely from simple threats and extortion all the way to developed systems of taxation and collection of payments, which under certain conditions characteristically can “resemble the state”. A continuation of this hierarchy for the economic use of violence is followed by the appearance of specific war entrepreneurs, and along with this, different forms of *top-down violence*. In this way, the use of physical violence becomes the economic means of the system. Not only are self-serving systems formed based upon violence, and consequently forming a certain type of pre-stage for “market violence” diagnosed by Elwert, but also there is an indication of a proto-state structure that remains out of the context of global net-
works. Lebanese police, on the territory under their control, took on the responsibilities of an entire series of state functions. They charged taxes and customs duties, controlled cantons according to rules that they adopted on their own, dealt with education and handled supplying the public with water and electricity (Enders 2003: 125).

In Columbia, the FARC established a system of territorial authorities financed by regular customs charges and other contributions, integrating their economic transactions into the formal economy of the country (Suárez 2000). Wars in Curdistan, Lebanon, North Ireland, Sri Lanka, and the former Yugoslavia, showed how easily the relations of interdependence crosses the territorial borders and enters the global market. Apart form this, a decisive role in financing war is different modes of war taxation paid by the diaspora voluntarily or under pressure. For example, the Tamil Tigers, mediated by the World Tamil Coordinating Committee, financed the war against the government of Sri Lanka through donations gathered from Tamil emigrants residing in the formal economies of Europe and North America (up. Angoustures/Pascal 1996).

**Forced Labor and Slavery**

In civil wars that have strong “market violence”, the phenomenon is omnipresent that different police use arms to force people into labor, prostitution or participation in combat. In extreme cases, slave trade and slave labor can occur. The war in south Sudan was notorious for this. During the war that began in 1983, Arab police from Darfur and Kordofan sent members of the Dinka people into slavery. Women and children were mostly targeted and were taken to the north of the country. There, they were forced to carry out household chores for members of clans in the Arab speaking territory. The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) gained the reputation of sending mostly children into slavery and with the financial help of the Sudanese government, fought in north Uganda. According to the report of Amnesty International (1997), LRA forced 8000 children into labor and into participating in the war.

**Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime**

Illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and humanvorgans represents a characteristic constituent part of open war economies. Growing, processing and transport of narcotics is the main source of income for participants in a series of civil wars and the main source of accumulation of capital of the police leadership and “warlords”. At a level above economic factors of production, distribution and utilization of narcotics is developing a process of global exchange, in which battlefields, at their outskirts, are inextricably connected to daily events of western democratic societies. Apart from this, this process inte-

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9 Up. Is there Slavery in Sudan? Provisional Observations and Conclusions of a Visit to Sudan by Anti-Slavery International Representatives (18 to 28 October 2000), March 2001, or at: http://www.antislavery.org/homepage/resources/PDFpublication.htm#isslaverysudan

grates the original accumulation of “violence markets” into war economies with investments of this “war capital” into global capital markets.

The link between the narcotics trade and civil wars also left a permanent trace on the histories of Columbia and Peru, who represent the largest manufacturers of cocaine in the world (McCaffrey 1998). However, this close link of organized crime and “market violence” should not prompt us to draw a conclusion too quickly that there may be a causal relationship between narcotics and war. Burnett Rubin showed in the example of Afghanistan how an economy linked to narcotics is spreading parasitically in a country destroyed by armed conflicts, as well as how local war economies are gradually integrated into formal economies of neighboring countries (Rubin, 1995; 1999). An economy linked to drugs during war and developed within the borders of a state, plays less of a role as the causal agent in the breakout of the conflict, and more of a role as an economic guarantee in maintaining a developed system based upon violence.

**Exploitation of Natural Resources**

An open war economy does not use only illegal global markets. One of the main economic branches in contemporary wars represents exploiting and legal sale of natural resources. During the war in Cambodia, for example, national resources, such as tropical forests, gem stones, ores, and antiquities were exploited to a great extent. It has been estimated that on the northwest border region of Cambodia, about fifteen companies intensively traded lumber with the Kmer Rouge. Transport by roads crossing the borders, tightly connected the Thailand economy with the war economy of the Kmer Rouge, whose politics and military, as well as economy were centralized (Lechervy 1996). African battlefields are also linked to global economic centers in a similar way. In Congo, the raw material COLTAN is of crucial importance to the industry of transmission equipment\(^1\), whose export was monopolized by rebel organizations (connected to Ruanda) from the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Johnson 2001).

**Trade Monopoly and Production**

In a civil war, it does not necessarily have to come to a disintegration of a formal economy. In many wars, the parties at war, through violence, succeeded in maintaining control over trade and the production of goods. The link with formal structures of the global world market can remain intact even when on the local markets, market force is replaced by the interests of those who control force. In Lebanon different police controlled domestic and foreign trade. Therefore, control over the port played the decisive role, and was, so to say, the main source of income for the Christian *Force Libanaise* (Endres 2003: 131). For example, in the post war situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina,

\(^1\) COLTAN is an abbreviation for columbit-tantalite, which is used for building computer chips, mobile telephones and lenses.
Mike Pugh showed how political and economic interests are tightly entangled when referring to control over trade and production. Bosnia and Hercegovina is also a good example on which to observe how the international embargo enabled forming multitudes of monopoly positions based upon force, as well as how, partially as a result of these monopolies, the economic structure of war to a great degree impedes building market order in the postwar period (Pugh 2002).

**International Humanitarian Aid**

There are many cases in which even international humanitarian aid enters a vicious circle of violence. Humanitarian aid, in this case, no longer serves the civilian population affected by war. Rather, it becomes one of the basic material elements in the structure of the war economy. For example, in the war in Somalia, Joakim Gundel proved that international food aid served to maintain structures governing violence and warlords, and also contributed to maintaining the actual structures that caused this catastrophic famine. Somalian society was torn apart, poverty-stricken, and there were armed conflicts. In this situation, international aid was one of the most important resources over which the bitterest battles were waged. Even if in Somalia the food aid helped many people survive, at the same time, it contributed to stabilizing the system of violence (Gundel 2003).

**International Military Aid and Political Rent**

The economic connection of the international system and local war developments can, however, gain even more abstract systematic traits, considering that it means going from an isolated to an open economy. It appears that within the political economy of war, amongst relative war resources, it is exemplary to store not only the received direct military aid but also the material and financial funds intended as a kind of political “salary”. In the bipolar international system, the USA and USSR allocated funds in the name of direct military aid that was distributed, adhering to the system of distribution based upon ideological differences. In wars waged in Latin America, Africa, in the Middle East, and in Indochina, the parties at war, whether they are states or not, rely on these resources that were accessible to them thanks to the political conflict of the two systems. This relatively clear structure of international military aid significantly changed after the Cold War. From then on, in giving military aid, mainly short-term and situation related issues were crucial. Therefore, it seems there is a decrease in the share of this aid for financing wars developing within a state. This is possible, amongst other things, also because there is a tendency today that civil wars are interpreted as a phenomenon of organized crime, and also because participants in these wars are forced to seek new economic sources. The “speech on war as a business deal” is even more a reflection of the fact that after the Cold War, ideologies in regard to financing wars were pushed into the background.

As was the case earlier, the most significant were political rents, or economic funds that poured in from the international system at the expense of its political loyalty. There were states – mainly in the Near East, for example the
Palestinian Autonomous Administration (PA) – that knew how to maintain the flow of political rent, and resources gathered in political conflicts and transform them into peace dividends. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan received aid in annual military and economic contributions from the USA. PA lived, above all, from the financial support of the EU.\footnote{According to data of the American Embassy in Aman, direct US military aid to Jordan in the period between 1994-2002 amounted to 845 million US dollars. The lion’s share of “peace dividends”, however, after reaching a peace treaty in Camp David (1978) is sent to Tel Aviv and Cairo. The Israeli government receives annual military aid in the sum of 3 billion US dollars, while Egypt must be satisfied with 1.3 billion annually (see: \url{http://www.hrew.org/worldreport99/imideast/egypt_and_Wood_2002}).} Therefore, all recipients invested in building its security apparatus. Thanks to this investment, in Egypt authoritarian power structures strengthened under President Mubarak and ensured its military superiority in internal conflicts with militant Islamists. In the Israel-Palestine case, these peace dividends were in the meantime transformed into a resource for armed conflicts between Israeli and Palestinian security forces (up. Beck 2002; Jung 2003a).

**Relations Between Building the State, Politics, and Economy in Actual War Developments**

Here, the roughly sketched pattern of economic structure in contemporary wars and actions directed toward earning profits confirms the central claim reached by the economic approach: war economies lead the concept of war within the borders of a state \emph{ad absurdum}. If you observe the material side of local wars, then it can be seen that they are intertwined in many ways with global economics. This is especially evident in the areas that were a subject of analysis by Jean and Rufin: international embargo, diaspora, international aid and organized crime. Local orders based upon violence transform into open war economies and enter into dynamic and symbiotic relations with illegal global markets and liberal market structures. In the center of this shadow globalization are mafia structures and “warlords”. They are, on the one hand, representatives of a merciless and violent exploitation of people and resources on the territory that they govern. On the other hand, in this context, local military control of the given territory is combined with fulfilling financial and political interests in the international plan. By means of so-called mafia structure war economies, illegal markets are integrated into the formal global economy. Therefore, “warlords” play a double role – they are local commanders and global entrepreneurs, investing their war profits into the formal economic sector (up. More in Jung 2003b: 20-21).

War economies are, thus, composed of dynamic forms of economic reproduction that range from surviving with the help of violence, to financing military expenses, to the accumulation and new investments of capital in the world market. The economic approach is not limited to only explaining the behavior of those who hold power and who are only interested in satisfying
their own interests. Violence permeates all social relations, and the motives that determine the actions of the participants in war evidently also result from a circular structure in which the consequences become also part of the cause (Genshel/Schlichte 1997: 503 and 505). In the context of the world market that is no longer connected to the territory and that in the global plane exists as a world market without violence, using force on a confined territory can gain a systemic character and for smaller groups of people, war can become a profitable business. In this sense, economically oriented analysis offers a credible explanation as to how there is a tendency for wars within countries to last longer than wars in-between countries and why is it more difficult to end them.

Nevertheless, the structure of these processes with its own dynamics also indicates the limitation of the economic approach in the explanation. All the described forms of war economies here assume the conditions of violent competition, and therefore, war itself. Whether the issues are structural or even an active-theory vision, the “continuation of the economy by other means” is based upon the use of these means, i.e. physical violence. Therefore, war economies even when they are transformed during war into self-serving processes, still remain a dimension that depends upon the loss of the control of force. Thus, the context of war outbreaks even in the case of new wars is political by its very nature. Taking this into consideration, the tendencies that exist in the global plan in wars after 1945 – wars are much longer and are more often waged within state borders, on the outskirts of areas where colonialism is finalized and processes of state building have commenced – cannot be explained even as the thieving interests of “warlords”, nor as a model of self-applicable “market violence”. Theoreticians who deal with the transformation of war do not have a ready answer. To the contrary, most of the participants in the debate on new wars focus on violence as a means of survival and therefore, miss the “criminal” aspects of today’s wars (Kalyvas 2001: 116-117). In this way, the phrase “new war” only hides the historical revelation that civil wars always characterize a great degree of irregularities, and therefore, the horrors that appear to be irrational (up. Waldmann 1997).

The use of physical violence, territorially limited and specific for the given area, and emerging war economies with its own dynamics and including these economies in the world market where there is no direct violence, cannot be explained without referring to a social dimension that Paul Collier systematically removes from his econometric analysis, and this is a modern state. Post-colonial states are not formed in a milieu of free and violent competition and by this, the state building process differs from the state building process that developed in Europe. In the process of decolonization, post-colonial states received a kind of “negative sovereignty” and thanks to it, regimes of these states enjoyed international aid and joined international law. Then, ironically, authoritarian power holders that stripped their population of political freedom and civil rights, began to exploit the same international institutions that were a guarantee of political independence for the colonized nation (Jackson 1990: 202). Today, the processes of building state authorities, already full of conflict, are developing within state borders that are guaranteed
Therefore, battlefields in the former Third World also give the same gruesome picture of how it was in the wars and conflicts during the process of building states in Europe. Even today, wars characterize processes of monopolization and feudilization of physical violence, violent destruction of the former functional social order and establishing a certain form of war economy.

European states emerged within the framework of building a world market and international systems, and this model of state building is based upon simultaneous external and internal building. Contrary to this, the post-colonial elite received a kind of negative state sovereignty and they were forced to integrate into the already existing asymmetric structure of the global market. Post-colonial states, therefore, characterize a tense relationship between states and societies – a statehood guaranteed externally, but that must be defended from within. Tilly analyzed (in 1985 and 1990) the logic in defending the state and taxation policies, but this logic does not touch on the process of post-colonial state building. While the authoritarian state elite refer to Westphalian norms of international systems, the elite still emerging as a civil society turn towards transnational institutional structures that represent suppositions of global civil society. Demands of achieving democratic legitimacy, fair economic distribution, legal states, as well as the protection of individual human rights are no longer a direct agreement between the state and society. Rather negotiations are carried out through international and transnational actors.

This relationship is clearly visible in the actual process of peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Iraq and in the region of the former Yugoslavia. A multitude of different state, international, and transnational organizations are involved. They have taken on the tasks that cover a wide range – from disarming participants in war, to building political, social and economic institutions. However, this new “protectorate” appears in the name of international peacebuilding. This peacebuilding only has a distant resemblance to state forms of political power as it refers to building a certain kind of “controlled anarchy” in which multitudes of international, transnational, regional, national and local interests and competencies. Actually, the right question is whether this is the way that it is possible at all to build structures of a legal state and market economy. It seems that these controlled anarchies only copy new wars in which there is also no control, only the difference is in that in post war anarchies, the local actors are stripped of physical violence as a means of achieving their goals. In all the mentioned cases, however, the crucial step must still be taken. The monopoly on the use of force, held by external factors, should not only be transferred to the autonomous state elite, but that elite should at the same time supply politically legitimate institutions that are able to restrain the state.

13 The syntagm of negative sovereignty was made by Jackson and it to some degree corresponds to the subsequent consolidation of the superior state, in the way that it is used in the so-called Hamburg approach to research samples of wars (up. Jung et al. 2003: 60ff).

14 Norbert Elijas (1976) described the link between monopolization and feudilization of physical violence in detail. In reference to the relevancy of this for contemporary wars, up. Jung (2000).
monopoly on the use of force. It appears that international peacebuilding has boxed itself into a corner as it is necessary to in one step ensure military security, within the state and on the international plan, but also individual freedom and economic growth.

Conclusion

In the actual discussion on the transformation of war and a peaceful solution to war conflicts, an important role is played by the explanation based upon the economy. They can, along with different models of war economy, explain the phenomenon of perpetuating states of war in wars waged within a country. On the basis of these models, they can also explain how “market violence” in the Third World interacts with global economy and how, as a consequence of this, war and liberal markets exist at the same time. In this sense, the economic approach can be of importance for peacemaking and peacebuilding. Ending war and developing postwar peacekeeping structures does not solely depend upon building institutions that deal with politically disputed issues, but requires a strategy that will initiate the transformation of war economies and present a material stimulation for those participating in the war.

However, in order to explain why wars are waged primarily in the Third World countries and why wars dominate within the borders of a country, it is necessary to begin from a wider supposition in which economic aspects only have a supplemental role. Structures of developed international systems are of the utmost importance, which, like the world system of states, represents a normative guarantee of negative sovereignty of the state. When a system of states was consolidated after the Second World War it was then that armed conflicts increasingly moved to areas separated by state borders. Also, this left an impression that processes of building a state in the Third World, which followed a violent process of decolonization, was an internal matter of post-colonial states. In order to understand the relation between economic globalization and this form of “political containment” (a relation that is crucial to today’s war developments), one must take into consideration, except for economic variables, the developed society of states, or what is for us today a characteristic of a normative milieu that is a product of international relations and political power. In order to understand the structural context in which contemporary wars develop we must recognize the essential importance of the analysis of economies and international systems. Nevertheless, for explanations of the processes that lead to outbreaks of war in individual cases, elements that fall under the theory of action are always necessary. However, it often occurs that reducing the participant in war to an ideal-standard model of homo economicus is often too simplified, because in order for “warlords” to appear, “political and ideological, ethnic and religious-cultural issues are still important” (Münkler 2002: 163). In order to explain why someone applies force, instrumental rationalism is necessary to supplement normative and cognitive claims, in the way that is done in discussions on ethno-national conflicts. In this sense, the economic approach represents one key in the bundle of keys that is necessary in explaining war conflicts.

Translated from Serbian by Theodora Pankovich
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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN 1990: WHY IT HAD A BAD PROGNOSIS

Former Yugoslavia entered a process of dissolution many years ago, which may be far from completed yet. It took violent forms from 1991; events in 2004 in Macedonia and Kosovo indicate that we have hardly seen the end there either. Was the dissolution unavoidable? Was war an inescapable consequence?

I shall attempt to translate these issues into manageable research questions, trying to make various postdictions concerning the former Yugoslavia (hereafter FY) around 1990. There are no natural laws in social science, so the questions will deal with probabilities, asking what were the prognoses with the highest likelihood at that time point? No empirical facts are drawn that were not available at that time; confirmed general propositions are used even if they have only found empirical support later than 1990.

**Was Dissolution Inescapable?**

The first question is then: how probable was dissolution, given the characteristics of FY and the circumstances prevailing some fifteen years ago. There is little quantitative research on when and how states dissolve. One relevant classical finding is Richardson’s (1960: 190f.) that the longer two groups lived under common government the less likely was a civil war. This does not say anything about peaceful dissolutions; but these are historically quite rare, so this finding actually covers the great majority of cases. The first problem concerning FY is to define its age: from 1918 or from 1945? In the first case, YU of 1990 was older than two thirds of all states; in the second case, it still belonged to the older half. Its prognosis on the basis of this indicator only was therefore about average, meaning that it was definitely less likely to dissolve than to remain. If we use *qualitative* analyses instead, the first problem is disagreement: some conclude that it was doomed for a number of reasons, others that it was fully viable. How con-

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vincing the pro and con arguments are is a subjective matter, or at least con-
tains large subjective elements. There had indeed been attempts at dissolv-
ing it, temporarily successful in 1941-45. Small-armed Croatian groups
from abroad failed to get much support in 1968 and were quickly sup-
pressed. The Croatian Spring in 1971 had much more support, initially also
in the party leadership, which, however, withdrew when public demands
rapidly escalated from cultural autonomy to economic autonomy and from
there to secession (eventually claiming large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina);
as a bid for dissolution it failed. The Albanian uprisings in Kosovo/a in 1968
and 1980/81 demanded recognition as a nation and a republic of their own
in FY; after the sanguinary defeat in 1981, largely consensual demands soon
escalated to full independence. A series of economic reforms and constitu-
tional compromises had led to less and less of central government; but this
is definitely not the same thing as dissolution. In fact, some research (e.g.
Galtung 1996: 67f.) indicates the opposite: contested states are more likely
to survive as such if they provide for autonomy and confederalisation when
demanded rather than stonewalling such demands. In any case, adding qual-
itative aspects to the quantitative aspect of age gives a different picture: FY
in 1990 definitely belonged to the small group of states whose very exis-
tence had been repeatedly challenged from within.

**Could Dissolution be Peaceful?**

Did the dissolution have to be violent if it came? The (postdictive) prog-
nosis in this respect depends on how much we dare extrapolate from mere
historical regularities. Peaceful dissolutions of states are historically rare. If
we look at the 20th century up to 1990 and disregard decolonisation (where
the record is more mixed) there are very few cases where a new state
emerged out of an existing one without this being the result of a world war,
a regional war or a civil war (Wiberg 1983) : Norway from Sweden (1905),
Finland from Russia (1917), Singapore from Malaysia (1965) and the dis-
solution of the United Arab Republic in 1967. All these cases are marginal
in one or more ways. First, the initial relationship was rather loose. In the
two first cases, there was a personal union rather than a common state:
Finland and Norway had their own constitutions, parliaments, currencies,
etc.. Malaysia was a federation and the UAR a loose association of two
republics (in an even looser association with the feudal kingdom of Yemen).
Second, none of the associations was very old: the unions were created
by military conquest, in 1814 and 1809, respectively. Malaysia was two
years old and UAR three, so one might see them as failed attempts at feder-
ation rather than dissolving states. Third, the case of Finland can be seen as
a result of WWI resulting in Russia collapsing earlier in 1917 (the Finnish
revolution broke out in early 1918, when independence was already estab-
lished and non-contested). Fourth, no independence declaration was con-
tested, except – to some extent – Norway´s (Sweden eventually agreed after
a couple of months of peaceful negotiations). Lenin immediately recognised the Finnish declaration in December 1917, Singapore was actually invited to secede by Malaysia, and the dissolution of the UAR was uncontested. Even after its major constitutional compromise in 1974 (and certainly before it), FY was a “tighter” state than either of the above.

Before 1990, there were some demands for full independence that were shelved after peaceful negotiations and/or referenda, such as Faroe Islands from Denmark in 1946, Quebec from Canada and Scotland from UK a generation ago - in neither of these cases has the issue definitely disappeared. There is a single case of success: Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 – but only after India invading to stop the bloodbath of Pakistan’s army (with more than ten million temporary refugees in India). Several attempts were crushed with much violence (Tibet, Biafra, Katanga...); in other cases, fighting has continued for decades (Myanmar, Sudan, Eritrea, East Timor...)

So the best prognosis in 1990 would have been that if there were declarations of independence in FY and if they were contested (highly probable), then it was very probable that the result would be a war where they would be defeated. In fact, there was war, but they were not defeated. The most interesting post hoc question (from an analytical point of view) is therefore why not in spite of the heavy a priori odds against.

Adding the years since 1990 to our database would not change much. Apart from Czechoslovakia and the USSR, there were two successful independence movements. After the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1974, the decades of severe repression may have killed one third of the population; but the success was entirely a result of international diplomatic intervention - and threats of vast economic sanctions - in a situation when only small tatters of the guerilla remained. Eritrea was incorporated by Ethiopia in 1962 in contravention of UNSC Resolution 390 (1950) prescribing considerable autonomy in a federation. After thirty years of bitter war, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front agreed to assist the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to take over power in Addis Ababa and TPFL agreed to recognize Eritrean independence after doing so; both promises were honoured, and were not contested in the later war between them. Czechoslovakia’s dissolution was uncontested: when Slovakia tried to back up political demands with threats of secession, the Czech government was apparently happy to get rid of Slovakia. The declarations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were contested for about a year, until Russia declared itself independent, thus de facto terminating the USSR. The conclusion would remain the same: a contested unilateral declaration of independence is very unlikely to succeed, unless heavily supported by external intervention.

What Statistics Tell About War and Features of States

Let me now rephrase the second question to asking what was the likelihood for war in 1990. This asks for a postdictive prognosis based on all the factors that are known to be correlated with the outbreak of domestic war,
making secession one (but ominous) factor among others. The analysis will be made in three steps: 1) What is generally known from quantitative research on causes of wars? 2) What can be added to this by adding aspects of the regional context? 3) What can be further added to this by taking into account specific features of FY?

The first question has an immediate complication: several studies have replicated – and none contradicted – the early finding that international wars and domestic wars seem to be different species. A heavy argument for this is that indicators of external conflict and internal conflict have close to zero correlations with each other (Tanter 1966; Finsterbusch 1974)), at least until we introduce third variables (and even then there is no clear pattern – Wilkenfeld 1973). Now one of the hotly debated issues concerning the wars in FY, with strong legal, moral and emotional overtones, is whether they were civil wars all the time, civil war changing to international war by recognitions (that abandoned the traditional criteria for recognitions), international wars from the first day of proclaimed independence, or some other combination? This discussion (where I would not know how to prove whatever stand I might take) can be avoided however: we are considering the prognosis in 1990, which calls for the correlates of domestic wars. To be on the safe side, I shall first also look at correlates of wars in general or international wars.

Since the pioneers (Richardson 1960; Wright 1942; Sorokin 1937), scores of quantitative studies exist that relate how frequently a state gets into war to a great number of characteristics of states. Sometimes this was done by “trawling”, running a great number of variables against each other and seeing what correlations turned up. More sophisticated studies used “casting”, testing causal models by looking whether the specific correlations they predicted were in fact there. Results are almost entirely negative. Correlations of single variables with war are almost all so close to zero as to be statistically non-significant. Where they are at least statistically significant, the correlation is almost always so weak that it only accounts for a few percent of the total variation in occurrence of war, making the variable quite weak as a predictor of war. Among the very few that are stronger than that, even fewer have gained more solidity by being successfully replicated. The variables that satisfy most or all of these desiderata and that therefore permit at least a weak prognosis of war are essentially the following:

A1) On average, great powers go much more to international war than other states (Wright 1942, Wallensteen 1973);

A2 ) States with many international boundaries are on average more engaged in war than others; if the correlation reveals some causality, it is from boundaries to wars rather than the other way around (Richardson 1960; Weede 1973)

A3) The balance of available evidence speaks for the thesis that states that are “overarmed” in the sense of having higher military preparedness (manpower, expenditures) than is the average for their size go more to war
than others – but the relationship is complex and there is sometimes a chicken-and-egg problem of what causes what (Wiberg 1990).

Some studies found additional correlates (Rummel 1979), but nothing to match these three: correlations were weak and/or a third variable was necessary to find them and/or the study was not replicated. Let me just give a couple of examples: 1) A state that is in rank disequilibrium (ranking higher on military and economic strength than on diplomatic recognition) at one time point participates slightly more than average in war 10-15 years later (Wallace 1975); 2) If a democratic state has (some kinds of) external conflict, it gets more (of some kinds of) internal conflict than average afterwards, whereas if an authoritarian state has (some other kinds of) internal conflict, then it gets more than average of (some kinds of) external conflict afterwards. (Wilkenfeld 1973).

What Kinds of Pairs of States Get into War?

So the total picture of causes of belligerence or peacefulness of individual states exhibits little of clear structure (Vasquez 2000). This may be due to wars being so specific and individual that few valid generalisations are possible – and practically all generalisations that can be found in literature are invalid, having no observed significant correlations to get support from. It may be due to looking at the wrong variables, but this is unlikely: very many variables, including all the traditional ideas, were tried in systematic data analysis. And it may be that we have looked at the wrong level, since it takes two to tango. Let us therefore look at how characteristics of pairs of states are related to their getting into war with each other. This was done in several studies, but the picture they give is also relatively hazy. The essential results mainly – but not entirely - mirror those from the single state level (Wiberg 2000, 2002):

B1) An average pair of great powers used to be much more likely to have a war than an average pair of one great power and one minor state - whose likelihood for war in turn is much higher than for an average pair of two small states. In the post-1945 period, however, one part of the picture changes entirely: an average pair of great powers has no war at all, though there is no consensus on why not. In addition, great powers are the only ones to fight others than neighbours; a few exceptions, such as Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, were due to a great power dragging some satellites along (Wallensteen 1973).

B2) In general, much trade between two states is associated with less than average war between them, but here is a chicken-and-egg problem (Barbieri 2002). There is one important proviso, however: that the trade is relatively symmetric. If it is strongly asymmetric, i.e. a great power takes a large share of the trade of a minor state, then the probability of war is clearly higher than if is symmetric; and when a great power fights a small power,
the latter is very likely to lie in the former’s zone of economic influence and furthermore to be an economic satellite of the bigger (Wallensteen 1973).

B3) If two “over armed” states (in the above sense) have a militarized dispute, then it is twice as likely to escalate into war as a pair of one “over armed” and one “under armed” – whose risk is twice as high as that of two “under armed” states (Singer 1981). For two “over armed” states the risk seems to particularly high if they have just had an arms race (Wallace 1979, Smith 1980) but the magnitude of the risk is disputed (Wiberg 1990).

B4) Democracy is particularly interesting. The standard finding from several studies of single nations is that it has no effect: democracies are neither more peaceful, nor more warlike, than other states. Yet when we look at pairs of states, we find a quite different picture: several studies concur that two stable democracies do not get into war with each other (with at most very few and quite marginal exceptions), the so-called double democracy hypothesis (Gleditsch & Hegre 1997). We have already seen that this cannot be because democracies per se are more peaceful – they are not. Two types of explanations have been empirically shown to contribute. One is internal: there is nothing to gain – and something to lose - politically in a democracy by threatening another democracy with war, whereas fighting a war with a non-democracy may increase political support. The other is that democracies are to an especially high degree tied to each other in common organizations with common norms and values. Both seem to have some explanatory value.

First Step: What Statistics Tell About Domestic Wars

So much for international wars. Since we are asking for a prognosis of internal war in FY in 1990, these findings are not of much relevance, unless we make the fiction of seeing its republics as independent states even before any declarations of independence. Once their independence is a clear fact a bit later, some of the findings above may of course be used to gauge the likelihood of war among them; but this must be left for another analysis.

Some reservations must be added. First, we must always be cautious when drawing conclusions from mere correlations to causal relations. Second, there are various categorizations of wars, usually with “internal” or “domestic” or “civil” as one of the categories, but it is often admitted that there is no clear and sharp line between them and international wars: several cases can be classified as both at the same time, or form a special, “mixed” category. Third, “internal conflict” is not a homogeneous category: it is sometimes subdivided into two or even three types, where war between organized forces typifies one, a coup d’etat of the second and riots the third. Yet, collected statistics on wars tends to simply use the total or annual number of casualties as the criterion for inclusion. Fourth, the bulk of quantitative research on correlates of wars used to be on international wars - which
for decades have become fewer and fewer in relative terms, nowadays accounting for less than one tenth of all wars. (Gantzel 1997, Eriksson 2003). Finally, given the non-correlation between external and internal war, we should not try to locate causes of the latter by using the correlates of the former. New studies are needed.

An increasing number of major studies on domestic wars have indeed been carried out during the last two decades, and the major results are found below together with assessments as to how they may contribute to the (postdictive) prognosis for FY in 1990. Several of them have to do with the economy.

1a) The poorer a state is, the higher is the risk for civil war, with the exception that the risk decreases slightly again for extremely poor states (FitzGerald 2000).

1b) This relationship is strong.

1c) The position of FY used to be in the low risk area, but the economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s moved it in the direction of the high risk zone.

2a) Long and deep depressions tend to lead to political radicalism of one or more kinds; exactly what kinds depends on the specific circumstances.

2b) The relation is indirect, since radicalism may or may not lead to war.

2c) FY had an extreme position in terms of both the length and depth of the crisis. In terms of GDP per capita (admittedly a rather weak indicator of how people actually live) the average FY worker lost about half his real income during the 1980s and came back to the 1960 level (Schierup 1990).

3a) Recent studies at the World Bank and elsewhere indicate that the higher the proportion of primary goods in the export of a state, the higher risk for civil war (Collier & Hoefler 1998.)

3b) Whereas the finding is relatively strong and replicated, its interpretation (originally in terms of “greed” and “grievance”) is still under dispute and causal relations uncertain (Ross 2004).

3c) FY was not in the high risk zone, but was moving towards it. Different parts of FY had quite different values, with Slovenia at one extreme and Kosovo at the other.

4a) There is some evidence that great regional differences in wealth are associated with a higher risk for domestic war.

4b) The evidence is not systematically quantitative however, so the relative weight in the prognosis may be low.

4c) FY was at the extreme end in Europe in this respect: already the differences between Slovenia and Serbia or Croatia were as big as the greatest differences in Sweden. Differences clearly grew between the extremes (Slovenia and Kosovo), but the picture is otherwise disputed in this respect. In addition, FY belonged to the few “sandwich” cases (like Spain or USSR) where some of the poorest parts would secede on account (among other
things) of being poor and some of the richest on account (among other things) of being rich. The situation was exacerbated by demands from the International Monetary Fund that the development funds going from the richer to the poorer parts of FY be terminated.

5a) The risk of revolution seems to get particularly high if a period of rapid improvement, creating rising expectations, is followed by a movement in the opposite direction. (Davies 1962).

5b) The evidence is anecdotal rather than systematic and has been disputed, so the weight must be rather low.

5c) Where to locate FY depends on what time periods we look at. with some choices, it lies in the extreme high risk group. It may be argued, however, that the highest risk existed several years before 1990 and that people had by then gotten used to worsening standards of living and developed micro level ways of trying to cope when those at the macro level failed (Schierup 1990).

6a) It is a common belief among “federalist” thinkers on the EU that economic integration promotes and even eventually necessitates political integration.

6b) This is not solidly empirically documented. Furthermore, the relation is at least indirect, since lower political integration does not necessarily mean war.

6c) When economic decentralization started in the 1960s, FY went in the opposite direction for a long time: a decreasing proportion of trade went between the republics and an increasing part within them and with foreign centres of economic power (especially in northern Italy and southern Germany). Some countermovement (by necessity rather than preference) seems to have accompanied the deepening crisis in the 1980s however.

There is still a heated debate, both generally and concerning FY in particular, on the extent to which civil wars are related to ethno-national conflicts, the extreme positions being “really not at all” and “first and foremost”, respectively. Given the open or hidden moral and political agendas in this debate, there is no likelihood that it will lead to any consensus in the near future. In any case, some observed demographic regularities are of interest:

7a) In general, the risk of civil war seems to be slightly higher in states that are ethnically heterogeneous, even though there is no consensus on this. In particular, however, the difference in risk is high in former Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Wiberg 1996): the smaller the biggest group in a state, the higher the empirically observed risk for dissolution, civil war, de facto partition or combinations of this.

7b) The relationship is fairly weak in the general case. It is stronger in Europe, where most of the lowest third (on size of biggest ethno-national group) had one or more of the consequences just mentioned, whereas none among the highest third even came close to that.
7c) FY was extreme in Europe on the “biggest group” indicator, with 38 per cent Serbs – and Bosnia-Herzegovina was number 3 with 42 per cent Moslems).

8a) If an ethnic minority group is strongly concentrated to one geographical area and constitutes a considerable majority there, the risk of an outbreak of violence is reduced.

8b) There is clear empirical support for the proposition. (Melander 1999:95f)

8c) For FY, this depends much on what minorities we look at – there is a vast difference between the close correlation between Slovenians and Slovenia at one extreme and the leopard pattern in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the other. Hence, the applicability of this proposition is a complex matter; at best, it can tell us that the risk for extensive war was lowest in Slovenia and highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A final group of factors may be referred to as political, if we need a common label for them:

9a) The younger a state (since independence), the higher risk of domestic war in it (Hegre et al. 2001).

9b) The relationship is moderately strong.

9c) Even if we put the birth date of FY at 1945 (cf. above), it was in the middle risk zone rather than the high-risk zone. All the new states into which it might be dissolved, however, would be in the highest risk zone.

10a) Previous domestic war increases the risk for a new war; and the more recent it was, the higher the risk. (Hegre et al. 2001)

10b) The relationship is moderately strong and its character disputed (Walter 2004).

10c) For FY we get two opposite tendencies to balance. On the one hand, FY was at the extreme end in Europe concerning the length and lethality of previous civil war (within the context of the international World War II), with Spain in the 1930s coming closest; this speaks for high risk. On the other hand, in 1990, these wars were more than 45 years ago, which speaks for a more moderate risk. In any case, a possible violent dissolution would mean high risk for domestic war in all the successor states, or at least those where other conditions made it possible (which would really only exclude Slovenia).

11a) War has a complex relationship with democracy and democratization. Stable democracies run the least risk of domestic violence and stable autocracies a slightly higher risk, whereas states located in between these poles run considerably higher risks. It has furthermore been established that these higher risks depend both on position -being in between- and on movement, whether in the direction towards or away from stable democracy (Hegre et al. 2001).

11b) The risk at the middle of a democracy scale is about one and a half times as high as at either of the opposite ends.
11c) FY - as well as its constituent republics and autonomous provinces - was certainly located somewhere in between the opposite ends and therefore ran higher risks than average. In addition, it was at that time clearly in movement, adding even more to the risks. It would take a closer investigation to establish whether it (and, later, its successors) was on their way “uphill” (where more democracy would add to the risk) or “downhill” (where further democratization would reduce the risk of war).

The provisional summary of the prognosis of FY in the light of generalizing quantitative studies of possible predictors and the values of FY on those predictors must be as follows. Several indicators contributed to a negative prognosis: some of them by being relatively strong predictors, some of them by FY having extreme values on the predictor variable. At the same time, there was hardly any indicators contributing in the opposite direction: at best, they would imply that the risk of FY was no higher than average. The prognosis was therefore bad by international comparison and probably the worst in all of Europe. Yet this should be read with precision. It certainly does not say that war was inescapable. In fact, it does not even say that war was more likely than peace - it would take a lot more of model analysis and statistical work to figure that out.

**Second Step: Regional Characteristics**

Let me now move to Step 2, looking at how postdictive (and, for that matter, present) prognoses can be based on the regional characteristics of South Eastern Europe, including its historical legacy. Both terms require clarification. Exactly how the region is defined and what states to count into it depends on the time period we study as well as on the particular aspects we are interested in.

If we look at the geopolitical aspect, the region has often been ascribed high strategic significance, e.g. by the Commander in Chief Nikola Ljubicic (1977: 249): “Territory of the SFRY is of exceptional strategic significance not only as a Balkan but also as a Mediterranean and Central European area”. Yet this has been varying with time, as have the reasons. Invaders from Asia to Europe always had to pass here, those in the opposite direction often did. With the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the strategic significance of the Balkans increased. European spheres of interest collided here in “the soft underbelly of Europe” and involved local actors in every major war. The Cold War formula 2+2+2 indicates that Turkey is also definitely a part of the region from this point of view, and sometimes Turkey is seen as a buffer (or intersection) between the European and the Middle East security complex (Buzan 1991: 210). During the last Cold War Peak in the early 1980s President Reagan had issued his National Security Directive on general destabilization of communist regimes in Europe – and FY was not excepted. Yet 1990 was when the Cold War was in its last moments and
there are disagreements on how this affected the region: losing significance because of that or keeping it for new reasons?

In economic terms, the region is differently defined. For centuries it had satellite relations to higher developed parts of Western Europe, whether Italian city states, single West European states, the USSR and other parts of the COMECON, or, finally, the EU, in relation to which it is weaker than ever before. This was so whether it was politically ruled by the Ottoman or Habsburg empires or consisted of states with at least nominal sovereignty. The main exception is given by much of the Cold War period, when the old relations were broken for a while in the Communist states, but in different ways: dependence on the USSR (Bulgaria, Romania, early Albania), balancing trade partners (Yugoslavia), finding them elsewhere (middle Albania) or attempting autarchy (later Albania). Yet in most of the region, shifting trade patterns and dependence on IMF re-created satellite relations to the West even before the Cold war was over.

Another aspect is that of history and culture, the historical legacy. We should be careful with this term for several reasons. First, as determinants of what happens, the perceived history or historical myths are often more important than “objective history”. If the writing of the latter may change (by new discoveries or interpretations), this is much more true of the former, as exemplified by all the “invention of history” in the last couple of decades in FY (and elsewhere) to legitimize post-communist regimes, nationalist movements, secessionism, etc. Second, “determinant” is not the same as, and does not entail “determinism”. The historical legacy is only one formative force among others, and its relative weight relative to them is also variable. So the notion that “since this has always been so, it is bound to remain so” is wrong on several counts. These reservations having been made, however, there are good grounds not to dismiss history. To understand a conflict it is necessary to know a long stretch of its real history and imagined histories.

One historical legacy of the Balkans is that of the Ottoman Empire: how it was created (brutal conquest, but also by dividing and ruling), how it operated and how it disintegrated. Its operation was in one way highly centralist, yet Ottoman rather than Turkish: people from all over the area could rise to high positions, once they were (voluntarily or forcefully) integrated by conversion to Islam and sometimes even if not: the Phanariote Greeks as administrators and priests, local vassal princes (Serbian, Romanian, etc.) who remained Christian, the monotheistic religious institutions enjoying considerable sectoral autonomy in the millet system. In all these cases, however, strict loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was required. This was often interpreted as treason by the population - as for that matter was conversion to Islam, which can be clearly seen in the epic Gorski Vijenac by Petar Petrović Njegoš (1948). By the millet system, religious leaders would exert a political influence (“ethnarchos”) far beyond the purely spiritual. Originally, there were only three millet (Christian, Judaic, Zoroastrian), which had as little
national characteristics as the Umma of Islam. Yet during the 19th century they proliferated to seventeen, now coming closer to defining nations, at the same time as early Turkish nationalism increasingly undermined the Ottoman character of the empire. The proliferation of millet also made it easier for European great powers to divide and rule by cultivating allies within the Ottoman Empire, which contributed to its dissolution and the attempted slicing up of Turkey in the wake of WWI until this was blocked by Kemal Atatürk. (Jung 2001). Among the legacies from this process there is a tendency to define Us/Them distinctions in religious terms, with the ominous implications this has for an area that combines the fault line between Christianity and Islam with that between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity.

This Ottoman legacy in almost all of the region (Slovenia and – largely – Croatia excepted) reinforced an even older Orthodox legacy: the division of Orthodox Christianity in autocephalic churches, which eventually became closely related to the definition of nation - and always were to secular political rule in some way, ranging between caesareo-papism as one extreme and abject subordination to Communist regimes as the other)

Another legacy is a low tolerance for minorities not belonging to the titular nations, whether defined in religious or linguistic terms or both. We see manifestations of this everywhere in recent history: Kurds, were until recently defined as "mountain Turks" in Turkey and their (very different) language forbidden; Macedonians and Albanians in Greece are heavily hellenized linguistically and Turks referred to as Moslem Greeks; Bulgaria tried to bulgarianize the Turks there and Romania to romanianize the Hungarians. What happened in FY after the Cold War (but also long before it) is part of a wider pattern. The term “ethnic cleansing” was invented by the Serb Cubrilović in the 1930s and used by the Croat Ustasha during WWII, in both cases reflecting older ideologists among their own peoples and older processes in the area, as testified by the Carnegie Commission on the wars in 1912-13 (Carnegie 1993). This means that the struggle between civic and ethnic definitions of nation is far from over and can take very violent forms. In fact, it is not over in Western Europe either. The notions of “patrie” and “nation” from French Enlightenment long made France look like a paragon of a civic definition, yet the Dreyfus process came as a nasty chock to the French (and other) Jews, and Le Pen is now rebelling against it. Post-war Germany looked like the final triumph of civic over ethnic, but question marks are defined by the ease with which citizenship is acquired by people who were never in Germany before and often do not even speak German (from the Volga region) with the difficulties for those who are born in Germany and speak perfect German (Turks and others). “British” has been the civic term for several generations, but had its limits, as demonstrated in Northern Ireland, Scotland and even Wales. Belgium is in a process of breaking up along ethnic lines and the same may be true for Spain.
It is a strength for a country and a blessing for its population if a civic definition is generally accepted or at least (as, e.g., in Switzerland and Finland) takes clear priority before the ethnic. Yet getting there is not easy, ignoring strong ethnic definitions just because of disapproving of them is dangerous, and trying to impose them by political fiat may be suicidal, since precisely this may be seen by the minorities as an attempt by the titular nation to annihilate them, no matter how much constitutions and other documents assert the opposite – they just do not become credible.

When Benjamin Disraeli was referring to “ancient ethnic hatreds” in 1876 to counter demands for British intervention against Turkey or John Major was echoing him in 1993 for similar reasons (Malcolm 1994:xx), there is considerable evidence that can be adduced against them. Yet, if we amend “hatreds” to “fears”, we may come closer to widespread Balkan realities. One important point is that such fears (in collective memory, etc.) may have fairly similar behavioural manifestations to those of hatred, once they are provoked; and another point that fears are more easily provoked by the (in his own eyes innocent) behavior of Alter than if no such legacy exists.

There is another widespread legacy in the region (and a wider one): the demise of Communist regimes (which was in full swing in 1990) and thereby also of Marxist-Leninist legitimizations of the idea of the state, leading to the search for others. As several authors have pointed out, nationalist ideologies were often strong competitors to liberal ones (sometimes even merging with them). Yet here too we find several different cases: Where the state itself was ethnically homogeneous and had an old and strong state tradition, this carried no risk for civil wars, at worst for irredentism (which, if too loudly manifested, would also mean losing the chance to join the EU one day). More heterogeneous states with weak state traditions constitute the opposite case, with much higher risks. In this respect, FY had bad odds: highly heterogeneous, with short state traditions that had already collapsed once, when Hitler and Mussolini found loyal collaborators in some ethnic groups – and having inside it several groups with state traditions of their own.

To put it cautiously, the bad prognosis derived from the first step of the analysis is not counterbalanced by the second step, but rather reinforced by it, even if the qualitative character of the second step makes it even more difficult to put any figures in the prognosis or tell whether a war was more likely than peace. In relative terms, however, the second step reinforces the first provisional conclusion that FY had the worst prognosis in Europe. Let us now see to what extent this may have to be revised when the focus gets even narrower in Step 3 towards a postdictive prognosis.

The Final Step: Particularities of Former Yugoslavia

This step consists in looking at particular features of FY to add to the prognosis based on the two first steps, which tried to answer the question: “What if FY had been an average state and in addition an average Balkan state?”
1. One of the particularities can be summed up from the data presented above: FY had extreme or very high values on several of the variables that are statistically associated with domestic war.

2. Reagan’s general destabilization policy against Communist countries made no exception for FY. In addition, destabilization was also attempted by the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst in collaboration with Croatian exile organizations (Schmidt-Eenboom 1995).

3. Whereas many European states had occasional political disagreements on their constitutions, FY appears unique in this respect with its long series of them. It started already in the planning of its creation (Banac), where Serbs wanted a state of the French type and Croats one in the Swiss direction. There were repeated constitutional crises in the First Yugoslavia and a series of constitutional changes in Second Yugoslavia. And the issues that formally defined the conflict objects at the very end were essentially constitutional: Serbia’s unilateral derogation of the autonomy of Kosovo, the demands of Slovenia and Croatia for de facto and later de jure independence, etc. There remained less and less of central government, the efficiency of what remained was heavily reduced by the need for consensus in important decisions, and in addition it rapidly lost what legitimacy it still had, in particular after the elections in all the republics in 1990.

4. Even after the end of the Cold War, what we may call the “Cold War Filter” for conflicts remained in place in the West, and in particular in the USA. This filter can be described as having three axioms:

   A. A conflict can have no more than two parties (“becomes too difficult for the readers/viewers”).
   
   B. The parties must be states or something state-like that can be personified by leaders.
   
   C. There must be one Bad Guy - and by virtue of that, the other one is a Good Guy.

   Whereas some search may identify a few conflicts that are not too badly represented even after passing through this filter, this is most decidedly not true for FY. First of all, the complex conflict pattern consisted of sub-conflicts – and these in turn usually had three or more parties: Serb/Croat/Slovene in the north, Serb/Croat/Moslem in the center, Serb/Albanian/Macedonian in the south. The important problem with axiom A for FY is that multi-party conflicts have a strategic logic that differs entirely from that of two-party conflicts, with shifting coalitions as a frequent pattern. Shifting coalitions was a pattern long before conflicts got militarized (Ramet 1992). The main problem with axiom B is that it focuses on (stereotyped presentations of) the personalities etc. of single leaders to the detriment of understanding the more fundamental conflict dynamics, including the issue of to what extent the leaders were actually driving or largely drifting along with these dynamics. And the problem with axiom C, if I permit myself to make value judgments, may not so much be the
appointment of the Bad Guy as the amazing procession of Good Guys that were imagined by this filter to be the sole virtue of somebody having to fill that role. Whether or not Western politicians were sufficiently uninformed to believe in the mass media versions, by the logic of dominant discourses they had to speak and act as if they believed in them.

5. FY was not the only ethnically heterogeneous state in the region, but it was by far the most heterogeneous one by any criteria. This in itself contributes to a bad prognosis on statistical grounds, as shown above. In addition it is a matter of the demographic distribution of groups. The “leopard patterns” of ethno-national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and some other areas has been shown to be associated with higher risks of escalation to violence than when each group is fairly concentrated to one area where it is the big majority (Melander 1999:95f)

6) A final and fatal particularity was that for various reasons the conflicts in FY attracted a high degree of great power interest. In 1990, there were many things going on at the same time while the Cold War was being written off. The EU was in the process of adapting to the new position of the united Germany at the same time as mass media pressure and an efficient Croatian propaganda machine made the German government helplessly drifting into stands on the FY conflicts that made these the first demonstration of the new German power position, but were deeply controversial in many other states in EU (and outside it). This made FY the arena of an internal power struggle in the EU in a critical period. Even if Germany eventually largely won by bribing the others in different ways, the victory meant making demands that were unlikely to be satisfied without a war – which Germany for historical reasons could not fight and nobody else was willing to fight for it.

At the same time the end of the Cold War also created great uncertainty concerning transatlantic relations: would the USA be in a stronger position by its claim to have “won” the Cold War – or in a weaker position by virtue of the weight of military power relative to economic power going down, when the former was in far less demand? The Soviet Union was in its death throes, the first declarations of independence already proclaimed. It–and later Russia–was in great confusion concerning its future doctrine and for a while believed that close cooperation with the West would bring desired rewards. So the FY also became an arena of transatlantic contradictions, where the eventual US victory meant (concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina) demands which were unlikely to be satisfied without a war – which UNPROFOR refused (and did not have the resources) to fight, the USA would not put land troops into and no alliance partner was willing to fight in their absence.

Because of all this, the actors in FY were bent to believe that they had some bargaining cards in terms of potential external support, but they were no better than others in guessing who would intervene when and how in favour of whom. Wishful thinking actually made their guesses worse, in
the direction of greatly overestimating the values of these cards; and this in turn made them more likely to escalate their demands, less likely to be able to find necessary compromises and more likely to get into a war by accident or even by intention.

**Conclusion**

Adding Yugoslav particularities did nothing to dispel the somber (postdictive) prognosis based on the other sets of premises, but, once more, rather the opposite. It is fair to say that FY had a far worse prognosis than any European country at that time. Let me return once more to what this means and does not mean. It does not mean that war was inescapable, only that the risk was high and continuously increased due to internal dynamics and international postures. There has been much “iffy” history written, claiming that the war could have been avoided, if only... And there is hardly consensus on a single “if only” clause, some of which are proposed in other chapters of this book. When I do not enter this debate here, it is for lack of space – it would become a chapter in itself. It is a very important debate, we need more of it and scholars from FY may in many respects have more valuable contributions to make than outsiders.

What the conclusion does mean, however, is that any attempt to find THE cause of the wars is likely to be futile. The situation was over-determined, with the implication that eliminating any single causal factor would reduce very little of the total risk of war. Personally, I am not yet convinced by any of the “if only” suggestions, either because they seem insufficiently argued or because the proposal itself calls for new “if only” clauses. A convincing “if only” construction is likely to have to combine several things at various levels at the same time.

This chapter has treated the likelihood for an outbreak of war. This is far from the whole story. To analyze the continuation of war is a different thing. In the first book in English on the Yugoslav wars, one of the authors (Vrcan 1993) quotes the Lebanese sociologist Ahmed Beidoun looking back at the experiences of his country and stating that whereas in the beginning the war there was about something, it eventually became war for war’s sake, since so many actors had gotten something to gain (economically, politically, etc.) from the war continuing. Several scholars have followed this line of analysis – which would also call for a chapter of its own. Let me limit myself to the remark that in order to end a war, it may not be enough to remove its original causes when new causes have been added during its course.

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LITERATURE


II

*DIFERENTIA SPECIFICA*

OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA
INVITING VIOLENCE AND FRAGILE MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Preparations for pre-justified violence

Despite the impression that violence is comprehensively treated in various disciplines, there is a conviction that the analysis of violence is always insufficient in respect to its complexity. The present social-theoretical efforts very much take violence into consideration as an, almost, unavoidable horizon. However, here we are also dealing with something else because, if we attempt to speak out about violence, if we attempt to identify the sources generating violence (from families to other levels), the interrelations and the complexity of relations involved make this analytical objective extremely difficult. As evidence of this, there is a visible fact that the constellation that emerged after the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia generates a discussion of violence. Namely, despite the fact that the example of ex-Yugoslavia cannot be dramatized as a paradigm for global ethnic violence, exercising enormous and massive violence with regard to disintegrating the fabric of a state, it represents a continuing invitation for contemplation. At the same time, we must raise the question whether the disintegration, “the caving-in” of ex-Yugoslavia, has contributed anything new analytically for the contemplation of violence or whether it is just a reiteration of the “thing itself” in a new context – after the collapse of the socialist project. It is a question whether we can only speak of contextual narrations of the “collapse stained in blood” which are merely added to the theoretically established features of violence.

We should recall that “disintegration mediated through violence” occurs in situations when it is clear that it is not possible to find and affirm the capacities

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1 Of course, one could point to H. Arendt as a key witness of the latest interpretations of violence, On Violence, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970. However, it remains to be confirmed what Z. Baumann noticed about the phenomenon of violence being «overtheorized» or «undertheorized»: Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Reality, Blackwell, 1995, page 139.

of reforming the socialist, ideologically prepared project. In this respect, ex-Yugoslavia found itself on the wave of disappearance of internal principals of the said project at the global level. It was then that it actually lost ground (so-to-say “the mass value” of the middle position) between the two blocks and the possibility to enjoy the specific position within the Cold War, especially as a receiver of foreign donations. From the situation in which it was an international “actor” (Yugoslavia) with a certain kind of maneuvering space, creating its allies, identifying partners in the non-European world, and with voluntaristic self-conceit overlooking the economic limitations, there appeared a new constellation in which the same actor was “shoved” into the necessity to adjust to global trends. The initiated processes of economic reforms and privatization started their course at the end of the 1980’s, but it is obvious that controversies of interrelations of the political and economic domain did not allow for transformation of Yugoslavia in a pacified manner. It may be added here that the de-installment of Yugoslavia, as a structural possibility, existed even earlier, but the issue of the modality of this came to the surface in full power after Milošević’s coming to the scene. So, here we are speaking of violence as the form of disintegration of Yugoslavia and its far-reaching consequences that can still be recognized today. So, the disintegration was not merely a reality of a non-performing state, as it is treated in certain theoretical literature, but an expression of a complex interrelation of external and internal dynamics.3

We may trace cumulative events which retroactively come together in a causal sequence:4 The first signs of crisis of ideological production of reality, the signs of disappearance of the differentia specifica of the Yugoslav way, can be traced to the conflict with liberalization in the 1970’s (with the projections that national orientations may be pacified within monolithic political structures), to the consumption of the previously existing economic opportunities for the wider public, reproduction of conflicts between the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which ended with the de-construction of the central authority which was becoming increasingly void, the competitive “game” played by national elites, the unsuccessful integration of certain elites into the usual track of the Yugoslav project (this refers especially to Albanians, as it became explicit during the 1980’s), the division of space according to the constellation of power (inconsequent regionalization which fired-up nationalism), mobilization of populist energy in the context of the end of 1980’s with indications of the war environment of the 1990’s, the “democratization” of nationalism by transferring the ethnic codes from the labyrinths of political establishment into the streets. It will suffice here to briefly follow up on the last statement, as we discern a paradigm in the manner how Milošević through “non-institutional” means arrived in Vojvodina. His arrival marked the (although, a part of this is an unconstitutional change of the position of provinces) “democratization” of moving the ethnic practices, enabling that in this utterly perverted environment there would merge

3 Miliken, J., Krause, K., State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction; Development and Change, 2002, 33, page 753-774. “The Bloody Breakup” of Yugoslavia can be only understood multicausally and I think that every orientation settling with pointing out to just one factor will ultimately prove to be insufficient.

the processes of shedding away the previously forcefully installed limitations within the communist milieu, and the upsurge of ethnocentric attitudes.\textsuperscript{5}

Any time that such questions are asked, the next question arises regarding the nature of national and ethnic violence. The first moment: as a historical reminder we state that there is a “non-coincidental” link between making a nation and violence, as many examples demonstrate. Violence, therefore, is not an external factor in the dialectics of exclusion and inclusion in the course of creating borders, determining national formations, which are the internal dimension of the process of nationalization, and consequently, we may speak of “structural violence” which is at the same time both “visible and invisible”. But this still indi Professor, University of Novi Sad rectly sheds light on the sequence of events that we are analyzing, because it is questionable whether we can be satisfied with the mere reminder. We should beware of declaring all forms of violence equal, as an experience belonging to belonging. The second moment: if we consider the political system, after the consolidation of the polycentric national structure during the 1970’s in Yugoslavia, the question arises as to the intellectual production of performance ideological codes. It should be noted that the relevant concept of a nation is the one which speaks of a nation not as a substantial, but rather a institutionalized form, a practical category. Thus, a nation is not an entity, but a certain collection of contingent events. If we look more closely at this assertion, it becomes clear, the constitutive role of manufacturers of performance reality becomes clearly discernable. What becomes especially clear, from the ex post viewpoint, is the legitimate - performance practice which justifies state mediated violence in the name of a nation and territorial-centric ambitions. It affirms the nation as the owner of an in advance justified violence. A creative role in the forming of different dimensions of national identity is played by political, cultural, media elites, state intellectuals, who are generally of great significance in Central and Eastern Europe, and national journalists. They are the ones who send the messages in the media that a certain ethnicity is the object of hate by others, so, they exhibit self-understanding for the said ethnicity as to the objectivity of hatred by others.\textsuperscript{6} In other words, they build patterns

\textsuperscript{5} This is not to be influenced even by the eventual fact that Milosevic and his crew simply instrumentalized a situation in order to strengthen their grip to power. For one can not forget the genuinely perverted fact that Milosevic’s advent interrupted the previous practice of the communist representatives of Vojvodina in a certain interregnum, offering “broader rights” to minorities with “the possibility to express their collectiveness”, which represented a breakup with hitherto repressive manners. Nothing in this paradox is changed by the fact that one could trace a short path leading to plebiscitary manipulations of the public opinion, which resulted in the adoption of the Constitution in Serbia (1990) containing serious separate content. Naturally, Milosevic’s crew carried the need for a new legal foundation. Here it is more important that democracy (which is being linked to Milosevic) has been paradigmically associated with the national brand. If we speak about war and democracy, it should be mentioned that M. Mann in particular had criticized the «School of Democratic Peace», according to which there is no chasm between democracy and war. Mann also compared expressis verbis the authoritarian situation of Tito’s period with Milosevic’s post-communism; The dark side of democracy: The modern tradition of ethnic and political cleansing, New Left Review, 1999, No. 235, May-June

\textsuperscript{6} This mechanism of hate (a performative expression «the other hates me for no reason» stands at the center of the discursive strategy of hate) has been already described by Spinoza in “Ethics”\textsuperscript{5}. Anything can hardly be added to that, even in treating contemporary hate speech. Confirming another’s hate of myself transforms me into a victim that justifiably defends itself by certain means. By claiming that “the other hates me” an effect of auto-legitimization is achieved. (Spinoza, Ethics, thesis 40-50, part III of ethics).
of identification, which turn violence into symbols, or which derive from ethnic symbols the potential of violence. Different parts of elites and sub-elites make up a catalogue of existing fears, direct energies towards preparedness for violence, which may crystallize at massive levels. They are the actors, which establish a strong network of “non-government” institutions, the “civil society sector” which mobilizes itself for the protection of the nation. If we recall Anderson’s statement of a nation as an imagined community, it is obvious that in ex-Yugoslavia there must have been also another process: building the belief that Yugoslavia as of now is “unimaginable”, that this heterogeneous community can no longer be imagined. Destruction of “Yugoslavia” as an imaginary entity and reconstruction of a nation through monopolistic activity required a discursive practice by the elites. If we go further, we will see that the political establishment of the then single-partly system easily adapts to new relations, that it creates “grey zones” of informal power centers which practice oversight of the means of production, that they enter the media and determine the perspective in which political issues are shaped. Simply, national policy always happens in the light of the interrelation of institutional norms, beliefs, ideals, economic dynamics and mythic-political elites. Raising expectations among the public, the effects of those who direct events in a favorable or unfavorable direction, makes the different elites the manufacturers of national reality. They are accompanied by the figures of “ethnic entrepreneurs”, who use ethnicity as a resource to gain position and who infiltrate media dominated public domains and introduce issues of victim discourse. Their appearance warns us of an unavoidable paradox that is worth noting: on the one hand, the promoters of national rhetoric in their public appearance glorify the nation as an aim of its own, while on the other hand they open up domains in which the nation is instrumentalized as a positional resource in the transition process. The exulted celebration-type of rhetoric continually mix with the contents of instrumentalization, in which ethnicity is exploited as previously said and in which “ethnicity” is used for speculative benefits and costs. This only proves that the national formation should always be viewed as a complex set of economic, ideological and political structural features. It is not sufficient to look only at the ideological performance of elites, but attention should also be paid to the fact how they are *effected* under a given institutional environment. Thus, this awareness obliges us to consider the relations existing between the structures and actors.

The mythical core of the mobilizing discourse about a nation is usually pregnant with the rhetoric of the dignity of a specific nation, of a series of national heroes. This mythical core is always mediated to the opponents of this dignity, against whom sanctions are imposed. Ethnic violence is used against those who do not belong to the holders of this dignity, i.e. against other ethnicities, but also against those within one’s own ethnicity who do not support and accept this kind of reasoning. The mention of enemies is important as through it we touch...
upon another important feature – when it comes to ethnic violence, the inter-group relations are always of a determining nature.8 However, these well-known facts, which have been accurately analyzed before, cannot be comprehended as a remote control of emotions, or, much worse, as an imposed nationalized perspective, which by channels of manipulation is imposed upon the people. Violence, as has been demonstrated in the case of disintegration of Yugoslavia, can never be fully explained exclusively through vertical communication between different elites and the mob, which wanders in the fog of history, but there is also a certain self-poetic form of violence, which spreads horizontally.

It is necessary, therefore, to analyze also the role of violence as a fundamental matrix of ideological identity of different elites. What matters is when and under which historical circumstances did a given ethnicity become prepared to undertake the risk of practicing violence or, when does self-assurance become predominant so that violence is an adequate form of ethnic self-formation. Organizing violence manifests numerous by-products that must be taken into consideration. Such an approach, however, requires a much broader look than the one mentioned previously, i.e. it requires a simulation consideration of both vertical and horizontal communication. On the one side, we see the performance-nationalized results of fragmented elites, which sometimes compete with each other, and sometimes are united in unifying the national idea. On the other side, we see vibrant relations among individuals, amorphous forms of their unity, and in certain situations a mob with an affective regime, which acts as receivers of the public rhetoric of the different elites. Only the study of points of contact of communications, the study of interactions between elites and individuals who are willing to be the atoms of the mob, will make analysis possible. Of course, by doing so we join the line of analyzing the converging forms, alliances between elites and a media-centered mob which may be traced to ex-Yugoslavia and predominantly to Serbia. In the context of populist mobilization during the 1980’s we certainly have to speak of the fantasy to be the One (Lefort), of efforts for substantial identities, and of the form of state void of divisions or which, in its indivisibility gives the Name. And if we reaffirm that we are dealing with a regime which continually produces massive participation as its fundamental principle, it is clear that here we are dealing with populist representation. It wants a Leader, a Leader with a charisma, to become formed in One Name, which will install unity through the “One”.

Thus, we must thread carefully between single-sided interpretations and avoid dangerous traps. On the one hand, we criticize the approaches, which are satisfied with recognizing in the manipulations by the elites the only reason for escalation of enormous violence. Manipulative activities and calculations of interest dynamics of different elites certainly play a role in shaping up the declarations in the name of a nation. We should reiterate their constitutive part in the strategic formation of the national dynamics, especially when democratization opens up an “empty space” that may be filled with national codes. However, that is still not sufficient to view the relations between the elites and the masses in an instrumentalized way. Because the investment by national elites into calculated tactics would not be successful if there were no receptors wishing to hear certain auto-suggestive messages from the manipulators. The investment by elites into manipulative tactics is not successful by itself. On the contrary, they are subject
to risk, which is evidenced also by the roads of Milošević’s regime, because the mandate given by the masses is always temporary and sooner or later subject to verification. The masses that are instrumentalized as the moving force of history, after a while are not certain that their ambitions have been fulfilled. The elite invites the masses to “vote” (in the sense used by Hirshman), but without active receptors. We emphasize that, in a given structured historical context, it is not possible to explain the readiness to accept violence as something that is permitted. On the other hand, we should reject the attempts to view a certain ethnic entity as a pre-determined and homogenous collective actor. The very fluid category of “ethnicity”, or “ethnic group” is always shaped through mediation of certain collective acts, meaning that only political practice forms “the category” of ethnicity. There is no direct road leading from the “mass” to ethnicity as a collective actor. Thus, we must consider the collective actions through which ethnicities are formed anew. We here reject the static point of view, because an ethnicity is a dynamic entity, subject to interpretation and this fact should not be overlooked when speaking of “ethnic violence”.

Violence in an ethnic context or the self-poetry of violence

When speaking of violence, we should recall that it implies physical power and the potential of physical destruction. In theoretical consideration of violence, social theory carefully weighs the distinction between violence, exertion and power. Thus, for instance, Arendt (who, in her considerations of the instrumental understanding of violence follows Hobbs and Clausewicz) makes a distinction between power and violence by saying that practicing power is possible only in collaboration with others (as power is never owned by an individual), whereas violence is like a physical force used to manipulate power. Violence serves certain objectives and, in the political domain, it is subject to calculation. In contrast with aggression, in the case of violence it is necessary to contemplate the mixture of reasons, which precede its manifestation, so it cannot be treated as a not-inspired action. Based on this, Arendt concludes that power is without limits, that it does not have physical limitations as force does. It belongs to intersubjective relations and implies collective action. Its limits are present only in the form of other people, because the one who practices power may implement it only with the acceptance of others and may act in the name of certain groups. Arendt strongly criticizes both theoreticians and practitioners for not making the distinction between power and violence, and for too often treating violence as an extreme expression of power. It is important to note that even totalitarian rulers

9 After a certain time the paths of the leader “with a caesarian mandate” and the people will part. The until then mobilized crowd will become apathetic. It shall still support the leader for some time, but the worm of doubt has already appeared.

10 Muro-Ruiz, D., State of the Art, The Logic of Violence, Politics: 2002 Vol 22(2), 109–117. In this article is a spectrum of different theories about violence, starting from the theory that sees violence as a reaction, to those that brand it a conscious instrumental action.

11 Here we should excogitate the difference between legitimacy of power and justification of violence.


13 I am just referring to the fact that by this distinction Arendt disputes the tradition in political thinking. She even claims that violence destroys power.
(who use torture) require the practicing of power, i.e. violence in its core requires power. Other authors also mention violence as demonstrating itself in the context of direct use of power for the causing of bodily injuries or as coercion to perform certain acts. But, when we speak of differences between violence and coercion, we should note that violence refers to not-structured coercion, which questions the order of things. Is it not true that those in power even at the present time often claim in reference to different perpetrators of micro-violence that they have broken the rules, that they have stepped out of the order and introduced disorder, chaos and confusion, and misunderstood their messages? Are they not saying that violence is what breaks the norms that they have set? In this disordered manifestation violence spreads beyond order. Its always-unexpected occurrence destroys regularity, brings unplanned consequences to the order. There are unavoidable constraints to the rational calculation of its occurrence, i.e. to regulated violence.

Violence stands in the light of the difference between order and disorder, the controlled and the uncontrolled, the regular and the irregular, the conceivable and the inconceivable. And, irrespective of the attempts to strengthen the limits between these contrasts, such limits are often very volatile. And it is exactly this dynamics that makes any rational management of violence risky and, above all, difficult to control. This may be an explanation for the fact that, even in systems in which potential violence is marginalized by being placed outside the limits, yet violence may return inside the center. This self-returning property of violence, makes it potentially dangerous for those who manage violence, as well as for those who rationally set the limits of violence. Arendt constantly warns that practicing violence may be a threat to power and that self-assured politician, who are convinced that they can manage violence, are susceptible to being unable to predict violence. Thus, violence is a constant danger to the power of the ruler.

We should also not neglect the fact that violence is always susceptible to interpretations. What is seen by certain social agents as violence, may be seen differently by others. Once the established order begins to produce illegitimate violence over others, it then becomes susceptible to outside rejection.

The next issue that we should consider is the relationship between the state, war and violence. We should recall the attempts to strengthen the modern state as a holder of ideal territorial sovereignty, implying that rationalized (in Weberian style) central bureaucracy takes a monopoly over organized coercion over a given territory. The repressive development of the state apparatus plays the role of social pacification in the measure in which there are new relations among citizens, and from this there stems a new meaning of violence. Certainly, the purpose of organized coercion is to promote the making up of a state and to install a strength-

14 Here it is particularly worth mentioning Bourdieu and his theory of symbolic violence. Bourdieu, P., Questions de politique, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 16 June, 1977: 64
15 I am just pointing to the fact that violence can not anthropologically be explained mechanistically, for it escapes utilitarian explanations. For example, prosperity has never been an obstacle to violence, and that still is the case. Clastres, P., Archeologie de la violence, Libre, 1977, 1, page 171
16 Clearly, the borders between acceptable and unacceptable force are subject to interpretation and in that sense H. Beji was right to add that “legitimate force returns as violence when the perpetrators are defeated and the victims sit in the court” and are the ones accusing. Le patrimoine de la cruauté, Le Débat, 1993, 73, 167, Bauman, ibidem, 141
ened rule. Apart from this, thanks to the monopoly of the state, coercion is divided in half into acceptable and unacceptable, so violence is often correlated with the latter.16 According to Arendt, the state should be the expression of power and the expression citizens jointly determined. Let us also consider other views. In his explicit statement of historical analysis, Tilly clearly confirms that there is a close link between war and state. It puts the state in a reciprocal position with war: the state makes the war, and the war makes the state.17 The state secures the monopoly of coercion by war which is at the same time also a process of popular mobilization. Finally, the substance of a nation is also created by war. Namely, earlier wars (religious wars or wars over overlapping sovereignty), the wars of the XIX century, become constellations between national states.

Along with this, as it is becoming increasingly recognized today, the key moment is the equivocal character of circumstances relative to the relationship between the state and war. Because war can not be an efficient means of reproduction of a nation, nor a mediator for ensuring national continuity. It can, however, be the cause of its degradation, with short-term or long-term consequences. This equivocal character can not be eliminated and it will be sufficient to cast a glance at Serbia during the 1990’s: the state becomes the instrument of the ruling elites, there is a link between the state and the regime and continued interference of administration and the state, extended clientelism, Cesarean codes of conduct, establishment of a financial oligarchy (which increasingly announced its dissatisfaction at the end of the Millennium), and the worsening of the social fabric. Based on lessons learned from the 1990’s, we shall analyze the possibility that a state weakens by generating war. It calls for recollection of all those moments when, weighing the war as a generator and medium of “justifying” violence, we analyze the situation in Serbia at the end of the 1980’s and when we express the long-term consequences of war. Because, at that time, (at least) the potential was being shaped that the war could ensure the “strength” of the nation, at least through a war centered on territory which would lead to delineating territories founded in ethnocentrically inspired maps. If we look at the predator strategy of Milošević whereby he took control over the JNA (The Yugoslav Army) and its supreme commander, the presidency of the state and other federal institutions, we will see that this strengthened the belief of being prepared for the risk of war. In other words, there was a real potential that the existing system could be re-tailored by means of war, because war is, after all, the utmost form of violence. Namely, it is important here to establish a “sponsorship” for practicing legitimate violence (the army).

Also of great significance is the fact that there are tensions between the institutional and functional aspects of the state. The state institutions can survive despite the fact that they fully or partly fail to perform their actions (of course, if

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we see them in the way just described).\footnote{Certain theorists believe that in such situations there is a failure of the state and that the cause of “ethnic cleansing” is not a strong state, but the one that “fails”. Esty, D. et. al., The state failure project: Early warning research for US foreign policy planning, in: J. Davis & T. Gurr (eds.), Crisis Early Warning Systems. Boulder, Col.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. However, this narrows the horizon for the examination of employing violence from the “bottom”. Moreover, previous situations of massive violence on behalf of the state have relied on mass movements from the “bottom”.} Even in situations when we can interpret the disintegration of a state as a cause of violence, we can not disregard the constitutive role of agents of the state which perform functions, which enable the transmission of violence, which provide military means to para-military formations (in territories outside Serbia) and transfer financial resources for armed acts. It is exactly these agents of a state which through their transmission contribute to transform structured violence into a diffuse violence “on the ground”. Provided that we can not be satisfied with the abstract denotation “state”, but should look at particular elites, parties, and actors responsible for violence.

Gagnon, in analyzing the case of Serbia, pointed to the well-known phenomenon of ethnic bargaining.\footnote{Gagnon, V. P., Ethnic conflict as demobilizer: the case of Serbia, Inst. European Stud. Working Paper No. 96.1, Inst. European Stud., Cornell Univ., 1996. compare with Brubaker, ibidem, 433} This phenomenon occurs when there is a possibility of presenting “ethnic projects” to the public and when there is a growing competition based on the “ethnic map”. In this, the essence of competition is raising charges against the opponent that he is practicing a too “weak” protection of the ethnicity, that he lags behind in respect to the need for radical advocating of ethnic interests. This author argues that ethnic bargaining does not reflect the situation of the ex-Yugoslavia if, of course, the situation is viewed from the point of view of Milošević’s regime. The Serbian elites initiated violence as a possible instrument for resolving the ethnic problem, they framed the “problem” within ethnic antagonisms, says Gagnon, not for purposes of mobilization, but rather for demobilization of the “population”. When the elites needed the public’s support, they used “sub-bargaining”, i.e. they presented themselves as the more moderate representative of ethnic interest. The analysis is of great significance as it sheds light on a moment that is often overlooked, and is important from the point of view of violence. The analysis is accurate, because in the public rhetoric of Milošević’s party we can truly recognize elements of “sub-bargaining”, as well as targeting of demobilization effects. In this form of addressing the public, we can identify a hidden rhetoric saying “I am less bad than the others”, especially in relation to “rightist opponents” in the political struggle, who are sometimes stigmatized in the media. Also, the public mention of violence is always a two-edge sword. One should never underestimate the unwillingness of those who are ethnically mobilized, nor take violence with reservations or completely reject it, especially if they are faced with its consequences. This kind of rhetoric used by the Milošević’s ensemble, which was dominated from the background by his personality, should be analyzed in the context of a wider dramaturgy. Attempting to cause demobilization effects is possible only after the power is consolidated and is personalized and consolidated through charismatic codes. This, demobilization follows after giving instigating mobilization, because it is believed that demobilization effects may ensure the conservation of power. There is also an open ques-
tion as to the measure in which we can speak of the bargaining practice in this case, because Milošević’s regime had mimicking tendencies to take as his own the territorially centered ethnic projects from other actors in the political arena. The dimensions of the political competition are also questionable because his rightist opponents were too much the objects of his management. This situation led many analysts to believe that Milošević has displaced “the hard core”, extremist option of defending ethnic interests to other actors on the scene in order to conserve the existing relationships. Thus, the demobilization effects, as well as promoting the more moderate option of defending ethnic interests, which are doubtlessly discernable, are a part of the regime of managing violence during the 1990’s. Finally, the rhetoric of “softer” violence, practiced at home, could be combined with “hard-violence” outside, at least up to a certain time, i.e. up to the moment when, due to international pressure, it became counter-productive.

The experience of the 1990s leads us to confirm that war can no longer be described in the context of battle. The violence has the central position, but there is a special significance assigned to symbolic forms, which carry a message and civilians as objects of violence. The behavior of actors of violence warns us that we are dealing with a dramaturgy of theatrical dimensions. The dramaturgy which comes down on the body of the opponent, who becomes the object of violence played by the actor of violence, is related to the intention of establishing ethnically clean territories and ethnic borders. Violence in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia is also related to executions, massacres, expeditions and “ethnic cleansing”, in which no feedback is expected from the opponent. The conquering campaigns and violent practice are usually unidirectional and not interactive. But, here also, we should recall the previous statement that violence is positioned between the system and non-system, regulation and deregulation. Finally, when we look in retrospect at different forms of violence, at the developed infrastructure, we can clearly discern the planned nature of the approach. Effects of violence point to the nature of organization, which are related to much more diffuse, finer forms of daily violence in camps and other places of violence during the war.

As a matter of fact, it is evident that already during the 1980’s Yugoslavia was under the aura of violence, whose potential forms were different: violent changing of borders by using armed forces, which was constantly debated, providing armaments to para-military formations, designing armed insurgencies, making available instruments for the practice of violence, etc. And, if it is true that there occurred a “democratization of violence”, it is obvious that there is a need to manage violence. If we move ahead in time, we may ask the following question: Was it not a fact that Milošević’s regime during the 1990s, while refusing in its official rhetoric that Serbia was at war, did in the “background”, for instance in Vojvodina, maneuver by strategic “management” of violence, sometimes just by being silent about what was happening, sometimes with explicit approval by the political factors, and sometimes instigating violence. Was it not a fact that the continued “stop and go” tactics of the regime continually produced a surplus of violence. Did it not happen that violence, which was attempted to be designed by means of controlled para-military formations and others, sometimes also “flood


62
over” into other contexts where maybe it was not planned, either in terms of time or in terms of place. Does this not indicate the difficulty to fully integrate violence into any strategy, and was it not a fact that violence which was built into the system, but rather actually continually producing a non-system.

We should here speak out also about the national/ethnic violence. The case of Yugoslavia has actually accelerated the contemplation of violence in social-theoretical discussions, also in terms of focusing on violence and “conflict”. Of course, due to the dynamics of violence during the 1990s, ethnicity became strongly established in social sciences as a backbone of explanation, so dealing with ethnic violence in Yugoslavia may be seen as a part of a changed orientation. It is important that violence has its own dynamics, meaning that violence is not only a stage in a conflict, but also a generator of the course of the conflict. The reaction to the enormous amount of violence in ex-Yugoslavia was accompanied with the typical patterns, which even called on pre-modern elements and according to which it was a neo-tribal manifestation of closed ethnic communities, and the return of pre-modern sentiments. However, such behavior is questioned by the fact that violent ethno-politics, which aimed at exterminating whole ethnic groups, was in fact highly characteristic of the 20th century, and that it can not be “tamed” in the sense that it can be labeled pre-modern. Dislocating ethnicities from specific territories (ethnic cleansing), genocide (criminal act directed at destroying other ethnicities, erasing their cultural existence and memory) and ethicizing political conflicts are truly characteristic of modern narratives. It is a question as to whether it was not ethnic cleansing that in numerous situations of the 20th century produced irrevocable changes, by changing the social reality.

It is known that production of ethnic hatred has its mimetic elements, it is a part of mimetic violence. Parties in conflict often practice similar procedures, but in a different direction. Ethnic violence, in this sense, is a phenomenon that I would term “mimetic adiutorization”. This last term denotes neutralization of...
certain subjects in an ethnic sense, or, in other words, makes neutral or irrelevant certain subjects in the ethnic sense of the word. In the case of ex-Yugoslavia, the disintegration and shaping the effects of myth-based politics put in motion this "mimetic adiophorization".

A War that Does not End

If we want to speak of the unavoidable by-products of war, we should recollect such colloquial dimensions of the issue of crisis which imply that certain values disintegrated but without establishing new benchmarks. In this respect, the post-war situation in Serbia again produces crises. The war does not end, the excess violence keeps flooding over into new forms and conflicts come back in retrospect forms. Fear, the memory of what was lost and hatred which can not be revitalized, remain a legacy.

The state in the stage following myth-based politics can not get rid of actors of the previous regime. It loses every serious chance of getting rid of myths, supports the authoritarian nature of the state, its opens the door to the implosion of violence. If previously we could speak of an explosion of violence, it is now implosion. Geography of the space is continually redesigned through messages of violence, minorities are threatened at macro levels, and violence is reproduced in public opinion. Slogans written in the resentful and impulsive terminology of violence written on the walls and on private houses, is a warning of the continued belief that minorities are an actual and potential sources of trouble. On the one side, there are the administrative-declarative statements of dedication to European values, and on the other there is a discernable intention to avoid responsibility which becomes unavoidable as soon as "Europe" is mentioned. There is an invitation for militarized and authoritarian power which would resolve the dilemma of an uncompleted national state and undefined state borders.

And finally, we will state that Kant in his famous book on eternal peace, although in a footnote, makes a recommendation which, in its utopian dimensions, is an eternal reminder. After the war, when peace agreements are made, it is recommended to introduce, apart from thanksgiving day, also a day of repentance. The day when mercy would be asked from the heaven in the name of the state, because it is necessary to be aware of the guilt which is a burden. The fact of the expressed "joy during the war for so much human happiness that has been ruined" is the fundamental ethical reason why Kant in this footnote focuses on the issue of war "as a barbarian instrument" used to confirm the right of a state. This indication by Kant, addressed to all parties in a war, and given in a footnote of his text, could be compared with his other acts, but it is certain that it is fully clear to Kant that wars are a sequence of events which do not end with a peace agreement. It is true that Kant does not give us indications of who should be the actor to perform this act, but it implies that the post-war period is a continuation of the war by other means. A war can not end, and Kant writing implies the problem that a war is something that leaves its signs outside itself.

Translated from Serbian by Žaneta Arnautović

27 For the notion of adiophorization see: Baumann, ibidem, page 149
Ivan Vejvoda

WHY DID THE WAR HAPPENED?

To Avoid the Extremes of Suffering...

I hate these absolute systems which make all events of history depend on great first causes by a chain of fatality, and which as it were exclude man from the history of mankind... I believe... that many important historical facts can only be accounted for by accidental circumstances and that many others remain inexplicable; that finally chance, or rather this intertwining of secondary causes which we call chance because we cannot disentangle them, plays an important role in what we see as the theatre of the world; but I believe firmly that chance only does what has already been prepared in advance. Previous facts, the nature of institutions, the condition of the spirit, the state of mores are materials with which it composes these impromptus which so astonish and scare us.

Alexis de Tocqueville

The best counter-example to the former Yugoslavia is Switzerland. At the peace of Westphalia in 1648 Switzerland’s neutrality and security were guaranteed. With ‘minor’ hiccups (including a brief civil war in the nineteenth century and, most notably in the present century, a long-running dispute over the Jura canton) this Alpine country had 350 years to work out, stabilise and consolidate a multinational, multilingual and multireligious state. The former Yugoslavia was on an historic fault-line with a short-lived history in two parts (of twenty-three and forty-six years respectively) from 1918 to 1991, during which a centralised monarchic authority and later a communist-totalitarian regime in turn failed to sow the seeds of a possible democratic community, but rather engaged in power-preserving strategies. Even with such an ‘unfinished state’ (Đinđić, 1988), such an ‘improbable survivor’ (Pavlowitch, 1988), there still seemed to exist the ‘possibility of a pluralist (re)constitution of Yugoslavia’ (Puhovski, 1989), predicated on ‘social change... democratisation (as an) imperative for (it’s) survival as an independent and integral community’ (Golubović, 1987: 446). The pluralist reconstitution, the democratisation, finally came with the first free elections in 1990 at the republic level. But that spelt the end of Yugoslavia.

* MA, Balkan Fund for Democracy, Belgrade.
State formation theory has identified:

two large processes... The first is the extension of power and range of a more or less autonomous political unit by conquest, alliance, bargaining, chicanery, argument, and administrative encroachment, until the territory, population, goods, and activities claimed by the particular center extended either to the areas claimed by other strong centers or to a point where the costs of communication and control exceeded the returns from the periphery. (The second consists) of the more or less deliberate creation of new states by existing states. The carving up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia out of the trunk of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is a relatively pure case.

(Tilly, 1975:636)

Yugoslavia was a country that had been imagined in the nineteenth century by Croat, Serb and Slovene cultural elites alike - a dream (the unification of the South Slavs) that their respective politicians espoused and endeavoured to turn into reality. This internal political and cultural dynamic was forcefully thrust forth by the Versailles-Trianon Wilsonian chemistry made possible by the defeat of empires after the First World War. A unification project had come to fruition at a time when the development of the identities of the South Slav ethnic groups was already well-advanced (Pavlowitch, 1994: 205). The ideal of creating a nation-state, composed of Yugoslavs, to be created - in the manner of the Italian Conte Massimo d’Azeglio (‘We have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians’) - out of the South Slav subgroupings, proved to be a Herculean and ultimately impossible task, in view of the completely inadequate, non-democratic political dynamics that were used in running the newly created (1918) and then (in 1945) revived state.

Yugoslavia was thus seen by many as an artificial construct. On the other hand, its seventy-two-year-long, often stormy, existence created a territorial reality which, especially after the Yalta settlement, cried out for political legitimisation. That legitimisation was provided in the postwar period by a communist ideology that thrust Yugoslavia on to centre stage, as a buffer country between the two Cold War blocs - but without changing its essentially peripheral position. The territorial reality was coupled by the experiential reality of generations being born and socialised in a country that, notwithstanding its communist garb and largely because of its growing international prestige, gave its citizens a sense of belonging to a stable European country. It was a country in which people were brought up to believe - like other Europeans - that war was a phenomenon of the past. Never again... This lulled many into the illusion that, for belligerence to be buried once and for all, it was enough to be geographically on European soil and that somehow the invisible hand of progress would do the job, irrespective of the institutional and political realities.

There were others who dreamed of a break-up and the partitioning of the country into a series of new states. They have been particularly prominent

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1 The word were spoken at the time of the unification of Italy in 1861.
among the various diasporas. The phenomenon of the ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992), of those who invoke the need for partition from several thousand miles away while peacefully living with their multinational neighbours in the United States, Canada or elsewhere, has been one of the elements fuelling the wars and divisions in the former Yugoslavia. Internally, within Yugoslavia, there were those who did not believe in its viability or its longevity, viewing it only as a transitory construct. Interestingly enough, Edvard Kardelj, the main party ideologue in the communist period, stated in private in 1957 to the carefully selected small working group writing the Communist Party programme:

Yugoslavia is a historically temporary creation. It is a phenomenon and result of the imperialist epoch and the ensuing constellation of international relations in that epoch. With the development of world integrational processes and the withering away of the imperialist epoch its peoples will be able to go and join new associations and integrations following civilisational and spiritual affinities, and Yugoslavia will thus inevitably be recomposed as a state. In that sense we Slovenes will understandably be with the Italians and Austrians, and the Serbs with the Bulgarians or with other historically close Orthodox peoples.

(Ćosić, 1987: 7)

Some thirty years later this co-national, Milan Kučan, now the President of independent Slovenia and then member of the highest body of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, wrote an article in the main party paper entitled ‘In search of a new identity for Yugoslavia’ (Kučan, 1988). He evoked a possible future for the country based on constitutional reform, but argued that this was only possible ‘on the basis of the 1974 constitution which is still valid today when it comes to the founding principles of the relations within the federation, i.e. the relations between our nations and nationalities and their national states. Competing visions of how the federation was to be recast, and more importantly how the spoils of communist power were to be shared or snatched, defined the contours of conflict over constitutional reform and later over territories and borders.

**Identity Crisis, Political Crisis**

The continuously ‘unsettled state of Yugoslav society and politics’ (Shoup, 1968: 265) produced a unique feature in Yugoslav politics, in that the question of the ‘sense and justification of its existence’ (Samardžić, 1994: 93) was constantly being raised. After Tito’s death in 1980, it seemed, in this connection, that a watershed had been passed. The death of the man who had ruled singlehandedly for more than thirty-five years was seen in the West as a possible breaking point, and a cue for the collapse of the federation. This opinion hinged on the simplistic idea that Tito had held the whole country together like a keystone in an arch, and that after the disappearance of the keystone the structure would simply fall down. The fact that Yugoslavia survived for another eleven years laid to rest the worst nightmares of Western foreign policy-makers, but unfortunately it also lulled
them into the false belief that Yugoslavia as a problem had been solved, and that
the danger had passed. This ‘unpreparedness’ (Pavlowitch, 1994: 203) on the part
of the West, caught by surprise as the edifice began to crumble, proved to be fatal
for the form and content of Western intervention - it came late and clumsily, and
simply intensified the endogenous dynamic of conflict (Rupnik, 1992; Rieff,
1995; Danchev and Halverson, 1996; see also Chapter 9 in this volume).

The profound crisis into which the country was sinking had been diagnosed
by many an actor and analyst. Milovan Đilas’s break with the party and the con-
sequent formulation of his critique in *The New Class* in the mid-1950s presaged
what was to follow. In 1971 the critical journal *Praxis* (later banned) devoted a
whole issue to a critique of the current state of society (*Praxis*, 1971). But it was
only with the ever-worsening economic situation after 1980, with the debt crisis
and the ensuing stagnation and decline, that it became apparent once again that a
major overhaul of the whole political and economic system was necessary. In a
closed meeting of a largely symbolic body, the Council of the Federation, in
1984, a liberally minded representative of the old party guard charged that the
party leadership and hierarchy was turning a blind eye to the crisis, in fact deny-
ing its existence, turning it to personal profit, and only deepening it by seeking to
preserve the status quo (Todorović, 1984).

It was clear by the mid-1980s that the chickens of the ‘crisis of identity of
contemporary Yugoslav society’ (Golubović, 1987) had come home to roost.
Many authors (Bolčić, 1983; Mirić, 1984; Golubović, 1987; Goati, 1989; and
others) produced analyses of the causes of the crisis. But the ‘system’ (i.e. the top
political elite) was unwilling to admit at first that there was anything seriously the
matter. Accordingly it was unable to come to terms with the situation, and when
it did finally recognise and accept that there was a crisis, it showed itself incapable
of reforming itself at the federal level and breaking the permanent stalemate that
had developed there. It was hardly surprising, then, that the pressure for change
built up and broke through at the level of the republics.

The fact that so many occasions and opportunities for fundamental reform
were missed or only very partially pursued, simply produced an accumulation of
problems, systematically neglected and therefore running increasingly out of con-
trol. Because of its ‘independent’ stance in international politics, Yugoslavia was
flooded with Western financial support. This support artificially bolstered the
economic prosperity of the individual Yugoslav, but more importantly ‘made it
regrettably easy for (successive) Yugoslav governments to postpone decisive
action’ (Dyker, 1992: 281).

There had been secret offers after the conflict with Stalin and the USSR for
Yugoslavia to join NATO (1953-54); there had been advances from the Council
of Europe in 1967. But Tito’s communist ‘reflex’, and his continued deference to
the ‘big brother’ (the USSR) meant that any move by Yugoslavia into the
Western sphere was simply outside the feasible area. Yugoslavia remained within
the ‘totalitarian logic’ (Lefort, 1979)and within the communist bloc, although
independent of it in many respects. Yugoslavia’s advantages over other East-
Central European countries - the endogenous character of its communism, its
iqueness and ‘socialist-market’ originality, proved, after 1989, to be simply
ingredients of a violent demise, thwarting any attempt to come to terms with its
complexities and communist heritage in a peaceful manner.
The many intellectual debates in postwar Yugoslavia over its future are indicative of the trials and tribulations of Yugoslavia itself and are an important facet of the complex, and often confusing, dynamic leading to the Yugoslav breakdown. We can mention just one such debate - between the Slovene Dušan Pirijavec and the Serb Dobrica Ćosić in 1961 - as a cultural disputation over Yugoslavism, ‘unitarism’ of the country versus the ‘fullest development of the republic of national traditions’ (Shoup, 1968: 197-8). The central issue here was whether or not to seek to develop a unitary, national (Yugoslav) identity. The controversy resurfaced repeatedly through the 1970s and 1980s (Milosavljević, 1996: 1), ending finally in a meeting in Ljubljana in 1990. Thus intellectuals were meeting and communicating on these crucial issues across republican borders. But notwithstanding often successful joint cultural endeavours, they, too (with notable exceptions), were tending to be driven back behind national-republican boundaries and compelled to answer the call of the nationalist sirens.

Yugoslavia’s Unsuccessful ‘Revolt against Yalta’

Eastern Europe’s ‘long revolution against Yalta’ (Feher, 1991) led gradually but decisively to a successful shedding of communist ideology and the espousal of the principle of peaceful regime change. The fact that Yugoslavia had already found a way to free itself of the Yalta dictate and ‘float freely’ between the two blocs during the Cold War period - benefitting greatly from Western financial support while remaining communist and even constructing a Utopian ‘third way’ that would be better than anything yet seen in the way of socialism - in practice simply produced over-experimentation and an overheated polity, society and economy. Most notably, ‘the constant tension between center and region in Yugoslav politics... the continuing destructive potential of allowing interregional conflicts to persist long enough to acquire ethnic meaning’ (Burg, 1983: 347, 349) had produced, by the end of the 1980s, a situation whereby every issue, however trivial, had ‘acquired ethnic/national meaning’, as increasingly strong links were forged between the communist elites, intent on preserving power, and the nationalist intelligentsias. In the word of one journalist, spoken in 1989, one could not say in communist Yugoslavia that a given individual was politically inclined to the right or the left; the only meaningful political label was Slovene, Croat, Serb, Albanian, etc. Allowing nationalist sentiments to substitute for political arguments, allowing the refraction and reduction of all conflicts to national grievances, facilitated the formulation and appearance of a ‘logic of final solutions’ (Vejvoda, 1992).

As nationalist intellectuals and nomenklatura circles drew closer, a new consensus began to emerge that the time had come to ‘finally iron out’ all inherited problems, to ‘resolve once and for all’ the Yugoslav tangle, to grasp the opportunity presented by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism to ‘sort out’ interethnic grievances. There was much talk of the impossibility of continuing to live together in one country, in a Yugoslavia which seemed increasingly to have been an ‘illusion’. This kind of talk helped foster processes of ethnic homogenisation and tended to marginalise those who were not only advocating a
possible institutional recasting of Yugoslavia in a democratic, multinational
image, but were also warning against the possible escalation of ethnic conflict.2

The economic and social crisis, the rising rate of unemployment, the prevalent sense of economic hopelessness, all played into the hands of the exponents of this expansive nationalist rhetoric of the ‘us’ (our ethnic/national group) being ‘exploited by them’ (all other ethnic/national groups). Everybody had a grudge against Yugoslavia and against each other.

The Great Fear

This profound economic and social crisis and depression, compounded by the agenda of unsettled scores between the political leaderships of the republics, the endless high-level Communist Party meetings where the future of the country was supposedly being sorted out, but out of which nothing ever resulted, led progressively but insidiously to the appearance of a ‘Great Fear’ among the population of the whole country. Although emanating from a quite different historical setting, the ‘Great Fear’ of 1789, and the vivid analysis of that phenomenon provided by Georges Lefebvre (1971) can help us understand the state of mind of authorities and citizens alike in the Yugoslavia of c. 1990.

What were the leaderships afraid of? They were all afraid of the new post-communist world of pluralistic politics they were headed for. They feared each other and each others’ secret goals. The leadership of Serbia under Slobodan Milošević had, in addressing the very real problem of relations within Serbia, thrown off balance the federal architecture of 1974, ‘provok(ing) resistance and strengthen(ing) the aspirations for independence of the other peoples of Yugoslavia’ (Perović, 1993: 63). Indeed, when Serbia, territorially the biggest unit, with the most numerous population and also the greatest number of nationals living in other republics, decided to move on the constitutional issue, it sent a veritable shockwave through the country.3 The repressive actions against the Albanians living in Kosovo were perceived, rightly or wrongly (it makes no difference in terms of the Great Fear) as the model of future behaviour of the Serbian leadership toward the other republics. And so the Great Fear spread to the population as a whole. The Albanians in Kosovo were in fear of the Serb leadership, but the Serb minority living within Kosovo had similarly been in fear of the Albanian majority with which they were sharing Kosovo. Once Croatia, the second largest republic, started to make clear moves towards putting forward its own independent agenda, fear started to spread among the Serbs living on its territory. Pronouncements by the newly elected President, Franjo Tuđman, to the effect

2 One notable attempt to prevent the spread of war was the ‘Pre-Parliament of Yugoslavia and Round-Table of the Authorities and Opposition Parties’, held in the autumn of 1991. It published its findings (September 1991) under the ominous title ‘How to Prevent Total War’.

3 Here is a view from Slovenia of Yugoslavia as a communitarian construct, framed by Serbian policies: Yugoslavia fell apart ‘because of intolerance, and even more so of Serbian incapacity to accept Yugoslavia’s ethnic and cultural diversity as a reality and a benefit. In terms of the latter factor, one can say without exaggeration that from the Slovenian perspective the Serbs’ equation of Yugoslavia with Serbia contributed substantially to the Slovene shift from Herder to Hegel, a move that ultimately led to the emergence of an independent Slovenian state. Serbia had tried since 1918 to turn Yugoslavia into an association of individuals, although it was in reality a community of collective personalities’ (Vodopivec, 1994: 44).
that he was happy that his wife was neither a Serb nor a Jew (Rieff, 1995:65) did nothing to dispel this fear.

This cascade of fear, uncertainty, and utter insecurity spread into Bosnia, where three of the six constitutionally (1974 constitution) defined ‘constituent nations’ of Yugoslavia were sharing one republic in a communist ‘consociationalism’ (Liphart, 1977) of sorts, with no group having a majority. The fear in Bosnia and Hercegovina was heightened when it was reported that the meeting between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević on 17 March 1991 in Karadodrđevo had focused on plans for the partition of Bosnia (Glenny, 1993: 149; Silber and Litle, 1995: 143-4). Against this background, relations between the three communities of Bosnia and Hercegovina, always delicately poised (see Chapter g), became increasingly precarious and vulnerable to the destabilising effect of rumour and hearsay.

The fear thus born was accompanied by and exacerbated by the revival of the bad memories of the period of the World War. And ‘where the images of the past and the affections which attach to these (and around which action is organised)... are pulled apart, where human beings have forgotten or no longer agree on ...’ the first and last things”, there is “opened up a great vacuum in the public mind, yawning to be filled”, and men rush in only to exhaust themselves’ (Smith, 1985:4). This vacuum is filled with a multiplicity of narratives: historical, real or invented, constructed or imagined, based on experience or heard from ancestors, practical, political, instrumental and manipulative, all joining one main current, feeding apprehensions and purveying black and white interpretations in which the majority of the positive sides of the past are pushed aside and obliterated.

One could make a hypothetical journey through all of the former Yugoslavia and its republics, spelling out the political, social, economic and existential fear that was slowly building up under the pressure of the acceleration of the dynamics of the crisis. In such a situation and there is no outlook for the future, the identity haven of ethnos/nation seems an ideal harbour for those stricken by stifling fear and discontent. ‘Nationalism was the most important such collectivity, promising a happy and healthy world protected against the rush of time’ (Mosse, 1987:1).

Individuals feared the exit from communism and the protective cocoon it offered. They struggled to come to terms with the risks involved in that exit. They were led by the loss of certainty into a pattern of homogenisation which gave no scope whatsoever for alternative action. The role of the media in the build-up of the Great Fear was at all times crucial. There had been a gradual ‘republicanisation of the press’ (Ramet, 1992:61), a raising-up of media walls inside which each nomeklatura could closely control the messages it was sending out to its constituency. The content of these messages became increasingly hostile to the ‘others’ as the war approached.

The Consequences and Costs of War the ‘High Price of Peace’

The consequences of war, more specifically of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor and Vasheee, 1996), are seldom what those who engage in them anticipate at the outset. Rarely do wars lead to improvement and even where the public or hidden aims of war are attained, it is generally through the unmeasurable suffering of civilian populations.
The Yugoslav wars have been by overlapping ethnic/national groups over conflicting claims to territory, against a background of confusion as to who has the right to self-determination - the former Yugoslav republics or the nations of the former Yugoslavia. The outcome has in the event brought independence and sovereignty to the former republics without changes of border, a higher degree of ethnic homogeneity in certain republic (Croatia and Bosnia) and a difficult multi-ethnicity in others (Serbia/Montenegro/FYR Yugoslavia and Macedonia). The Yugoslavia that in 1991 had a population of around 24m has been broken down into five smaller states: Slovenia (2m population); Croatia (4,4m); Bosnia and Herzegovina (composed, for the moment, of two entities: the Bosnian/Muslim)-Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic) (4m), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (10.5m) and Macedonia (2m).

There have been enormous losses to set against the gains. All the new states, with the exception of Slovenia, have been severely set back in economic and social terms. The war has perverted the course of economic restructuring and transition to the market economy. It has led to a widespread criminalisation of the economies at the focal point of the war. War profiteers, in league with corrupt politicians, have made immense fortunes, while the lot of the majority of the population has been one of loss and despair. Much of the population of the new states now lives below the poverty line and people are forced into the grey economy to survive. The wages from official jobs simply cannot provide even for bare essentials. Brain drain has been the personal solution for many highly qualified individuals, but this does not bode well for rapid recovery in the economies concerned, because much needed expertise will simply not be there. Those who have stayed behind will continue to be hampered for years to come by the deficiencies of a run-down, vandalised transport and energy infrastructure.

The most serious damage, however, has been psychological. Individuals have been, in various ways, some more, some less severely, knocked out of their everyday private and professional routines. When asked by journalist what was the greatest problem for his business in postwar conditions, a small private entrepreneur in Lebanon answered that it was the fact this workers had simply lost the habit of working eight hours a day at a machine.

There has also been a political cost. While the formerly hardline communist eastern neighbours of the former Yugoslavia have already embarked on the road to accession to the European Union, with six years of consolidation of democratic institutions behind them and a successful record of alternation in power, in the war-struck states that have emerged out of former Yugoslavia the political dynamics has been wholly distorted. Those who were and remain in power have managed to throw off balance and marginalise their oppositions. The latter will only now, in postwar consolidations, be able to begin to recover.

The fact that the Yugoslav wars coincided with move towards democracy, that democratisation seemed to have opened them up to war-prone behaviour (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995), will also have relevance to future political developments (Puhovski, 1989: 218-19). Majoritarian democracy has proved fatal in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This former Yugoslav republic, which had functioned politically in terms of a three-way power-sharing relationship, should not have been forced by the EU Robert Badinter Commission into majoritarian democratic decision-making (29 February - 1 March 1992). It would have been
much better to develop a consociational democratic model (McRae, 1974; Lijphart, 1977). As in the case of other similar, if not identical conflicts, as in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine and South Africa, inventiveness and imagination are an indispensable element in the quest for a satisfactory solution for all parties involved. The ‘high price of peace’ (Crickm 1990: 269) becomes evident with the realisation that there can be no ultimate victory for any one of the parties, that the ‘other’ (as co-national or as neighbour) will always be there, and that therefore accommodation is unavoidably necessary.

As ‘the elusive search for peace’ continues, the new states are increasingly in a situation where they can articulate their interests, and thus find common ground with neighbouring new states in the pursuit of stability and prosperity. And although ‘national states are not the ... possible form of human government, nor necessarily the best’ (Crick, 1990: 275), new institutional solutions will have to be sought within the framework of the newly formed national states on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. It is clear to even the most nostalgic of former Yugoslavija that Yugoslavija will not be reconstituted in its previous form, as a common state, in any foreseeable future. The Yugoslav idea may have only gone into hibernation. But its reawakening is so distant a possibility that it is frankly not even worth contemplating. The stark fact is that five new states, some of them in a precarious condition will have to fend for themselves in a globalised world.

Of the Role of Individuals and states

We can legitimately ask questions as to the role of individuals in the breakdown, of elements that go beyond societal and political structures, institutions, ‘habits of the heart’, customs, norms. The positive or negative contribution of individual actors to the whole dynamic cannot and should not be discounted. The preponderance of politics from above, not only under communism but also under preceding regimes, has given immense power to the power-holders in the region. It has been noted for the nineteenth and early twentieth century period of East-Central European history that ‘in each of the countries... certain individuals emerged who had an enormous impact on the outcomes’ (Stokes, 1989: 243). In such a context it is possible to imagine different outcomes with different key political actors in the leading roles. Further, what was true of the nineteenth century, namely that ‘in the Balkans... (the) introduction of a state on a European model occurred in a social situation that was almost completely unprepared for it’ (Stokes, 1989: 245) is equally true of the introduction of democratic institutions, rules and procedures at the present time. The state continues to be used the main political protagonists in most of the former republics as a tool of monopoly, rather than of rational governance. ‘It is not surprising, therefore, that they constantly interfere in the day to day operation of politics, (seeking) to create personal regimes’ (Stokes, 1989: 244).

The individuals that were elected as heads of the republics at the time of break-up are all still in power, in their presidential roles, six years and several years later. It can be said that Slovenia and Macedonia, the northernmost and southernmost republics, have had the benefit of the more moderate politicians. I respective of how we judge the role of Milan Kučan in the lead-up to the unilateral declaration of Slovenian independence and the ensuing ignition (via Slovenia) of the
Yugoslav wars, Slovenia is one of the success stories of East-Central Europe in transition/while Macedonia, under Kiro Gligorov... str. 257) while Macedonia, under Kiro Gligorov, is the only former Yugoslav republic to have made an exit from the federation (and secured the retreat of the JNA from its territory) without a shot fired or a citizen of Macedonia killed. And Gligorov is now seeking to play a difficult at internal political balancing internal between the competing political parties on the one hand, and between Macedonians and the large indigenous Albanian population on the other, rather than to establish any kind of personality cult of his own. Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Alija Izetbegović, by contrast, have been heavy-handed in the conduct of internal politics, using all the means at their disposal to maintain their positions, and largely sidelining legislative and other executive bodies by concentrating all power in their own hands. They have largely worked with very narrow inner circles of advisers, in the context of which key decisions have been made without consultation with their legislatures.4

The relevance of all this to the question of whether there could have been a peaceful parting of the ways for the Yugoslav republics and the Yugoslav peoples is brought out by an episode - one among many such, in varying instances and circumstances - illustrating the way in which the chemistry of the political dynamics of post-Yugoslavia has worked and the intended or unintended consequences it has brought. The episode in question is the agreement manque between Slobodan Milošević and Alija Izetbegović in 1991. Adil Zulfikarpašić, a liberal of the Bosnian (Muslim) diaspora, brokered the deal and awaited the final go-ahead from Izetbegović. But the Bosnian president backed out at the last moment (Đilas and Gaće, 1995: 203-26). Zulfikarpašić offers valuable insights into the background to this vitally important series important series of developments and seeks to explain the breakdom of post-Yugoslav pattern of interaction between individuals and political grouping. ‘However catastrophic it may seem, it was rejected out of consideration of petty party and personal interests’ (Đilas and Gaće, 1995: 221). Izetbegović may have been unwilling for Zulfikarpašić to take all the credit for an agreement (although the latter disclaimed in advance any desire to make political capital out of the matter). Milovan Đilas, in his book-length debate with Zulfikarpašić, is inclined to lay most of the blame at the door of the Serbs, and secondarily at that of the Croats (Đilas and Gaće, 1995: 223). But Đilas and Zulfikarpašić are agreed that the three ‘nationalist, totalitarian parties’ in Bosnia ‘paved the way for the conflict; they live by it and draw their strength from it’ (Đilas and Gaće, 1995: 223 and 226).

Pax Daytoniana - Ceasefire or Peace?

Four-and-a-half years after the eruption of the first armed conflicts in 1991 the war(s) in former Yugoslavia have come to an end, or at least to a durable truce. After violence, destruction and looting, with 200,000 dead and 2,7m displaced persons, the war stopped, not because one side had won, but through a peace which had been brokered/negotiated/imposed from outside. The warring parties

4 The character, features and method of Milošević’s rule is well-documented in a recent book by one of his acolytes, who, after the publication of the book, lost his high-ranking position in the ruling party in Serbia (Jović, 199... see also Đilas, 1993).
were unable to sort it out themselves. In the end, they had to seek intermediaries to lead them out of the chaos they had, with varying degrees of responsibility, plunged themselves into. This plea for intervention was, in fact, very much in line with the nineteenth and twentieth century history of these territories. They have always been fenced around in one way or another by the great powers, never left to themselves, always dependent on the broader constellation of the state system prevailing at their given point in time.

It is easy to be cynical and pessimistic about the Dayton peace agreement (initialled on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995). And, perhaps, we should be: a peace achieved through 'proximity talks' involving three intra-Bosnian actors, two key actors on Bosnia’s outer perimeter (Croatia, Serbia) and five of the major world powers (the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany), with three multilateral organisations (NATO, EU, OSCE) also in attendance: an internally contradictory constitution written for one country/state composed of two independent entities, although de facto made up of three entities, written by US State Department legal experts, a document which embodies probably the most generous human rights provisions known to date in any constitution, but gives no indication as to how the military is to be controlled, to be upheld for one year by a 60,000-strong multinational military force under NATO command, after which a plethora of appointed civilian foreign experts are to oversee the proper functioning of the new institutional framework - need we do more than quote the local proverb that says: Too many midwives make a feeble child?

The ceasefire is precarious, the outcome of the talks reprehensible, unjust and unrealistic to many of the people affected.

But cynicism leads up a blind alley. There was no velvet divorce, no peaceful parting of the ways between the former Yugoslav republics, and it is no use expecting a good outcome after a violent separation. There can only be more or less bad solutions, and the longevity of any given solution will depend on the sincerity and will of the signing parties (internal and external) to implement them. The Dayton agreement is what exists and the players involved have to work with it. It is, like all similar agreements, a compromise to which all parties have adhered in an attempt to save what they can of what they have left - a power game in which all those who were in the leading roles at the beginning of the war are still in power. Those in whose name this war has been fought - the countless civilians - are the losers and victims, in the worst case, that of Bosnia, virtually wholly dependent on aid, without work, plunged back into darkness, having attained a relatively prosperous standard of living before the war in the ‘old’ country.

The Dayton agreement has stopped the killing. This is its greatest achievement, critically important in the short term. The construction of peace, through an infinity of small steps at the everyday as well as at the macropolitical level, will be a long, painstaking, precarious process, strewn with as many pitfalls as the countryside is with landmines. The violent interruption in the Northern Ireland peace process occasioned by the IRA’s bomb in central London on 8 February 1996 exemplifies the kind of obstacles that stand in the path of any search for the stable settlement of large-scale community strife. We must expect similar interruptions to the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

The physical reconstruction of Bosnia will require an enormous effort. International commitments have already been made, although not all the money
from the main contributors is yet forthcoming. Even more important, it will take repeated concrete and successful examples of freedom of movements, of returned refugees, of freedom of speech and assembly, of chances for work and employment, of media openness, of war criminals brought to trial, of the de-enthronification of politics, before the still pervasive fear, insecurity and uncertainty among individuals passes. Trust and confidence in people and institutions have to be rebuilt just like the infrastructure and the economy - only this is a much more intricate and complex process.

The top-down nature of politics in post-communist territories means that the rhetoric and signals from the perspective leaderships to each other, and to their populations, will have a profound influence on the overall political atmosphere, and therefore on the prospects for change. The leverage that the United States and other foreign countries have over the internal actors (who have accepted that leverage) is a key tool in the furthering of the search for a lasting peace. The conditionalization of economic and financial aid on compliance with the spirit and letter of the Dayton agreement is a key factor in the quest for a permanent solution.

But the agreement is only a stepping stone. Whatever happens further down the road, peace, trust, confidence, normality require that those definitely committed to abandoning violence prevail over those who secretly still cherish it and want to bring it back. A tired, war-weary, disillusioned population must be allowed to recover its energies and recover its capacity to voice its needs and interests. The first condition of all this is guarantees for human rights strong enough to start to rebuild the feeling of security.

The recovery and rediscovery of the political in a postwar situation, the process of re-establishing the social fabric and social bonds, of forging plurality and legality, are as important as jobs and social security, once the bare essentials have been satisfied. This is as true of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) as it is of Bosnia. Quite simply, without a return to a normal political dynamic, without the fostering and strengthening of democratic practices in all these countries, there will be no stability in the region and no ‘creeping normalisation’ such as can lead the new states from ceasefire to peace. The dangers loom large; a return to violent conflict is still possible. All the more reason to enforce the Dayton agreement rigorously on those who have agreed to act on behalf of the population concerned and the international community.

In 1946 Istvan Bibo wrote:

> the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe must be prevented from constantly upsetting the tranquility of Europe, with their territorial disputes... This means that in every area where some kind of consensus is yet feasible - not a mere political agreement, but a clarification of principles - we should implement this with all our force within the framework of the present (1945) peace construct, because unsettled territorial issues represent a grave threat.

(Bibo, 1991:80)

Fifty years later, we must simply register the fact that Bibo’s warning was not heeded. The creation of new nation-states has provoked havoc for more than four years in one former country of South-East Europe. The pattern produced by the
exit from totalitarianism coupled with the emergence of democratic institutions has again demonstrated the truth of Tocqueville’s adage that societies are most vulnerable and prone to collapse when they embark on a change of regime. That syndrome has led, in the area of the former Yugoslavia, to a return to conceptions of organic society and ethnic homogeneity. The consequent haemorrhaging of pluralism has made it that much more important that the distinct, multiple identities of the individual (all of which are trending to be submerged by the ethnic element) be brought forcefully to the fore. In the end, the ‘struggles for recognition’ (Habermas, 1994) will have to reconcile all these various identities.

That collective identities exits in this region of Europe is a given. But something must be done to blunt their edge and lessen their grip on the citizenry, through the rooting and guaranteeing of individual rights. The problem is that communism, and before that traditional, patriarchal societies, stifled the development of any counter-balancing individualism based on an awareness on the part of individuals of their right to have rights, as the ‘basic principle of all political modernity’ (Arato and Bendahbib, 1994:31). Any awakening to rights and to solutions that do not necessitate a nation state (‘Why should we be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in ours?’ Gligorov, 1994:87) will demand vision, much institutional imagination, and the will of (emerging) democratically minded leaders and active citizens to begin the ascent from ‘self-imposed immaturity’ (Kant, 1991:54). Is the fact that this time, and for the first time, the war came from within the former Yugoslavia, a guarantee of calmer historical waters in the future?

The first public obligation is to avoid the extremes of suffering... The best that can be done as a general rule is to maintain a precarious equilibrium that will prevent the occurrence of desperate situations, of intolerable choices - that is the first requirement for a decent society to which we can always aspire in the light of the limited range of our knowledge and even of our imperfect understanding of individuals and societies. A certain humility in these matters is very necessary.

(Berlin, 1990: 17-18)

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In order to achieve even the possibility of a serious understanding and assessment of “our things” – something that was not even close to being offered in advance – one should get away from deafening and intoxicating self-understandability. That intoxicating understandability could be simply described as follows: What has happened in the former state are wars (or a War) that were caused by nationalisms (or Nationalism). So, we see our task as an attempt to deal with this way of “understanding”.

More than the War - Radical Evil

First, a word of warning or qualification of the thing we are dealing “with” in here. This issue, as a question (not an answer!) should begin the developmental process for our opinion. Because, everything that can possibly be said of “our things” will vastly depend on how we begin. We are convinced that the thing we intend to think is not easily accessible – as it seems. On the contrary, it seems that we deal with an extremely “problematic reality”, which is not only slippery, in fact, by its definition, it runs away from us. But the problem we are dealing with, certainly, is everything else but superficial. Since it is deep, one should - at least try to – study it deeply.

So, the war or wars: “Our things” – without dilemmas - function in advance as something self-understandable In fact, it acts as if the problem shows itself as something completely clear and unquestionable, therefore easily accessible, as a non-problem. This is what the self-understandable appearance of “our thing” looks like: What has happened may be denoted with the expression War (or wars). With a surprising level of ease in the naming of what has happened, we have here the first self-understanding which we are going to tackle.

In this text, that is true, we talk about War and wars, but with significant reserve and with an important supplement. That is, we are not quite sure that it is possible to denote the events in the former state as war. The thing is more...
complicated and worse, more dangerous than it seems. We are ever more con-
vinced that what we deal with, or what we should deal with, is in fact, some-
thing a little bit different, more probably something more than we can under-
stand as the word war, or wars. Therefore, we are afraid that non-critical usage
of the words War/wars hides or erases more than it reveals and enables more
serious topics.

Here is why, in brief. To say that war has always been something “neces-
sary” or “normal” for humans as a species, represents a typical sign of irre-
 sponsible (un)thinking, which almost borders on the assertion that wars never
existed or that they are impossible. Because, talking equally (within the word
War) of the Peloponnesian, Thirty-Years and Napoleonic wars, or the First or
the Second World War, War or wars in the former Yugoslavia, or wars against
drugs and alcohol, represents an exclusive production of thought’s darkness in
which all the cows are black, in which there are no more wars and things that
are possibly connected to them. For us, it is the main feature of what should
be named non-thinking.

Of course, we do not say that in “our” region there was no War or wars.
There were, there is no doubt about it. But those wars, in our opinion, were in
a kind of “minority”, so, they are not decisive for understanding our problems.
If we try to assess events as a whole, we should take into account that “all
together”, it was only in its smaller part a War, and in its bigger part it was
something, more (or less) than wars. So, we deal here with complexity that is
easy to miss if we are in advance satisfied merely with the label War or wars
(reductio ad absurdum).

The least that should be considered in accordance to the aforementioned,
is the so-called modern term of war, adopted from Napoleon’s times. In order
to denote this type (not sort!) of “violent occurrences” with the term ‘war’, we
necessarily have to have at least one decisive ingredient, and that is a state.
Within the term “wars”, the modern state means, existence of at least one sub-
ject of the international law, and that is the state. A “Declaration of War” should
be added, and also at the end, the signing of the “peace treaty”. However, in our
case, even if we “have a state”, the most that can be said at the level of defini-
tion is a civil war. Because in case of a war-in-one-state, we deal, in fact, with
the “disintegration” of the state, and maybe with the creation of two or more
states on the battlefield.

1 There is a saying that the first victim of a war is complexity; therefore exclusion of all
complexities or their reduction to pro and contra relations, division to ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, rep-
resents one of the first preconditions of war. If it is really like that, is the return of complexi-
 ty exactly one of preconditions of peace. Isn’t the task of thinking work for its return?

2 The notion of state is an explicit modern product, and its earliest creators should be
sought in the generation of Hobbes and Machiavelli (commonwealth, lo stato), not at
Acquinus, Augustine, Cicero or even Plato, as it is most often suggested by different sources,
by definition a-historic types of non-thinking. In another words, the modern state and the state
in the strictest sense are one and same thing. There is no state before a modern one, except in
theological scientific dreams, which implant their own products on the “beginning of the his-
tory”.

82
We do not know exactly why these modern “ingredients” of war are being discarded as something unnecessary. We are not sure that the basic conditions for the definition of war in the “Yugoslav situation” were met, and even less sure that the high prices that we pay have nothing to do with it, among other things. For example, we are not sure we had declaration of war. There were no peace treaties that would be signed simultaneously by two states. A rule, one state used to appear in “Peace negotiations” at best, or the state-in-creation, while on the other side there was something like “a company”, “a society”, certain “rebels” or “liberators”, or another “state-in-creation”, or “state-no-more”. In any case, we had a “relationship” (in fact, Non-relation) between some potential or real states with the “not-yet-state”, “state-no-more” or similar quasi-state structure. The only treaty (but that was at “the end”) that brought some kind of peace, was the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was not only signed by the “states”, “not-yet-states” or “states-no-more” as parties, but was contributed to by the super-state, the USA.

Therefore, an easy and dangerous simplification in a-priori denotation - War or wars - should be definitely discarded. One should cease to “behave” at the level of thinking at which it is enough to have well arranged massacres, military and paramilitary, mass murder and perpetrators, to “denote war”. Unfortunately (or fortunately) it is not like that. It neither is like that at the level of the law, nor at the level of serious thinking. A lot of casualties, many wounded and refugees, a lot of suffering, that is more than terrible. There is no doubt about that, but we talk about the fact that massacres and similar craftsmanship - manual or industrialized - of killing, raping and expulsion still are not enough to call something a War or wars. In the same way, we are indecisive as to whether the huge number of casualties represents something more or less war (we are inclined to the first option). All that is not enough for a “definition of war”, and consequently, one should not just like that, colloquially and easy talk about war without additional references.

That is, if we use the expression and term War unselectively, we do not relieve denotation of respective occurrences, neither its consideration nor maybe possible sanitation. On the contrary, we fall into the darkness of non-thinking, in which those acting according to principles of strength are always have an advantage. Lawlessness – not only legal, but also the lawlessness embodied in irresponsible thinking – regularly is suited to those with power. Fall into non-thinking, among other things, represents an ideal opportunity for not understanding what has happened from the point of view of the “self-understanding the war” (reduced to war), but it serves well for its possible prolongation, or for

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3 The price of what we call wars is not and for a long time will not be paid, because we cannot possibly pay it. That is, there is no explicitly written bill that we could and should formally pay. This is because we did not have a “declaration of war”, and consequently, “we did not wage wars”. And if we “did not wage them” how can we stop “waging them”, i.e. how (and whom) “can we possibly pay the price for them”. The problem is the following: These “wars” will not be put in the past for a long time, since we did not and cannot “bury” them and let them stay behind us. A symbolic dimension in signing treaties at the end of war/wars would be of extreme importance for all of us, present and future (not only for the dead and the past), as a document which maybe could enable “to end wars that did not happen.” A peace, without legal, meaning or a formal “agreement” at the end of war/wars is not possible.
its domestication and acceptance a priori. And the latter exactly seems to be the biggest danger.

Nonetheless, by “domestication” and “socialization”, War and wars are being “naturalized” in an extremely dangerous way. That is to say, out of something difficult to understand, we create something that is shown “in fact”, as something easy or simply understandable, usual, or even normal. Consequently, we act as if War is something so domestic that we do not dare question it and therefore we are not able to, since it becomes unnecessary. Through non-critical and the unselective usage of the words War/wars, we close any serious possibility to understand the dreadfulness that occurred in this region over the last fifteen years. What happened – that is our next hypothesis - was more than War. It was much worse than War.

That is, when we pronounce the word War, it seems that we do a favor to ourselves and to others, since we all already “know what it really means”. But the thing is, unfortunately, reversed. With that we do a great favor to all those who in the “war” practiced their butchery for which they should be individually (!) responsible, by definition. Taking war, implicitly or explicitly, as something where “everything is allowed” (because that is the point here), means ignoring elementary issues such as numerous international conventions, rights of POW’s, refugees and radically annulling each, even the tiniest protection of human values and humanity. In fact, it means radically mixing up at least two different “issues”. In other words, not everything is allowed in a war. War is, in a sense, an issue which, it be might said, goes “beyond” rights (even beyond understanding). However, at the same time and in relation to war, we deal with an issue that ground or “jammed” and then put into certain rules and laws, legal order and war legislation. Consequently, this has been relegated to “categorical thinking”, or we might even say to the very possibility of thinking, that we are bound to if not obliged to do. Losing that difference would mean to lose the difference between “a natural” and a “human/civil/conditional state”, which means, losing many other specific differences that enable life to be worth living and that are deriving from that. In the case of losing these differences, we are also losing the possibility to try the prosecutors, and what is even more important, the possibility to avoid falling beneath the level of the modern “understanding” of war, which literally “fell” below the level of international (war) law. Negation of that right is, in our opinion, a result we can obtain if we talk about what happened in “our example” uncritically and just call it (only) War or wars. We can place a small thinking dam for this dangerous flood and darkness (installed as gleaming light in the media) if at the initial point we discard undifferentiated usages of the word War or wars.

Nonetheless, War is not the most/worst that can be bestowed upon us, says the “popular voice”, spread across the media of mass intoxication and becomes unbearable and literally lethal. There is even worse than War, and that is what happened in these territories. If it seems that we do not have the appropriate words for it, we can use a different, less used and older word. Past generations of scholars, when thinking still was an activity related to severity, knew about similar events. In denoting them, they used the expression “radical evil”. We shall do the same on this occasion. By using the expression Radical evil, we will not be very far from War and wars as it may seem. However, with it we
only open different themes in which we may be able to speak more accurately of “our events”, for which we claim that were something “more than a War”. A similar example was used by H. Arendt (Hannah Arendt), in determining the holocaust, when – in relation to Eichmann - she spoke as much about a radical as “banal evil”. Our hypothesis would be that what has “happened to us”, and what is more than the War could be denoted as a radical evil. In its core, it is banal, and it does not contain anything mystic, unspeakable, incomprehensible and even less alleviated - at its level of incomprehensibility.

The difference between War and Radical evil is important, before all, because with its help it is possible to guess more accurately (or to guess it at all) the essence of butchery (eg. Sarajevo, Srebrenica, killing Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats in Croatia, etc.). It is in the sense that radical evil enables the existence of something which is literally beyond, above, out of (or under) the war and what is “more than war”; and of something that enables a different comprehension of events that happened over the last few years. Srebrenica was no “excess”, no “accident”! It was and will be the very essence, even the Truth of all those things we must try to comprehend. And Srebrenica – that is the problem we wanted to reach in the first place – cannot be comprehended through the concept of War! This word is definitely too small, too void for understanding what those slaughters signify, what they are and what they will remain. By the help of the expression ‘radical evil’ it is at least possible to indicate that evil compared to War – which due to its ‘state background’ already receives an ‘alleviated’ sense in advance – comprises radical nonsense, or more precisely, Evil and at the same time, it comprises banality which is the very essence of Evil. It is exactly killing without sense, and more, without any reason, that could possibly justify those misdeeds, that represents “something more”, that is banal, that one should try to comprehend hoping that thus we enable “closure” of this dangerous abyss. That is exactly what is the issue in our case, radical evil, and not War. To avoid any misunderstanding: We do not say that killing is possible and needs justification through some “sense”. We say that maybe it

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4 Arendt, (1992)

5 It is exactly the ‘war’ that pastes to all banal killings some addendum of “misunderstanding”, “incomprehension”, and with it also the note of “alleviation”, “morality”, at the end even of “heroism” and “specialty”, not to say “sanctity” and “intangibility”. The expression “war” at the thinking level has a power to turn the banality of evil, more implicitly than explicitly, into something sublime (in the meaning of Burke), high, even aesthetic. Anesthetization, de-sacralisation, de-sublimation, the profanization of war is what should be most definitely faced. Living under the burden of the “provincial” (Konstantinovic), one should accept that it attacks us when we do not consider it, when we do not dare to think clearly, strictly and implacably about one’s own position.

6 Some, in the meantime expressed excuses related to events on the territory of the former SFRY, shaped by state leaderships (Serbia, Croatia...) are a good sign, but insufficient. Maybe a solution to the above mentioned problem “we-did-not-wage-war” could be searched in one joint, formally-legal binding statement that would be modeled and signed by representatives of all states created on the territory of former Yugoslavia. That would be a kind of compensation for (impossible) peace treaties, and would refer to events from the nineties. Certainly, with the aim directed into the future, in the sense of a formally and legally binding statement of peace, nonaggression and neighboring relations.
would be possible to comprehend killing and suffering in both cases: with or without any sense.

We will try to say it in a more simplified way, in everyday jargon and telegraphically. Initially it is possible to comprehend war as an instrumental activity that is being waged on behalf of a Subject, who is always supposed to be standing behind the activity. In modern circumstances, war is waged on behalf of a state, on behalf of a Subject (who, in principle, rules the war, that is why we talk about ‘waging war’), who presumably has certain goals (strategic, territorial, invasive, economic etc.) These goals are achieved by a state through war. All killings, all ‘operations’ and all casualties in that context are related to the state as a reason and as the (absolute) subject-substance which initially starts the whole thing, wages it and eventually terminates it. The subject-state has (additional) power to step out of the war. Firstly it has a possibility to “step into peace” – signing the peace, meaning, a legal treaty (with other states), and thus to admit casualties and justify that as victims for “real” (state) things (within the state, for its citizens). In such a position we have a rather “comfortable” situation - for, understanding and for post festum justification - which enables differentiation between casualties (costs, investments - war is as instrumentum, comprehended in a bottom line, as utilitarian-economic (calculative and profit-oriented), and merits (profit), and even enjoyment related to war. Enjoyment related to war in this situation is at the side of peace and state, and by definition it is beyond the war which is understood as temporary suffering.

One of the larger problems is that in our analysis we have to respect the fact that in the area of the former state, “division of labor” between waging war as sacrificing, and peace in which we will enjoy the “fruits of all our bloody work” was clearly done only partially. The most complete example of this could be found in Slovenia, much less in Croatia and Bosnia, Macedonia, not to mention Serbia, Montenegro and JNA (because it should be counted as well - even if only as an “army without a state” - as a party in conflicts, which is often forgotten. What has happened and what is not very easy to comprehend (in the absence of the state which means in the absence of the idea of state) as a Subject, which by definition, stands “behind the war”, we found ourselves in a position in which “butchery” (hypothetical “medium”) became and was a goal in and of itself. Since there is no war without state, only butchery (violence in general), it became its own goal and a direct enjoyment, which means, “more than war” – Radical evil which is banal, per definitionem. Since there was no “higher” (state) goal (or it persistently and successfully fled), that would come “through” slaughter, in the function of which all these would be done (with a promise that after the war “reward for deeds” will come), bloodshed as such and for itself followed. Bloodshed became the “surrogate Subject” that lead and pulled the whole thing in accordance to its dynamics of pure killing as pure enjoyment (to be a Master of life and death is the very essence of enjoyment. All the bloody events, all those “inexplicable” and “unspeakable irrationalities” that we “could not” and still “cannot realize”, derive from the fact that they were goal for themselves, that they did not have any other goal beyond and above themselves. They did not possess what would “justify” them post festum, wash them and make them alleviated, sacred. With it, all those chains of slaughters, massacres, rapes, all those interminable convoys of refugees, were and

86
remained “without sense”. They were, are and will remain the result of banality. In history they will remain written as results of Radical Evil, which, by its essence, is banal and which resists our attempts to schematize it more or less appropriately as War.

That radical evil, in principle, could be “transcended” if there was a state or at least an “idea of the state”. Simply - and that is a big part of “our” problem’s essence - state would take over responsibility for what has been done, in order to sign a peace treaty at the end and to bring the killers to trial. 7 That is what did not exist in “our case”, 7 and that missing “element” of the state disables us to use the denotation War adequately. Consequently, what happened at the area of the former SFRY was neither done on behalf of the “goal”, nor to “achieve peace” (to “enjoy” in it in the aftermath), nor from the perspective of a state as it is usually falsely presumed. Radical evil was created within the second horizon of comprehension and acting, in a perspective of another and essentially different “Subject” than the state. All that was made, more or less, in the perspective of People, and People is not the same thing as the state. It was this “perspective of People,” “People as its own (self)goal” and “regulatory idea” that enabled and even demanded enjoyment in the slaughter itself, or in pure slaughtering and it, consequently, could not and did not “result in a state”. Furthermore, it resulted in People, which often meant, ‘no-state’, ‘not-yet-a-state’, ‘nation-state’ or even in a disintegrated ‘state-no-more’. In brief, above slaughtering and beyond it, there was no (and could not be) a “peace” concept, no real concept of a “state”. Even quasi-goals were shaped “along this path”, if any. But there was the Idea, there was the very present “concept” of People. 8This idea, however, is radically different from the concept of the state, and it demands a completely different approach and orientation, rather than different understanding and steps. 8 Accordingly, it produces different results. In brief, one should recall that the “definition” of, let us say, a good/real Croat or Serb, Slovene or Macedonian was (and remained) the one which existentially, in Schmitt’s meaning, had its grounds on The Other. Consequently, the more (quantitatively!) of the Others you hate, kill, and slaughter, the better (quantitatively) Croat, Serb, Slovene, Macedonian you are. “To-be-a-People-member” is not a qualitative, closed “mark” (eg. closed in state or law), instead, it is a quantitative, open apprehension. It is not something that is self sufficient. It is opposite: It is something radical, dependent on the Other, even dependant on

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7 If it is possible to transferr the idea of hell in its secular pendant, then it would be our position exactly. It is a “hell position” because, apart from the enormous number of deaths and suffering, we found ourselves, by definition, in a situation that we cannot even talk about tragedy in the real sense of the word. Because if we could, then catharsis would be possible, but from our position, the Aristotle’s katharsis is not possible. The good side is, maybe, that neither heroes are possible.

8 Spoken in the language of the idealism of 19th and 20 century, “the idea of state” is coming from this, human, closed world. Qualitative, even final, it is closed inside, completed and perfect, an in a way calmed and/or even dead in the final instance. The state is the nothe place of completeness at which People and individuals “find their peace” – symbolically or literally – including also “eternal peace”. On the other hand, the “idea of People” comes from the other “transcendental” world, and compared to the idea of state, it is made of rather different material. It is an idea from a quantitative, mathematic, even divine area at the same time, which, by its definition, opens into infinity, which is alive and open.

87
hatred and destruction of the Other. Only through permanent destruction of the Other, through \textit{a-priori} and permanent negation of all others, apprehension of People can be alive. To be a member of “one’s People” is not the same as being a citizen. If the latter presumes state and laws in the sense of rights and equality of all citizens, the first one presumes “laws” of “our”, “national”, “domestic, “natural” (sanguinary!) quasi-law, that is being established through permanent negation of all others and all different ones, including the existential negation of the other at the body level and/or level of extermination.

\textbf{Populism, and not Nationalism!}

In the case of wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the issue, before all, was not Nationalism or nationalisms. The issue was – and still is (although in some environments it evolved towards nationalism in the meantime) – something which is similar to nationalism, that is true, but what is different at the same time (and more dangerous), what is at the same time more and less than nationalism. That and such hypothetic comprehension we call the hypothesis on populism. We do not want to say that there were no nationalisms too, some kind of “inclination” towards state, we rather want to warn that nationalism was more or less, (in different cases) in the shadow of populism. Populism was (and stayed) the dominant “process” which dictated tempo and the aims of events.

Over last fifteen years or so, the extremely simplified mass-media stereotype of “events in the Balkans” was very aggressively imposed. It suggests that first we had half a century of socialism, and then, when it fell, its place was taken by nationalism, therefore, nationalism “broke” socialism. The form of this expressive non-thinking reminds us of what Aristotle (in Physics) rejects as thinking of already given “receptacles” which change their contents based on certain external “causes”, while they remain as they always \textit{(a priori)} were. On the basis of such a fabricated (not reflective) reflex, Milosevicism, Tudjmanism, Jansism\textsuperscript{11} and other populist appearances should be something like “nationalism in its essence”; i.e. something

\textsuperscript{9} We stay within the logic of “searching the cause” on purpose, because we hope that its very destruction will enable a critical distance from the methodic action.

\textsuperscript{10} The integral part of it is the expression “Balkan wars” which has decidedly cultural-racist (Malik: 1996) connotations arrived from the depths of the past century. For orientation only, we would like to point to Schevill (1991), and to the language abuse of the verb \textit{to balkanize}, which became not only a part of Anglo-Saxon speech, but also an important “analytical” category. The nineties of the 20th century were the time of rebirth of old discourses about Balkan, Balkans and balkanization. Consulting the literature for writing this paper, we have found more than 120 units (scientific articles and books) containing the expression Balkan or a possible variation already in the title. In a desirable research in the future, literature on the Balkans should be added to the ones writing about “ethnic” and “neo-nationalist” features. In that sense and related to the Balkans, one should take into account the excellent study by Todorova (1997).

\textsuperscript{11} Compare: Kuzmanić, (2003)
that could be classified as one general “sort” without any problem, or put in one or the other “receptacle”.\textsuperscript{12}

That is exactly a matrix that is questionable for us, since it disables more accurate understanding of that events that needed to be faced. In order to clarify the “working area”, first it is necessary to discard the quasi-nationalist construction \textit{a priori}. If we really want to talk about Jansism, Tujdmanism, Milosevicism, and appearances such as Jelincic in Slovenia, Djapic in Croatia, Seselj in Serbia and a very big number of similar creatures, then we should not even confuse them, and equate them with nationalism, or classify them just like that, under nationalism. Those are specific appearances which, except for an uncritical observation, are not able to be reduced to nationalism without reservation. Therefore, first it is necessary to open the blocked thinking channels and at least generally, to allow for the possibility that at our post-socialist scenes - apart from nationalism, with it, under it or through it - there was and there still is something else, additional, different, more complex to understand then the “self-understanding” nationalism. What is it that should be pointed out as their \textit{differentia specifica} against nationalism? For them it was important that those were populist motions, populist structured movements with their specific goals and modes of acting that in no way correspond to nationalism; furthermore, they are qualitatively different from nationalism.

In our region, populism did not appear until the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, so it is even less something that existed once and now became only a dead letter. Furthermore, it could be said that populism was the predecessor of “nationalism”, maybe even something that might appear after nationalism.\textsuperscript{13} At the Balkans and related areas, we know it in rather developed form, as a pre-nationalistic syndrome, conditionaly speaking. This expressed itself in the form of rather fierce behavior among collective revolutionary subjects — for example in Russia, in the middle of 19th century. We are talking about movements which set the establishment and formation of People as a key goal of their activity. It is due to these reasons that are, in fact, simple, although incomprehensible to us today.

\textsuperscript{12} Echoes of similar schematic misunderstanding can be found and shown within the difference lines between “nationalists” and “chauvinists”. The essence of “differentiation” is in comprehending it as a qualitative, not quantitative category. Chauvinism is here comprehended as something more “by quantity”, by “intensity” and some “extremity”, but of the “same” kind and same sort as nationalism.

\textsuperscript{13} More serious analysis of post-modern situations will not stop at understanding complex movements such as Basque, Scottish, Corsican only as a combination of “nationalism” and “terrorism”. It will be necessary to understand what is called here ‘populism’ and here we have to talk only within the context of “time continuity”, but we talk about a typical issue which is “historically illogical”, something that is ancient, and at the same time present and even future. Such an issue would probably be determined by Bloch with the aid of \textit{Ungleichzeitigkeit}, since the matter is something that, \textit{Foucaultly} spoken, cannot be closed/hunted, given in advance, “time series” 1989). Because we deal with “nonlinear”, non-simultaneous timeliness, with “pieces” of “other time”, with some kind of “non-simultaneous-ness” which persists, exists in the given period, present “timeliness” and which it will, most probably, persist in the future.
Populist motions act in circumstances in which People – in conservative jargon of the 19th century that is revived in our time - as a “Subject of the past” that has not been modelled yet, i.e. was in the phase of “creation”. Therefore it needed (re)modeling – certainly, according to populist receipts and principles – into something that could be called afterwards: die volks Gemeinschaft. So, the issue is not that populists try to establish a Nation (and through it or over it to establish a modern state), it is rather People as a “basic”, or even “natural principle” of life in a certain area and time, that is not only “dissatisfied” with the state, but also considers it as an obstacle and its biggest enemy. And it is decisive detail: Nation is a concept (and a subject) from which and through which nationalism “starts”, and a movement that has People for its aim of and in a horizon in which populists move, are qualitatively of a different nature. Difference is possibly shown in a very simple way: Populists do not want to establish either Nation or state, they want People and national community (“society” is the furthest target). Compared

14 Uncritical and usual equation of fascism and national-socialism (“Nazi-fascism”) prevents us from understanding an analytically usable difference between fascist persistence on the “ethical idea” of (Gentile, radicalizing Hegel’s idea) state on the one hand, and the national-socialist concept based on the People-state, i.e. People, connected with the expression Volkish by the then theoreticians, on the other. The most explicit and most brutal expression of the Volkish orientation still can be found in the first volume of Hitler’s book Mein Kampf (Compare: Hitler, 1999).

15 It is easily understandable for the conditions of an absolute monarchy, empire or other pre-state structure that more or less violently and (un)successfully tried to play a role of a modern state. It was similar in “our” circumstances when the main target was “state demolition”, and not what most often seems to be the case – communist demolition. That is exactly from whence came an extremely paradoxical situation where this “thing” collapsed. Paradoxes for “our” situation are two at least: First, SFRY was not - except with regard to its external sovereignty - a state of citizens. On the inside, it was rather a sum of “Working people”, and quasi-national societies (“peoples and nations”), whose statehood (republic and/or provincial) was a priori disabled. On the other hand, the “joint” (federal) state was in the continuous processes of a priori derogation or cancellation of the state. The only “direct” element of statehood was the sovereign (Tito), who was a sovereign in the way of “a monarch” (the last Habsburg, A. J. P. Taylor). According to biological derogation of sovereignty, the whole thing fell into paradox and from there, into a black hole. The paradox was best “incarnated” in JNA, which was an instance of military power, something – deadly sovereign – could not be state outwards any more. It was an army without state, one that not even constitutionally was in charge of “state defense”, because the state in the self-government was something strange, redundant and dangerous (“alienated”). JNA was installed as a defender of integrity (but only territories, not the state as a form of political living) and system (self-government). In brief, nobody wanted or dared or even could defend the state as an abstract, general precondition of political equality. It was superfluous for everybody, because it was on their way, one way or the other.

16 It is not superfluous to warn that all populist movements on the area of former Yugoslavia towards a tragic story do not start from the position of the “own state” (form an offensive concept regarding non-existing state), but from an extremely defensive concept of “protection and imperilment of their own people (no matter where)”. The idea of “state” in all those populist groups and movements appeared in the nineties, amidst hasty and even forced conflict events, not in the eighties when there still was enough time for sober thinking and planning. More accurate analysis of e.g. appropriate Slovenian, Croatian and other literature would confirm this easily. Furthermore, it would show that populist directed movements were very limited due to inability of any serious abstract comprehension that is an elementary condition for the possibility of “state comprehension”. 

90
to nationalism, populism is simultaneously, in a sense, one step backwards. It happens in a delay, but at the same time – if we look at today’s numerous events – it is something that could follow nationalism and that relates well to “globalization” and anti-state aspirations of post-modern times.17

Populists do not have business with People as part of an existing, available matter and material they process but rather with People they “already have”. They derive from settings and circumstances where People are not there yet, or where People’s cohesion is not there (not as the One/Unique People). Populists, in comparison to nationalists are more thorough, they deal with some “fundamental sense”, they make steps “into depth”, “steps backward” and dig in something that “precedes People”18, that has to do with its preconditions and assumptions; that establishes it as People in its sovereignty, supremacy.19 More tangibly said, they deal with something that can be called “folk”, some kind of gathered, undifferentiated mass of potentially our people (language, history, blood, culture, tradition, mythology), that has not yet become Integral, United, and that is not Singular. Populists deal with something called “puk” (commons) by Tudjman in Croatia. From that, by populists’ perspective, not structured matter, one has to create (forge/produce, therefore poiesis) something that will be maybe in the future called “self-conscious People”, something that will become a “Single body” and thus “United”. Only this “(self)conscious, conscious of itself, (self)structured – integral product, People, may serve as the first and central “Lego cube” for construction of (a long-term goal), a Nation-state and of all appendices of the constructive branch of folk poiesis.

Distinctly from the differently constituted and “developed” West, where all the processes of national production and upbringing, as well as appropriate breeding have already well advanced beyond the populists of the 19th century in less developed parts of Europe. These less developed part from the very start have other roots apart from nationalism. Superficially, first it seems that populism has nothing to do with West Side Story, that it is an explicitly Eastern (often bloody) story. However, links between the West and the East exist, since populism is really under strong impact of the Western view (shaped around the French Revolution). Populism is a product of the European East (not only Russia),18 and originated as a more complex movement and occurrence in environments that were rather differently structured than the Western ones. Populism, in fact, was different and deficient in a far more demanding and brutal context. Only under the condition where we find a paradigm of “developmental thinking”, we might say in a very simplified sentence, that populism is a product of an “underdeveloped” Eastern, or even “Russian environment.”19 For the Russian and similar envi-

18 One prominent populists was, let us say, F. M. Dostoyevsky, during a part of his life, and also Lenin’s brother, as well as many other well-known personalities.
19 Populism is known to all Western democracies, except for the fact that in some of them, populism was not the winning, but the oppressed, limited, marginalized occurrence, “tamed” by the state/statehood.
ronments, it was characteristic in 19th century to have had, by default, a revolutionary and even violently oriented populist movement.\(^{20}\)

Out of this general context it is not possible to uncover what is specific for the populist behavior, or to show that this “pose” does not occur in direct relation to the “state issue”, but rather in relation to the “People issue”. If it were different, then the results of such a positione and action would be a “nationalistic” or “state program” of some kind, or the state would stay alone. \(^{21}\) Since with populists the issue is not and cannot (yet) be the state, but only “the People”, we deal with occurrences that have populist, National programs. \(^{22}\) Populists act, therefore, in circumstances in which the state becomes something that “should be left for later”, or the state as a “realistic possibility” was too far, or something existed that was in the shape of a pre-modern structure (empire, monarchy) that “occupied” the possible area for shaping up the modern state.

Populism, therefore, is an occurrence that exclusively rounds out the “People issue”. All their discursive apparatus is exclusively related to People. Certainly, in a specific and impeccable way: \(^{23}\) By revolutionary cancellation – this is the second key element – of the difference between (poor) folk and its elite; thus establishing the People as the ideal/goal of the “first phase” of the revolution. \(^{24}\) In circumstances in which People still are not formed, the substitute role of the Ideal/goal is placed by the “people’s elite” – populists themselves (with their Leader)\(^{25}\). Populists do not deal and cannot deal with the external problems of the People. Even if they do, then they see the state exclusively as a “means” in the function of People, for “establishing and creating People” (construction metaphors are the most convenient for understanding this position).\(^{26}\) If they ever talk about inter-

\(^{20}\) As a time parallel to populist movements at the East, on the West we know the event that has faded today more or less, and was called once the “Radical Party” (in Serbia it was the constant of political life with the exemption of the socialist period). As the word itself says, it was thorough (Fr. radical, from Lat. radix = root; a term that became known in politics before all, after the party of French Radicals) movements, directed towards the fundamental things and parties that in their activities (often out of Parliament) did not have doubts when it was necessary to apply violent means for achieving their goals.

\(^{21}\) Populists can speak of state only indirectly, in general categories and in a further time perspective. Populist positions share the theory on “two revolutions” or “two phases” of revolution with socialist revolutionaries, only they deem the first revolution more important, the one that “creates People”.

\(^{22}\) For Slavic example, see: Prunk, (1986)

\(^{23}\) Despite, (or due to that fact?!) the populists functioned on radically utopian fuel of creating new. More in: Kuzmanić, (2003)

\(^{24}\) Today, Janez Jansa of Slovenia most explicitly talks about the “unfinished revolution” and “the second phase” of changes at the territory of former SFRY.

\(^{25}\) The populist movement is more expressive and more fundamentalist to the extent in which the role of its leader is bigger. Populism without the function of Fuehrer cannot be efficient. Compare: Schmitt, (1994)

\(^{26}\) The populist movement is more expressive and more fundamentalist to the extent in which the role of its leader is bigger. Populism without the function of Fuehrer cannot be efficient. Compare: Schmitt, (1994)
state relations, then they talk, in fact, about “international” relations, or relations among peoples, not among states. “A unit” of their thinking is not the state, it is the People.

The “People’s elite” in the given position sees itself as a “seed” (the cause, the first momentum) of the People, as those that are aware of what and how it should be done (they are the people’s midwives, doctors and shepherds at the same time). In Russian and other numerous cases from the middle and the end of the 19th century, there was an elite educated in the West. During their studies, its members got acquainted with German, French People, meaning, something that was not found in Russia and other places in undeveloped (not only Slav) Europe – that is, “at home”, it their homes. Comparing two different situations, they wanted for their homes the same thing others already had, and called that thing the People. However, what was available to them, was too small: They mainly had their own knowledge (“people’s self-consciousness” in the form of a cell) and knowledge of the West (Peoples from the west), but they needed something more. For the construction of “their own People” they needed more material. Idea/cell needed matter, and it would be added in a turbulent processes of “populist awakening of the People” by already existing folk, the above mentioned Tudjman’s commons, or however it is called in different languages.

27 This issue can be understood through an expressive counter of the well known “Western” position. For example, for the Italian situation in the 19th century it was valid when in 1861, upon “joining of the territories” and establishment of statehood, the first Foreign Minister said the famous sentence: “Here it is, we have Italy, now we have to create Italians!” Any similarity with the e.g. sentence said by Tudjman, “We have Croatia” and its silent continuation is, naturally, accidental.

28 At this spot is seen that even “western” concept of the state is to a great extent of a populist origin, the only difference is that somehow it has been lost during the last two centuries. The speech about organization of the the United Nations is the obvious proof that even in the Anglo-American tradition there is a presence of equating People and the state, or even – what is more precise, in our opinion – lack of concepts of state and politics.

29 We will risk an analogu, and risk even more numerous complaints: It would be maybe the easiest way to understand the relation of populists towards People through Heidegger’s fundamental construction Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins (Heidegger, 1976).

30 To take seriously the 80s and the 90s in the former SFRY means at the same time to take seriously the role, sometimes decisive (most expressively in Croatia, then in Slovenia, and less in other areas) role of those returnees living abroad (Diaspora), who – differently from situation that I am trying to schematize here – were not educated at elite universities; most often they were not educated at all. They were trainee, pupils of “practice universities” such as “pizzeria management”, “waiting tables”, “transportation”... Very rarely will you find among them people who have degrees in philosophy, social sciences, some studies of humanity. We can explain the fact that the less they knew about politics and state, the more successful they were in building their own People, with the idea that they did not “build” either politics, or a state, but something else, different, something they were “specialized” for.

31 Hence the impression and reality of radical subjectivism and volunteerism among populists.
Populism is in that context, before all, a revolutionary politically mod-eled wish, of more or less educated returnees and future people’s revolu-tionaries. Upon return, the populist elite quite clearly see first their own “alienation” from “miserable and poor folk”. “Folk”, directed towards the heights of the People (whatever is “at the bottom”, whatever is Nothing, wants therefore to become All) is understood by populists (similarly like by Marxists) generally, through the simple formula of distinction – the have/the have-nots; that is, through poverty. That raw material-poverty is the dough from which populists bake. People in their revolutionary receptacle, were in their own eyes, comprehended as something in nuce, very healthy, in fact, extremely potent. Commoners were the substance that is a potential at the same time, something that will “underlie” (sub-stance), that “brings tradition” and therefore, the future itself. Populists relate to People as a possible product-child on whose creation-birth there is still more to be done, as “fathers”, but also as midwives-shepards. In such an environment, there will be no mercy for those who keep “our folk” in poverty, sickness and ignorance. The task of the populists is, of course, to free People (in creation) of all the bloodsuckers. From there comes a strong pathos of “emancipation” which reminds us of socialism. All that is possible for populists is that under the condition that they literally go “at people”. Nevertheless, a real, long term task of populists is to cancel the distinction between the commoners and themselves, populist elite, and in considerably smaller extent, it would be to discard all the exploiters. Canceling the difference is, in fact, the union of the populists with their “own folk”. More vulgarly told, People as a goal - from the position of populists as people’s initiators/inseminators - is achievable only in the case of literal, but not symbolic copulation with the folk.

That is the point where populists will achieve their goal, and in the lan-guage of psychoanalytical pathos - with their “sophisticated mind” (they are

32 This category was, similarly as by their contemporaries, social revolutionaries, very frequently used by people’s revolutionaries. Anyway, there is a more narrow connection than is usually thought. The issue was often, at least in the East, the two sides of one phenomenon, one had the working class for the central figure (worker), the others had People (peasant). The common thing is contained in violent revolutionary spirit, in methods and approaches of “construction”, and in an extreme anti-political and anti-statley attitude. 33 Potential multi-meaning (including the one of importance of natality), that was talked about a lot in past years in all fields that colonized with ideologies of the populist revolutions and which different churches handle very efficiently. All them are mainly joined not only by “anticommunism”, as it is usually wrongly thought, but also anti-statehood – as a struggle against secular, secularized state; and related to this, struggle for quite a determined type of non-state which must be identical to the People (Volksgemeinschaft). 34 We should not comprehend as a coincidence the fact that the basis of the discourse matrix among populist revolutionaries are metaphors from the area of oikos, home, family (Farther, People, figure..) at one side, and construction, building...(potezis) on the other. 35 That is the part of work that social revolutionaries vary about, that great part of the “people’s mass” will, in one moment, differentiate from the populists who will, in our circumstances are still pretty sensitive to anti-equalitarian moves – show very quickly themselves as new wealthy ones and producers of poverty, not like the ones who reduce or even cancel poverty.
the “active” part), they will fertilize the folk (raw-material, matter, passive female) and in that inspired and truthful, even divine act of creation, they will create/make the People. Spoken beyond ideological and populist self-comprehension, this Event of events (“Occurrence of the people”) that is shown as an act of divine creation is (that is why when acting on behalf of People, they do not shrink, no matter what), nothing else but a brutal rape of (their) commoners. Consequently, it is a creation point of something godly, divine, the untangible son of God, his majesty (supremacy), the People itself.

Populism in former Yugoslavia functioned almost in the same way at the end of 80s and 90s of the last century. After People “started” to function according to the pattern shown, from the present distance we can say without hesitancy that the birth of the People, in fact, was not a post-socialist coincidence or a by-product. It was a highly desirable goal and planned and very efficiently created product. The following should be added to what has been said: The birth of the People, there is no doubt about it, was, in fact, the birth of the tragedy from dough-matter, in an extremely brutal way.

Our hypothesis is that at the turn of 80s into 90s and through the nineties, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, populists (not nationalists) did the populist revolutions through which they, more or less successfully, established “their People” and sold their populist programs as nationalistic very successfully. Broad segments of the populace bought the product, believing they bought nationalism, and consequently “their state”, so they were accordingly surprised after realizing that what they bought is, in fact, the People, that is more or less, in conflict, not only with other peoples and states, but also with their own state and even with the very idea of statehood.

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36 That is exactly from where we should understand frequent conflicts between populist newly composed “states”, between which, more frequently seems that we are on the verge of a priori possible new wars. The problem is in the fact that in such relations we do not deal with two-sided “relations between states” Unfortunately, situations are such that, mostly, we neither have states, nor “relations”.

37 Maybe the “example” of Serbia is the most appropriate and most obvious for – brutal and literal – a clear distinction between nationalists and populists. The late Zoran Djindjic was a typical nationalist of the nineties, more or less liberal than the others, and his basic concept-idea, maybe even obsession for action was focused on state and citizenship. He was one of the rare ones who appropriately understood a self-governing “state” (state in self-cancellation) as “not-finished”. His wish (and the policy he lead) was “completion”, establishment of the state and statehood, some kind of normalization and escape from permanent extraordinariness. He was killed: The answer to the question why he was killed is simple, although to someone it might seem a paradox – because he was a nationalist and not a populist. Because he tried to “transcend” (calm down, norm, and normalize) People and to establish the state; because he was “ours”, populist, too little, and linked to the strange side, to the ‘western’ idea of a legal state and a constitution too much, because he overemphasized the meaning of Verfassungspatriotismus instead of “People-patriotismus”

38 The same is valid for other post-socialist environments in which there were no single-nation socialist unity. By the way, former “people’s democracies” of the Eastern block already at the level of their appointments had preserved the tradition of populism from 19th century, which was disabled per definitionem, in circumstances of Yugoslavianty.
Populists masked as nationalists sold the wrong product to “their people” (who became literally the “people’s”, which means “populist” and “Theirs”39). They have been selling and they still sell rather successfully, the new-social, populist die volks Gemeinschaft, and people (to a lesser extent) think they have both and buy political products such as democracy and or state. Instead of the political structure that we currently call the state, almost all those on the territory of the former state received sovereign products of social origin, called the People. That People, last but not least, with the aid of masquerading warrior’s, turned into some kind of independent state, which had very little to do with the state and statehood (oppression: monopoly of power and the exercise of violence,40) or had nothing in common. 41Instead of a legal and social state, people in this area got radical the populist structures of a non-state or, better told, People-states, which rather than anything else, exercised characteristics of post-modern, cultural-racist seances. In brief, the new populist structuration, that should be a state, does not function according to principles of citizenship, legal equality, freedom, and human rights. On the contrary, it consistently discriminates, harasses, segregates, excludes, disables, erases, hate and if necessary kills. Frequently it kills in an industrial, massive and systematic way. Instead of any “industrial production of things”, around which a modern state is organized, and to which it serves, here, we most often deal with no production of things (therefore they are mostly imported) and with hyperproduction of hostility and hatred, if necessary for (potential) “wars”. When we, more or less, as “a whole” started to sober-up from the populist hangover in this region, it was already too late. Trains and retailers of popular “baked sweets” (Buldozer) had already moved too far. The seller of a pup, who until yesterday preached from the television, sent trashy dispatches of heart-breaking cheap populist rhetoric, today - being a war profiteer or transition tycoon – he has become a creature which is ethnically and in all other ways superior. He has also become – that is also an issue here – the new master.

After fifteen years of populist orgies and all the things that accompanied the epic populist undertow, millions are slowly coming to their senses. 42More or less, it becomes clear that what we have received over the last few years of turbulence were not national parties or national states, those were some populist communities, organized as People-states at best, but most often as Peoples that

39 “Denationalization” (in fact, a populist category) that covered millions related to social ownership is something that has at least a double bottom: first, people were deprived of the state/denationalized, and only then it happened with things, land, buildings. When we talk about things, again, we deal with a double process: privatization (a person becomes an owner of former „social“ ownership, but in fact, it was „ownership of the state in derogation) and nationalization (persons become a part of the People, not a part of the state). Individuals in those populist processes of a fundamentalist nature do not necessarily become citizens, but they necessarily – by force if necessary – become Croats, Serbs, Slovenes. Compare the example of Slovenia related to “erased” in: Đedić, Jalušič, Zorn, (2003)

40 „Populist state” is being reduced to apparatus of force and violence. Frequent statements by Milosevic from the end of 80s, related to Kosovo, as a rule called for “legal state”, while we all knew too well that it meant calling for exercise of power - if necessary.

are trying to impersonate states rather unsuccessfully. In all those quasi-states, we have received also quasi-parliamentary democracies, whose essence is – they convince us – the possibility of “swapping the elites”. And it was exactly that (Parethian) reductive way of speaking about democracy as a mechanism of swapping the elites, which was written at the flesh of populists. That is to say, the whole thing is dependant on the (populist) elite. That is exactly what was installed by the populists – after their own image and based on themselves as elite. In that sense we have “societies”, people’s communities, that function according to the following matrix: At one side there is – surely still existing, but in fact, only newly established – some kind of community of small, common people (commoners), and on the other, there are elites (populists themselves, joined by newly formed elites). Now those new elites “enlighten” the folks, “pull” them out of poverty and exploitation, mostly from the “communist darkness”, and establish some happy presence, called the “People”. People in this sense are but a unity of re-established, expropriated folks (the more pauperized the more it is open for populism), and “enlighted” (in fact dimmed) elite, which leads to Heaven. Furthermore, it should be underlined that it was the deprived, dispossessing and humiliated folk on the one side, and the thin elite of mighty tycoons and recent quacks who became elite, on the other. These people were, in fact, the main product of populist revolutions and wars on “our” territories. What moves these newly created societies into ever deeper gaps between the first ones and the other ones, can be some kind of glue that is grounded on power and that should be already thought of as categories for upcoming conflicts.

At the end, we should warn that we should anyhow avoid the comprehension of populism exclusively as “outdatedness”, “backwardness”, the “past”, which is very simple to paste to such and similar appearances. The danger is especially serious if we look upon this problem from the so called “left perspective” which, by default, may make too great a simplification in valuing everything a priori as positive if it is “open”, “up-and-coming” and “revolutionary”. The problem with populists is far deeper and more dangerous.

It is clear that they are impersonating the state and visible to the point where there is no distinction between the “People’s interest”, and “national interest”, and “state interest”, i.e. “interest of the state and its citizens”. For them all that is, in fact, “one and the same”, all that is unknown to them. In the darkness of this ignorance, in which all the cows are black and the People are the same as the state, where there are no citizens and citizenship, not to mention human rights, one should look for causes for ever more dangerous hunting in the darkness, that became by far, the most successful and profitable “sport” discipline headed by populists themselves.

43 Compare analysis of cultural racism as the example of populism in Slovenia in: Kuzmanić, (1999)

44 It could be instructive to compare the writing of Vuk Draskovic, for example, in his novel “The Knife”, with his political engagement during the 80s and 90s.
Populism is not only a reactionary or revolutionary, conservative or thriving phenomenon. In our case, we deal with something that would be most accurately defined as a neo-conservative revolution, with the ingredients that are conservative or even neo-conservative but also revolutionary at the same time. Anyhow, populism as an ideology of a popular revolutionary act is something that goes extremely well with social revolutionary acts. That is exactly where the essence of our problem should be sought. If we simplify, the “ground” for shaping populism in the region, meaning, the ground of social revolutionary acts upon which the former system was founded, was (and still is) extremely hospitable for populists. Furthermore, the most frequent approach was the fusion of both concepts and mentalities, so it was very difficult to distinguish who is with whom in fact, and even more difficult to explain who is, in fact, against whom. Kinship (not only in programs) of social and populist revolutionary acts, their openness towards violence, only produce additional difficulties in attempts to decipher those, not very frequent, historical symbioses.

Something else should be said. We did not “fall into the abyss” through these concurrences, as it is often suggested. It is even worse: We fell into the feeble future. “Our wars” were not “medieval”, pre-modern. They were rather, and they will remain – if we do not prevent them by our thinking and acting – post-modern wars that anticipated to a great extent, the “wars” of the 21st century. We did not (unfortunately?) fall outside this history, we are in its sad coat-tails. Milosevic’s populist spirit spread in geometric progression and not even Bush Jr. is immune from it. In that sense “our experiences” and “our problems” are not ours only, they are of a universal nature.

Translated from Serbian by Olga Angelovska

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45 One of those was national-socialism. However, it seems it would be too easy to draw the analogy and say that what happened on the territory of the former state is only national-socialism. We believe that the whole thing is more complex in the sense of a “breakthrough” and mixture of elements of democracy with what had happened in thr 30s and additionally aggravates denoting and labeling. We would only plead that the appropriate label for what happened here is, in fact, post-fascism. More precisely appropriation of the concept of post-fascism can be found in: Kuzmanić, (2003)


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The late 20th century’s resurgent national movements in the Balkans and Eastern Europe promised, like in the case of earlier waves of European nationalism before them, prosperity through entry into the modern age. However, in most of what was Yugoslavia, as well as in a good many other parts of what used to belong to the realm of ‘actually existing socialism’ (Bahro 1978), it appears safe to conclude that current nationalist movements have performed no better in sustaining the growth of a flourishing modernity than their nineteenth century predecessors.

During the late nineteenth century’s golden age of European nationalism - at a time when the Piemontese champions of the Risorgimento and Prussian social engineers managed to construct powerful cohesive nation states out of culturally and politically heterogeneous city-states and petty dukedoms - in the Balkans, processes of nation state formation were still hampered by imperial domination, continued ethno-national rivalry and the nature of indigenous political and economic relations (Chirot 1989). This was all circumscribed by an inferior position of the region within the international geopolitical and economic regime of that time (Tomasevich 1955). The emergence of new nationalist movements in the 1980s and 1990s, has routinely, with this hindsight, been interpreted as a ‘return of history’ in favour of a better future. The trajectories of our times’ national movements in the Balkans and elsewhere in The Other Europe are, however, framed by a deep economic, social and identity crises, expounding that the project of the modern national state is today questioned at a more general level (e.g., the argument of Alibrow 1996). What has emerged in extended parts of the ‘Other Europe’ after the collapse of programmes for a better modernity through national gathering laid out by local master minds - the ill famed Serbian Memorandum among them (e.g. Schierup, 1999) - is a re-traditionalisation of politics, culture, and economy. An understanding of this, in many ways paradoxical, development demands alternative perspectives beyond the horizons of conventional interpretations of contemporary nationalism and the still ongoing post-communist transforma-
tion. It carries with it the dead weight of unsolved dilemmas belonging to the historical interlude of actually existing socialism and depends, as much as ever, on global economic and geopolitical contingencies [e.g. Schierup, 1999 #306].

**Realsozialismus:**
**Historical Triumph with an Inherent Dilemma**

The ‘historical achievement’ of Western European bourgeoisies was, in terms of economic modernisation, to develop an advanced industrial society based on science and technology, a proletarianised workforce and an increasingly sophisticated division of labour. This happened through the rupture with feudal bonds as in France, a radical transformation of feudal social relationships as in Britain, or through the eradication of whole peoples as in the case of the genocide that ruined the indigenous populations of North America.

Due to the emergence of the world wide hegemony of Western imperialism, modern revolutions in the twentieth century could not possibly have the same agents nor the same historical, social and ideological content.

Social revolutions in Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Albania and Cuba took place in societies on the periphery of the global economy.

Their problem was to make their societies capable of mastering the scientific-technological potentialities already in existence, not – in the first place – to create new more advanced ones. A precondition for overcoming underdevelopment was freedom from an unequal integration in the international division of labour (Marković 1979).

The bourgeoisies in pre-revolutionary Russia, China or Yugoslavia were disinclined to carry through a grand industrial transformation. They were, typically, weak and divided (e.g. Mouzelis 1986). There were - as maintained by Robert Brenner (1989), in his illuminating analysis of the historical roots of the continued economic backwardness of Eastern Europe - important ‘indigenous’ reasons for this. But, once inserted into world-wide structures of domination, the opportunities for action of indigenous bourgeoisies were blocked by their insignificant scale, their subordinate and ‘symbiotic’ relationship to international capital (Marković 1974), and due to a continued selfish tutoring of their peripheral societies by dominant world-political centres. The economic power of the West, in combination with the successful early construction of strong modern states, forcefully limited the scope of the strategies of indigenous elites in Eastern Europe and elsewhere to fight back (Chirot 1989).

Thus, historically, the ascent to power of centralised and highly disciplined communist one-party elites was not random. Rather, it expressed an historical necessity, understood in the sense of Bertolt Brecht’s famous dictum: ‘Upheavals take place in dead end roads’.1 There was a state of society and economy, where the coalitions that communist revolutionaries represent-

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104
ed appeared to be the only powerful alternative. They proved indeed capable of mobilising and concentrating the scattered resources of poor societies on the periphery of the capitalist world. They showed capable of setting up centralised authorities with strength to deal with predatory great powers, discriminatory international organisations and foreign capital, the power of which underscored the convoluted development of underdevelopment together with political ’Balkanisation’, corruption and nepotism. There hardly existed, under the historical circumstances prevailing in these parts of the world, any other programme for reform, any other charter for social justice, or any other organised movement that could realistically compete (in passim, Schierup 1990).

However, what was in the beginning a victorious concept, would, in the next instance, become a stumbling block for further modernisation. But the conspicuous demise of a projected long-term revolutionary transformation of all spheres of life cannot be deducted solely from the ideological horizon of the communist political elites themselves, nor, simply, from the nature of an inflexible state administrative planning process. Soviet history, from Chrutchev to Gorbachev, as Yugoslavian from Kidrić to Marković, gives, in the face of jeopardising contradictions, witness to will and action to reform the economic and political system of real-socialism from within. But, the incapacity of the post-revolutionary state bureaucracies to lead their nations beyond a certain limit of modernity was politically ’over-determined’ by the type of social coalition that lay at the roots of the bureaucracy’s political authority. The paralysis of communist reform efforts cannot be blamed simply on the bureaucracy’s own taste for power ‘in the last instance’, nor, plainly on the propensity of an uncompromising ’moralistic centralism’s’ incapability of ’tolerating partial truth’ and to ’absolutise everything’ as maintained by Ernest Gellner (1993:2). Rather, it represents an intricate problem of transgressing certain established forms of political consensus and legitimacy. This problematic has, in the case of the Soviet Union, been examined in the work of Victor Zaslavsky (1982). In Yugoslavia it took on a specific character; an issue most extensively discussed by Josip Županov.

**Actually Existing Self-Management**

The way in which the new post-war Yugoslavian working class was formed, within a society that was in 1945 still overwhelmingly agrarian (extensive analysis in Schierup 1990), had important consequences. Županov (1977) locates the central dilemma for Yugoslav socialist development in the contradictory relationship between a traditionalist society in the world’s economic periphery and a conception of socialism that had sprung from the western labour movement (see also, Katunarić 1988:153). Industrialism made possible, at least for some time, a compromise between the two. The mediating values were an ’egalitarianism’ departing from the perspective of equal redistribution, belonging to the modern labour movement, and an image of the limited good pertaining to the heritage of corporate peasant communities.
This social compact was reproduced and reinforced at the micro level in enterprises and work organisations. The economy was fragmented into functionally disconnected ‘segmentary associations’ with a dual power structure (Županov 1969), i.e. one derived from the techno-structure and from workers’ self-management principles, and one from the power of informal groups. The latter came eventually to predominate, set up as an informal social compact between localised bureaucracies and the quasi-proletarians of a fragmented working class, crystallising around the central values of redistribution and egalitarianism (see further, Schierup 1990).

The ideological world-view of the post-revolutionary political leadership, however, was fundamentally one of modernisation. Its dominant long-term perspective was a technically advanced society. This could not, forever, lean towards the egalitarian matrix of a proto-peasant manual working class, even if this was the main political basis legitimising the state bureaucracy’s dominant position in society in the role of redistributing the limited good. At a certain stage influential party-elite factions were to push forcefully for methods of economic management based on the allocative functions of the market, income differentiation, reliance on highly educated cadres and entrepreneurship.

Radical market oriented reforms in the 1960s were staged as an attempt to realise the preconditions for a more skill- and education-intensive economic development, which had been made possible due to the two preceding decades’ extensive investments in education and technical research and development (Schierup 1990). As such, the reforms also represented an attempt to become integrated into the international division of labour on more equal terms. It meant a rupture with earlier extensive industrial development and with egalitarian values in a society where unskilled industrial labour occupied a central position within the accumulation scheme. This represented a radical rupture with state bureaucratic hegemony and egalitarianist socio-political matrixes to the political benefit of directors of large firms, the technical intelligentsia and highly skilled and urban groups. It meant toppling the weight of a delicate economic and socio-political rural-urban balance in favour of the urban based segments of the population, but in a society where the unskilled/semi skilled, rural/semi-rural population segments would still represent an indispensable source of legitimacy for any stable political regime.

**Bureaucratic Backlash and New-old Liaisons**

Reforms of the 1960s were to become an *interregnum*. Rather than leading to the expected great leap ahead, they brought economic, political and social anarchy and fragmentation. Large sections of the manual labour force were heavily marginalised, among them the numerous so-called ‘peasant-workers’ (see further, Schierup 1990:82ff and 158ff). This was to undercut the reforming elite’s legitimacy among the manual working class while, simultaneously, the elite found it increasingly difficult to control new social and cultural forces unleashed by reforms. Exacerbating this jeopardy, by the advent
of the 1970s student revolts and numerous strikes by skilled workers started to coalesce with THE centrifugal forces of resurrected nationalist claims.

The response became, during the early and mid 1970s, a peculiar combination of authoritarian repression, permissiveness and new pervasive reforms from above. The proclamation and institutionalisation of a new phase in the development of ‘self-management’ should, on the one hand, act to harness popular protest and claims for social change to a common socialist cause under the guidance of the established elite. On the other hand, this new reform wave was geared to curtail unwanted tendencies towards economic anarchy and so-called ‘technocratic’ dominance, which had resulted from the haphazard manners in which the economic reforms of the 1960s had largely been conducted (Platform 1973), and which, allegedly, threatened to bring back the reign of a socially and politically disruptive peripheral capitalism, pre Second World War style (see further, Schierup 1990).

But rather than effecting the alleged new era of popular democracy and economic progress the reforms of the 1970s carried with them a pervasive re-bureaucratisation. This paved the way for a forceful political backlash. Županov (1983) speaks of a realignment of the old coalition between the manual working class and the political bureaucracy. This reaction was, however, to cast Yugoslav society in a mould qualitatively different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. It meant a profound re-traditionalisation of society. Bureaucratisation during the 1970s took place mainly at the level of the republics, and became dominated by local bureaucracies without grandiose visions of internationalism, popular democracy, or economic and technologi- cal self-reliance. It exploited the opportunities a transformed ‘self-management system’ offered for a bureaucratisation of all social relationships and could take on a profoundly localised form against the background of constitutional amendments that granted individual republics a large measure of political and economic autonomy (Županov 1983).

It was a coalition of unequal partners, in which the elite would ‘protect’ the working class by guaranteeing existing jobs, a minimal income and extensive social privileges, while the ‘protected’ would guarantee the elite its social legitimacy (Županov 1983). Labour would accept the official ideology, while the elite accepted the values of radical egalitarianism. This ‘social compact’ provided a basis for social stability in the face of a deepening economic crisis (Županov 1985). It was profoundly authoritarian in character. All that ever existed in the way of genuine workers’ self-management at the enterprise level largely died out in favour of the voluntaristic regulations of a ramifying bureaucratic apparatus.

The new bureaucratic elites of the republics and autonomous provinces entrenched themselves within what came to look like new local ‘national states’ with important features in common with pre Second World War Yugoslavia. Under the shadow of economic subordination, essential features of a pre-war neo-colonial ancien regime - the reproduction of state power through political clientilism and a network of primordial loyalties (Mouzelis 1986, Tomasevich 1955) - were from the early 1970s to blend with the most
authoritarian features of the social and political relations of real socialism. Local party elites and the ‘national’ working classes of the single republics and autonomous provinces were to be bound together by innumerable clientelistic ties of kinship, friendship, locality and ethnicity. They took the form of a network of reciprocal favours, pervading the entire society (Schierup 1990; cf. Sampson 1985, discussing other socialist countries). Patron-client relationships and nepotistic networks rooted also within a widely ramified underground economy came to penetrate society. During the 1980s and 1990s these types of local alliances were transformed into the broader nationalist-populist movements that lead Yugoslavia into collapse and civil wars.

A Systemic Paradox

In their central theoretical work on Soviet society from 1979, Diktatur über die Bedürfnisse (Dictatorship over Needs), Ferenc Féher, Agnes Heller and Georgy Markus (1983[1979]) point to underlying centrifugal social forces built into the practices of Soviet state bureaucracy. These ideas were, however, not introduced by Féher et al.. Intellectuals in former Yugoslavia had exposed similar problems long ago through in-depth analyses of their own political and economic system.

In his theory of ‘state capitalism’, dating back to the early 1950s, politician and economist Boris Kidrič (1952 and 1969) maintains that state socialism was characterised by contradictory forms of governance. Apparently centralistic, state-controlled planning systems contained impelling fragmenting forces. Local economic monopolies were defended in the context of ongoing political power struggles against competition from other regions and local communities and confronting higher levels in the state-bureaucratic pyramid. The consequences were dire in a society, which could not, at any level, integrate alternative social forces, be they functional markets, autonomous trade unions, political parties, or independent social movements cutting across ethnic boundaries.

This built-in contradiction between centralism and localism was common to all the socialist countries but, in Yugoslavia, factional localism was particularly marked. Local bureaucracies knew how to take advantage of the decentralisation of government self-management socialism (Schierup 1990:210ff.). Self-management did not affect the underlying state bureaucratic character of the system, but rather amplified its segmentary and potentially anarchic features. The Yugoslavian economist Časlav Ocić (1983) builds on Kidrič’s theories in his analysis of the development of local ‘national economies’ in the 1970s. Most pronounced and by far most threatening for the social cohesion, maintains Ocić, was ‘bureaucratic particularism’ at the level of the republics. Changes in the social and economic system and in the federal constitution (1974) made the republics’ the most potent vehicles for centralising political power at a sub-federal level and for publicly legitimising local monopolies by appealing to latent ethno-national loyalties. The local party organisations of the republics were set free to dominate almost all aspects of local social life:
the economy, political representation, social policy and education. Step by step the federal elite with its roots in the struggle against Fascism during the Second World War disintegrated. The authority of the central state was challenged by a new generation of political elites in the republics.

Political power accrued to the eventually independent communist party organisations and bureaucracies within the republics, who, on the ideological platform of ‘workers self-management’, formed corporate coalitions with segments of the local working classes. This exacerbated competition between local ‘national economies’ and between ethno-national groups for jobs, housing and positions within local state apparatuses (see also Schierup 1990:241ff). The eventual absence of alternative political identities rendered ethno-national identity its supreme status. An atomised federal structure, combined with continued communist party monopolies, meant that the only legitimate conflicts became those that followed ethnic lines (cf. Magnusson 1988). The legitimacy of the new ‘national’ elites in the republics rested on the Leninist-Stalinist idea of ‘the nation’, perceived as a primordial ethno-cultural collective with special rights to a certain territory. This interpretation was perfectly fitted to the efforts of the increasingly ‘national’ bureaucracies to legitimise their local hegemonies. The Yugoslavian federation was transformed into a loose and exceedingly conflict-ridden de-facto confederation.

Radical reforms in education towards the end of the 1970s were directed entirely at the level of the republics. The federal educational system had been dismantled. This exacerbated the development of separate ethnic-national identities. At the same time, higher education at the university level was given lower priority than vocational education at the high-school level. Parallel to these events, tens of thousands of highly educated people emigrated because job opportunities were scarce in an industrial sector, which regressed into a marginality reminiscent of the recent past (see further, Schierup 1990). It was primarily this section of the population that had embraced pan-ethnic (Yugoslavian) and cosmopolitan values. Therefore, emigration and reforms in education supported the general division of society along ethno-national lines. As the economic crisis deepened during the 1980s a fragmented communist state-bureaucracy should become the single most important midwife to blatantly absolutist ethno-nationalist ideologies and movements. A communist movement and a system which originally gained power primarily because it represented the only political alternative capable of uniting the population across traditional ethno-national divides, had shown itself capable of intrinsically transforming these antagonisms whilst simultaneously elevating them to become the all pervasive issue in the political and ideological arena.

**International Subordination and Technological Breakdown**

Ocić (1983) uses the idea of intra-bureaucratic segmentation to explain the specific terms on which Yugoslavia became again, since the early 1970s, a subordinate adjunct to the world economy, as this Balkan region had for so long been historically. A protracted economic and social crisis, latent during
the 1970s, but coming into the open during the 1980s, led, in conjunction with the centrifugal dynamics of state bureaucratic rule, to a escalating disintegration of the economic system (see also Mihajlović 1981; Bilandjić 1981; Horvat 1985). Despite the Yugoslav constitution’s emphasis on a unitary Yugoslav market, closed separate ‘national’ sub-economies (corresponding to territories of single republics and autonomous provinces) developed (Ocić 1983). This territorialisation of single autarchic economies within the federation was defended through ‘visible and invisible’ means by ‘national’ interest groups located in the individual republics and autonomous provinces. They produced their own legitimacy through the fabrication of still more openly populist-nationalist ideologies (see also Bilandjić 1981; Katunaric 1988).

The economic fragmentation, of which Ocić speaks, became increasingly evident during the 1970s and 1980s, and translated into open rivalry between mutually opposed local elites mobilising around national symbols. Republics and autonomous provinces developed separate power structures and institutions, which favoured economic autarchy. Capital investments would increasingly take place within single republics, while inter-republican transfers of capital dwindled. Through informal means republics and provinces fiercely guarded their own ‘home-markets’ while they fought and undercut one another trying to sell similar products on the world market (Ocić 1983; Korošić 1988). Patterns of trade were either locked inside the borders of each single republic or, increasingly, flew from each republic in the direction of the world market (Ocić 1983). Patterns of internal (intra-Yugoslavian) migration and urbanisation processes became, in the process, increasingly ‘ethnocentric’: Serbs migrated from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo to Belgrade, Croatians in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Voivodina towards Zagreb, ‘Muslims’ from Serbian Sandjak and Montenegro towards Sarajevo, etc. This all contributed to a progressing ethnic homogenisation of would be ‘national territories’ and labour markets.

Yugoslavia’s political and economic fragmentation ran parallel with integration on unequal terms into the international division of labour. New asymmetric economic ties developed in relation to transnational capital. The most important was discriminatory conditions for the transfer of technology. This was contingent on the collapse of previous long-term efforts at domestic technical research and development (Đurek 1981). Federal institutions for technical-scientific education, research and development were dismantled in connection with the profound decentralisation of the political and institutional system. The corollary of a growing autarchy of republics and autonomous provinces became that of single units forging individual bonds with western partners. Production equipment, industrial licences and spare parts were bought from foreign partners without co-ordination or co-operation (Mihajlović 1981; Ocić 1983:110ff.). The existence of a multitude of different technical conceptions and systems, licenses and standards impeded co-operation among Yugoslav partners and made Yugoslav plants increasingly dependent on foreign partners, but on unequal terms. Parallel to
the disarticulation of the joint economic infrastructure in general, facilities for research and development became fragmented and marginalised in the wider international context (see, further Ocić 1983, Đurek 1981).

Re-Traditionalisation in Re-Peripheralisation

From its position as one of the most promising Newly Industrialising Countries in the early 1960s, Yugoslavia slipped back to its former position as an economically stagnating and politically unstable European region. Republics and autonomous provinces had come to constitute disconnected ‘national economies’ dependent, on unfavourable terms, on transnational capital, know-how and technology. While federal economic structures were being pushed into the background and the economies of the single republics increasingly isolated from one another, Yugoslavian enterprises became unilaterally coupled to the world market as the last and most subordinate link in transnational chains. Through the faculty of an inflated petrodollar market, following the ‘oil crisis’ of the 1970s and assisted by Tito’s international authority, the national debt had grown to threatening proportions. The situation was further complicated by extreme and growing disparities in levels of economic development and rates of growth between different parts of the federation (cf. Schierup 1990:155ff. and 189-215).

This ‘re-peripheralisation’ (Schierup 1992) of Yugoslavia acted, in its effects, to marginalise a numerous intelligentsia. It created a retrograde deterioration of the educational system, and it spawned a general re-traditionalisation of society running along the lines of new types of ‘symbiosis’ between its rural and urban domains.

Originally, propelled by socialist visions of a technically advanced social era, an unprecedented expansion of institutions for higher education took place after the Second World War. By the 1960s Yugoslavia witnessed an eruption of social and professional aspirations among young people. The result, under the conditions of ‘reperipheralisation’ from the late 1960s, became, however, a ‘hyper-production’ of young ‘experts’ and intellectuals, which a stagnating economy was unable to absorb (cf. Županov 1981). As expressed by Korošić (1988:147) the articulation between a segmentary state bureaucratic management and the forces of an unequal international division of labour gave the economic and social crisis of the 1980s the character of a ‘crisis of innovation’. It implicated the continued predominance of unskilled or semi-skilled manual labour in ‘peripheral’ labour processes. During the 1970s and 1980s a huge, but eventually largely structurally superfluous, technical intelligentsia was becoming matched by an ever decreasing number of international patents (Korošić 1988:147, Đurek 1981). Efforts to promote advanced research and development floundered (see Đurek 1981; Horvat 1985), no new long-term conception of an integrated education of technological cadres was conceived. Under these conditions, the existing technical intelligentsia was
most liable to be either ‘exported’, disciplined according to the criteria of a conservative management, or to remain unemployed.

Secondary school reforms from the late 1970s were to reproduce this situation, setting the stage for a more long-term re-traditionalisation of society.

A skilled and highly educated army of unemployed had by the 1980s become a permanent feature of society (Davidović 1986; see also, Schierup 1990). The school system ceased to be a channel for social mobility. To make a living, young people were driven into the informal veins of a large shadow economy or were forced to sustain themselves as parasites in a familistic process of barter. ‘Just like his peer 200 years ago’, writes Županov (1981:1953) ‘a young person cannot lean himself towards any other institution than his own family-background... Other institutions let him down - and if he has no rights to expect and realise through the institutions of society, then he must get them by barter and blackmailing; and here the family is his main support’.

This was exacerbated by the political leadership’s conception of extensive industrial development as the strategic option (Korošić 1988:146), which guided a radical reorientation of the educational system in parts of Yugoslavia during the late 1970s. An industrial labour force was formed, which fitted Yugoslavia’s retrograde position in the international division of labour. The number of students accepted to higher academic education decreased. Priority was given to short-term education directed towards skilled industrial employment and other skilled occupations. The secondary-school system’s stress on versatility and general knowledge was supplanted by early specialisation in narrowly delimited subjects.

The explicit goal of the first educational reform along these lines, which was undertaken in Croatia in 1978, was to curtail ‘elitist tendencies’ in the old school system (Podrebarac 1985). By forcing about 70 per cent of the primary school-leavers to enrol in schools leading to extremely narrowly specialised working-class professions, the educational system effectively ceased to promote inter-generational social mobility (Županov 1981:1950). The reforms were constructed so as to systematically hamper inter-regional mobility (Županov 1981:39). Linking contracts to employment in particular enterprises and organisations obliged students to work in the same local areas in which they started their education. This was exacerbated by the clientelistic character of society in general, as outside their own local area, without kinship, friendship, ethnic and other informal relationships, it proved practically impossible to obtain such contracts (Županov 1981:39). In a situation where any indigenous scientific-technological development of importance had ceased, an extensive semi-industrial and industrial production came to function as the basis for a primitive accumulation of capital and, as long as it lasted, consolidated the rule of a primitive bureaucracy dependent on excessive foreign loans (Strpić 1988). The reformed educational system acted as a systemic mediator ‘procuring
suitable servants and subjects - non-creative, uncritical, unfit for high-productivity, self-organisation and social action’ (Strpić 1988:39-40).

This development was interlaced with a ‘rural-urban symbiosis’ that should remain a basic structuring feature at the heart of Yugoslavian society and the successor states during the 1980s and 1990s. It became the backbone of those social compacts – of a semi rural manual working class and petty bureaucrats in villages and provincial towns - that would carry up the rule of populist tribunes like Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman.

Initial industrialisation in socialist Yugoslavia had rested on the so-called ‘peasant-worker’ strategy (Kostić 1955, Cvjetičanin et.al. 1980, Schierup 1990). With a partial reproduction of a large labour force within a subsistence oriented peasant economy, wages in the socialised sector of the economy could be kept low and ‘free rent’ harnessed; a source of ‘primitive accumulation’ for socialist reconstruction. The genuine peasant population decreased rapidly. But both in villages and towns there continued, into the 1980s, to exist categories of the population, who were ‘situational’ peasants (Korošić 1988:91); in the village a sort of ‘proto-peasantry’, for whom the land remained an indispensable source of income; in urban-industrial areas widespread dependency on this spurious peasant economy.

The crisis of the 1980s restored the importance of small-scale private agriculture. It was to become an important ‘shock-absorber’ as the Yugoslavian economy was shaken up after having been ‘doped’ by excessive foreign loans and migrant remittances during the 1970s (Puljiz 1987:15). Economic reforms and incipient prosperity for certain urban groups in the 1960s and the petro-dollar boom that had broad distributive effects in terms of rising living standards during the 1970s, faded out as historical intermezzos, when a latent economic crisis burst openly the 1980s. At this juncture peasant agriculture became again, as during the great depression of the 1930s (see Tomasevich 1955, Schierup 1990), the main bastion of retreat for substantial population groups. A cultural backlash and ‘re-traditionalisation’ went hand in hand with this reaffirmation of a ‘rural-urban symbiosis’. Those who were the most exposed were those among the urban population living exclusively on their wages or pensions.

The crisis also meant a reaffirmation of the ‘peasant-worker’ as an important social category. But the basis was no longer ‘primitive accumulation’ directed towards domestic industrialisation as in the two decades following the Second World War. ‘The free rent’ from subsistence-oriented agriculture was now sifted off by transnational networks. The most important mechanism was sub-contracting. Foreign companies subcontracted existing production facilities of Yugoslav firms, while exploiting village-based labour in return for sub-minimal wages. An example was the development of the textile and clothing industry during the 1980s (Chepulis 1984a); a ‘historical rebirth’ of foreign dominance in that industry, first established during the period between the two world wars (Chepulis 1984b). Textiles were exported at prices way below the cost of production,
and export itself became ‘an economic sacrifice and necessity for maintaining production’ (Chepulis 1984a:12). This was effected by federal economic policies during the 1980s, which enforced ‘export at any price’ (Chepulis 1984a:12) trying to cope with austerity measures imposed by the IMF. The Yugoslavian textile industry paid lower wages than any other industry and became renowned for having the ‘highest level of exploitation in the world’ (*Ekonomska Politika* 1989:15ff.), with wages below those in countries such as Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea; some of Yugoslavia’s main competitors on the world market.

**‘Identity Seekers’ or Predatory Survival Strategies**

Reactions resulting from this new-old ‘dead end road’ - of protracted economic and social crisis, of soaring poverty, of political fragmentation and clientilism, of cultural segmentation *cum* re-traditionalisation – became Milošević’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, Tudman’s final solution in the name of the Croatian millenarian dream and, in effect, civil wars and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The new populist movements started up with promises for fast tracks into modernity. Serbia was to be transformed into a prosperous modern Switzerland of the Balkans, Croatia to retake its just place among the modern European nations, sheltered from Oriental backwardness by unambiguously Catholic *Antemurales Cristianitatis*, which definitely did not include Serbs.

Cynically understood, the new nationalism may be seen as just another phase in the creation of modern culturally homogenised national states (e.g. Gellner 1992), taking on notably bloody features in this part of Europe with its ‘uncompleted’ national projects. But, on the ground, it was difficult to discern any fulfilment of the spuriously modern logics of nationalist master-programmes. At work, we came to meet neither the spirit of a rationalist enlightenment, nor any contemporary manifestation of a Weberian Protestant ethic style modernity (e.g. Gellner (1992). Nor will the historical image of the Holocaust’s rationalised and hyper-perfectionist modern mass murder do [e.g. *Bauman, 1989 #2595*. Rather, the generalised violence following ethnic-nationalist mobilisation across former Yugoslavia appears to correspond to Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s (1993) axiom of the triumph of irrationality in contemporary civil wars; a pandemonium of ‘losers fighting losers’ without any kind of orderly conception of the present, let alone a vision for the future.

The seemingly unbounded nature of current ‘ethnic cleansing’ cannot be explained with reference to an elaborate and relatively coherent ideological system. It has to do, rather, with the particular character of the ‘reborn’ nationalism, which, Kaldor (1993) argues, could best be identified as ‘a primitive grab for power’ based on an anarchic ‘war economy’. The new nationalism became de-centralised and fragmenting in contrast to ear-
lier nationalisms, which were centralising and unifying. Its ideological legitimacy was to become that of trivial and ad hoc identity claims. This is a far cry from the modernist horizon of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences or, for that matter, any other local intellectual master programme for national reconstruction in ex- or post-Yugoslavia. But the scenario corresponds to the visage of a range of other crisis ridden trouble spots in the contemporary world like the post-Soviet Trans-Caucasian region, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Africa’s Horn, Angola, Rwanda, the Congo, to mention only a few. It keeps up with a (post-)modern global process, marked by the return of neo-traditionalism in the contexts of ‘political economies of internal war’ (Duffield 1994).

We may see contemporary populist-nationalist movements as ‘seekers of solid identities’ in a contemporary world of contingency and flux (Peterson 1994). But, on the periphery of the transnational world-system this appears to express something existentially different from the identitarian manipulation of the modern media ‘image space’ (Peterson 1994:6) in the post-modernist West. It is about the cultural accomplice to the fabrication of new local shadow economies, structured around a reason of survivalism and fast spoils, woven intricately into the tissue of very real traditionalist social relationships (kin, clan, friendship, locality, ethnicity). We encounter an ethos belonging to Mafia-like patron-client networks and informal economies; configurations induced and made imperative by transnational relationships that turned these parts of the world into the last link in a chain of complex interdependency structured along the lines of political dominance and an uneven international division of labour.

Their particular background in the ‘Second World’ are unequal conditions in confrontation with a global capitalist economy undergoing profound re-structuring. The social and economic systems of actually existing socialism proved incapable of commanding forms of organisation contingent with the demands of the third industrial revolution on increased ‘just in time’ flexibility and decentralised institutional autonomy harnessed to an intensified accumulation of capital (cf. Castells and Kiselyova 1995). At the same historical juncture, transnational capital’s vastly expanded integration of selected formerly ‘third world’ regions into their economic orbit meant that the stagnating and increasingly world-market dependent economies of The Second Europe were abruptly exposed to new sources of competition. In extended parts of the Second (Communist) World’ the results became exclusion of intellectual and skilled labour, an extended brain drain and forced full or partial reproduction of the majority of the remaining labour force within informal shadow-economic networks and, like in Yugoslavia, the revival of a rural-urban symbiosis. Re-traditionalisation became the elementary cultural kit of a day-to-day social life revolving around regional-local networks of self-help and clientelism.

Imperatives of the transnational micro-electronic world order left modernist reformers little other choice than one of combining their efforts at
economic, political and cultural change with some transformed version of habitual legitimacy policies. A hyper-radical modernisation project, like that of Ante Marković was, in the process, with unanticipated speed, devoured by its own unwelcome offspring: immanent industrial closures, public sector shrinkage and threats of mass unemployment. But, once leaning towards well-worn matrixes of populist legitimacy, reminiscent of a late edition of real-socialism, new local nationalist regimes were caught in a dynamics, which they themselves were not able to control. For, in a part of the world where international super-austerity measures and isolationist containment policies make no social compromise possible, the most obvious exit for ship-wrecked elites, as well as the only immediate avenue to the boons of modernity apparently still open to the common man, appeared, in the last instance, to be that of internal war, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and an anarchic economy of pillage, all couched in a massive cultural exodus into a more glorious past. This is the critical historical memorandum of Yugoslavia.

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116


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III

CAUSES AND DYNAMICS
OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA
Latinka Perović

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA

“In practical life, as well as in history, final decisions are made only by real reasons”

Stojan Novaković

The disappearance of the Yugoslav state in wars that were waged during the last decade of the 20th century is a fact that concerns all former Yugoslav nations equally. If nothing else, their historical situations are different and should be studied as such. Any different approach would deepen old misunderstandings and create new ones, but above all, it would not lead to an assessment and explanation of the real reasons for the disappearance of the Yugoslav state.

The Serbian people, who for the first time in history lived together in the Yugoslav state, found themselves living in the ruins of that state at the end of the 20th century and back to where they had already been at the end of the 19th century. The question is how did this happen? The answer to this question is not possible without the help of history. However, history cannot be limited to the last fifty years, i.e. to the formula offered by the then banned Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the nineteen twenties, which normatively set and accomplished the formula during World War II and its aftermath.

Among different interpretations of the reasons for the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, when we talk about Serbian historiography, two dominate: 1) Great powers, whose will created Yugoslavia in the first place, did not find any reason for its further existence after the Cold War and 2) Yugoslavia disintegrated due to the separation of Slovenia and Croatia, and other republics that followed their example.

Domination of national themes was a joint feature of historiography in all states – that is successors of the former SFRY. Although not different from historiography in all Eastern-European countries, domination of national themes in historiography of Yugoslav nations mainly was an expression of their need to

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* Higher Scientific Associate, The Institute For Modern History, Belgrade
1 See: Latinka Perović, From Centralism to Federalism, Zagreb, 1984
2 This was ascertained also by Međunarodni znanstveni posvet (International Scientific Council) Zgodovinopisje v drzavah naslednicah SFRJ

121
uncover the deeper roots of disintegration of Yugoslav state, i.e. long lasting processes that were leading to their development into modern nations. At the same time, that was a consequence of instrumental zing the past. Objectivity about the past, which presumes a non-emotional approach by historians in the use of professional ethics, still stands as a target which historiographies of all South Slav nations face, to a greater of lesser extent.

In Serbian historiography, even Stojan Novakovic (1842-1915) raised the issue regarding the consequences of unconfident and lying history. He emphasized that such history only pointed out new sins and that this was not needed by the Serbian people. Rather, only the history that would serve as a basis for new lessons was necessary. That approach has never been realized, today more than ever. In fact, the explanation of the position in which the Serbian nation found itself after two centuries of its modern history put Serbian historiography to the test: how to identify and analyze this tendency in its development which proved, during two centuries, to be incompatible not only with the Yugoslav state in all its variants - monarchic and republican, unitary or complex - but also with the modern Serbian state. Of course, here we talk about a people’s state in which both the religious and social component of Serbian patriarchal issues are embodied. The bottom line is that these two components are closely related. However, authors of ever more numerous papers about the disintegration of the Yugoslav state and wars do not establish this connection or they do it very rarely.

The ethno-religious dimension of wars is emphasized more than it was earlier. That can be explained through the notable role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the final two decades of the 20th century, a role that was more national-political than religious. “Even the highest dignitaries were unambiguous in that sense. Explaining why Serbs know so little about ‘their religion’, Patriarch Pavle noted that in its history, the Serbian Orthodox Church was less occupied with religion and more with the state and politics. Without questioning that fact, the Patriarch notes that during its entire history, including the 20th century, the Church had to “leave its primary duties aside”, in order to participate actively in the struggle for ‘Serbian Unity’ in which each “priest had to be both a teacher and a judge and even to take up a rifle in order to defend himself and his family”. In expressing this, the Patriarch neither expressed reservations with regards to the latest wars, nor did he offer his position”. The logical conclusion that is derived from this is that the Patriarch’s “legitimate neglect of spiritual tasks in the interest of the creation of a state, which logically called for war to achieve such an end, meant, even indirectly, legitimizing the support that the Church gave to the Serbian wars for the state during the last decade of the 20th century. It was also an implicit message that the Church will continue to deem this posi-

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tion legitimate and to ‘put its primary duties aside’ in the future so that it can deal with politics and if needed, with war, until all the Serbs are in the same state.”

Such a role for the Serbian Orthodox Church becomes understandable when one looks at the relations between the main trends in Serbian development during last two centuries; the relation between the patriarchal and modern approach, which is a central difference between newly formed ideologies, formulated political programs and determined priorities of development. However, from the perspective of history over the two last centuries, two tendencies in the development of Serbian people are noted: srbijanska, the development of a real modern Serbian state, ipso facto, by models of West-European states and as a seat of cultural unity for the Serbian people; and Great-Serbia, the political unity of Serbian people through the extension of the Serbian state to all territories populated by Serbs.

These two tendencies were incompatible. However, it was necessary that the latter tendency come full circle in order that the “relief” of history be noticed first. “Serbia, as a “state of Serbian people” existed less than 40 years (1878-1912), and then, during the whole 20th century, it was a part and an axis of multinational states - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, Yugoslav Kingdom, Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and finally, in the 21st century it became part of a specific state union – the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro – with a realistic chance to become only Serbia, again, in case of separation by Montenegro. A two centuries long cycle – from the First Serbian Uprising until today – was filled with social and political achievements and failures, with searches and experiments, whose roots should be traced in a period between the forties and nineties of the 19th century; when consolidation of the Serbian state was done and when concepts of its further development were determined”.

In any case, the point is that we do not talk about one development concept but about concepts.

The foundations of the Greater-Serbia concept rely on the tradition of the Serbian medieval state, which was the organic comprehension of a nation as an indivisible unit, as a single personality. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as one of the churches of the East, was also based on this organic principle. It appears as a bearer of national identity and is linked with the state; a triad nation-church-state is, by definition, opposite to the constitution of a modern nation as a community of citizens, i.e. a liberal and secular state. Realization of an ethno-national state goes hand in hand with constant wars for territories and ethnic cleansing. But no state that was projected by the elite (not very different from the people), during the key time frame of the 19th and 20th century, was considered a completed state.

In its widest perception, Yugoslavia was also a Serbian state, populated by both Croats and Slovenes as well, and that is why it is imaginable only as an un-
tary and centralized state. Federalism, even in its administrative-cultural form, and especially con-federalism, was considered more or less, an open separatism. Each attempt of constituting the Yugoslav state as a complex state opened the issue of the Serbian body within ethnic borders that were difficult to determine.

Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirovich said to Professor Mihailo Konstantinovic, who worked on the Agreement between Serbs and Croats for proclaiming Banovina Croatia in 1939, “that he had always thought that Serbs should have their own state and not to mix with others”. He saw Agreement with Croats exclusively as a political tool to preserve the state, not as a principle that would be a foundation for that state. One should not go on and create some Banovinas.

In the second half of the 20th century, the Serbian Orthodox church was reduced to its basic function. Even that function was reduced itself, and the Church was monitored in exercising it. When the Communist project, within which the model of revolutions across Eastern Europe was shaped in 20th century, entered its final stage of crisis, the Serbian Orthodox Church engaged in politics. In order to prevent modernization of society, i.e. further development of the Yugoslav state as a complex state, the religious elite reaffirmed the ideology of a ethno-national state. Besides religion, intellectual, political and military elite stood with a slogan – all Serbs in one state.

Factual defeat of the ethno-national project did not lead to its reassessment. On the contrary, its defense is underway, and more or less open. When Europe becomes tired, “Serbs should be ready for a revision of their defeat”. An assessment that the moment has come for the revision, created in society the state which professor Vojin Dimitrijevic recently described as a bizarre counterrevolution. But, if counterrevolution is immanent to revolution, then the root of counterrevolution and in the Serbian people is in the revolution that took place at the very beginning of the 19th century.

Summing up the Serbian people’s history of last two centuries, Zoran Djindjic expressed in 2001: “Since the First Serbian Uprising, Serbia has continuously been on a seesaw. This is true of almost every individual and the nation, as a whole…If we look at Serbian history since 1804 until today, all big disputes happened between modernists and anti-modernists, reformers and those afraid of any kind of change. Unfortunately, up to now, reformers usually suffered.”

Explanation of this fact followed. Reformers focused on development of the society in order to reach the state, and their opponents focused on the state, i.e. the union of Serbian people, without differentiating the state and the society: “During the last hundred years, we have always dealt with state issues but beneath the surface, we have an outdated inefficient society with archaic institutions. We are constantly improving Constitutions and living in the Middle Ages in many social areas. Instead of saying now: Our aim is modernization of soci-

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8 Ibid, 197
9 Srđa Trifunović, Danas, November 16-17 2002, XVIII
10 Zoran Đinđić, Serbia in Europe, Belgrade, 2003, p. 299- 300
The World is in an institutional transformation. Who will have sovereignty, how sovereignty will look in ten years, it does not depend on us… 11 The world is facing new challenges deriving from globalization, from environmental issues, from technological processes.” 11

Zoran Djindjic based the modernization of Serbia at the turn of centuries on understanding the essence of Serbian history, but also on a grasp of the processes the modern world is passing through. He saw illegitimacy of the party state as a direct objective of that strategy. Anyway, all Eastern European states, as well as all the republics from the second Yugoslavia faced that objective. Only Serbia reacted to it with the anti-bureaucratic revolution, in which it, in fact, obtained the authoritarian leader. He fermented the disintegration of Yugoslavia and closed Serbia for changes.

The long-term goal of Zoran Djindjic’s strategy was Serbia’s rapprochement to the values of West-European civilization. That means to adjust “its economy, legal institution, environmental protection to European norms”, or otherwise, stay a “bankrupt Balkan mass,” “on the sidelines of the future”, always ready to reignite ethnic and regional conflicts. 12

Out of reasonable fear based on the knowledge of historical experience and fear that Serbia will loose time once again, stay on the margins of development, stuck in the mud13, Djindjic insisted on fast changes by radical means: “If we want this objective, we have to accept the means leading to it”, “to pay a price for objectives we have accepted… and the price is the same for all the world’s nations.” In other words: “Let us grow up as a nation and as a people.”14

Growing up requires a reassessment of past. 15 Inevitable questions are: “How could all these wars happen?”, “Who is to blame, who are they?” 15 There is no maturation of either individuals or nation, there is no credibility without it. But regaining credibility is not only a condition imposed from the outside, but also an internal existential need. “We need justice as a consciousness that perpetrators have been identified and punished. There is no future without it. Either they will regain the power and close the process, or the process will carry them away. There is no third option. It is not possible, after these ten years of enormous robbery, misuse, murder, to say now, ‘we are at the zero point and we are starting from scratch.’”16

It is necessary to polarize a mentality consisting of both Eastern and Western elements. Zoran Djindjic did it with his European strategy. While still in opposition to the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, he unambiguously outlined his stand: “My choice is clear: I wanted to be seen as a pro-Western politician.”17 That is how he saw the orientation of the Government at the head of which he was, as well. “Luck for this government is that we found ourselves on the right side of history, and history is European integration.” That is the “spirit of an epoch”18 which is dangerous to dispute.

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11 Ibid
12 Ibid, p. 397
13 Ibid, p. 168
14 Ibid, p. 139
15 Ibid, p. 207
16 Ibid, p. 139
17 Ibid, p. 204
18 Ibid, p. 322
European strategy is not ideological. On the contrary, it is an alternative to the union of ethnic nationalism and state socialism through which Serbia reacted to changes at the end of 20th century. One can also understand the SANU Memorandum within that core idea. In critiques of this document, especially in numerous political attacks, its very ideological essence was losing attention. The exception is the essay by Prof. Ljubomir Madzar, *Who exploits whom*.

Not contesting the description of the situation in Yugoslav state and society, Madzar saw the Memorandum, before all, as an amalgam of state socialism and nationalism, two ideologies that dominated in Serbia over the 19th and 20th centuries. So, it was an anachronous program which did not seek an exit “in determinate and definite emancipation of the economy from politics and in transferring the economy to a solid path toward a market economy.” The collectivist form of property was favored, which assumes “political monopoly as logic dependent and inevitable precondition for global stability in a socio-economic system in the widest sense of the word”.

The call for national interest, i.e. for returning to the 19th century, ensured that the price of resistance relative. This call still lasts, so not even today are there data on human and material casualties, as well on all other consequences (social, demographic, cultural, health) of the longest war in a long history of wars that Serbia participated in during 19th and 20th century.

Alternative to this program, has been a crystallized based of knowledge on minor groups that wars waged over the last decade of the 20th century brought Serbia “according to all criteria, especially economically, among the worst rated (countries) on Earth.” Then, based on the knowledge that, due to an ideological project that prevailed at the end of the eighties of the 20th century, Serbia conflicted with the spirit of the time and missed the real chances presented after the Cold War in breaching the ruling ideology in all countries of Eastern Europe (large investment cycle after the fall of the Berlin wall; IT trends, a period of recovery for the world economy). At last, based on the admittance of a factual defeat of great-state ideology.

The strategy resulting from the above mentioned knowledge remained minor, but has created a polarized mentality. After the defeat of the project which in Serbia at the end of 20th century was a reply to the biggest challenge in its modern history, this strategy was the most comprehensive alternative strategy that Serbia ever had. Its aim was the creation of a European Serbia. But all the conditions were fulfilled for this aim not to remain only a declaration: respect for the constants in the development of the Serbian state and society over the past two centuries; knowledge of the modern world; insight into the real position of Serbia and its possibilities; readiness to take over responsibility for its own development, i.e. abandoning the idea that the country is “a part of a world conspiracy” and instead adopting that it is “simply...a part of very complex world.”

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21 Ibid, p. 224

22 Zoran Đinđić, *Serbia and Europe*, p. 279

23 Ibid, p. 206
Reactions to the strategy for a European Serbia proved that there was a polarization of mentalities. The reflex for closing up and self-isolation is very strong. Refusal to see wars as a main reason for impoverishment and general degradation in the society, to admit and sanction committed crimes, represents in its essence the expression of continuity of an archaic ideological project, which had a decisive role in the Yugoslav state’s destiny. The outcome of conflicts of the patriarchal project that degenerates and the strategy with the aim to have a European Serbia is not finished.

On the eve of the presidential elections in Serbia in 2002, Zoran Djindjić stated that: “Even if Kostunica wins, he would still be far away from winning the battle for Serbia. Only then the battle would really start.”24 However, the question is whether the fact that Zoran Djindjic physically is not here, means that the battle is finished for Vojislav Kostunica.

It’s worth recalling Zoran Djindjic again. In one of his lectures held in Berlin in 1992, he said: „the destiny of Serbia is less and less in the hands of the political system, and thus of the parties, and ever more dependant on autonomous social processes. Behind all inter-party and personal disputes, at the end, which means very soon, the basic dispute will be crystallized, a dispute between modernists and anti-modernists. That is, between those who want normal European development for our country, with all appropriate rules and institutions, and those in favor of a special road for Serbia” 25

The division between modernists and anti-modernists and the tension it brings in Serbian society does not derive from the personal differences of the two men. Therefore it will not disappear with the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, to the same extent in which the electoral victory of Vojislav Kostunica could not be a definite victory.

Translated from Serbian by Olga Angelovska

24 Ibid, p. 55
25 Ibid, p. 55
THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICTS

If we adopt the premise that religious wars are only those wars that are waged about religious disputes and unresolved issues, then the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were not religious wars (at least not in a narrow sense), because they were not instigated by religious problems. In that way, they differ from religious wars of the past. For example, the religious wars of 17th century Europe would not have been possible without the Protestant Reformation, which de facto represented an act of a religious reform and transformation. Furthermore, if we accept that the importance of the religious dimension of a conflict increases in proportion to the extent to which the religious structures within a state coincide with the power structures (the thesis of the German theologian Heintz-Günther Stobbe) then the former SFRY is definitely not a good example of that. Secularization was a predominant process until the late 80s, while an increased religiousness mainly coincides with the transition from one quasi-religious system (ideology of Communism) into another (nationalist ideologies).

Communism and nationalism, as well as religion, are the symbolic systems on which any broader, functional or symbolic definition of religion, could probably be applied. Take, for example, the functional definition of Milton Yinger from 1970:

“Where one finds awareness of and interest in the continuing, recurrent, permanent problems of human existence – the human condition itself, as contrasted with specific problems; where one finds rites and shared beliefs relevant to that awareness, which define the strategy of an ultimate victory; and where one has groups organized to heighten that awareness and to teach and maintain those rites and beliefs – there one has religion”. 2

In his approach to religion, Yinger rejects the need to discuss the supernatural as an essential element of religion, while other authors contend that there is no religion without the belief in the supernatural. At any rate, this definition is too wide and may include some forms of quasi-religiosity that, in turn, also represent the systems of belief and activity providing the answers to fundamental

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questions about the meaning and sense of life. Yinger’s main problem is how to precisely distinguish religion from other forms of belief: faith, indeed, may be religious, as well as non-religious in its character.

A similar dilemma is implied by the well-known and detailed definition of religion formulated by Clifford Geertz in his work *Interpretation of Cultures*:

“Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”.3

I think that the former two examples aptly illustrate the difficulties related to defining religion in theoretical terms. Today, the boundary between the religious and the quasi-religious is very thin. For example, the web site www.adherents.com, often used by religious scholars for obtaining information on the number of religious adherents in the world and other statistical data, regularly mentions Scientology and “religion” Juche in North Korea, i.e. a form of “Kimilsungism” which is more of an (atheist) ideology than religion. If beliefs and rituals are the major elements of any religion, one could claim that the quasi-religious systems, such as Communism and nationalism, include those elements as central for both ideologies. On the level of belief and dogma one may clearly recognize the utopian-eschatological patterns that, in fact, represent religious heritage, especially one derived from the “Abraham tradition” of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In the area of ritual one identifies, at least on the syntax-level, a parallelism between religious and political rituals, i.e. the initiation rites patterns, the rites of passage or the glorification of a religious, military, political leader in his earthly and posthumous existence. It is certainly not an accident that the military hierarchy of the former socialist Yugoslavia, at least ideologically, relatively easily and painlessly survived the transition from the Communist into the nationalist quasi-religious pattern.

However, despite the similarities between the religious and quasi-religious systems, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could hardly be characterized as inter-religious. After all, the religious communities issued various appeals to reconciliation and joint prayer even during the war. In this respect, the Yugoslav case was specific in comparison with other modern wars.4 On the other hand, a great number of temples and religious facilities were destroyed in these wars, while priests were also mistreated or killed. Some members of the high clergy even appealed to the continuation of conflicts when it was possible and realistic to make truce, or adopt a peace plan. Viewed from this perspective, at least some religious communities could not be easily amnestied from their responsibility for war.

However, if the religious element were more important in this context, religion should have been singled out, as a significant factor, in the process of sta-


4 This was aptly pointed out by Thomas Bremer in “Why is the Reconciliation among the Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe so Complicated?”, *Regional Contact XII*, no. 13, 1998, pp. 30-39.
bilization of South Eastern Europe. This would, at least, apply to official documents, such as the Dayton Agreement or Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, religion is mentioned only a few times in the Dayton Agreement (in a rather general context) in the Constitution and Annex on Human Rights, whereas in the Stability Pact religion and churches are not mentioned at all.

In order to clarify this dilemma regarding the role of religion in the Yugoslav wars, let us note that the majority of conflicts in the world, in which religion represents a significant factor, are not waged for religious reasons. This is primarily the case with so-called “identity conflicts”, where religion may serve as an appropriate differentia specifica that perhaps more easily articulates much more complex reasons for the conflict, including warfare. This, I would contend, was the case with the Yugoslav wars in the 90s.

The highly secularized society of the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Communist, atheist ideology left its mark on the political, as well as cultural, national and religious levels, suddenly faced, in the late eighties and early nineties, a massive ethno-mobilization, ghost of nationalism and the politically imposed identification of religion and nation. This society also faced its own semi-literacy regarding religious matters, providing, thus, a secure refuge for an ecclesiastical nationalism and nationalist populism. Therefore, it was possible that in this region, under the conditions of a fratricidal war and long-lasting politicization of religion (first in the communist, and then in the nationalist key), one witnessed a subsequent, secondary “religization” of politics and interethnic conflict. This, of course, has found its expression in the theories concerning the religious roots of the Yugoslav conflicts. The war in the former Yugoslavia from 1991-1995 was, however, primarily a result of political and inter-ethnic conflicts. Religion, however, appeared as a significant element of ethnicity, and this is probably the reason why the war itself, in this context, has been experienced as an inter-religious conflict.

Speaking of the temples destroyed during the war, let us have in mind that this was primarily a symbolical act: the temples were not destroyed so much as religious facilities, but rather as the national and ethnic symbols of a community’s presence on a certain territory. In the perception of some churches, the war was also experienced as a territorial issue. As such a perception, it gained legitimacy, because it was necessary to defend, as it were (unfortunately, at the cost of war-crimes), one’s presence, one’s physical and spiritual survival in the “fatherland”.

In order to support and illustrate my thesis, let me quote a sufficiently characteristic, sufficiently official and sufficiently general document released by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the summer of 1994. The Appeal to the Serbian People and World Public of the Bishop’s Conference of the SOC (July 5, 1994) reads as follows:

“With full responsibility before God and our people and the history of mankind we invite all Serbian people to take a stand in defending the centuries-long rights and freedoms, its own vital interests necessary for its physical and spiritual survival in its fatherland and grand-fatherland... as the people and the Church, deeply rooted in the martyred country Bosnia-Herzegovina, today we
may not accept the Geneva imposed decisions on percentages and maps and, thus, remain without our: Žitomislići on the Neretva, or Synodal Church in Mostar, or Church Sopotnica on the Drina, Monastery Krka, or Krupa in Dalmatia, Ozren and Vozuća in Bosnia, Prebilovci in Hercegovina or Jasenovac in Slavonia.\(^5\)

In this appeal, the Church, therefore, invites “all Serbian people (emph. M.V.) to take a stand in defending centuries-long rights and freedoms, its own vital interests necessary for the physical and spiritual survival in its fatherland and grand-fatherland”.\(^6\) This actually meant that all Serbs, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and beyond it, should have taken arms in order to avoid the implementation of the Contact Group peace plan. This was, in fact, an open invitation to continue the war that, fortunately, this time did not find a response among the Serbs.

Tragically enough, what wasn’t clear to the representatives of the SOC in 1994, became clear only after the war, in 1996:

“Notwithstanding the dissolution of Versailles Yugoslavia, i.e. the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church still extends to all the Orthodox in that territory”.\(^7\)

In other words, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction does not necessarily imply the state jurisdiction on a given territory. After all, one of the greatest Serbian sanctuaries, the Hilandar Monastery, is not on the territory of Serbia, but Greece.

In the light of these reflections and examples, it is clear, I think, that a war should not be directly waged about religious issues, in order to acquire, in any of its phases, its religious dimension. It seems that the role of religious aspects of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia should be viewed in such a context. Although the religious structures did not essentially coincide with the political power structures (as was the case, for example, in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979), in some of its phases, the war indeed acquired religious characteristics. On the one hand, this was manifested by the mistreatment and killing of priests, as well as in the destruction of temples and other religious facilities as the recognizable symbols of presence of an ethnic, national or religious community on a given territory. On the other hand, as we have seen, the religious communities themselves experienced the war as a territorial issue that could have affected the jurisdiction of a religious community, especially in those cases where the territorial organization was inherent to the church organization, as is the case with the Serbian Orthodox Church.

It is, however, in the spirit of Jesus’ message that holiness is not to be sought in the desolate territories, but rather in the relationships between the people who share the same land.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 120.
Researchers still cannot agree about the real nature and essence of the Yugoslav war (wars).\footnote{No entering here the dispute as to whether we talk about one or more separate wars, in the further text we will mainly use singular, having in mind that we refer also to the series of war which, independently from the fact that they can and should be differentiated, derive from the joint (YU) source.} Difficulties in its understanding and interpretation thus remain. After that, follows problems with naming and classifying it into one of the (traditional) war categories. It is clear that there is will to construct a theoretical research paradigm on the war which during last the two decades of 20th century spread over the territories of former Yugoslavia. With all the differences among participants, the common ground for these debates is that they start from the conviction that there is sufficient knowledge about the dynamics and relevant facts regarding the Yugoslav war. Let us put aside that the few reliable facts are subjected to different (daily) political and ideological interpretations, i.e. that is reading-into things (Hadžic, 2003: 16-24).

Therefore, there is an open question as to whether it is possible to construct, a theoretically and empirically sustainable paradigm for understanding this war without additional and systematic research on the hidden issues regarding the wars inception and self-perpetuation. It is justifiable to question the validity of findings we have on the key actors involved in the Yugoslav war. After that, we must question their role in preparing and inflaming the war and spreading it to all levels. And also numerous unknown facts about the methods and means they applied in perpetuating war violence. Above all, a precise list of perpetrators - inspirers and bearers – of violence is missing, as well as a list of their primary motives and interests.

Today it can be determined without mistake and without visible benefit – which was also possible at the end of 80s - that the violent disintegration of the second Yugoslavia was a real civilizational measure of people, gathered in an undesirable and unsuccessful state union by the (evil) will of the history. That is bloody proof of their historical inability and will to rearrange (or disintegrate) a complex state union and the accompanying authoritarian regime in a demo-
ocratic way. Though, however right it may be, the self-comprehension of this assertion is also seductive and lethal for the truth. It offers a way out and justification to everyone. If the truth looks (only) like that, despite the victims, then there is no one to blame — or at least, not (many) among us.

The prevailing interpretation of the last wartime period in Yugoslav history is mainly built on a black-and-white matrix. This bloody period has been even personalized for that purpose. The main warlords and their army leaders are known. Each of them had their own “Stalingrad”. This was done all in the hope that it would be big enough to cover and justify all those small and big “Jasenovac” camps. It seems that all armies of that time are preliminarily listed, but not the paramilitaries. Everybody has their own bade elements in them.

Hence, current interpretation — judicial, biographical and even investigative — of the Yugoslav war dealt with national (war) leaders and their entourages, their public and secret trade with people, territories and absolutions. It does not lack even ideological creators of ethno-religious violence (extermination), decked in poems and incense. Its (para) military protagonists are also in reach. There is also quite a bit known about the ways the public and media efforts in the Yugoslav nations drove entrance into the war (Thompson, 1995). Comparative analysis confirms the manifestation and dynamics self–perpetuation of this internal war.

In spite of all this, it seems that the reliability of available knowledge on the real causes, essence, dynamics and consequences of the violent dissolution of the second Yugoslavia should be verified once again. So much more, since primary sources still lay beyond investigators’ reach. To make it even worse, today in the newly created states, there is insufficient political and professional interest for scientific explanation of the YU war, based on a valid empirical material. It seems that there is a path into oblivion, built upon a deliberately ensured ignorance or half-knowledge about the most recent turns in Yugoslav history.

As a result, we now witness the fact that, for example, in Serbia, instead of a consideration of the unfinished (forbidden) Yugoslav war, there is a (daily) political and ideological debate about the Second World War, through which a delayed change of its results is desired. No wonder then that a renewed search for winners in a civil war is prepared during fascist occupation. Today, the less informed reader of the newer history could think that the war in Serbia has not been finished yet, and that the name of the winner is still to be determined.

Even if it is true that history is still written by the winners, those who would like to be winners did not. Especially if they want to justify or cover their former and recent defeats. Hence, the current dealings with Partizans and Chetniks in Serbia have at least a double purpose. With this the South Slav wars of the last generation are shown as a natural and necessary continuation of mutual exter-

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2 Sieges of Vukovar and Sarajevo, therefore, cannot be comprehended in military categories

3 Hence, paradox is the fact that state bodies of e.g. Serbian and Montenegro, or Croatia send daily their parts of secret war archives to the Tribunal in The Hague, only under pressure, and local public does not know anything about its contents.

4 Additional legitimate reasons for war and violence against all other and different were drawn from the similar mizanscen during presidency of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia.
mination that started anno domini 1941. At the same time, the attention of (expert) the public is drawn from wars forbidden and stopped only after intervention from the outside, to the archived war.  

With the allegation that only now there are enough conditions for serious study of the previous war, the intention is, in fact, to avoid debate on wars with whose lethal consequences we live; i.e. the debate on the contribution of Serbian warlords and their followers to the violent collapse of the second Yugoslavia. Hence, the intention is to prevent any discussion about the basic reasons for the newest, historical, but also civilizational defeat of the Serbian people. Above all, the simultaneous intention is to avoid determination and sanctioning of individual responsibility for Serbia’s collapse during the last war and its return to position it was in 1804.

Visible Perpetrators of Violence

It is possible, without reservations, to make and complete the list of the main, public perpetrators of the Yugoslav war. The central position on the list belongs to the JNA, especially in the initial phase of the war. Arm in arm with JNA, were the armies of the future states then in creation. The list is finished by numerous paramilitary and private armed formations. Even a superfluous insight into the literature shows that the main actors in the Yugoslav war remained mostly at the margins of contemporary investigations.

For example, the basic reasons for and hidden flows of JNA inclusion into war have not yet been confirmed (proven).  

The whole story about JNA was shaped around Slobodan Milosevic, and in it, the abuse of the army for the greater-state goals of Serbian power elites is used as a premise, but not as a conclusion. In this procedure, the first (pre)war product of the crisis – the link between Milosevic and the JNA Generalstaff - shows itself as an inevitable and fatal cause of war. Thereby, other pushers of Yugoslav nations into mutual war were excluded from the analysis, and their contribution to the Generals’ alignment with Milosevic remained unnoticed. And all (quasi)investigative efforts stopped at the gates of JNA, therefore we are deprived of serious insights into its internal, pre-war, wartime, social and political dynamics. All that aggravates discovery of the basic reasons for mass and massive violence by (parts of) JNA against their former citizens.

It is then no wonder that the activity of JNA is mostly understood and interpreted within a given and local – political, religious, national – Yugoslav context. We are, thence, deprived, of previous or final and comparative answers to the dilemma as to whether any army, in this case JNA, even if it wants, can prevent,

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5 Illustration of that is the recent initiative by Vuk Draskovic and the SPO that members of Chetniks (allegedly anti-fascistic) formations should be retroactively equaled in their status rights with those from partisan units.


7 For such intentions there are always willful foreign sorters with their investigations matching given results: compare the example: Sabrina P. Remet, UNDER THE HOLY LIME TREE: The Inculcation of Neurotic & Psychotic Syndromes as a Serbian Wartime Strategy, 1986-1995, Polemos br. 9-10, Novi Sad, 2002, page 83-97.
stop, terminate and/or resolve internal armed conflict of an ethno-religious nature. And if it can, how?

Due to that, it is not bad to recall some vital features of the internal (civil) war in a multinational and multi-confessional Yugoslavia. This war emerged from the long lasting influence of numerous and diversified internal, cumulative and situational causes and motives are variable and inequal rank (Hadžić, 2003: 165-187). In action were those nullifying political, economical, state, territorial and national goals of parties in conflict. The relation between war causes and war goals was multi-sided, and subject to modifications, as well as to permanent transfer. All this was happening in the circumstances on war (political) battlefield, packed with emotionally-psychological motives of an ethno-religious origin. Thus, the war and its actors were very susceptible to (ideological) instrumentalization and induction, in the same way that the present and final results were also situationally conditional. No wonder that the Yugoslav war after emerging, began to self-perpetuate so as to evade the efficient control of their main protagonists.

We are, therefore, convinced that the present knowledge about the Yugoslav war and the JNA role in it confirm sustainability. They may even demonstrate a wider importance, i.e., several summarized insights: (1) internal ethnic-religious conflict cannot be solved thoroughly and permanently through the use of state force – the army; (2) any army, due to its inherent features and limits, is unusable for resolution of inner conflicts,\textsuperscript{8} since with the passing of time, it reaches ever less results with the growth in scope and intensity of destruction; (3) the regular army, in most favorable conditions, might only prevent growth of a political conflict into its armed phase, or maybe stop the initiated conflict in its early manifestation; and (4) each internal (civil), and especially ethnic war is an insoluble riddle and the biggest challenge for any army, which, sooner or later, might (must?) disintegrate according to the war-drawn lines (ethnic, religious, ideological) of division (conflict).

Less is known about the origin and nature of (para)militaries in the “political finish” of the Yugoslav crisis, from which the regular armies of newly built states of YU origin were created.\textsuperscript{9} The qualification of the Yugoslav war will highly depend on the way we interpret their legality. Supporters of their legality easily interpret the war from that basis, as the non-provoked aggression of Serbia and JNA, while their opponents comprehend it as a logical product of armed revolt against the then valid system of SFRY, i.e., allegedly legitimate will of the incomplete state Presidency and JNA top to preserve it (by force). Keeping the debate at the level of legality, the aim is to avoid questioning and measuring the part that these formations and their political fathers had in provoking and flaring the Yugoslav war. From that point it is not difficult to unveil the morphology of Yugoslav war violence, and determine who, and to what ends they urged and practiced it. So, no wonder that there are still no valuable insights into the flows of the (pre)war, interest merging and nationalist monolitization of the (para)mili-

\textsuperscript{8} Here are several reasons: Organizational-formational dimensions of the army (system-mastodon), high dependence on fight technique and technology, contents and goals of fight training, different timing and different meaning of space.

\textsuperscript{9} We remind you that the Slovenian Army derived from Territorial Defense, and the Army of Croatia from the National Guard Detachment, formed within the Ministry of Interior of Republic of Croatia.
tary and political elites in states that successfully extricated themselves from the second Yugoslavia. To the same extent, there is insufficient understanding about the sources, substance, scope and reach of their victorious power over their communities (see, for example: Zunec, 1998: 143-177).

Above all, numerous and diversified YU paramilitary formations — private and party armed groups — remained completely outside of scientific scrutiny. Post festum, it is relatively easy to grasp their basic purpose. Their primary task was to apply unmeasured violence in nationally mixed micro-territories and thus eliminate the last prospects for a compromise and peaceful resolution of the state and social crisis in Yugoslavia. Then, through these produced effects, to enforce the pro-war rhetoric of their national leaders and decisively help the realization of their strategy of violence, thus accelerating the accomplishment of an ethnically clean state. For that purpose, they were supposed to produce additional and irrefutable reasons for acceleration of the Yugoslav war on all levels. As it is well known, both jobs were done more than successfully. However, it is not known with certainty how these formations were made.11 According to available data, it is difficult to differentiate — verify and determine — which were made upon directives from the center (supreme command), and how many of them were products of situations and micro war circumstances, personal or group — revenge and/or robbery — motives of local warlords. Therefore, we lack sufficient reliable findings for the reconstruction of ways and flows of the production and orchestration of violence between: (a) nominally legal armies and paramilitaries, and (b) central and local paramilitaries. During this procedure, naturally, it would be interesting to discover and determine what were the modalities and contents of (military-criminal) cooperation between hostile paramilitaries.

The Hidden Perpetrators of Violence

The real nature of the Yugoslav wars, however, cannot be unveiled only by relying on hunches or allegations of someone’s planned and/or rhetorical ethnoicide. It is even less possible to rely on partial findings about its armed perpetrators. The allegation that states mostly appear or disappear through war, i.e. more or less planned and higher goals which justify violence are not of any help. Consequently, that militaries and paramilitaries are the key and most efficient instrument.

At this point, additional questions for understanding the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia have been posed. We have no doubt about the main issue — the Yugoslav really was not inevitable. However, it does not remove our need to verify who expected something from the war and who had the most benefits. The general benefit derived from obtaining an ethnically cleansed state, of course, cannot compensate for the immeasurable losses of inhabitants who were forced into and then willingly engaged in warfare. This general benefit is always used

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10 We are not aware of a single existing systematic study of this phenomenon. Initial insights may be obtained only from secondary sources — local and foreign media.

11 It is not apparent that any systematic study of this phenomenon has been done. As a beginning we might start from secondary sources-local and foreign media.
when there is an intention to cover-up a measurable and materialized war profit for national military-political elites and their ideological cohorts.\footnote{Already the fact that enormous majority of their members is, for now, exempted from any responsibility, i.e. that still enjoys war royalties, represents and immeasurable war profit for them.}

Therefore, it seems necessary first to additionally investigate the patterns of violence in the Yugoslav wars. If we put aside topics and dilemmas which belong to philosophers, psychologists, social psychologists, anthropologists and cultural workers, it is upon us to ask ourselves:

- Did those national-republic (war)leaders and elites calculate armed and other violence within their state plans, and if yes, when and why?
- To what extent, after that, did they estimate that the quantity of organized violence outwards and inwards, was profitable for themselves, their nation and state, and bearable for the others?
- Did they also believe that, alone or together with their opponents, they could control, regulate, orchestrate and target violence?
- Did they, then, have any idea or ability to predict all those final consequences of this illegally targeted violence and
- Did they, and at which point – willingly or not - lose the power to control the violence and its perpetrators? In other words, are we able to determine whether and when the war started to self-perpetuate uncontrollably and to feed itself with the autonomous reasons and motives created by war?

No matter how we qualify the YU war - as an aggression, or a legitimate armed defense, it is proper to wonder again whether and to what extent the war in Slovenia was (silently?) agreed upon, and the one in Croatia regulated. That is, whether due to those two facts, their derivate in Bosnia-Herzegovina had inevitably to be inhumane and brutal (Hadižić, 2003: 132-147).

Independently from answers to the above dilemmas, there is the irrevocable allegation that (apparently and initially) the stronger actor had built his strategy on force, i.e. on violence. We are convinced that, at the same time, it was the main handicap of Serbian military-political elites. It is clear that their strategy, if there was any, relied on the illusion of possessing enough power and force to impose solutions, i.e. to achieve their goals easily and quickly. This illusion was generously supported by JNA Generals, who misused their subordinates for that purpose (compare: Jović 1995, Kadijević 1993).

All that, of course, demanded that we previously check, and if possible, measure, whether and to what extent the violence against others and different persons, was a part of the dominant political culture in the second Yugoslavia. That is to say, how and why was it easy to make a pretext for immense violence, and did it (violence) draw its initial and destructive force from the combination of instrumented historical traumas, ideological and political sects, mass and massive indoctrination, based on exclusivity, combat aggressiveness and intolerance.

We believe, however, that the internal dynamics of mutual extermination, simultaneously and additionally legitimized by ethno-religious and historic rea-
sons, cannot be reliably recognized without drawing the hidden chain of command. In a rough model construction, this chain seemed to have three main instances: Commanders – Moderators - Perpetrators. This subordinately arranged triad of violence had its replicas at each next, lower hierarchy level.

If there is at least a minimum of initial proof for this thesis, our search for answers necessarily leads us to the hidden planners and moderators of violence. That is, of course, if we agree that JNA and other armies, especially paramilitary formations, were the primary an immediate, though willing, executors of violence. With the risk to slide into conspiracy theory, we are convinced that the above said planners and moderators were placed in secret - military and civil – intelligence services. To testify to this, we give three initial and summary arguments:

First: These services in the second Yugoslavia, gained enough power and knowledge for violent "crisis management". They, of course, did neither lacked the will for that, nor scruples and morality. Not only did they act within all the system’s institutions, but also permeated the whole society, and no actor or event could be missed or omitted (Žunec, Domišljanović 2000: 41–49). In a party state, Services were, among other things, the main selector and creator of the personnel map of power and verifier of their bearers’ suitability. At the same time they were the central personnel base for renewal of the old and creation of the new - party and military - elites. Thanks to all the above, these services eventually used their knowledge for warfare purposes, and thus realized and additionally capitalized on it.

Second: Only these services survived the Yugoslav wars untouched. The State’s heirs have not so far, at least not publicly, disputed the existence of the secret services, their networks and archives. Moreover, a majority of their members readily and timely joined to serve their new political masters. Today what keeps them together and in safety is the power of knowledge, i.e. the fear that they know ways to induce the Yugoslav nations into war. The masters and guardians against publicity are additionally protected by the monopoly of knowing enough (inaccessible) information about their former and present fellow citizens.

Third: Their hidden influence on wars increased and multiplied the power of these services and/or their renamed heirs over their general society and state, and today they make a firm core of resistance to reconciling and sanctioning the Yugoslav war. To the same extent the current, although already forgotten, demands for punishment because of (political) breaches of human rights remain only a surrogate of compensating justice. No wonder then that the hidden moderators of violence and warfare were and remain the main obstacle to post-modern reforms in their societies. It is evident that without their disman-

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13 For that purpose, the so-called strategy of a special war was designed, with the emphasis on so-called internal enemies; compare: Special war, GS JNA, 1981.

14 It is illustrated also by the fact that, for example, two most influential politicians in Slovenia, especially during its path towards independence, but after that, as well, Stane Dolanc and Milan Kucan, arrived in the politics from the State Intelligence Service.

15 No wonder then, that in one of scientific versions (A. Savić, M. Delić, M. Bajagić, World Security From Secrecy To Publicity, Security Institute, School of Internal Affairs, Police Academy, Belgrade, 2002) on secret services, there is no word about activities of Serbian SDB (State Security Service) in YU wars and in the aftermath (compare: 535-543)
tling, it is not possible to exit from the war and authoritarian system, still hidden behind a façade of a pseudo-multiparty and parliamentary system.

Let us add to the above-said another reason for investigating the war role of the secret service’s moderators of violence. Their constitution, as well as the quantity of existing and “in war” increased power, justifies the assumption that, apart from all else, they are the only proprietors of reliable knowledge on hidden processes of preparation, waging and completion of wars. And we also presume that in their possession is vital evidence for the creation, origin and use of numerous paramilitary and private armies. It seems a reasonable assumption that they crucially induced, controlled and directed the criminalization of the war. They were also the key intermediaries in the wartime linkage of political, military and police elites, and in attracting war profiteers.

Therefore it is justifiable to revise the war contents and scope of powers of wartime ruling national leaders and their public chief assistants. There is no doubt that the secret services were, nominally and/or factually, subordinated to local warlords all the time. It is probably also indisputable that the above leaders, publicly and secretly used them for their (state and/or private – party) purposes. One should not have any doubts about their intimate conviction that the services (were) loyal to them and fully controlled by them. However, it would be necessary, especially for our topics, to investigate carefully whether somebody (mis)used anybody in that connection, and if yes, how and why. For such a purpose, we offer one possible circle of power and will for violence in the hidden circle.

It has been shown that the middle position of the secret services as moderators of violence, at the same time was the central position, and thus they were the mediators and the headquarters. Moderators were a central relay through which information (desirable, processed, directed) was forwarded in both directions: upwards - from the society, through executors to commanders, and vice versa, from commanders to joint and individual executors and the perpetrators of violence.

Moderators had or could have decisive roles in both ways: they determined which information and in what shape it would reach the commanders. Moderators were also, even if only indirectly, included in the planning of (non)combat actions and in suggesting military and other measures. In other words, planning, regulating and targeting violence, in its final instance, was their competence. Certainly, it did not prevent lower commanding and executive players in giving their creative contribution to the specific acts of violence. Even worse, moderators have always been middlemen, so they could

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16 This is the idealistic picture that Zoran Mijatovic (Requiem for Top Secret, Pharos’ d.o.o, 2004), former Deputy Head of Security Service of Serbia offers about the service and its leaders – Jovica Stanisic, and Franko Simatovic, linked for the creation of Special Operations Unit – “red berets”. Judging by allegations of the author, one could think that the abovementioned, and the entire service, was all that time, only a group of professionals and heralds of present will to put it under democratic civil control.

17 New, clear evidences of this are offered by the author of the TV show “Insider”, RTV B92, part I, 15. November 2004.
(re)shape the initial commanders’ orders. Above all, they were also the main, although unofficial, verifiers and supervisors of efficiency, and thus of ideological (patriotic) suitability and commitment of the final executors. That enabled them to induce, or if necessary to force their own and others’ subordinates to commit violence.

If it is like that, then the search for answers to some other important questions follows. Open is the question as to who found and elected whom on the eve of the Yugoslav war – leaders (communist ones) found moderators, or moderators considerably contributed to the election of the most desirable masters. Then follows the list of equally hard questions: Who induced and renewed the need for violence before and during the Yugoslav war? For whom, how and why did they do it?

Possible investigation of the role and power of the moderators of violence would require drawing, at least roughly, beforehand, a social, professional and ideological profile of the former and present secret services on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In such a framework, it would be useful to determine, among other things, from which social levels and groups, and in what way were the members of these services recruited. At the same time, was the role of the main but hidden ideological priest of the service immune to ideology; i.e. did it make him responsive to all ideologies and thus suitable for all regimes and systems. In accordance with that, whether or not and to what extent did the unlimited and ‘beyond-system’ power make them receptive to the orchestration of violence.

**The Extended Existence of Moderators**

Unveiling the wartime role and scope of power of the moderators of violence supersedes the requirements for gathering valid facts as an introduction of a scientifically sustainable interpretation of the Yugoslav war. At issue is the need to discover what has happened with local secret services after the termination of the Yugoslav war based on those facts. Such a need is contained in the key dilemma of post-conflict and post-authoritarian states of Yugoslav origin which is: whether real democratic transformation is possible without finding and sanctioning the outcome of all the war and violence actors, especially all secret services, both inherited and taken over. We must also look at whether the inherited security services can be a reliable support to new authorities. It would surely demand first that we determine the source, content and scope of their current power. Only then it makes sense to wonder if and how the sources of renewal and/or strengthening of their hidden power over the society can be disconnected. All that would require a check whether the new elites in power have enough interests, will, knowledge and courage to reform these services radically and use them for the real needs of citizens (society) and put them under the rules of a democratic system. If, instead, the radical reform of these

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18 Initial insight into events behind the scene, e.g. at the army top can be found in: Vladan Vlajković, *Military Secret*, Helsinki Board for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade, 2004;
services fails, as it is the case in Serbia (but also in Montenegro), then the difficult search for real reasons of failure will follow.¹⁹

The relationship between the inherited secret services and the post-October power elites in Serbia is, moderately speaking, not transparent. This state continues despite the daily public eruptions of different scandals in this area by the tabloid press. Still, at the beginning, it is possible to note a few doubtless facts. On October 5, military and security services refused to defend the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. One can only guess the real reasons and motives for their willful (peaceful) re-subordination to new authorities. And new authorities, opposite to their previous announcements, readily accepted the new loyalty of the old regime’s central subjects. Furthermore, they seemed to believe that with such an act, they gained control over these services. At that very point, the leaders started to use them for their own party and/or personal needs. Consequently, even the replacement of the first personnel echelon fell behind, not only in the secret services, but also in the army and the police (Hadžić, 2004: 65-89). In continuation, instead of radical reforms, their followed only reappointments and reorganizations of these services (Milosavljević, op. source). To tell the truth, the installation of mechanisms and procedures for parliamentary and public control over secret services was initiated in SaM and Serbia.²⁰ However, the first visible thing is that the war legacy of the services remained unsolved. There are no valid proofs that the actual authorities have operative control over them. Furthermore, there is reasonable doubt that, although not identified, parts and/or members of these services were actors and participants of many military-police affairs involving criminal activity. This series of scandals was, unfortunately, topped off with the assassination of the prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, on March 12, 2003.

Hence the incidents can be comprehended as a (dangerous) sign of - more or less joint and/or coordinated – resistance within the layers or parts of the (para)military forces, criminalized in war, to social and security reforms. Nonetheless, with the given assumptions, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether, how and to what extent there is involvement of war violence moderators, i.e. present renamed security services.²¹ If there is, then it is probably motivated by their wish and the will of their political protectors, to avoid any (political, moral, judiciary) sanctions for their war deeds.

However, due to the postponed reform and unfinished dismantling of the old regime in Serbia, consolidation (normalization) of the society in Serbia has been prolonged, and a number of new (modified old) internal challenges, risks and threats to the security of citizens, society and the state appeared and

¹⁹ Fast reacting journalists already in November launched a story about crucial contribution of services, i.e. their units (JSO) in peaceful outcome of massive citizens’ protest (Bujošević, Radovanović, October 5, Twenty-four Hours of Overthurn, Media Center, Belgrade, 2000, esp. p. 47-50, 85-89 and195-198). To tell the truth, leaders of DOS later varied this story.

²⁰ More in: www.ccmr-bg.org

²¹ The impression is imposed that cores of these services have increased their abilities of absorption and mimicry use of democratic phrases, and that for each new set of authority they have prepared a reform team, which should preserve the substance (of power) of the Service, feigning loyalty and reformist orientation.
started to flourish. So much more, since it has been ever more evident that authorities from DOS did not gain enough power for the reformist modernization of Serbia. But obviously they have it (the power) in sufficient quantity to be able to block and delay thorough changes. More and more we see evidence that they really want to make those changes. Among other things, they failed to measure and present to the public the economic, political, destructive and lethal power of the old war-time and criminal lobby in Serbia. Hence they have lacked the radical breach with their own wartime and authoritarian inheritance in politics and values. Thanks to that, there is remaining and often increasing discord between the verbal and operative will of ruling elites to transform Serbia and reform the security sector, that is, the armed forces shaped by war. No wonder then, that they have the will to enter NATO and the EU, but without fulfillment of key preconditions (cooperation with The Hague Tribunal). In the same manner the current re-organization of the armed forces is being shown as radical reform. It is visible, though, that there are no signs that beforehand, it will be determined reliably what happened in the meantime with numerous paramilitary formations created during the Yugoslav wars – were they disarmed, or are they staying alert, outside the mainstream.

It is therefore, justified to assess preliminarily that (pro)democratic transformation of society in Serbia faces new and additional security challenges, risks and threats. We should add also the presumptions according to which the biggest number of the above said challenges, risks and threats derive from the local sector of security and the inherited (wartime) armed forces. Thus far, the example of Serbia proves the need for special investigation on the origin, nature, reasons for creation, contents and forms of manifestations of internal security challenges, risks and threats to (pro)democratic transformation of the post-conflict and post-authoritarian society. For that purpose, it is necessary at the same time, to identify their bearers, methods and means at their disposal. Based on this, it would be possible to predict the direction, intensity and scope of (un)predictable security consequences. Therefore, there is a need to determine the inner key points of security in Serbia (SaM). The aim would be to offer additional questioning of available strategies for reforms in society and the security sector and to make note of the reasons for their optimization and further development.

Only empirical findings and generalized insights would allow additional discussion about the unknown in the reforms of society and security sector in Serbia:

- Scope and level of connection, and dependence between the reform of society and the reform of the security sector (armed forces and especially, secret services); It should be rechecked whether it is feasible to reform first the one (society), then the latter (security sector), or whether simultaneous transformation is necessary, if possible;
- Whether and to what extent are stoppages in social reform and security sector reform caused by the disappearance and (re)generation of internal security challenges, risks and threats;
• Whether, and to what level are the objective challenges, risks and threats, only indirect forms of synthesis and crystallization of inherited and newly formed contradictions and conflicts of interest, and also the final product of the major unreadiness of citizens, supported by elites, to pay the – economic, social, political – price for the desired (pro)democratic transformation;

• Whether, when, how and why the possible growth of internal security challenges, risks and threats can disconnect initiated (pro)democratic changes, and whether this growth necessarily leads to a retrograde involution of post-conflict and post-authoritarian society, and

• Whether, and to what level the possible evolution may increase the security challenges, risks and threats, not only for Serbian citizens, but also for their first neighbors – the Western Balkan region (SEE), and indirectly for the Euro-Atlantic community.

• Valid answers, certainly, can only be reached by a comprehensive analysis of the above said challenges, risks and threats in the context of tough normalization and stabilization of the post-conflict and post-authoritarian society in Serbia and Montenegro.

Translated from Serbian by Olga Angelovska

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22 Proof of that was the public protest and demonstration of the Special Operations Unit.
An often-asked question regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia is: Why is it so difficult to assure stability and peace there? Why is there such a fragile democracy in those countries and why is there still so much hatred and such a high degree of nationalist emotions and violence? Is it because the crimes of war have not been punished yet? Is it because there has been no reconciliation process and because there are still too many open wounds? Another often asked question is: How was it possible that people succumbed to aggressive nationalism? This question is to a large extent misleading, since there existed no “aggressive” nationalisms as given identities to which people could “surrender”. Instead we should ask: Why did violent solutions prevail and why did they become acceptable and how did violence become collectivized? I suggest that some important elements of collective violent identities started to develop in the course of a long process of constructing what I call a victim identity in the former Yugoslavia. This victim identity has been based on intense sexualization, genderization, and the (re)construction of the self through the Other, a creation of myths, mythical re/interpretations, and an increasing belief in the creativity of violence and the impotence of peaceful means for conflict resolution. In this process, which became more intense after Tito’s death when every ethnic group started to believe – and still believes – “that it was the major victim of the communist system and that the rival group itself was the beneficiary of it” (Puhovski 2000: 42), “national” identity has been constructed as a victimized identity and this is still going on today.

A number of Yugoslav and other authors mentioned and analyzed the process of victimization before and during the war in the former Yugoslavia. Many of them devoted special attention to questions of sexualization, of

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1 For example, the repetition of the well known saying that Serbs “lose in peace and win in war”.

women, and of violence and rape. However, only a few of them connect their analyses of victimization of nations/ethnicities with the question of how vic-
timization, rape, nationality, and gender identities were interconnected as the conflict escalated, and what consequences this had for post-war political develop-
ments. They either analyzed victimization without taking gender into account (Puhovski, Zakošek, Blagojević, Mertus 1999a) or they wrote about gendered consequences without pointing to the overall political outcomes and processes (Kašić, Žarkov, Spasić). In feminist analyses, there are still two main lines of interpretation. Both maintain that the issue of rape is connected to vic-
timization. However, they do not connect it to the origins of war. Instead they see rape as mainly functional in war. Other approaches assume that women are raped in all wars; still others point to the problem of the “politicalization of rape” for the sake of war propaganda; others underline the specifics/novelty of the situation in the war in Bosnia, where the “strategy of rape” was obviously used as an instrument of war, especially against the Muslim women/population. Skjelsbaek summarizes four purposes of rape in wars (Skjelsbaek 2000): First, as an inherent part of warfare, as an element of male communication (symbolic humiliation of the enemy); second, as a way of reaffirming masculinity; third, as a way of destroying the culture of the opponent; and fourth, and as an outcome of hatred against women. However, there are still some additional aspects to be analyzed. In particular, the connection of rape with the ideologies of war and the preparation of war and with engaging individuals to become involved in war and participate in the annihilation of the other is at issue. It seems that these aspects might show much greater division between gender as a cultural construction and the behavior of concrete men and women in conflict situations as it is usual assumed.

**Blaming and Victimization**

In the following, I will outline four gendered processes, which, in my opin-
ion, were central to the developments in the former Yugoslavia and which pro-
moted, legitimized and facilitated the war. Moreover, they contributed to pro-
ducing an uncertain power structure, to building exclusive homogeneity instead of cohesion, and to sustaining problematic legitimacy and ‘stability’ in the new political units in the region. The main gendered components in these processes were:

a) First, a process of self-victimization of ethnicity/nation through gen-
dered nationalist-racist stories of rape thus creating a pre-war discourse apt to mobilize the population (see for instance Luci in this volume).

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3 Except in quoting Brownmiller, who says that “as propaganda, rape was remarkably effective, more effective then the original German terror. It helped lay the emotional ground-
work that led us to the war” (Brownmiller 1975: 44, Nikolić-Ristanović 2000: 155).

4 Such are the differences between Nikolić-Ristanović 1995, 2000 and Kesić 2000 on the one hand and Magaš 1999 on the other.

5 This is based on Ruth Seifert’s categorization (Seifert 1999). Some others mention rape as a means “to terrorize civilian populations and induce civilians to flee their homes and vil-
lages, to humiliate rival armies by showing control over ‘their’ women and as a ‘perk’ for sol-
diers, and an inducement to courage on the battlefield”. (Goldstein &Tierney 1998: 5)
b) Second, attempts of annihilating and discrediting plurality. This went hand in hand with the actual annihilation of the Other (through ethnic cleansing and rape).

c) Third, a fascination with violence, which was also used as a source of legitimization in the new political units.

d) Third, what I call “organized innocence”. This was used as a strategy against inclusive or post-ethnic citizenship having long lasting effect for the newly built identities.

These processes and discourses – which I will examine in more detail below – survived the war and were transferred and translated into post-war societies. They persist even today and maintain old sentiments, myths and fantasies within the newly founded political bodies. They remain a mobilizing source for ethnic and racist forces in some segments of civil society also influencing discourses on European integration and attitudes towards globalization. All four strategies make use of the interconnections of nationalism, ethnicity, racism, gender politics and body politics.

The Politics of Truth: Collective Victimization, Sexualization, Genderization

The victimization discourses in pre-war Yugoslavia have drastically stimulated the formation of ethnic conflicts and substantially contributed to various extremely violent “solutions”. These processes culminated in a real rivalry between different ethnic groups over who is going to acquire the status of a victim and who will prevail as a greater victim. This strategy was not an invention of the late 20th century Europe. Already in Nazi-socialist Germany in the 1930s, Hitler’s approach to “German suffering” after the Great War was a crucial feature in forming a collective German victim identity. Victims’ discourses and images were/are also central to preoccupations with national identity in Poland, Russia, Romania and elsewhere.

Victim discourses are gendered. In the case of many East European socialist and post-socialist countries (as Verdery has detailed shown for the Romanian case), one could speak of a genderization of territorial boundaries which makes these boundaries “like the skin of the female body, fixed, yet violable, in need of armed defense by inevitably masculine militaries” (Verdery 1996: 78). The same tradition existed in the South Slavic nations and it became part of the victimization discourse. In post-Tito Yugoslavia one of the characteristic gendered discourses coming up in the mid-80ies was the topic of demographic policies, extensively addressed in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Central to these debates was the question of the ‘biological’ survival of, first, the Serbian and Slovenian, and then all...
other South Slavic nations. In the media the following slogans were rampant: ‘Two Children are not enough’; ‘Family Planning, what about Survival?’; ‘The High Birth Rate among Albanians’; ‘The Kosovo Birth Rate as a Record and Taboo Subject’; ‘Demographic Bomb in Kosovo’ and so on.8 The high Albanian fertility rate in the autonomous province of Kosovo was merged with the so called ‘female question’. In the words of a Slovenian demographer, Albanian men used their women as ‘birth machines’ thus strengthening the Albanian separatists’ strategy in Kosovo by a conscious pro-natalist and separatist politics (see also Drezgić 2000: 217-8). Metaphors such as “white plague” for the less fertile (Slavic) ethnicities and “demographic explosion” for Albanians were employed at the same time with a clear racist theme alluding to a wild and non-normal Albanian sexuality, both male and female9.

Almost at the same time, politicization of the issue of rapes (mainly the debate about the allegedly attempted separatist rapes) in Kosovo started in the media10. Significantly, rape in those discourses was not discussed as a legal or criminological problem, but as an act perpetrated out of separatist and nationalistic motives and the wish for a Greater Albania. In spite of no proven cases of interethnic rapes and the lowest Yugoslav rate of rape incidents in Kosovo11, public opinion in Serbia maintained that the goals of Albanian separatists were put into practice not only with enforced exile of Serbs from Kosovo, but also through atrocities such as “raping of Serbian women, murder, robbery, desecration of Serbian graves…” (Pešić 1996: 33)12.

8 These are mainly titles from the Slovenian media in the mid eighties. On Serbian “demographic nationalism,” see Drezgić 2000, and on the Croatian see Pavlović 1999.

9 The sexuality issue is one of the most important within the racist imagery. Racist ideologies and movements do problematize the “Other’s sexuality” and its assumed dangers throughout the whole (Western and Eastern) Europe. A parallel Western example is Le Front National in France which also points to ‘questionable’ Arabic sexuality, seeing it as animalistic, violent and radically ‘other’ in relation to the French civilization. Arabic men are seen as rapists, threatening domestic women. Meanwhile, the stereotype of North African woman is that of a passive subject who ‘breeds like an animal’. At the same time within the racist imagery, they are a source of fascination and exoticism (see Evans 1996: 51, 35).

10 It was actually quasi political since it was a mass mobilization issue and not a political issue in the sense of politicizing rape as a gendered problem (Mertus 1999a).

11 My analysis of the statistical data and interviews from 1987 showed that there were negligible interethnic rapes in Kosovo in 1987 and afterwards. See Jalušič-Kuzmanić 1988. The same view is expressed by Vesna Pešić in her analysis of the reasons for the war in former Yugoslavia; she says that there was not any such official data except about some minor cases (of 134 reported rapes from 1981 to 1987, 17 were reported to be committed by persons of Albanian nationality on the women of Serbian/Montenegrin nationality, see Jalušič-Kuzmanić 1988). See also Pešić 1996: 60.

12 Pešić is underlining that there were “also other reasons for the Serb migration” from the autonomous province of Kosovo (ibid.) However, “anyone who dared to mention those other reasons (economic, educational, employment-related), especially if this came from another Yugoslav republic, was ruthlessly attacked and declared a Serbian enemy (ibid.)… Repression of the Albanian rebels (demonstrators), the military occupation of Kosovo, and the presence of hundreds of Albanians in prison did nothing to change the estimation that in Kosovo an incredible ethnic threat was present” (ibid.).
Thus, the rape issue was through a series of inversions made part of the national/interethnic imagery both in the media and also on the political and legal level (including the criminal code).  

Regarding rapes in general, in the typical case there is no comparison in criminal procedure with other cases in the point where the normal procedure is not just identification of the motives of the rapist but of his victim as well. Usually, the media discourses take an interest in the behavior of the victim as well as that of the perpetrator and almost always produces two kinds of rape victims: Innocent victims (presumably non-promiscuous, too old, unattractive or too young) or guilty victims (prostitutes, ‘easy’ women, ‘provocative’ dressers, the unmarried, and so on). As a consequence, the rapist can also acquire two images: that of a beast attacking innocent victims or that of a rightful avenger punishing ‘whores’. Within the legal discourse, a rapist is defined as a man who falsely recognizes the specific individual on whom he can exert his sexual purpose. Rape of a wife or a woman of “lower” morals is traditionally in many countries still not considered rape (in all the criminal codes in the former Yugoslavia – except in Slovenia – rape in marriage was not considered a crime). Paradoxically, the discourse on nationalist-separatist rapes in Kosovo de-sexualized the alleged perpetrator – the Albanian man. The logic of this was as follows: First of all the victim of rape was no longer an individual woman (with female attributes) but a woman of a certain nationality (usually of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality), i.e. a national woman. Her femininity was thus subordinated to nationality. He was seen as raping because something other than sexual motives (thus his sexuality was questionable). She was seen as an innocent, if not heroic victim. Through these inversions, rape became a main signifier of inter-ethnic (and not inter-gender) violence, and through this ethnicities were (among others) gendered. Thus, reconstructed and imagined rape was not only made a national and public issue, but at the same time became a signifier for the greatest violence and humiliation and could thus be used as a perfect tool for the victimization of the nation which was in need of strong, masculine protection.

The public discourse about rape and the fact that rape was used as a metaphor of violence against the (feminized) nation produced the image of a

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13 On this, see Jalušić-Kuzmanić 1988. In the Socialist Republic of Serbia, a specific type of rape was dealt with in the section entitled “Endangering of the security of citizens belonging to another nation, nationality or ethnic group by way of attacking their full freedom” (Art. 61 c); it was defined as “rape, forced intercourse, intercourse with a helpless person, intercourse or perversion with a person who has not reached 14 years of age, intercourse of perversity by abusing position, sexual abuse or perversion, in a way or under the circumstances provoking or due to provoke disquiet or a feeling of uncertainty in citizens belonging to another nation, nationality of ethnic group”. The punishment was twice as high as for the ‘common rape’ defined in another chapter (Criminal acts against personal and moral dignity). These were amendments to the Criminal code or SR Serbia after 1981 that were in force in the whole area of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, including the two provinces (Zbirka krivičnih zakona, Official Gazette of SFRY 1988).

14 These descriptions partly draw on an article by Dumaresq (1981), regardless of the differences in the legal definition of rape in the British and Yugoslav criminal law. In spite of differences, the investigation procedures in rape cases have the same common principles.
homogenized ethnic woman-body needing protection. This was the turning point where ethnic hatred started to be a very concrete endeavor and not an abstract idea of community any more. All ethnic women (and potentially also non-warrior men) started to represent the national body and became thus a potential object of protection or assault. Vice versa, the nation became a woman who needed a protector at the political level. This was the opening of the door through which Milošević and all kinds of protectors and warriors could jump in and form their rules of comradeship\textsuperscript{15}.

The fact that each nation revealed the “Truth” of being a victim could legitimize all sorts of action. All groups claimed yet uncovered “Truths” that were necessary for understanding and acknowledging the situation and for feeling compassion with the victims\textsuperscript{16}. The fight for “Truth” about past wrongs has occupied people in all former Yugoslav republics pushing existing commonalities into the background and making it difficult to construct a common future and to find a viable political solution. First in Serbia and then elsewhere many so called “meetings of truth” were held in 1988 and as “truth” became the main issue in politics the logic of “fiat veritas pereat mundus” was not far away\textsuperscript{17}. Concerns about “Truth”, not politics, has dominated and created mass mobilization movements and especially the media played a crucial role in “promoting the Truth” (see Marković 2000: 592ff). It was Milošević who, together with his supporters, was the first to apply this “politics of Truth” with great success\textsuperscript{18}. While happened was that a strong and obvious bond between gender identity and national identity was constructed, which developed enormous symbolic power and gave a special legitimation to the possible violent “defense” (but in fact aggressive attack) against the other groups.

Victimization through rape was only one part of the intense discursive, ideological and symbolic public mobilization before the real violence began, but one of the most pervasive ones. Rape remained of utmost symbolic importance in all parts of former Yugoslavia and appeared everywhere as a main tool of victimization. It represented the keystone in the creation of a new, consistent symbolic universe\textsuperscript{19}. Simple and unambiguous Truths about victims and perpetrators were generated in the media, in popular culture, especially pop, rock

\textsuperscript{15}On the rule of comradeship in the wars see Gray 1959.

\textsuperscript{16}Julie Mertus wrote the following about the “truths”: “Much has been said about the recent rise of Balkan nationalisms, and particularly of virulent, anti-liberal Serbian or Albanian nationalisms. But few commentators have focused on the Truths that are the fodder of power-hungry nationalists, nor have they explored the processes by which these Truths are perpetuated in preparation of War”. (Mertus 1999a, 7).

\textsuperscript{17}Some three million people attended the Milošević-sponsored meetings in 1988 (Mertus 1999a, 295). On the dangers of politics of truth, see Arendt 1972.

\textsuperscript{18}As it was expressed by D. Rusinow: “Kosovo provided the time-fuse, and Slobodan Milošević provided the detonators for a chain reaction of explosions in which first Serbs and then Albanians, Slovenes, Croats and others came to believe, often to the point of obsession, that part or all of their nation was already or could be faced with extinction” (cit. after Mertus 1999a, 8).

\textsuperscript{19}On the creation of such a symbolic universe in Croatia and Croatian media, see Zakošek 2000: 109ff.
and folk (“turbo”) music, in other revivals of “traditions”, and football hooliganism. They were marked by both victimization of oneself, the projection of evil onto the other, and creation and dehumanization of the supposed enemy.

Creating Targets: The Civilized Against the Uncivilized

Using violence demands legitimization and quite a high degree of rationalization. Before brutalizing and annihilating the other, the other has to be excluded from the community that is entitled to human rights and this is generally done by bestowing on him or her non-human or pseudo-human characteristics.

In the former Yugoslavia there existed (at different times and under different circumstances) discursive attempts of symbolically dehumanizing supposed others, which were already then marked as those who did not deserve inclusion, not even life. In these discourses, the other acquired features of a strange and queer identity. Usually the groups that were targeted were depicted as not being men (= human) enough to be treated as equals, i.e. they were feminized (in the Yugoslav case the Albanians and to the certain extent also Slovenes); as being close to animals (Albanians: their demographic “expansion” was often described in terms of “breeding like rabbits”); and as being childlike creatures (non-responsible and not capable of taking care of themselves such as the economically under-developed or those seen as “the Balkans”). This categorization shows the racist content in the construction of gendered cultural differences. Contrary to the many observers and analysts of the Yugoslav conflict who think that racism was no feature in the conflict, I think that there were obvious racist elements, and that we are dealing with a combination of nationalist and racist patterns that worked through biological/sexual metaphors.

Already in the eighties, one could see derogatory images of a presumed Balkan and uncivilized enemy throughout Yugoslavia: on the one hand the “Balkan man” was depicted as lazy, indifferent and violent; on the other there were images of a diligent, hard working, honest, civilized non-Balkan man. West-east and north-south divisions played a very active part in these boundary drawings within former Yugoslavia and paved the way for the Europe-Balkans division line, which divided Yugoslavia itself. This division, too, was gendered, showing masculine and feminine features. The Slovenian and Croatian media and the cultural elites tried to classify themselves as more civilized than the others and to mark the line between Europe and Yugoslavia putting themselves on the

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20 Hannah Arendt argued very convincingly that there is nothing irrational about violence and that it always requires legitimization (Arendt 1987).

21 The wild other, dehumanized to a degree of a “beast”, became a possible monster and evildoer and thus a legitimized target. Albanians were the first to represent such a target: “[A] sexualized imagery of Albanian men and women was adopted. In the mainstream Serbian and Yugoslav presses, Albanian men were declared to be rapists, although Kosovo had the lowest reported incidents of sexual violence in Yugoslavia. Albanian women were portrayed as mere baby factories, despite statistics indicating that the childbirth rates of urban Albanian women and those of other urban women in Yugoslavia were nearly identical. Accused in the past of being culturally inferior, Albanians increasingly were depicted as genetically inferior as well. This is racism of the purer sort” (Mertus 1999a: 8).
“European” side. They did this by enforcing an image of the “Balkans” as violent and macho, lazy and ‘backward’, fatalist, fraudulent and cunning. The Balkans has, as Maria Todorova put it, “served (and still serves among the political elites of post Yugoslav republics, rem. by V.J.) as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” has been constructed” (Todorova 1997: 188). As a Croatian politician said in 1991: “[T]he Croats are not an aggressive nation. They are in general industrious, honest, diligent, people who are bound together by their strong feelings for their homeland”. And: “[W]e do have our president Tudjman who has stressed that the difference which separates two worlds on the territory of Yugoslavia: two politics, two ideas and two irreconcilable Weltanschauungen, democracy and Bolshevnik dictatorship”. (Cit. after Buden 2000: 56).

The “North” or “West” saw itself as defending and savoring European culture against the black spot of the wild and dark, orthodox and oriental Balkans. Yet the “eastern” part of the country, on the other hand, was worshiping her own putative ancient, traditional, hospitable and “anti-fascist” values. From their perspective, Slovenians were seen as feminized, weak, exploitive, cunning, selfish and calculable whereby Croatians were illustrated as more Western but Nazi-followers and the evil and bellicose traits of the supposedly similar Croat and German characters were underlined (see Wilmer 1999, 168). Albanians, Muslims and Roma were in the worst position. Especially to all those who shared a Slavic language, Albanians represented the “Other within” (see Drakulić, 1999, Wilmer, 2002: 101).

The patterns of war, genocide and rapes were present long before the real violence and the war started and facilitated the extreme use of violence finally resulting in “ethnic cleansing”. The fact that rape was an act of violence with an extreme symbolic meaning (the violence of all violences) explains how it could be made an instrument of ethnic cleansing spreading utmost terror. In a process of ethnic revival, the described genderization and sexualization of the interethnic relationships also contributed to (re)creating one’s own identity through violence.

**Gender and the Annihilation of the Other**

One of the most problematic practices of the wars in the former Yugoslavia was what some analysts considered a very “innovative” strategy of rape with forced impregnation. After the rape many women were told that they had to give birth to little Serbs, Croats or Muslims i.e. children of the different ethnic group. Rape victims reported that the perpetrators aimed at ‘making babies’ (see Nikolić-Ristanović 1995: 59-60 and Thomas & Ralph 1999: 208). Often pregnancy in war rapes is seen as an ‘inevitable byproduct’ of rape. Therefore, the “function” of impregnating women has not been closely reflected. Using rape in war the way it was used in the former Yugoslavia obviously originated from the previous preparation for war through a sexualized, genderized and historicized construction of the enemy. To some it is not plausible that rapes in war, especially if accompanied by forced impregnation, can represent a strategy of ‘ethnic cleans-
In her detailed study, Nikolić-Ristanović rightly concluded that from the point of view of ethnicity rape, if it results in a forced pregnancy, amounts to ethnic mixing and not ‘cleansing’. Nevertheless, rape clearly functioned within the strategy of ethnic cleansing as a pattern of annihilation of the other. Rape and forced impregnation in a way made a woman superfluous, negated her as an autonomous being and made her a means for the ‘production’ of the rapist’s child and his ethnicity. Women were thus nothing but a vessel for the other. Impregnation was clearly seen as a cultural production of one’s own national identity regardless of the biological facts. The power of this symbolic and mythical (patriarchal) interpretation was much more real and effective to those concerned than any power of biological ‘facts’.

This example shows clearly that ethnic “cleanliness” and “homogeneity” always represent an artificially created ‘cultural’ and gendered interpretation/ construction of facts and that they are not ‘naturally’ given (cf. Malik 1996, 149ff; Kuzmanic 1999). In order to eliminate a group it must first be symbolically created, unified and homogenized. Only afterwards is it possible to identify and annihilate it. Rapes together with forced impregnation did not only “destroy the physical and psychological existence of the women concerned” (Seifert 1996) - they also embody an extreme attempt to annihilate plurality: of gender plurality and of ethnic plurality. Rape and forced impregnation aimed at the total annihilation of the other (without killing her) through the negation of the other’s body which is not more than a womb, a vessel for one’s own racial or ethnic (re)production. This strategy amounts to an extreme collective homogenization, where men act as one unified collective subject, one Man. In this act, plurality and difference are annihilated and responsibility and guilt are blurred within the collectivity. As the American philosopher Glenn Gray (who was fighting in WW2 in France and published his reflections later) observed, in war it is not an abstract ideology or abstract emotions which push warriors to kill and slaughter, but the very concrete feelings of comradeship, “loyalty to the group” and collective action. (Gray 1959: xviii).

The attempt to “produce” ones own ethnic ‘copy’ through the body of the Other, can and should be understood within the framework of the specific ‘concept’ of rape as creative violence and as a group/collective action. Rape and enforced pregnancy are nothing less than enacting the myth of self-reproduction of a unified and homogenized Man, who does not need diversity and plurality for his existence and can re-create himself through a violent act. Violence (rape) is seen as an act of self-recreation, which is performed through the annihilation of the other (gender) as an autonomous being. The annihilation of the other, the annihilation of her/his basic autonomy and agency is thus a gendered and a two-way

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22 The term that has acquired its meaning in the war in Bosnia, originates from the military expression to “cleanse the territory” of the enemy but at the same time symbolically shows the distinction between ‘dirtiness’ and ‘cleanliness;’ clean and pure is creating the symbolic boundary between inclusion and exclusion.

23 Nikolić-Ristanović shows how war rape started to represent a ‘means’ of interethnic communication at several levels, as a means for vengeance upon men, and as a vengeance upon unsuitably behaving women, as a part of the war strategy (prosecution), and as a violation not only of women’s autonomy but of their ‘reproductive rights’ (Nikolić-Ristanović et al. 1995: 59).

24 Ivan Čolović has brilliantly described how “the Warrior’s” violent identity, emphasizing its allegiance to Serbia and its leader Milošević, developed through hooliganism and football comradeship, and how it was quickly mobilized for the war and killings (see Čolović 1996, 2000).
process. It not only involves destruction; before destruction to be able to be effect-
ed, the violent construction of gender difference/separation and identity is neces-
sary. Gender identities are first extremely dramatized in order that difference and
autonomy be totally destroyed later. Persons are destroyed through the destruc-
tion of their individual (gender) identity, not as ‘human beings in general’. This is
why rape (symbolically and practically) fulfills such an important “function”.

The very first step in the annihilation, killings, prosecutions, humiliation, and
degradation was the physical separation of males and females (and children) into
two gender groups. One of the most obvious phenomena in the mass killings
(especially in Srebrenica in 1995) was what you could call gendered manipula-
tions, i.e. people became in the first place an element in the gendered-ethno racist
series. Women were degraded by making use of a tradition of seeing them as
less human; Men were degraded by making them childlike and non-male through
various practices of feminization. Both were excluded from humanity and thus
from those who deserve to be treated as humans and to have human rights (this
inevitable dehumanization has been described in detail by Rorty 1999, 68ff).

In her analysis of the elements of totalitarianism Arendt described (Arendt
1986) how plurality and individuality are usually destroyed by robbing human
beings of all their personal attributes and by rendering them human only (thus
they are reduced to the “Menschengeschlecht”, so to speak naked human species,
mere humanity). Especially under the extreme circumstances of the concentra-
tion camp, humans thus lose all their distinct characteristics as well as the private
space around them. These ‘naked beings’ at the same time lose and acquire gen-
der or any other inscribed identity. They lose it at the individual level but acquire
it anew, so to speak. by becoming a part of the larger ethnic/race body. They are
wiped out as individuals and only exist as representatives of one gender/race’.
Only from this perspective is it possible to think about the re-production of one
group through the annihilation of the other: Women’s and men’s bodies become
literarily the bearers of ethnic symbols and messages. Sometimes they willingly
accept this; sometimes they are forcibly inscribed in their own bodies. Ethnic and
gender messages are written on the bodies and once this has been done can be
annihilated as ethnic, national and gendered bodies.

Self-Re-creation: Violence and Heroism

All political communities are built upon myths of foundation. The founding
myths are usually marked by narrations of a common identity. Many of them
have a violent origin and many of them explicitly or implicitly include transgres-

25 Slavenka’s Drakulić’s book about the women’s experience in the concentration camps
in Bosnia with the significant title “As if I do not exist” narrates the story of a young woman, a
concentration camp survivor. She had been in the group of women continuously raped by the sol-
diers. Drakulić describes the loss of her self and the reduction of the person’s to the homoge-
nous series of women and men of a certain nationality (Muslim and Serb). (Drakulić 2002: 81).
26 For the term series, taken from Sartre and used for the analysis of gender, see Young
1990.
27 Many such cases were seen in the wars in former Yugoslavia where women were liter-
ary imprinted ethnic symbols. Cf. also Brownmiller (1975, 54 ff.) and her accounts of symboli-
cal markings on women’s bodies in relation to war rapes.
isions (improved and rationalized through the narrative itself) and a call for homogenization. In his 1989 speech on the occasion of the six hundredth anniversary of the battle against the Turks in Kosovo, Milošević evoked such a myth claiming that it was difficult to determine the historical truth, but that this was no longer important and stating that “the lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history” (cited after Wilmer 2002:137).28

Most of the cases in the series of the Yugoslav wars ended up with either a creation of a new political unit (Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton agreement) or with the attempt of the restoration of the old ones (Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo). Due to the fact that in the post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe democratic transitions a very homogenized liberal model of the state-building, namely the Hobbes-Schmittian concept of re-establishing of the modern state(s) as political unit(s), prevailed, it is no wonder that this represented an (even more expressed) model for the rest of Eastern Europe.

Such a model demanded a significant degree of homogeneity and tried to suppress differences among the potential consumers of new democratic institutions. Within a Hobbesian framework the state works as an “exchange” between individuals and state power, whereby the individuals give away part of their autonomy and hands over certain rights to the state which, in turn, protects them against “Others”. This idea, which was at the basis of state building in the East, merged well with the belief in the creativeness of violence and fascination with violence as a politically creative force (not at all only Yugoslav but also in the West and also among theoreticians widespread fascination). In all the myths of foundation or restoration in the new post-Yugoslav states homogenization, war and violence played the role of the almost ultimate source of power, politics and political authority.30

After the war, the warrior’s narrative about the victory over the Yugoslav People’s Army (Slovenia) and the violent acquisition/restoration of territory (Croatia) started to play a significant role. In Croatia, war veterans became an important mass mobilization force and guaranteed the cleanliness and heroism of the Croatian war efforts. Likewise, in Slovenia, where the war was shortest and armed conflict itself only took ten days altogether, heroism, warfare and the defense of the homeland were strongly emphasized feeding into the founding myths of the new, independent state. Before the war everyone knew the Serbian proverb that Serbs “lose in peace and gain in war only”. After the war, there was almost no Yugoslav ethnicity which would not have – in one way or another – claimed the same. The fact that Albanians in Kosovo took up arms after the years of non-violent resistance, shows the still remaining working link between the creation of a new political unit and the assumed amount of “necessary” violence.

28 However, not all of them necessarily have violent character, although there are not many of those who’s “deus ex machina” would not have used at least certain amount of violence for creating the new political unit and would thus be particularly concerned about the possible plurality of the factual funding.

29 In my opinion, one cannot speak about one war, since there were at least three if not four (including Kosovo) wars in the former Yugoslavia.

30 Post-Dayton Bosnia might seem an exception here, since it does not really have a myth: as a state, it has been created by the international community.
Also, sustaining a warrior’s and a heroic identity was a means for the “re-masculinization” of men (feminized under Communist rule). Second, a sometimes weaker, sometimes stronger source of authority was democratic legitimization and identification with (belonging to civilized) Europe and the claim that the newly-founded political institutions automatically rest on human rights. Thus Europe itself, which was seen as “civilized and peaceful” served as a source of authority, There is an inherent and obvious contradiction between these two legitimization forces (war and peace, force and human rights etc). On the other hand, due to the re-masculinization of politics in all Eastern European systems, the new defense and protection ideologies tended to build on the new, homogeneous identity and exclusionist citizenship practices.

In those Yugoslav countries which defended themselves against the aggression of the Yugoslav People’s Army and which saw themselves as victims of Serbian domination and aggression and strove for international recognition, this endeavor had several aspects. As Boris Buden observed in his analysis of Croatian attitudes towards Europe, the endeavors for recognition were not only legal endeavors but at the same time aimed at social, cultural and individual inclusion (see Buden, 2000: 53ff). The formation of the new states and their re-constitution were accompanied by ethno-national and patriotic political ideologies. In these processes, identities were and are the most contested terrains, identities meaning ethnic, national, gender and social identities and also citizenship. The manner in which these identities become homogenized and included into a unified state was dependent both on the psychological traits shaping these identities as well as on outside forces that took an interest in accompanying these processes. The transformation of former political communities into new political entities can take different paths; it can proceed in non-violent ways, as some of the East European velvet revolutions have shown; it can be inclusive (for some), and exclusive (for others), and its long-time legitimacy, durability and efficiency also depends on these features. The way in which members or non-members are included and/or excluded is decisive for the question of democratic transformation and of political equality. Regarding the question of citizenship, after the secessions and processes of ethnic cleansing in some parts, all legal arrangements in the former Yugoslav states – with the exception of post-Dayton Bosnia31 – included discriminatory procedures for those who were not considered citizens according to the *ius sanguinis* principle. The principle of *ius soli* was applied only in part (Dedić, Jalušič, Zorn 2003).

Frequently, exclusions seemed to be entirely ‘innocent’ and nothing but an urgent bureaucratic ‘measures’. One such case was the so called “erasure” in Slovenia which is considered to be the most successful transitional state. In 1992, Slovenia erased from its registers the individuals from other republics of the former Yugoslavia who had not applied for Slovenian citizenship (see Dedić, Jalušič, Zorn 2003). This erasure (i.e., the sudden removal of the resident data from the register of permanent residents and with this the complete loss of their legal status) was a co-ordinated action on the part of the executive, legislative and judicial power, the police and of administrative authorities and laid the ground for massive and systematic human rights abuses. The erased were almost exclusive-

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31 The Serbian Republic of Bosnia, however, functions differently.
ly ethnic non-Slovenes (i.e. Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Roma, Serbs etc.) thus the act of erasure contained elements of ethnic cleansing, which has been carried out through administrative procedures and in accordance with law (see Dedić, Jalušič, Zorn 2003). In spite of the fact that the highest political authorities of the Republic of Slovenia were informed about the problems of the erased persons already in 1993-1994, and in spite of the two judgments of the Constitutional Court in favor of repairing the wrongs done to the erased, throughout the past 10 years no concrete step has been undertaken to redress the injustices arising from the erasure.

The problem with state nationalisms in the newly emerging post-Yugoslav states that have built their ideologies and identities upon the “West” and “Europe” was that in spite of the formal, international recognition, they felt (either partly or fully) misrecognized by “the West” after the war. Neither their merits nor heroic endeavors in fighting against evil in the Balkans, nor their innocent, just, honest and civilized identities were recognized in a way that paid tribute to the important features of their identity. This perceived ‘misrecognition’ gave rise to a certain resentment against Europe and the West resulting in a wavering between pro-and anti-European positions (cf. Buden, ibid. 60). On the other hand, the fact that the type of identity (nationalism and racism) in which these states have enacted their independence has been “misrecognized” by the West was partly a product of the Western projection of the ancient hatred towards the Balkans.

Organized Innocence and Identity: The Strategy of Blaming the Other

Many collective national movements and nation-states show that a victim identity that cherishes its own ill-fate and vulnerability is not only dangerous but also hampers the development of an independent political community that could accept responsibility for itself or others. Israel, where the political elite, despite the horrible experience of the Jewish people, is not yet capable of assuming political responsibility but continues to pursue a politics of war that is legitimized by a victim identity and by a presumed, a priori collective innocence, is a case in point.

In the former Yugoslavia, the war and its roots have affected different parts and groups in different ways and to different degrees. The immediate violence, terror and killings, resulted in a high death toll. Moreover, there were immense material consequences and suffering as well as post-traumatic syndromes and experiences of loss and degradation. However, there were also other consequences of war. Another outcome of many years of self-victimization, blaming the Other and strictly denying nationalist and racist fantasies, a syndrome I call “organized innocence” emerged. It is something that sprung up and developed in all post-Yugoslav states, in Serbia and Montenegro, in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and even in Slovenia.

Organized innocence is a phenomenon which actually emerged in the whole of Yugoslavia from the above described processes of self-victimization and of constructing nations as innocent and truthful. We encounter the same
language in all parts: from Macedonia to Montenegro and from Slovenia to Serbia (take for instance Milosevic speech in Kosovo cit. in Wilmer, 2002: 136; cf. also a Croatian politician cited in Bude 2000,56). Facing such attitudes, the problem which is still to be faced after the war and after the crimes and injustices done in many parts, is how to think about the question of guilt and responsibility, before, in and after the war in the former Yugoslavia. Without pretending to have an answer to this question I would like to point out the following.

In Serbia, where the question of guilt and responsibility was put on the agenda and Milošević used a strategy of collectivizing guilt at his defense in The Hague, the syndrome of organized innocence took a form of almost total rejection of responsibility for the war. The strategy of blaming the other was used as a strategy to reject any responsibility for starting the war, participation in the war and war crimes done by the army and paramilitary forces on the Serbian side. Besides, other forms of disavowing crimes and responsibility were at work such as the idea that everyone, every nation in the former Yugoslavia was equally responsible or guilty for what happened; that “they are no better”, since they committed crimes, too; that the country had suffered enough (including the NATO bombing in 1999); that mainly the ordinary and thus innocent people were victims of the regime; or that the international community was primarily responsible for what happened. The dialectic between collectively demonizing Serbs as natural evil-doers, making them the only evil source of all crimes and the ensuing rejection of any responsibility worked perfectly well, since the collectivization of guilt can only result in its rejection (cf. Jaspers 1965; Arendt 1994). This phenomenon has been described by some intellectuals and NGO’s in Serbia that have dealt with the question of guilt, responsibility, truth and reconciliation in some depth.32 They spoke not only about “organized efforts... to relativize the crime”, but also about attempts “to de-ethnicize”33 it in the sense that “the way this new Truth is placed has the same totalitarian characteristics as nationalism which in times past has propelled the war machinery” (Biserko 2002). This “totalitarian way of thinking” has been considered the main obstacle to democratization. It has been primarily put forward in the new authorities’ interpretation of the recent past who, instead of establishing the responsibility for the crimes, were trying to relativize them by invoking the broader historical context, by laying the blame at the door of the others. In Croatia, the main argument has been that, since the Croats fought a defensive war, their violence was different than the Serbian one and that the war crimes committed in retaliation were different from those committed as

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32 At the international conference “In Search for Truth and Responsibility – Towards a Democratic Future”, organized by B92 TV station in Belgrade in May 2001, many opposition critiques of the Serbian president Vojislav Kostunica’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission were especially underlining the fact that the president’s commission was established as a Serbian-only body and could thus be aiming only at the question of responsibility for the crimes and reconciliation within Serbia, as well as the fear that such commission could only compromise the idea of truth and reconciliation. If the Serbs only reconciled among themselves, that could aggravate the reconciliation with others.

33 The problem here was that neither the victims’ nor the perpetrators’ ethnic origins were mentioned. This “de-ethnicization” amounted to hiding the genocide already proven at the Hague tribunal. (cf. Biserko 2002,3).
aggression (see Wilmer 2002: 84). Thus some parts of the population collectively opposed the extradition of the war criminals to the Hague tribunal.

However, maybe the most interesting phenomenon of the “organized innocence syndrome” is the case of Slovenia which was the country least involved in the conflict and which has been regarded by the international community and others as the most democratized, developed and successful of all the post-Yugoslav states. What does this syndrome in Slovenia look like?

Thanks to numerous democratic movements that emerged in the 1980s, the newly formed state of Slovenia had the positive image of a community expressing solidarity with the victims of discrimination (for example Albanians in Kosovo). Indeed, there was a chance for the country to reaffirm itself as a state truly based on human rights and civil responsibility, rather than on the idea of a victimized national/ethnic identity. But even Slovenia, the most successful transitional country, let this chance slip by. In the 90s Slovenia experienced numerous examples of exclusion, tolerated xenophobia, hostility towards strangers and public intolerance that were comparable to situations in many other European states (see Pajnik 2002). Still, the main problem was the ignorance of the political elite regarding this and the above described problem of the erasure which, given the number of persons affected by it, the coordination of action on the part of the executive, legislative and judicial power, of the police and of administrative authorities, unprecedented in Slovenia. The main question regarding this case is, of course, how it could happen and why there was no repair of the injustice for such a long time, why there was a systematic denial of the violations. I have no simple answer to that, but here I would like to point out especially the interconnections among the foundation of the new state, the definition of “citizenship” and “resident” and “organized innocence syndrome”.

In Slovenia, the “organized innocence syndrome” approximately reads as follows: Slovenians never oppressed anyone and never did wrong to anyone; moreover, throughout history Slovenians were the victims of foreign peoples, totalitarian regimes and so on. If they happened to be violent, they took to killing their fellow Slovenians (under the pressure of external totalitarianism). The (often essentialized) identity of the people is described as that of a trusting nation, which is (usually) the victim of global politics that descends on it like a natural disaster. Slovenia has suffered economic exploitation and cultural oppression in the former Yugoslavia and was, in addition to all this, violently attacked by the Yugoslav People’s Army under Milošević’s command. Hence the new state is by definition free of any responsibility for the past and those who created it are innocent and untouchable (the underlying implication is that its citizens have only recently shaken off the yoke of discrimination, so the state’s primary task is to protect “Slovenianess”). At the same time, the traditional kindheartedness, humanity and tolerance of its people are seen as a guarantee that people will be treated kindly. Those who do not go along with the state or do not recognize its kindness are labeled as enemies or opponents. Another variation of the same tune is the viewpoint that those who call for respect for law and justice are actually making fun of “our country,” abusing “our” laws for their own interests, and are “toying” with the rule of law, while others – the imaginary “we”, the majority – will pay the bill. And all this produces the belief that evil things happen (can happen) only in our neighborhood, down there in the Balkans, in those horrible wars.
The proximity of not only horrendous violations of human rights but also mass slaughter suggests the conclusion that what happens in Slovenia is a “lesser evil”. This creates the impression that the violations occurring in Slovenia are rather administrative errors and are negligible compared to what happened “there” (ethnic cleansing). When compared to the atrocities committed in Bosnia, nothing is really evil any more. What indeed are 18,300 administratively “erased” people compared to 9,000 killed in Srebrenica?

This presumed innocence, the self-image as an eternal victim and the radical distancing from the Balkans created a condition for non-responsibility to spread and paved the way for a politics of blaming. As the case of Slovenia shows, exclusionary politics can have a long lasting effect on the described victimization processes. It resulted in a kind of identity, which divides people into those who have the right of social inclusion those who are excluded (Alexander 1992: 291).

Conclusion

Trying to answer the initial question of this paper why there seems to be no stability in post-war former Yugoslavia (although, if we to compare the region with other post-conflict regions, the situation here is quite stable), I tried to elaborate on how gender relations and gender identities were mobilized and re-constructed within a discursive practice of victimization that contributed to a violent solution. I tried to show that gender represented one of the most important focuses of identification and that by making use of gender, identities were produced that were ready to invest and engage in a violent, but in their view justifiable, cause. Summarizing what has been said before, four features of the development towards violent solutions can be identified in the separated political units: First, genderization and self-victimization through blaming the other; second, the annihilation of the Other through means and practices that differed in their degree of violence; third, a fascination with violence as a “creative” force; and fourth, “organized innocence” as an important part of the foundation of the nation-state’s self-consciousness. Finally, I claimed that the so called “organized innocence” syndrome represents a very problematic foundation of the state and democracy, since it promotes self-justification, blaming of the other, rejection of responsibility and constant demands for homogenization.

In my view, all four elements sprung up in all parts of the former Yugoslavia, even in Slovenia, which generally is presented as a model for successful transition, where there was no serious fight or material damage, which experienced the least violence and had almost no victims to deplore in the process of separation from the Yugoslav state. Still, the example of the administratively “erased people” shows that the collective attitude was similar to other republics and made use of similar sources for building a collective identity. At least on the administrative level, the results were also similar to those in other republics, albeit less violent.

It must be concluded that xenophobic and racist feelings supported the building of a new Slovenian state and identity as well, and influences its asso-
ciation with the EU. In Slovenia, too, the “Other” is confronted with hatred, primarily focusing on the supposedly wild Balkans, meaning the other formerly Yugoslav republics. Important elements in this process are: emotionalization (a policy of creating crises and scaremongering in the public arena); laying blame on immigrants and the state; self-victimization of the “indigenous” local residents (emphasizing the excessive rights of the immigrants and sympathy towards immigrants as a problem); hatred of the state; legitimization of possible “defensive” activities, and a process of normalizing xenophobia and racism normalization and making it part of everyday life.

The case of Slovenia shows that we cannot understand the logic of identity and conflict if we fall into the trap of what I would call “reduction ad Balkanis” in the sense that we see the Balkan war and its consequences as a result of an ancient hatred which cannot affect the “more developed, progressive, liberal etc. democracies”. As a matter of fact, the narrative of victimization of a group is a very frequently used practice in contemporary Western democracies, as the examples of not only Austrian Freedom Party leader Jörg Heider, French Jean Marie Le Pen or the Dutch Pym Fortyune, but also some newly adopted international politics discourses and practices after September 11, 2001 show.

The creation of new national and states’ identities and new ideas on citizenship in the post conflict Yugoslav region were very much connected to the construction and annihilation of otherness, foreignness, and a racist hatred that was additionally nourished by war experiences. All this contributed to new discourses of homogeneity and many new potential problems (instability, conflict). The victimization discourse introduced what you could call “the hegemony of the victim” and it also introduced a dialectic between the feminized victim/people and the masculinized leader presenting it in terms of a love relationship. Thus, politics was charged with (gendered) emotions and those emotions contributed to provoking war. They also contributed to the idea that at the end of the war homogenous identities should result. Thus, gender and sexuality played the crucial role in the process of establishing these identities.

I also claim that no ethnic or gender identities that could have been mobilized for the war pre-existed in a primordial sense. To be sure, certain stereotypical identities existed before the outbreak of violence and were used for mobilization. However, I do contend that these identities were no more problematic than in other (peaceful and democratic) societies and did not live up to the typical Western or European prejudice about the “mobilization of the ancient hatred” in the former Yugoslavia which contributed to the building and continuation of the (dangerous) stereotype of “Balkanization” together with a belief that the old European nations are far above such “barbaric” practices and that they represent something typical for the “other” regions which reinforces European mythology of higher civilized space and historic development. Also the typical Western stereotype of the “masculinized” and especially sexist Balkans is to be viewed with caution. The view of the predominantly violent macho Balkans has been reinforced even by some feminists who attributed the violent tradition to the traditional Balkan family patterns and the exploitation of women, the long years of socialist emancipation notwithstanding. Also, the pre-
dominant assumption that the reason for most rapes committed by Serbs in the war in Bosnia was the Serbs’ natural aggressiveness and not the fact that they were the most powerful and winning side, was very similar to the earlier conviction that separatist Albanians were professional rapists34.

At the end, I would like to emphasize again that gendered images of politics and international relations are by no means unique to ex-Yugoslavia. A case in point is Fukuyama, who states in one of his famous articles that a masculinized South might decide the pace of world politics in the future, since the North’s aging population is weak and feminized with middle classes supporting a non-aggressive, pacifist state (Fukuyama 1998). He suggests to aim at some kind of equilibrium and to bring masculinity back to the North. In view of the above analysis that shows what an emotionalized politics built on gendered images and gendered identities has effected in the former Yugoslavia we should watch these global developments with great caution.

Proofread by Theodora Pankovich

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162


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THE FIGHTING MORALE OF NATIONAL ARMIES IN THE BREAKUP OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

The armed conflict over the territories of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not have the characteristics of a modern war. General compulsive military service was deemed in the ideology of the warlords a right, duty and an honor, and its avoidance tantamount to treason. The role of the human factor in the war was classical; soldiers were the “living force” of the warring parties, they did not have modern military equipment, and each side resorted to irregular military groups (mercenaries, volunteers) to make up for the lack of motivated fighters. Military actions most often were not conducted in accordance with strategic and tactical rules and the warlords or the lower officers did not bother too much to distinguish civilians from soldiers. As a rule, the targets were selected randomly, while the military power employed was disproportionate. Despite all this, the wars in the former Yugoslavia all had one mark of modernity. In elections and referendums, the citizens had voted en masse for the nationalists’ ideological platform. However, when the time came to confirm this attitude in practice, there

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1 The emphasis of the significance of the human factor has been in the history of war a euphemism for technical inferiority. The human factor can represent the “living force” of an army, or have a somewhat safer position, like in modernly equipped armies. The warlord who has an advantage over his enemy in terms of “living force” can count on victory only if this living force is to be “consumed” more intensively. Warmakers have a penchant for consuming “cannon fodder” and there was little difference in that respect in history between politicians and military leaders. This difference is also nowhere to be found in both just and unjust wars: soldiers and politicians have always had the same attitude towards the human factor. Conquerors and those who had defended their freedom did not lament too much over the lives of their soldiers. Warmakers who evoke the value and force of the moral factor have hidden or less hidden intentions to “consume” more intensively their human factor than those who invest more in technical advantages in equipment and weaponry.

2 The right in modern democracies to opt not to go to the army at all derives mostly from social changes and less from the modernization of weaponry and professionalization of the military. The tendency to avoid military service has its roots in different (democratic) social relations. In societies in which the potential use of force or violence within the community has been replaced with a social consensus and the rule of law, the citizens have opposite values than those that the military people must revere. The very nature of democratic society is such that there is an inherent lack of fighting spirit, since the conditions in those societies provide for a lack of sense of collective danger, while at the same time individualism and personal autonomy are cherished.
was no unity of purpose. The Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian societies had been divided in their preparedness to participate in the war and thus supporting the political goals of their warlords. In this way, they showed that they possessed a critical spirit toward the war as a tool of politics, even though this seedling demonstrated their incoherent attitudes. It was as if everyone, especially in the cases of Serbia/Croatia/Bosnia, who gave their support to independence failed to bear in mind the price achieving independence would have in terms of human lives, destruction and long-term consequences. According to the data — that is data on the number of men of military age who have left the country to avoid being drafted during the wars in Croatia — and Bosnia-Herzegovina — the anti-war-oriented citizens of Serbia, Croatia and BiH had considerably exceeded draft plans of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) outlined in peace time. On the eve of the war, the JNA could have counted on 500,000 potential soldiers, and in accordance to UNHCR data in 1994, there were 643,000 people from the former socialist Yugoslavia in third countries. The number of submitted applications reached at one point the number of 924,060.

The policy of Communist oligarchies long before the breakout of war has been characterized by overt nationalism. After the fall of Communism, independence tendencies became public. When the Communist mask had fallen, nationalism had already become the chief ideology in all the institutions of society. It became the fundamental ingredient of further homogenization of the already divided nations and the main instrument for the “new powers that be” to conduct their belligerent policies.

The hopes of antiwar oriented citizens that they could fill the void created with the disappearance of the communist concept of “working people” with anything but new ideological content proved to be unrealistic. The ensuing foreseeable escalation of violence in the war took away every possibility of resolving the issue of borders and minorities in the newly-created states in a democratic manner. The haste to sacrifice human lives for the national cause and pave the way to war was the shared intention of all the national warlords. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), previously considered as the last stronghold of Yugoslav Communism, did not manage to avoid following in the footsteps of the overall breakup of the country. This was, in large part, due to the Army’s own internal national divisions that came about because of the old system governing the status of officers and promotions. Just like in 1941, the military disintegrated rapidly to become the respective cores of new national armies. In the war, the nationalism that these armies had inherited acquired full “legitimacy”. Each nation, as a fundamental identifying ele-

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3 In September 1991, the Serbian Parliament discussed on a closed session, the problems of desertion from the battlefields of Eastern Slavonia and the failure of the partial mobilization in Serbia (50 %) and Belgrade (15 %), Vreme, News Digest Agency No 1-2, 30. September 1991.
5 Everywhere where the official policy has been national self-determination, the policy was ruthless and used nationalism and war to achieve that goal.
6 Šipka, P., Hadžić, M., Public Opinion Research of Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about Social Reforms, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the JNA, Belgrade 1989. This research showed a high correlation between the nationality and the political positions of members of the JNA.
ment for members of the worrying armies, had been attributed an “exceptional” origin, language, religion, “glorious” past, church and state. All these goals, the warmakers had claimed, could be achieved solely by war.

In the JNA, the sources of morale had been the national struggle for liberation: the revolution in the Second World War, self-management, non-alignment, “Brotherhood and Unity” of Yugoslav peoples, and the doctrine of “Universal Popular Defense” during Socialism. By inherited methods of indoctrination, a new ideological amalgam (of elements of the “identity” of the nation) had replaced the old one and become the chief source of morale in the new armies. The things Yugoslav nations had shared in their former country have been unfoundedly and tragi-comically attacked and ultimately divided. A reduced notion of the nation had become the source of morale not just for the army, but also a source for a “revalorization” of history, the publication of new schoolbooks and creation of new cultural models. What in modern armies is considered an important source of morale – the quality of weaponry, organization, training, leadership, command – did not play an important role in the armies of the bellicerent peoples of the former Socialist Yugoslavia.

Once awakened, the nationalist fire has been easily stirred up and was almost impossible to extinguish. During and after the war, these societies became maybe even more nationalistic than on the eve of the breakup.7

Similarities and Differences in the Foundation of the Fighting Morale of National Armies

With the decision to go to war, each state that counts on political and military support will generally organize a media attack on the “peace time state of mind” of its citizens. Mental war always precedes real armed conflict. Having said that, no war comes as a surprise. It must be prepared in the minds of future warriors. During a certain period, warmakers attempt to justify the political, military and moral reasons for war in order to gather support for their decisions and justifications for future sacrifices. In the republics of the former Socialist Yugoslavia, the propaganda war has begun long before its very breakup and the war for territories between newly established leaders. In the coming war between the peoples (citizens) of the former country, one could have followed the preparations in the neighborhood, among friends, colleagues and relatives. The citizens had namely become units of the division of one or more warring parties. Ethnic hatred already created in society was the perfect environment for fueling the fighting morale of national armies. The mobilized citizens, depending on the degree of personal acceptance of the state’s war policy, came to the military apathetic or enthusiastic, depending on their (non) allegiance to the national war effort. The comparison of certain facets of the fighting morale of the three armies has been drawn up just on the basis of these external factors, the source of which has been the policy of the warring parties:

7 On the presidential elections in Serbia in December 1992, the nationalist candidate Slobodan Milosevic obtained 56.31%, while his pro-democracy rival totalled 33.79% of the popular vote, with the turnout being 68.31%. On the presidential elections in September 2002, two years after Milosevic’s removal, nationalist candidates V. Kostunica (30.88%) and V. Šešelj (23.24%) together obtained 54.12% of the vote, while the pro-democracy contender M. Labus finished third with 27.36% (voter turnout 55.30%). www.cesid.org.yu/ total results for Serbia
The abolition of political monism and the introduction of multiparty politics has been a “pluralistic shock” solely in Serbia. Serbians had two reasons to be shocked. One was a genuine ideological split, while the other lied in the fact that for Serbia, Communist monism has been the means to safeguard a state which would gather all Serbs under its roof. Nationalism and Communism (monism) have found, at that point of looming breakup, a common interest. Political pluralism and political freedom in society, conflicting in many aspects, is thus one of the reasons for the war and internal Serbian divisions. In all other republics, there was less resistance to pluralism (BiH, Macedonia). In those that wanted to secede from Yugoslavia, pluralism has been the instrument to achieve national interests and was complementary with the latter. The introduction of multiparty politics had created a different political foundation for war morale. On one side (with the Slovenians, Croats, and later Muslims/Bosnians and Macedonians), nationalism could have been presented as a weapon for bringing down monism, as a demonstration of newly-acquired political freedom and the means to keep it; on the other (Serbian) side, nationalism had a common interest with Communist monism and had thus been discredited with nationalists and the West as well with respect to global ideological trends.

All three armies, created in the interethnic war, had built their fighting morale dominantly with nationalistic ideology, thus becoming ideological and politicized themselves. The factors of organization, training, professional and moral quality of the personnel, fighting spirit and leadership in small units all were secondary factors for morale building. The cohesion of the human factor had been reinforced by the linking of historical myths and the creation of new ones regarding national sacrifice. The national cause has been the most problematic one, although varying from army to army (for the Bosnians, it was a Bosnian civic state, while for the Serbs and Croats the hidden objective was Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia by means of division of Bosnia). In each of these nations, it was simply not possible to define the moral contradictions openly and acceptably. The internal conflict regarding the war’s purpose was the source of the fundamental qualities of fighting morale in the warring armies. It was impossible to develop cognitive and emotionally coherent national attitudes as a foundation for patriotism and fighting motivation.

The pyramid structured army had been put under the military and political responsibility of one person. The new armies had been, in that respect, the successors of JNA, even in terms of establishing the status they secured for themselves as war leaders. Everyone was commander-in-chief with something that we could call a Tito complex. To the warlords, the belief in the objective of national ideology as they defined it, and the permeation fo the whole army with nationalistic spirit, were the only criterion for fighting and moral values.

Disproportionate and random use of force has been a characteristic of all three warring sides (Serbs were however the “leaders” in that respect, thus bearing the largest portion of responsibility for war). The participants of the war have never been convinced that a particular military action (conquering part of the territory, a particular area, villages or towns) would achieve any definitive political or military goal. Knowing that, the those giving orders and unit commanders

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8 Countries that are not sovereign (and these are all small countries) can not count on the durability of the solutions imposed by military force.
engaged in battle only when confident that they could outpower the enemy – out-
power it much easily than prescribed by tactical rules – and that there was not
going to be any resistance. The Serbian side enjoyed an early advantage due to its
huge initial superiority. The Croats and the Bosnians were paying attention to
what the West and NATO were doing and gradually grew stronger and bolder
under the auspices of the big superpowers. There were no decisive battles for ter-
ritories, which were the real cause of the war. Attacks on unprotected military and
civilian targets were a general practice – the “courage” of the Slovenians in the
war that Milosevic had planned to lose on purpose; the chasing of citizens out of
their homes and jobs; attacks on their property; persecution and killings; attacks
on uniformed individuals; the isolation of military facilities; the blackmailing of
officers by threatening members of their family; the isolation of JNA barracks;
the shelling of villages and towns with the purpose of ethnically cleansing them;
the establishment of camps where torture was routine and finally, massive killings
of civilians. The military and moral character of these orders couldn’t have
aroused national dignity and pride among the order-givers or the order-takers.
The war methods stemming from such orders were filled with psychological feel-
ings of hatred, revenge and destruction. The patriotic rhetoric of the warmakers
had, with time, become a well conceived pretext for crime perpetrators, as well
as for war crimes. Fighting morale in terms of war goals or individual battles
could not have been born out of such conditions. This was also due to the fact that
it seemed that dying for those goals would have been futile. Revenge was more
useful for the warlords, and looting and crimes were a natural ally of that kind of
fighting morale.

A heterogeneous commanding personnel structure – JNA officers, reservists
trained in the JNA, volunteers with experience from other armies, foreign mer-
cenaries, volunteers with experience acquired during the war who had become
officers – did not contribute to the formation of morally solid units and mutual
trust. Some top brass JNA officers (Slovenians, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs),
when needed by the warmakers, played their roles and cashed in on their loyalty
to the new ideology. The middle and lower brass of the JNA, in spite of having
switched their allegiances on time, were under constant suspicion by Croatian and
Bosnian political and war strategists, even more so than their colleagues on the
Serbian side. Communist (pro-Yugoslav) remnants and the atheist education of
JNA officers were lesser trouble for the Serbian side. Serbian wire-pullers left a
place in their manipulation spectrum for quasi-leftists, quasi “Yugo-Nostalgics”
and Greater Serbs. In Serbia’s armies between the Drina and Kupa rivers there
was no place for ideological gradations. The communicating vessels of ethnic
cleansing could only tolerate pure nationalists.

The involvement of the commanding personnel/officers in war crimes, loot-
ing and crime, as well as poor discipline (adequate training and internal relations
based on proper rules had not been a basis of discipline on any side) had weak-
ened fighting morale on all sides of the frontline. The main warring parties
(Serbs, Croats and Bosnians) had been suspected of crimes or threatened to be
indicted and some escaped trial after having dying and others tried on the basis
of command responsibility (Milosevic, Tuđman, Izetbegovic). The Heads of the
General Staffs were also suspected of crimes (Mladic, Gotovina, Halilovic) or dis-
charged for their involvement in corruption and crime.
The issue of rationality and purpose of the war: there are questions about whether the war could have been avoided and each side has a different opinion about that. During 1991 and 1992, the war could have been prevented or stopped if the Serbian leaders had recognized the administrative borders of the Yugoslav republics as the new interstate borders, at the same time carrying on with the political struggle for the rights of their fellow countrymen. However, that possibility was hampered by both the Serbs and the international community. Perhaps one could have expected the international community to act in that sense. Nevertheless, foreigners took the path to war. Finding a response to the question about the possibilities to avoid the war is not an easy task; every man of military age who had contemplated that possibility must have found the warmakers’ (especially Serb ones) policies, as well as the political platform for the draft and the motivation to fight, suspicious. These doubts were not dominant, but they never weakened fighting morale, particularly in Serb armies. The Croat (in the war for the borders of independent Croatia) and the Bosnian side could have, to some extent, justified its nationalism with defensive requirements and built on that the fighting morale of their units.

In terms of personnel and military equipment, the Serbian side had a significant advantage at the beginning of the war, which had a negative impact on the morale of the Croat and Bosnian army. In quantitative terms, no genuine balance was ever established; the balance of powers and the fighting capability of the Bosnians and Croats were raised by their ally, NATO. The fighting quality and morale of Croat and Bosnian soldiers grew with the support of the West and NATO. The quality of the armies of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina plummeted with the approaching of the war’s end. The Serb morale gradually declined and that was the consequence of the obvious collapse of the political goal set by the Serb warmakers, as well as the determination of NATO to reassess its credibility in the wars in the Former Yugoslavia.

The divisions in Serbian society in relation to the issue of foreign allies did not provide a single foundation for building fighting morale. Misconceptions about possible alliances and the confusion that ensued after political leaders pointed their fingers at their ideological, political and military allies added even more to the disorientation of the Serbian people. For some Serbs, the ally was Russia (in the Pan-Slavic, Communist or pro-European context). For others, the allies were Europe and America. The policy with respect to alliances fueled a sense of isolation with the Serbs. They were divided into pro-Westerners and anti-Westerners during the whole course of the war; after the war, Serbs were either pro-reformists or anti-reformists. In a different way, this problem has also bothered the Bosnian side. The Bosnians pretended to have two allies – the Islamic and the Western World, which, in turn, could have come to odds with each other. The situation in Croatia, with respect to society’s main orientation and choice of allies, was pretty much clear.

Two moral traditions (the followers of the Chetniks and those of the Partisans), on which the identity of the Serbian soldiers had been built, remained irreconcilable. The war leaders of these two ideologies purposefully cooperated with each other in order to achieve their war plans, as well in order to stay in power. At lower levels, where fighting morale was articulated as a cohesive element of the military unit, reconciliation was impossible and failed to take place. In a certain way, the Croats had the same problem. The Croatian side had pub-
licly spoken about its struggle against fascism in WWII with the purpose to link the “War for the Motherland” to the global fight against fascism. Considering, however, the fact that the antifascist Communist or pro-Yugoslav Croatian movement had far less support among the population during WWII than its Nazi puppet state, it has been impossible to integrate this dimension in the lower brass of the Croat armies.

The Morale of the Serbian Soldier – The Outcome of the Political Manipulation of the Army

Multiparty politics was greeted in the JNA with a feeling of defeat. The abolition of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (SKJ) and the collective enlistment of JNA officers in the newly-founded Communist Party – Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ) did not hold ground for long. The clumsy defense of monism included intimidation and stemmed from the impotence of the military. “The army shall be freed of the Party’s influence and that is the essence of depolitization”, we were told by military analysts of pluralism.

Their interpretation was characterized by undermined communist conviction and “shaken believer’s” syndrome. An excess of loyalty, as an accustomed instrument of “good behavior” and a deepening gap between ideology and reality, kept pushing them towards self-deluding explanations. The Communist picture was falling apart with the advent of pluralism and with the evidence provided by the war. The army’s analysts held on to their basic ideological interpretation in spite of the fact that the latter ceased to correspond with reality. Their version, hampered by ideology, could not have been replaced by a more systematic vision. The second group of “interpreters”, when it had become clear that Communism was dead and that war had begun, was personified by officers who had immediately replaced one collectivist mechanism with another – nationalism took the place of Communism. Those were the ones who were advancing strongly in the military hierarchy and were thus ready to put current political requirements and their careers above ideology, logic and morality. A number of personalities in uniform presenting themselves as defenders of the Serb national interests took stage. Their advocacy for Serbian national interests was mainly insincere, since it was completely subordinated to official thought. It was opportunistic and ambitious, with elements of Communist confusion. The officers of the “new” army were “confident” that the Serbian nation was threatened and that it should be defended by means of war. Nevertheless, the limits of loyalty to that idea were in positive correlation with the ascending or descending line of their careers. The ideological legacy, social bonds, the rapid disintegration of morale in society and JNA and the war policy of the Serb (and others, but here we are dealing with the declining fighting morale on the Serb side) national leadership, led to ideological confusion and the weakening of fighting morale in the JNA and

9 Those were best represented by the viewpoints of general Kadijevic (Federal Secretary of Defence), Admiral Stane Brovet (Deputy-Federal Secretary), general Blagoje Adzic (Head of the General Staff) and general Stevan Mirkovic (Head of the General Staff).

10 The most prominent representatives and champions have been B. Stevanovic (Commander of the Air Force), V. Obradovic (Head of the Political Office), Z. Panic and M. Perisic (Heads of the General Staff), etc.
ultimately in the armies of RSK and RS. Just a few examples shall be mentioned here with respect to their influence on the fighting morale’s deterioration, that is, from an ethically neutral stand point:

The nationalists’ initial huge confidence (the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution) dwindled when the war started. A large number of military age men left the country not wanting to fight. They were fleeing from Serbia and from the war-torn areas in Croatia and BiH. The state’s reaction was to foster nationalism, xenophobia and hate, as well as to manipulate refugees’ rights. A triple disorientation could have been observed – the pro-Communist one (pro-Yugoslav and anti-Yugoslav), the “Greater Serbian” and the pro-democratic. Such ideological dissolutions could not have been a basis for homogenization, but rather a source of internal conflicts. The outcome of the simultaneous existence of “Yugoslavism” and “Serbianhood” in Serb armies was the division among Yugonostalgics (that were deemed Communist nostalgics) and Greater Serbs, or “Partisans” and “Chetniks”. Each group fought for its own “greater cause”.

The breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia and the JNA had a devastating effect on the morale of the Yugoslav/Serbian society and particularly the army. In order to remain in power, the warmakers were compelled to conceal defections and at the same time stir up nationalism in order to mobilize the populace for war.

The limitation on the length of the reservists’ stay on the battlefield, the introduction of volunteer units and later the creation of personnel centers sanctioning the divisions of Serbs across the Drina River and Serbs from Serbia pointed to the acknowledgment of uneven motives for war. Reservists were given preferential treatment and the notion about the need for saving one’s own life became everyone’s ultimate mantra.

The first military defeat that left a significant trace on the morale of the society and the army took place with the alleged attempt to prevent Slovenia from seceding from Yugoslavia. At that time, the official policy was Yugoslavism. The in-the-field advantage of the Slovenian Territorial Defense could not have been countered by the JNA’s inadequate action. Nobody was held accountable for the “defeat”. The outcome of that war was renewed confusion over the future goals of the war.

Politicians also “played” with the JNA and later the Yugoslav Army (VJ) by being incapable of making the right decisions about how to use the army. There was a discrepancy between the nervous reaction to enemy tactics of teasing the stronger JNA and the unreadiness for a coordinated political and military response.

Paramilitary units created and used with their symbols and interpreting tradition in terms of uniforms, the look and characteristic rules concerning internal relations. Many mobilized reservists from Serbia were reluctant in 1991 to fight in JNA units with a red star on their cap. Others did not want to wear the cockade. The General Staff decided to replace them with the national flag – a tricolor flag without ideological symbols - which spoke volumes about the ideology driving the new powers that be. At the same time, paramilitary units were established under their auspices, each with its own symbols, depending on the political parties pulling their strings. By avoiding to assign any responsibility to any structure in particular over army-controlled zones, the JNA and the establishment have shown that all those units had been working on the same political task. That, however, failed to have an integrating effect on the fighting morale of members
of such ideologically diverse groups. Anthems, flags, uniforms, symbols – everything was different and thus conflicting, frustrating and depressing.

The use of the State Security Service and special units for controlling political processes and the army, as well as for military operations, often made the formally appointed democratic institutions of the RSK and RS (and even in Serbia proper) almost redundant. The same went for command competencies in the army.

Military defeats were increasingly confirming doubts as to the official rhetoric of the commanding political and military establishment. The insight into the ideological union of the political and military leadership had provoked a feeling of helplessness and hopelessness in the Serb armies’ units. Furthermore, the business-driven, war profiteering coalition of military commanders and civilian structures in the war zones allowed the further spreading of crime.

The utilization of the Church and the manipulation with religious feelings has been one of the most important tools for boosting fighting morale. The Church during the nineties did not refrain from actively supporting the warmakers and their plans. The rulers, soldiers and priests, just like in the pre-modern era, worked on the same task.\textsuperscript{11}

The Serbian leadership had two policies: a secret agenda, as well as a public (two-faced) one. Serbian leaders weighed territorial division and swaps, while at the same time boosting militant nationalism propagating the unification of “rounded-up Serbian territories”.

The sanctions and the two-facedness of the international community towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were condemned, while at the same time the rulers in Serbia realized that further war-waging would be against their interests and therefore introduced sanctions against the RS.

Overt political conflicts between the political leaders of the Republika Srpska (RS), Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) and the FRY, as well as the absence of political authority of governmental and political structures in the RSK, and to a lesser extent in the RS, with respect to Belgrade (which had been a political fabrication of the latter in the first place) was a constant pattern until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This maintained a political feeling of helplessness and the need to rely on Serbia and its leadership. The Dayton Peace Agreements proved that this state of affairs has been recognized by the world. Milosevic signed for peace on behalf of all Serbs.

The unpreparedness for compromise and thus the susceptibility to the inertia of destruction, the tolerance of crimes, looting and indiscipline (alcoholism, fights, murders and suicides, car accidents) continuously weakened fighting morale. Analysis pointed out that more fighters had died in conflicts that were a consequence of indiscipline than in combat or from artillery fire. The absence of a legal framework and responsibility, as well as the crippling, politicizing and abuse of the military and state judiciary had also added to the fighting morale’s decline.

The rule is that no commander can justify war mistakes by claiming that “he was ordered by his superiors”. Before accepting to execute those orders, he must put forward his counter-arguments, insist that the plan be changed and offer his

\textsuperscript{11} Đorđević, M., Essays: The War Cross of the Serbian Church, Republika no. 273, November 2001.
resignation in the case that he would risk become a tool of destruction of his own
unit due to wrong political or military decisions. In contrast to that, the state of
affairs was that the relations in the army had been characterized by mutual accusa-
tions by officers and soldiers of ones sacrificing others in combat. This was par-
ticularly the case between officers of the former JNA and their paramilitary col-
leagues. Many officers’ tours on the frontlines were promotion-driven, while oth-
ers built their careers on nationalism.

The Serbs in Republika Srpska Krajina were prisoners of nationalist policies,
which they had accepted under the slogan “Never in Croatia Again”. The euphe-
mism for this motto was that Serbs “themselves” agreed with Croatia about the
modalities of their common existence. The same went for Serbs in BiH. They
were supposed to “agree” with the remaining two nations in Bosnia about the
modalities of joint life. The “autonomous” policy of Serbs in the RSK and RS had
manifested itself with the intensification of nationalism and tendencies to draw
Serbia openly into the war.

This contradiction illustrates the absence of political consensus within the
national leadership about the war it was waging. Those in Serbia who had voted
for war – under the threat that it would spill over to their country – accepted their
rulers’ suggestion that Serbia was not involved in the war; those who had voted
against the war claimed Serbia to be the sole culprit for the war and that it was
Serbia that had initiated the bloodshed. Both extremities were defective and failed
to contribute to the army’s fighting morale.

The unpreparedness for compromise and the rejection of the international
community’s plans for the RSK and RS, as well as NATO’s pre-Dayton final
military solution have been interpreted as the realization of the anti-Serb conspir-
acy that couldn’t have been prevented. The collapse of the military resistance of
the RSK army to the Croatian forces reinforced the belief in the conspiracy. RSK
soldiers, amid the general chaos and panic among the civilian population, did not
wait for the orders of their superiors; with various excuses (the most common of
which has been betrayal and one could say it was genuine considering the previ-
ous common policy of Belgrade and Knin) they left their positions to ultimately
flee the RKS with the population. There was no organized resistance by the RSK
army, apart from sporadic opposition from smaller units in certain areas. Serbian
authorities blamed for the fall of the RSK and the RS local Serbs who had, as we
were told by the political top brass, cowardly and unpatriotically waited for Serbs
from Serbia to come to their defense.12 In the spring and fall of 1995, refugees
from Eastern Slavonia were being arrested in Serbia and sent back allegedly to
defend their homes. The militancy expressed with the throwing flowers on the
tanks that headed to Croatia in the fall of 1991 to defend local Serbs had evolved
into the approval of such treatment of Serb refugees. It is with that kind of fight-
ning morale of the three Serb armies that the struggle for Serb national interests
was brought to an end.

Translated from Serbian by Bogdan Petrović

12 http://www.hlc.org.yu/srpski/suoavanja_sa_prošlošću: “Why did they come here at all?
Maybe they expected that someone else was going to fight for them”, said Mirjana Markovic in
her diary in the “Duga” weekly.
IV

PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION
AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SECURITY
WAR AND THE SYSTEM:
THE CASE OF SERBIA

Four years after the removal of the dictatorship, the political community in Serbia is showing not just huge difficulties in the process of democracy consolidation, but also a particular kind of failure to establish a modern constitutional state. Many characteristics make the Serbia of today an unfinished state. This essay shall try to analyze the causes and the aspects of the non-statehood, or lack of statehood in Serbia. The central axis of this analysis is the political dynamics in Serbia over the last decade of the 20th century. It tries to illustrate the process of destruction and restoration of the system/order in conditions that have in their essence not been political (wars, violence, existential fears, crime and massive theft). So the central axis of this analysis is the “Big Paradigm” (Bobio) about the relation of system and non-system, and the state being the main core of political integration of modern political societies, it can be translated into the category of statehood and non-statehood. Thus we find a special kind of normative identity between the concepts of civic normality and normal statehood. With a normative concept of constitutional democracy, we mark the desirable condition of a “well structured system”. In certain chapters more advanced formulations of the main concepts shall be offered. The first chapter analyzes the nature as well as the social and political consequence of the destruction of the system (legality). We shall describe the destruction of the system (legality) as the most traumatic experience in the history of a political community. We shall analyze the relation between war and system and try to point out the generic bond between the destructive role of war and the difficulties in consolidating the principle of the rule of law (legality). In the second stage we shall describe Serbia as a post-dictatorship society with the aim to show why defeated and non-reconciled societies, that lack a clear critical stance and moral reflection towards the recent past and negative political traditions, are not able to establish a distance towards the political alloy of the “old regime” and set up a radically new reception of collective and political identity.

Like Weimar Germany after Word War II, Serbia found itself in a social and political environment in which there was no political group showing the will to defend the fragile and feeble democracy earned in the October changes from the enemies of democracy. We shall also characterize Serbia as a post-communist society. In the second part we shall analyze the formative principles that were the
basis for the amalgam that was born in the ruins of socialist ideocracy (Dimitrijević). We shall analyze the process of destruction of the legal and political system and show when this process evolves into a formation of “naked power” that “suffocates society, destroys the law and the dignity of the people” (Neumann). The third part of the study is dedicated to the “Big Change” (the October Revolution). We will point out the significance of the constitutional opportunities given to the Serbian political and civil society, as well as the reasons why these constitutional opportunities (the first after the October changes and the second after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic) and the broad opportunity for constitutional choice were not taken. We shall defend the hypothesis that distrust in democracy and civil society has been the main cause of the failure of the October Revolution and the constitutional opportunity brought by that revolution in Serbian society. The political strategy of social and political conservatism, promoting the idea of ethnocracy as the main axis of the response to the open questions of state and nation building, relies in the ideological sense in two basic political blocks: the political axis of one are the enemies of democracy, while the axis of the other are the political forces and players who are wary of democracy. All that indicates Serbian society still faces one key imperative, and that is the shaping of an alternative political strategy. The ideological backbone of such a strategy must essentially be democratic. Democracy in Serbia is still looking for an actor that will defend and support her. In the final, fourth chapter, we shall in a more extensive fashion analyze the reasons of the failure to establish modern statehood in Serbia. We shall defend the normative stance that there is a generic bond between the modern state and poliarchy (constitutional democracy) and try to demonstrate the preconditions necessary for this process to be accomplished. We will point out two stages. The first involves the establishing of a modern system based on the formative principles of law that, in Hobbes’ words, allow society to overcome the area of “negative politics” – *summum malum* (fear, violence, crimes, poverty and misery as political products, public cruelty) – and guarantee the safety of the “basic goods” (security, freedom, dignity). This is possible only in a well-organized state. This is *extra civilatem nulla securitas*, as Schmitt wrote reinterpreting Tomas Hobbes. Only with these foundations is it possible to shape the institutions and values of constitutional democracy (freedom, limited and controlled power, democratic legitimacy) that are characterized as the *summum bonum* of a well-organized community.

The Destruction of Legality

The destruction of legality (system) is the most traumatic experience that a political community can experience. When the legality of a political body is destroyed, even in the situation when it is possible to justify its destruction pointing to its weaknesses and bad characteristics, the members of a political community are in a state that is characterized not only by general insecurity, but also by the lack of clear orientation allowing us to routinize our individual and collective experiences (Webber). In the absence of clear orientation (*theologia civilis*) people orientate themselves not towards common values, but are instead motivated by individual impulses. Fear and the diffusion of insecurity, panic become the main engines of individual and collective behavior. In these conditions, society typical-
ly precipitates into non-system (chaos), values of trust and solidarity are being destroyed and a special breed of existential fear (fear of a non-system) replaces all other forms of behavior. Nothing marks better this condition of “big fear” than major social cataclysms (wars, civil wars, revolutions, populist movements). These are situations when people realize that the institutions that have united and bonded society - the army, justice, police, administration and laws - are being replaced by terror, violence, invasion, destruction and wars without rules. In the early nineties, the political societies in the former Yugoslavia went precisely through that kind of state. In his excellent account of the situation in the Balkans, M. Ignatieff dubbed it a state of armed paranoia. Ignatieff made the case that the people had destroyed a weak state from fear of others and now want the same state brought back to defend and protect them. In the meantime, fear has made them insecure, violent and lonely. Fear of a non-system inspires people to seek a state of order and security. The destruction of the system of the former Yugoslavia and the nature of “legitimation battles” through which this process is unfolding is the “birthplace” of the political amalgam born in this region.

The main core of the political system in the former Yugoslavia has been the system of charismatic authority and charismatic legitimacy. This type of system, as shown by Weber in his Systematic Sociology of Law, carries in itself more possibilities for self-destruction than political regimes based on traditional or rational authority. The most delicate problem these types of systems are facing is the issue of charismatic legacy and the routinization of charismatic authority. The way these two problems are to be solved essentially depends on the nature of the political system. The analysis of these types of political systems shows that there are two possible solutions for dealing with the issue of political legacy. The first one would be that the establishment of a new charismatic leader is based on rules and criterions set up by the charismatic leader himself, in cooperation with the members of the “charismatic” community. This is the case when the charismatic leader establishes the procedures of political succession. The second solution is when the charismatic leader himself appoints his successor. The recognition of the designated successor is normally done by acclamation of the mightiest and the most privileged followers of the leader (of the charismatic community). An important trait of the political system in the former Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz is the fact that the issue of charismatic legacy was never solved. Neither was the political successor designated during Tito’s life, nor were the procedures and rules to solve this issue established. The stabilization of government and the reduction of charisma to everyday relations has proved to be impossible without solving the above-mentioned problem. On the contrary, the Yugoslav society had faced a tendency of degradation of authority with the divinization of the defunct ruler (“Tito After Tito”). This degradation of authority that has taken place as a consequence of the unfinished process of routinization of the charismatic authority (government) has taken the shape of “lowering” someone from his sovereign post to the position of the first among equals. In the history of political societies there have been cases of “collective rule” (Archon, Consul, Doge) and the Yugoslav case is one of them. The state was ruled by a collective body run by one of its members. Two political processes are simultaneously underway. One we shall describe as the degradation of authority of the collective head of state, which unfolds at the same time with a state in which certain groups within the inherited
charismatic community (the oligarchies of the republics and provinces) do not recognize the one who is at the helm of the “group”. In the type of political regime in which the charismatic leader (Tito) had been the main factor of stability and a charismatic figure that was an orientation point for the normative consent of the political community members – making up for the lack of active consent within the “suppressed civil society.” The degradation of the central government was completed in the process of the opening of legitimization battles. The Serbian political leader Slobodan Milosevic opened this process by breaking the obsolete balance between the inherited political oligarchies of the post-Tito regime. He had become the key political figure for understanding political processes, as well as for grasping the political system (order) in Serbia, while the nature of the legitimization battles – battles that uncover how he came to power – is the central axis of this political formation. The core of this project was the substitution of a utopian model (Communism) with an organic one (Serbia as a natural and organic community), one collectivist legitimating formula (“Brotherhood and Unity”) with an equally collectivist formula of “nationalist patriotism”. The organic and utopian models are included in the foundation of every totalitarian regime, as excellently noted by Claude Lefort. The main axis of the political struggle becomes the formula of “the friend and the enemy”, and the energetic approach of “fear of the enemy” becomes the backbone of a repressive and imposed type of political integration of society. The second attribute of this technology is usurpation as a means of coming to power. The political formula of usurpation acquires its quasi-legitimizing screen with the plebiscitary and populist mobilization of the people. The power of the people, wrote Montesquieu, substitutes its freedom. Yet, the key factor definitely instituting this political formation is the systemic context of the war. War is the main core allowing this political formation to make up for its lack of legitimacy. War irreversibly destroys political and legal institutions, the initial enclaves of civil society and independent public, confirming de Tocqueville’s thesis that all those who wish to destroy freedom in a new democratic nation should know that war is the most reliable means to achieve that. Political theory does not include comprehensive readings about THE political consequences of the war. Hobbes’ analysis of war as a non-system and essentially a non-political state, for which he uses the metaphor of a Leviathan, is certainly one of the most instructive ones. In Leviathan, Hobbes analyzed the state of the English civil war and defined it in the categories of chaos, non-law, non-system and anarchy. It is a state in which human liberty, personal security and property was lost. War is a non-civil state that is not ruled by civil (political) laws. Opposite to the state of a non-system, the system (the state) is established in the interaction of power, submission and law. In one less known early work about laws (A Discourse on Laws), published simultaneously with the treatises on Tacitus’ Annals and a study about Rome, Hobbes presents a meaningful, minimal definition of the system, constituting a particular type of identity between system and legality, for the “true aim of all laws is to regulate and establish system and government between us.” The main pillars of the system are the courts and the laws we should submit to, the rulers that we should serve and the captains (soldiers) that we have to follow. The system is a set of rules regulating and limiting the way that we live. Nevertheless, what gives legitimacy to the system is not the paper (contract), but power (the sword). State bodies either function, or they don’t. In the first case, the state guarantees its citizens the securi-
ty of their physical existence and requests submission to the laws governing its functioning. Any other deliberation leads to a condition of non-statehood and insecurity (non-system) in which not even physical existence is safe. On the premises of such theoretical architecture, Hobbes is sending the following message to the people in the preface of his treatise *De Cive*: “I hope that in the existing conditions in the state, even if it’s not the best of all, you assume that you are enjoying your life instead of starting a war in order for someone else, when you yourself are killed to be able to have a better system later.” Force is the main producer of non-systems; it is the second name for non-system. Liberal conservatives Constan and de Tocqueville concisely warn that war produces non-freedom and tyranny. Political societies in the Balkan region and Serbia in particular have confirmed this suggestion. In a more developed theory on the difference between system and non-system in the closing parts of Leviathan, Franz Neumann, deliberating whether Nazi Germany was a state, ascertains three constitutive elements of the “system”: the constitutional role of law, a synchronized and rational political theory of the system and a unified system of power. Neumann’s message is methodologically extremely important. It says that we can have “systems of power” that cannot be marked with a coordinated system (the state). Serbia has in the process of de-institutionalization of the system of law and politics (the destruction of legality, devastation of public liberties, colonization of the public domain, razing the borders between public and private, systematic creation of fear) acquired the above mentioned characteristics of a non-system (non-state). Let’s analyze now the mechanisms of reproduction of this formation in the last stage of its existence. If the system of power (the state) – to introduce the first criterion – is characterized by the “rule of law”, then Serbia is not meeting this norm. A state that is ruled arbitrarily – and Serbia renounces even the “window dressing of democracy” – is an autocracy. Nevertheless, an autocracy is not justified by structural political and legal principles. It relies on their very destruction. It is the reason for which Montesquieu did not assign autocracy the status of a state. The second criterion is “softer” and points to the system’s nature of “civilian theology”. The formation of political power in Serbia fails to form a systematic, rational and comprehensive theory with which the rulers would justify their rule. That naturally does not mean that there have been no attempts to justify the rulers’ title with a variety of doctrines. In this legitimizing strategy, we can observe various elements: vitality, pragmatism, an organic state, etc. However, what characterizes the (quasi) system in Serbia and its formula of quasi-legitimacy is that these elements are not mutually integrated. Only when integrated in a unique formula of legitimacy, will it make sense of individual and collective actions of people and represent a unique and common pillar of the operations of the holders of power. Consequently, the rulers of that period needed a unique “ideology without ideas” to compensate for the absence of a rational and modern formula for legitimacy. That function is taken over by nationalism. Although nationalism is close to ideology with its method and form, its inherent attribute is the fact that it is devoid of a theological component. Nationalism does not contain the ideas of justice, truth or prosperity. It is, as we have hinted, a distinctive “ideology without ideas” and that is why it cannot be the foundation of the people’s individual identity for a longer period of time. However, it is precisely that feature that made it a very convenient *instrumentum regni*. A politically void nationalism has been a very convenient framework one
could have filled with various “doctrines”. As a common trait, those doctrines were antiliberal (anti-individual), antirational and antidemocratic. For this permanently vacant place of the system’s ideological rationalization patriotism is a much better contender, due to the structural limitations of nationalism. The attribute that nationalism has permanently lacked – individual identification – is the basic constant of patriotism. As opposed to nationalism, which always functions on the collective level and as a collective emotion, patriotism is always an individual and private attitude. It contains the feeling of a separate identity for people, belonging, and self-understanding of the context in which a person is formed. Patriotism thus always represents the stance of the individual towards a country, culture, language and his own place in the community. It is always filled with our rational and irrational identifications and that is why it is always unique and specific. These are precisely the attributes of patriotism that the regime in Serbia has attempted to crush and to develop, in the most dramatic episode of its rule (the bombing of the country), a specific amalgam of patriotic monism. The regime did this by turning patriotism into a collective emotion in order to seize for itself the sacrosanct position as arbiter determining who is a patriot and who is not. This has always proved to be a very repressive form of ideological control of society. The political society in Serbia has undergone precisely that sort of overt and covert repression. It became clear that a regime of power that lacks a comprehensive and universal theory of the state must resort to the most varied collection of irrational offers (the people, the community, origin, founding myths, etc) which, ultimately, always serve as instruments for concealing the real constellation of power and typically lead to the form of political de-subjectivization of people. “The old regime” in Serbia in the last decade of this century belongs precisely to this type of negative regimes in which the “theory of the state” is reduced to a mere arcanium dominationis, a simple political technique devoid of any normative stance on “good” and “bad”. Understood as such, this theory always serves as a simple pillar of political power. Nevertheless, antirational doctrines (religious, mythical, etc) have proved not to be able to replace forms of rational legitimacy. Hence the regime in Serbia had to rely on completely different formative principles. What was less under scrutiny is the following: formative principles that were the pillars of the regime of power in Serbia are not the formative principles of the system but, by its key attributes, represent formative principles of the non-system. The next chapter of this report shall analyze these formative principles.

Formative Principles of the Regime of Power in Serbia

Usurpation. We shall characterize “the old regime” in Serbia as a form of usurpation, as a system of power that throughout its short “history” (these systems have typically been short-lived) has attempted to acquire a justification for a villainous “titulus”. As it has been proven by the “Serbian product”, it was a mission impossible for this type of regime. Usurpation is not a “titulus” and the ruler who grabs power in that fashion is in serious trouble. The usurper is living in a “house built on sand” wrote Constan. The usurpation snatches the usurper like a ghost and he can never be sure in a house built on sand. Therefore, the usurper is always accompanied by a special breed of fear (“the fear of the usurper”). To characterize someone by saying his rule to be illegitimate (usurpation) does not mean just
to say he is bad off, but that his rule is bad and morally questionable. The history of Milosevic’s rule is precisely that kind of state. The same way in which there have been attempts to secure the attribute of a system in a crumbling establishment, a state of usurpation has also been in need of legitimacy. Quasi-legitimate rule has, as shown by the system in Serbia, a rule masking the principle of force, fear, insecurity and instability with a semblance of freedom, institutions and legitimacy. Based on the de-institutionalization of the legal and political system, usurpation always carries the fear of the disappointed audience. Sooner or later, as Milosevic’s regime has shown, “the plebiscitary appeal” will fail to find its political audience. Usurpation cannot be maintained, and that is the political truth every usurper tries to change. The shameful crumbling of the Serbian usurpator’s power clearly confirms that.

Corruption. The polemics of Montesquieu and de Tocqueville claimed that the source of secret of autocracy (despotism) was in corruption and not in fear. He did not deny Montesquieu’s remarks about fear as the “energetic principle” of autocracy, but merely warned that in the “new autocracy”, which relies less on direct repression and more on manipulation, the influence of despotism is actually stronger. De Tocqueville almost repeats the brilliant words of Tacitus that “corruption is the worst disease of the state.” In a nutshell, the argumentation is the following: as a rule, corruption destroys all political values and civil virtues (opinion, knowledge, honor, wisdom, dignity, courage). Corruption builds the stability of rule and power on money and sinecures. Money takes the place of opinion and honor Tacitus said, as reiterated by Tocqueville. Tacitus’ description of how rulers destroy the reputation and authority of prominent citizens are among the Annals most beautiful pages. He teaches us not only the anatomy of the system, but also shows the strength of the moral stance and civil virtues. A society of shattered values is a burden both for the rulers and the ruled. Milosevic has amply used this technique, corrupting active and militant followers in order to keep the remaining population in complete check.

Caesarism. Usurpation is always established by the usurper’s individual supremacy. Hence, as Trottsche wrote, this is the type of system that can be characterized by the mere name of its ruler - “the name of the ruler itself is its legitimizing title”. The political regime in Serbia in the last decade of the last century belongs to this breed. The key attribute of this regime is a form of personalized authority. It is a type of power that relies on and produces a plebiscitary type of support. At the same time, as Eric Voegelin brilliantly wrote, Caesarism at the same time cannot be separated from the character of society. It is essentially linked with the “fall of society”. This type of regime is always linked to the destruction of constitutionalism and is thus unconstitutional by nature and can be defined as a special breed of tyranny. Hence, Caesarism is the doom of a weak society and a corrupted people, and it is also a well-deserved punishment for a degraded and corrupted people. (Vegelin). Caesarism implicates the destruction and the abolishment of civil virtues and public spirit. It rests on a degraded society and subsists on its degradation. Hence a low level of Caesarism cannot be separated from the low quality of society and the public sphere. Its significant characteristic is that, as demonstrated by the regime in Serbia, it uses repression to destroy the public domain and the political public without which one cannot realize his political identity. Caesarism is the antipathy of citizenry.
**Propaganda.** Bad rulers, Tacitus wrote, always use “public language” that has nothing to do with reality. Tacitus brands the public language of despotic rulers as corrupted language, explaining that those rulers use the false name of “rule” for plunder, violence and cruelty. They describe cruelty as just punishment; plunder as economy, executions as discipline teaching. What Tacitus calls “the corrupted language” in modern societies is called propaganda. Propaganda in modern societies is nothing but violence against the spirit of the people. Propaganda is of course not a substitute for violence, but is always a segment of it: they have an identical goal, which is the establishment of homogenous control over the people. Moreover, the propaganda of negative regimes like the former Serbian one always proves to rely on the “corrosion” of “soft points” of the social and political fabric. These examples in the practice of this regime have been many, but the most dramatic ones were those that followed the line of the division between “friends” and “enemies” (the minority and the majority, Serbs and “others”, citizens and patriots, nationalists and globalists), producing **fear of the enemy** as the main self-perpetuating principle of power. The energetic principle of “fear of the enemy” is considerably more complex, but we shall present it here in its more simplified form.

**Fear.** When de Tocqueville ascertains corruption, and not fear to be the foundation of autocracy (despotism), he questions Montesquieu who points out that fear is autocracy’s main formative principle. The foundation of autocracy consists of force and fear, while its goal is peace. This is however the kind of peace (torment), which resembles the picture of, huddled towns awaiting enemy invasion. Tacitus too gives a picture of a “dead city” after the murder of a prominent senator. The regime in Serbia was based on a “culture of fear”. Fear is produced and diffused through the social fabric of society in both a direct and indirect manner, with a combination of repressive policy and absence of institutional protection (destruction of legality), as well as with the violent forms of imposing social and political transformation of society. All these forms have been demonstrated in Serbia, merging with methods of selective state terror. The role of selective terror is to institutionalize fear as a lever of perpetuating power. Like all other negative regimes of power, the Serbian one also combined fear of the known with fear of the unknown. Fear of the known is imposed mainly with physical repression, public cruelty, violent control of society, destruction of the public and private domain and the enormous presence of power in the public domain. Another brand of fear is established by a situation of non-doing, absence of clear rules of behavior and the destruction of mutual communication and solidarity. Irrationality, arbitrariness and authoritarism always go with regimes of fear.

**The Big (October) Change: The Dual Regime of Power in an Unfinished State**

With the aim to analyze the prerequisites and the strength of the emancipating potential of the October Change (revolution), we have here borrowed and somewhat redefined a construction (The Big Transformation) of Karl Polanyi. This construction pretty much requires the kind of analysis that would show how a “chained society” liberates itself from the embrace of bellicosity, on the basis on which a **political culture of resistance** is born; it would also explore the creational opportunities to embed in the Serbian society the patterns of **civil culture**. This tri-
angle reveals the main impacts of social and political struggles in Serbia over the last decade. The first and the clearest lever of this dynamics is the value of civil peace. Civil peace above all is a public good. Only in a state can civil peace legal and political institutions be built and shaped. Plutarch’s remark that all major republican institutions in Rome were established during the rule of King Numa Pompilius has an important explanation: during the reign of this Roman ruler the doors of war had been closed for forty-three years. Serbia is a imbued with “layers” of militant society and militant spirit and that has been one of the constants that have thwarted the establishment of a stable and modern (legal) system and at the same time the ground for parochial, corrupted and unenlightened rulers. A militant tradition establishes authority as plunder, and the rulers’ unrestricted, arrogant and uncontrolled behavior as a natural virtue. The other important lever and achievement is the specific political culture of resistance, which was born in Serbia during the civil and students’ protest. As it has many times been shown in the history of societies and nations, only great events produce a new political culture. The civil and students’ protest has revealed two things. The first is of a general nature and all cruel rulers sooner or later come to learn it: you can’t sit for long on top of bayonets. The second impact has been even more significant. In the core of the civil and students’ protest a particular civil culture is shaped and a particular “class of citizens” is established. It is only when this class prevails that the possibility will be opened for Serbia to launch its political and civic development. The modalities of protest take the shape of civil disobedience, the main core of political struggles is “basic goods” (procedural rights) and the main actors are the citizens. The October Change opened such a possibility. With this change, the political actors and actors of civil society in Serbia (citizens, citizens’ associations, political parties) get the chance for a comprehensive restructuring of Serbia as a state and political community. We shall define this process as the process of constitutionalization of the revolution. Such constitutional moments, as well as the state of constitutional policy – conditions in which citizens manifest an emphasized sensibility for the problems of the political reconstruction of society – are decisive for the existence of a political community and the manner it establishes and defines its fundamental values. These are situations in which the members of a political community are allowed and given the opportunity to redefine their common collective identity. Serbia, who was the prisoner of a political amalgam that for a decade was the centre of resistance to the values of the European political enlightenment, is given the chance to re-legitimize the project (the system) representing the political core of the modern state (constitutional democracy). In the post-October dynamics, the general expectation was that the new authorities were going to commence the construction of the political edifice and the political and democratic institutions from top to bottom (the constitution), for the shaping of the political architecture of a society always is a risky task for which there is typically no precedent. In the words of Hana Arendt, the constitution is the place where the newly established system seeks for and institutes its own principles”. This process always takes place in certain limiting conditions within which the agents of change establish the framework of the new beginning. The key particularity of this process is the tension and asymmetry between the initial forms and creations of the civil revolution in Serbia (the emergence of civil movements, the initial public, actors, values) and the inherited framework of a pre-modern and unfin-
ished state. This term (Serbia as an unfinished state) has been borrowed from the treatise of N. Dimitrijevic – I am using it in its minimum and somewhat redefined meaning. The use of this term is the acknowledgment that the political processes and struggles in Serbia are taking place within a structure, bears the elements of a window dressing state. This window dressing state, as Ernest Fraenkel has brilliantly proved (the Dual State), has no serious influence on the nature of political processes. It has no power to give political significance to conflicts and competition over the allotment of fundamental goods in a society. Political processes do not have a public character. Inside the window dressing state, key processes are still essentially non-political. In order to systematically and thoroughly develop an adequate theoretical model that would allow deeper understanding of the political dynamics in Serbia, we shall introduce here another new term. It is a concept that we borrowed from Ernest Fraenkel and it stands in the title of his book about Nazism. Contrary to Neumann’s concept of Leviathan (non-system), Frankael used the theoretical concept of the dual state. Nevertheless, after a deeper examination of his model, we find out that in its essence lies the regime of privatized power, behind the window dressing (inexistent) state. The dual Nazi state is a system of privatized power. Its vital trait is the decomposition of the political fabric of society and the non-political nature of political processes. The political dynamics in Serbia, on the other hand, have a somewhat different dynamic. One of its key features is a particular parallelism and the conflict of the effects of the civil revolution, as well as the entrenched power structure of the “old regime”. By combining these two methodological points (the unfinished state, a dual regime of power), we could thus define the main core of the political amalgam in Serbia as a dual regime of power within the unfinished state. On the level of constitutional and formative principles of the system, this dualism is articulated as a specific conflict democratic legitimacy and window dressing legality. Democratic legality, active hegemony and republican forms of constitutional policy are shaped within the awakened civil society, while the window dressing legality is the legacy of the regime of power that has remained untouched almost during the whole post-October period. This particular conflict of the (civil) society and the regime of power have two significant negative effects. The first one is the fact that the entire post-October period has not seen the enrooting of processes of constitutionalization of power (the establishment and the development of the political domain by the constitutionalizing role of the law). The second one is that political actors, who asserted themselves during the civil revolution, or civil revolutions in Serbia to be more precise, increasingly rely on a particular strategy of decisionism. This strategy has had two extremely negative effects: it has gradually destroyed any pretense of democratic legitimacy and with the implicit standpoint that power, and not law, is the foundation of the system, it has ruined the possibility to constitute Serbia as a modern (ruled by law) state, destroying in that process the liberal core of the civil revolutions in Serbia. In the conditions when the new system is established “from the top” (Holmes), the window dressing legalism has further excluded the creational role of the state in establishing the institutions of civil society. All this points to the political society in Serbia facing today the imperative of establishing a modern system (state) and restoring and consolidating democratic legitimacy. One should know that the establishment of these imperatives does not stem from the same domain and that they have different
social and political effects. Another particularity of the political dynamics in Serbia is that it does not adhere completely to the well-known modernist pattern (the rule of law preceded liberty, and liberty preceded democracy), establishing instead the protodemocratic framework that has been earned in the revolution as the main core and groundwork of modernization processes. In America the people are the source of the law. We shall use this important point of political theory from Bruce Ackerman, because it brings forward stronger than other theories the elements of civil republican traditions in America and in a certain way proposes the normative context for understanding the political dynamics in Serbia after the “big October transformation”. Considering its key features, this transformation has primarily been democratic. The direction and the shaping of the public discourse in which the constitution as the central symbol of political achievements (the constitutionalization of the effects of the civil revolution) has represented the opportunity for political actors in the pursuit of renewal and redefining of the political identity of the community to build this identity on the values of constitutional patriotism, restoring the loyalty of the people to the political community by means of the values of constitutional democracy, which we have marked as the most significant product of European political enlightenment and modernity. The other important effect of such a public discourse, one should recognize in the spreading of constitutionality and constitutional culture. The promotion of constitutionalism directs the discourse on the liberal course and opens the space for debate about the key issues of liberal reconstruction of the system. The advantage of liberalism over other competing theories is that its constitutional theory is much more developed and receptive for active groups and individuals. Hence it is important that those groups see the constitution as the manifestation and the symbol of the achievements of political changes in Serbia. The establishment of the primacy of the system from the foundations of the protodemocratic framework does also have the good side of narrowing the circle of questions that can be a factor of deep divisions in the formation of political consensus. Within that formation it becomes easier to shape the domain of basic consensus, which in every political society is constituted outside of the area of political battles and without which it is simply impossible in a political community to shape the domain of politics as an area of public, peaceful and amicable contest of political actors over key political goods. The shaping of the basic consensus on liberal foundations would facilitate the securing of a minimum framework of a modern state (rule of law).

The Foundations of the Basic Consensus: Constitutional Patriotism and the Modern System

The capturing of the constitutional opportunity for the renewal of the collective identity’s redefinition I have characterized as the biggest achievement of the October change. The adoption of the constitution always is also a form of self-liquidation of the constitution. The constitution always shapes the creative, unorganized and the explicit force of the revolution into a constituting and limited power of the new political system. The normative message of such a standpoint is extremely important. It points out to the fact that when the constituting power has established the constitution, each authority having the ambition to be legitimate must be submitted to the authority of the constitution. This removes any possibil-
ity of establishing or perpetuating any kind of unconstitutional or even extra-constitutional power. The constitution is always and above all an autobiography of power (Finnem) and it always includes the answer to the question “who gets what, when and where”. Nevertheless, the constitution is more directed towards the relations of society and the state. It always tames its revolutionary (legitimistic) origin, becoming not only a potential instrument of struggle against any kind of non-system and non-freedom (tyranny), as described brilliantly by American federalists (Hamilton in particular), but also a tool of curbing and controlling every authority.

For the normative redefinition of the new system in Serbia and its connective tissue (basic consensus), it is extremely important that the new political edifice be established after the fall of the political despotism (autocracy). The constitutional and political battles suggest that constitutions that are drafted after the removal of autocracies – that are always in the form of non-systems – have a completely different role and require a different kind of allocation of political power compared to constitutions emerging as the result of constitutional paralysis and blockade. Negative experiences of political despotism from which Serbian political society has liberated itself from with the October change, restore the values of public freedoms and mechanisms of constitutional limitation of power, as a sort of prime public good that has a pre-constitutional value. Guarantees of public freedoms and the values of limited government in a social and political context and that has a strong antilegalistic tradition, tilt the balance in favor of liberal constitutionalism in the process of restoration of the political system. The fact that this process takes place in the situation of post-October proto-democratic legitimacy adds to it an additional meaning. De Tocqueville’s observations about feeble constitutional achievements of democracy reveal elements of a possible strategy for solving the conflict between democratic legitimacy and window dressing legality. In his own argumentation, de Tocqueville analyzes the different attributes of a democratic constitution in America (universal voting right, election system, adjudication, etc), but his primary intention is to appraise the scope of democratic choice compared to other types of systems. De Tocqueville’s main message is that democracy minimizes and pluralizes political life, but that its constitutional achievements are limited and insufficient. The fear of despotism shared by de Tocqueville with the leading liberal conservatives of his time reinforced his belief that the law is the constituting power in the modern state, with legality being the other name for the system. The experience of political despotism (autocracy) in Serbia shows that this area is impregnated with strong anti-legalistic ideologies. The patterns of those ideologies are various and range from those that glorify spontaneous violence as a proxy for the morality of the law, to different forms of nihilism that see revolutions as authentic forms of self-reflection of nations, as well as different forms of anarchism and communitarianism that reject the ethics of the law in the name of communal forms of life. Political society today needs a qualitatively new perception of collective identity. In this part I will analyze the prerequisites of this collective identity in the process of the establishment of a modern system (state). I will characterize the foundations of this new identity as constitutional patriotism. In a nutshell it means that I am pleading for a balance of moral and political principles that would institute Serbia as a state and community on universal and liberal principles. I shall describe constitutional patriotism as the kind of political
formula that diffuses the tension between democratic legitimacy and window dressing legality. The reason for that is first and foremost the fact that the political dynamics characterizing the process of THE reconstruction of Serbia as a state differs from the manner in which the modern European state was founded. Unlike stable European societies, Serbia is a society of deep divisions and in which the strategy of identity does not yield results that can be observed in stable and well-organized societies. In Serbia it is simply not possible to find a middle ground response for the fundamental question on what is the foundation of society – the pre-political unity of its members or the consensus on universal and moral principles. So, to respond to the question “what is the pre-constitutional source of the constitution” in Serbia is not an easy task. Contrary to modern European societies, that have managed to do away with this dual power structure, the political community in Serbia is not able to make a good hand of and “pozitivize” in the form of basic consensus the specific emancipating effects of the “division of labor” between liberalism and nationalism, in which nationalism has essentially molded the feeling of collective identity, while liberalism shaped and built the institutional foundations of free development and self-actualization of the individual. All this suggests that political society in Serbia, in the process of redefinition of its collective identity, must renounce from even the symbolic reference to the nation that is typical for Western political societies. Apart from the arguments that we have presented (liberation from the state of despotism and non-system), two reasons are also important in this domain. The first is pertaining to the nature of nationalism in societies of Central and Eastern Europe. A common place is that modernization processes in those societies have a specific dynamic. While in the West, as F. Meinecke concisely wrote analyzing these processes, the existing state had already been nationalized. In societies of Central and Eastern Europe nations had already been formed and “etatized” through a process. This type of process, however, has a completely different dynamic. It does not even show the kind of progression, spontaneity or a specific aspect of republicanization of politics. All this has strongly shaped and influenced the nature of nationalism in this part of the world, making it wild, schizophrenic (Bibo) like any force in statu nascendi. In addition to these general reasons, there are several other ones that in the Serbian political society de-legitimize nationalism as the foundation for the establishment of a democratic political community. The first one is definitely the way in which the nation has been instrumentalized in the recent past. After everything that was done in the nation’s name in the last decade of its existence, it is not possible to establish a civilized community on the foundations of political memory soaked in crimes, devastation, violence and existential fear. On the contrary, the possibility for a new beginning in Serbia depends on to what extent society will be ready not only for a “legal suppression of the past of the former regime” (Dreier), but also for a moral reflection and the establishment of critical command over it (N. Dimitrijevic). The second reason is of a normative nature. Serbia is an ethnically heterogeneous and complex society. The third reason pertains to the social corrosion of Serbia’s very national identity. Talleyrand used to say that after the fall of Bonapartism, the French needed almost fifty years to restore confidence in republican political institutions. The political society in Serbia after the fall of Serbian Caesarism faces the same challenge. All this therefore suggests that the political society in Serbia must in a way relinquish the integrational capacity of the political community itself,
which of course is not without negative political consequences. In bringing this part of the analysis to an end and responding to the question about unifying factors of the system (state) in Serbia, we will infer the following political axiom: constitutional patriotism is the kind of political formula that allows Serbia to rebuild its political system and shape the more durable identities and loyalty to the political community and the state, in the domain of political principles and values stemming from the constitution itself. Constitutional patriotism consists of those principles and values that everyone will adhere to without limitations or exceptions – and that would pertain not only to the particular attributes of pre-political unity of the community’s members (particular and national traditions), but also to the “republican domain” of democratic institutions and processes. This system of values we will characterize with liberal principles of equality of freedom and rule of law, while the democratic character of the policy of a system we will measure by the very (liberal) values, a part of which stands outside, and a part inside the democratic process. In the condition of the proto-democratic framework that has been achieved, the inbred and structural tension between liberalism and democracy shall be considerably appeased, while the “deficits of legitimacy” in both domains – poor constitutional achievements of democracy, limited mobilization potential of the universal principles - are considerably diminished. It is the means, as demonstrated by Lefor, for liberalism to strengthen its framework of legitimacy and for democracy to boost its constitutional effects.

Translated from Serbian by Bogdan Petrović

 SOURCES
3. C. Schmitt, Die Verfassungslehre (Munich, Duncher, 1928)
5. F. Neumann, Behemoth (New York, 1944)
6. E. Fraenkel, Dual State (New York, 1952)
7. A. Sajo, Limiting Government (Budapest, 1986)
8. A. de Tocqueville, democracy in America ( New York, 1955)
10. B. Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge, 1991)
11. N. Dimitrijević, Nedovršena država, Reč (2003, br. 69, str. 5-20)
From the name of the conference – “The Violent Breakup of Yugoslavia – Causes, Dynamics and Effects” – one can deduce that the participants are expected to analyze the causes, mechanisms, dynamics and consequences of the destruction of the Socialist Yugoslavia by war and so-called “ethnic cleansing”. The subject of the conference is, as we can see, primarily the past, and not the future. In addition to that, one gets the impression that these analyses should be structural and functional, in order to be able to establish the relevant mechanisms from which some conclusions about the future as well could be drawn.

In the text that follows we have taken a somewhat different approach, which has the following characteristics:

First, although it is true that history can teach us a great deal, we think that the time has come for post-Yugoslav countries to complement their analysis of the past, or maybe even to replace them with a view to the future. There are two reasons for that: first, different interpretations of the past and fear of uncertainty have precisely been the factors that have cleared the path for ethnic nationalisms that have destroyed Yugoslavia. Second, establishing some distance from a negative past is a prerequisite of formulating a more desirable future.

Second, we think that a structural and functional sociological analysis and the investigation of the processes in institutions and bureaucracies and so on, are not the best starting point for turning to the future; The reason being that such analysis typically facilitates the fathering of the responsibility for the negative past on more or less “objective” social institutions, structures and processes, assisting in the process the indirect exculpation of individuals who have operated in those institutions. This type of ulterior exculpation we have had the opportunity to see in post-national socialist Germany, where even today they discuss to what extent, between 1933 and 1945, indi-
individuals were blameworthy for the crimes they committed, or to what extent were they “forced” by the mechanisms of those institutions and structures. It is necessary to point to the similarities of this approach to the development of society and to the ideology with which the Communist Party (hereinafter: the Party) in Yugoslavia had justified its rule. Namely, to legitimize itself, the Party had used, among other things, the comprehension of the “objective” reasons of the development of society. However, that “objectivity” had faded away with the dissolution of the Party’s power. In a nutshell, it is better to look to the future teleologically and normatively: Determination, knowledge and actions of people who have decided what kind of future they want are facts that lead to a “better future”, and not “objective” structures and processes.

And third, if we contemplate the future of post-Yugoslav states, and even of Europe as a whole, we think that, accordingly to the teleological and normative approach, attention should be focused principally on the central elements of cultures of the actors involved; that is, on their comprehensive beliefs, values, norms, education, customs, habits, desires and fears (from which can be drawn some conclusions about their motives to “deliver themselves” to nationalist leaders), the direction in which the existing culture – above all the political one – should be changed, as well as the individual responsibility of every man for his actions.

The Socialist Yugoslavia and its Downfall

The Socialist Yugoslavia was a state founded on and legitimized by the victory of the Partisans in the Struggle for National Liberation against National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy in Word War II; the historical and philosophical project of “the building of Socialism” as a society of prosperity and harmony; the dictatorship of the Party as the “leading force” in that building process; as well as on the personal charisma of Josip Broz Tito. While between 1945 and 1980 the Struggle for National Liberation, as a legitimizing foundation, increasingly faded away in the old times, as did the Socialism of harmony and prosperity in the increasingly remote future. Two new legitimizing foundations emerged: economic progress and industrialization yielded an increase of prosperity, while also bringing social security of employees and a relative egalitarianism in their remuneration.

During the eighties, the above mentioned legitimizing foundation began to “lose its carrying power”. Tito died and economic progress was halted. The Party de facto disintegrated into its republic and province-level branches, steeped in corruption and incapable of pulling the country out of crisis. National communist oligarchies had, to a different extent, legitimized themselves as nationalistic, which was in contradiction with the allegedly resolved “National Issue” in Socialism. High rates of unemployment and the increase of social disparities had destroyed the last shred of hope in the “better socialist future”. When Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union had launched his radical reforms, naively hoping that the rule of the Party could
become democratic, transparent and efficient, in Yugoslavia began the search for alternative legitimizing foundations of such a rule. In search for it were the national Party oligarchies in the Yugoslav republics.

Soon it had become clear that, other than Socialism as a project and foundation of group solidarity, the national Party oligarchies could only resort to ethnic nationalism as an alternative legitimizing foundation. The civil, liberal-democratic culture in Yugoslavia prior to World War II had been scarce, and the Communists during their rule made sure they destroyed even its modest embryos. Religious organizations – the Catholic “Church of the Croats” and the Serbian Orthodox Church - were reluctant to advocate for Yugoslavia due to having foreseen a better opportunity for themselves in ethnic nationalism; that is why they curried favor with the nationalists who in return had promised them favors they did not have in Communism. Serbia saw the emergence of the charismatic nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, who decided to use this unstable situation to redraw the borders in Yugoslavia accordingly to his own nationalist preferences.

As compared to religion and liberal democracy, ethnic nationalism undeniably offers important legitimizing benefits: the possibility to define biologically the “nation” and thus avoid the necessity of its ideological and doctrinaire definitions; the possibility to completely avoid the defining of the “nation” by pointing to an “enemy”, accordingly to the logic “I’m not completely sure who we are, but it is clear that we must solidarize and homogenize as a nation in order to defend ourselves from that terrible enemy”; and the possibility to depict nationalism as an alleged return to old “nationalist” traditions. Using these benefits, during the eighties all national communist oligarchies accepted ethnic nationalism hoping to cling to power.

**Characteristics of Ethnic Nationalisms, Especially of the Serbian One**

The general characteristics of ethnic nationalisms are the following: Their foundation is the structure of groups the members of which – based on their ethical (mainly cultural) similarities – solidarize with each other satisfying in the process their need for group adherence, convinced that they should have the right to their own ethnically defined “national state”, in which they can achieve their political independence, freedom, etc. Such groups justify their demand for an independent state – if possible – by their conviction that their ancestors – who they believe were members of the same ethnic group – already had their own state in the past, which had been unjustly taken away from them by various invaders, crooks, etc. and that the time has come to remedy this injustice; or they believe that, owing to years of cultural development, they had become a “nation-building nation” and the like. Having said that, there is typically no consensus on what characteristics are to be considered ethnic and how much of these characteristics are needed and by what combination if one wants to define an ethnic group.
The other main characteristic of ethnic nationalism is the belief that the independent “national state” should be home to all members of the given nation. Since by and large this is rarely the case, the problem emerges how to achieve this requirement in practice. One possibility is that all members of the nation who live outside of their “national state” be called upon to immigrate. Since such calls are most often largely ignored, ethnic nationalists are, in general, bothered by the problem of the “Diaspora”, i.e. the fact that many of their fellow nationals live in emigration. The second possibility is that regions populated by members of the given nation be annexed to their “mother state”, which generally triggers conflicts and wars. At the beginning of the nineties, Serbia opted for the second alternative and even enriched ethnic nationalism with the idea that Serbia is not only everywhere Serbs live, but also where their graves are.

Tightly connected with the above is the third characteristic of ethnic nationalism – the belief that members of other nations can not belong to the “national state”, or at least that have the same rights as the majority nation. Members of national minorities are thus expected to move out - which is at times assisted by violence - or to be assimilated, or at best to settle for the reduced rights they can obtain. Due to these convictions, at the beginning of the nineties in Yugoslavia the word “minority” became degrading. The merger of culturally mixed theories in order to achieve “national unity” diminishes, on the other hand, “national homogeneity” and incites nationalists to “ethnic cleansing” of captured territories, what was well illustrated by the 1991-1999 post-Yugoslav wars.

The fourth general attribute of ethnic nationalism is the feeling of being threatened. There are many reasons for that. (1) Ethnic nationalism is in itself the consequence of the feeling of threat due to the breakup of traditional communities brought about by the process of modernization. (2) The establishment of “national states” is typically followed by dangerous social conflicts, wars, etc. (3) “Ethnic identities”, since they are devoid of any content whatsoever and fail to offer any orientation in life, this shortcoming is often compensated by animosity towards other nations. (4) In the modern, globalized and interconnected world, it is almost impossible to maintain “ethnic homogeneity”. (5) If the neighborhood is also dominated by ethnic nationalism, as has been the case in the Balkans, one can conclude that those nationalisms are mainly based on animosity towards neighbors. This feeling of threat often manifests itself as the belief that one’s own nation is hated by the whole world and is the victim of a global conspiracy. In Serbia this fear has manifested itself with stories about the horrors of the “New World Order” or the “Global Catholic Network”, the concept of “the Croats being all Ustashis”, the Albanian “genocide” against the “Serbian people” by means of their high birth rate, as well as of all sorts of capitalist swindlers, adventurists and “Serb-haters”, etc.

To these general characteristics we should add some specific attributes of Serb ethnic nationalism. Those characteristics are the outcome of the historical fact that this nationalism is founded on the ideologization of the wars
of Christian Slavic peasants with the Ottoman Empire – the so-called “struggle against Turkish slavery” in the XIX century.

Hence maybe the most important attribute of Serbian nationalism is the aversion towards Islam. It manifested itself in the systematic demolition of mosques in the XIX century, the outcome of which is the fact that there are practically no mosques in Vojvodina and Serbia proper, as well as in the destruction of mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 war and the animosity towards the predominantly Muslim Kosovo Albanians.

The second specific characteristic of Serbian nationalism, as the ideology of discontented vassals of the Ottoman Empire, is the disloyalty to the state, i.e. the inclination to trick the state – its laws, institutions and its bureaucrats – for personal benefit in every possible situation; to not respect the law; to look for – as Slobodan Milosevic well put it – “non-institutional” means for achieving a given goal; to bribe government bureaucrats; etc. “This habit of getting around the law is considered a virtue, and not a vice.

In recent times, this disloyalty to the state and the lack of understanding of its functions has manifested itself on two occasions. In the beginning of the nineties, the ruling Serbian oligarchy failed to grasp that it could safeguard Yugoslavia as a state only by renouncing communism and nationalism. Instead, the Serbian elite increasingly tried to legitimize itself with a mixture of communism and nationalism, hence condemning the country to doom by trying to drive Slovenia out and destroy Croatia by war. Neglect for the state was present in 2000 too, after the removal of Milosevic: the incapability to determine its borders i.e. to bring about an workable decision on the status of Montenegro and Kosovo; the unpreparedness to go to the polls on the 2003 parliamentary elections and elect a president; the willingness to recognize party leaders and elect to Parliament war crime indictees, who stand no chance of being acquitted and released from jail; lack of care for appointing a stable government, etc.

Such behavior of a large portion of the population also reveals a character trait called “obstinacy”. Contrary to defiance, i.e. readiness to risk opposing an external power for one’s own benefit, which remains pragmatic, obstinacy is everything but that. Obstinacy is to refuse in a conflict, to give in, even when it is obvious that it will be to one’s own detriment. Slobodan Milosevic defied the world for fourteen years of his rule and practically lost four wars (in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), provoked the de facto secession of Montenegro and Kosovo from the state he established, was removed from power and found himself in the Hague Tribunal where he continues with his obstinacy. The results of the 2003 elections are also a manifestation of the logic of obstinacy: since the West is pressurizing us to give up nationalism, we will obstinately elect nationalist parties, the bosses of which the West by way of the Hague had accused of war crimes and is keeping locked in prison. We will do that even if it means compromising the state before the world and subjecting it to political and economic blockade.
And fourth, and often as the result of obstinacy, we have the inclination to use excessive and counterproductive violence, which triggers counter-violence and reduces the odds of establishing a stable “national state”.

This tendency to legitimize excessive violence we shall illustrate with two personal experiences. When in 1990 I visited several towns in Croatia devastated by Serbian and Montenegrin forces, from what I saw I was able to conclude what was the aim of these incursions. If it was plunder, then one would assume that the plunderers would, according to the routine of people of their kind, retreat from the plundered place and enjoy their loot. If the goal was long-term occupation and the establishment of Greater Serbia, then looting and destruction should have been avoided, for they do not go only against the interests of the enemy, but also against your own. Based on that, we can only conclude that the goal of Serb incursions was an incoherent combination of plunder, conquest, ethnic cleansing and revenge – for Ustashi crimes, for the desire of the Croats to separate themselves from Milosevic’s Serbia, or something else – by destroying everything of value, even if this definitely went against their own interests. That is the only way I can describe the inscription I read in 1994 on the wall of the devastated building of the Dubrovnik Bank branch office in Slano, a little town north of Dubrovnik, that was also completely destroyed: “Marko Grandov, Bijelo Polje, Montenegro”. Underneath was another one: “Omer>Chetnik, Zvornik”, with the well-known Serb symbol, the four S’. Marko and Omer had “conquered” Slano where they went on a plundering, destruction and drinking spree for some time, and then left to return where they came from, after the town was mainly destroyed and foreign pressure on Serbia became strong enough.

The second example is of somewhat older date. Between 1955 and 1958, I attended the last three years of eight-year primary school in the Serbian language – in the then still possible Classic Gymnasium “Orce Nikolov”, located in the monumental building of the former Gymnasium for Women, destroyed in the earthquake of 1963. Within the framework of the subject “Serbo-Croatian Language”, I had to read and learn by heart the epics of the Kosovo Cycle. I still remember one situation when the teacher of Serbo-Croatian, Mrs. Milanovic, tried to explain to the pupils the violence that had been committed, according to one of those epics, by Kraljevic Marko. She explained one of his acts of violence by rationalizing it as a means for achieving one of his goals in the struggle against the Turks. However, that act of violence was followed by a second one, which was interpreted by a smiling Mrs. Milanovic as a confirmation of his strengths. Nevertheless, the smile on her face a moment later turned into a smile of confusion, when she understood the violent act to have been completely excessive, i.e. that it could be explained only by Marko’s barbarism.

The Serbian ethnic nationalism from the end of the 20th century was born in 1981, with the Albanian demand that Kosovo become an independent republic. It was stirred up by animosity towards Kosovo Albanians and the Slavic “European” nationalists. The goal was that Milosevic would be
able to use that nationalism, in this fatal stage of the Yugoslav crisis, on his "Truth Rallies", as a means for the putsch against the leaderships of certain republics and autonomous provinces, with the intent to replace them with his minions. Although after the failure of his plans in Slovenia and Croatia he was offered at meetings with the Communist Party establishment of a loose federation that would allow him to control Montenegro and two provinces in Serbia, and even the establishment of an “asymmetric federation” that would allow him to indirectly control Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, Milosevic’s obstinacy prevailed: if things can not go my way, they won’t go yours either. Violence was closely followed by obstinacy. The breakup of the state came about when the nationalist leadership of Serbia, after the failure of the above putschist policy, decided to draw up the borders of Greater Serbia by means of war.

The European Context

Post-Yugoslav states can not escape from the cultural and political context of Europe, which after the collapse of the communist Eastern Bloc is on the path to unity on the basis of Abraham’s monotheism, personal freedom and rights and liberal democracy. Even though in Europe ethnic nationalisms and the idea of sovereignty of certain “national states” are yet to be overcome, the development of the European Union (EU) goes in the direction of establishing a common political culture and common political system, which will in turn facilitate the suppression of ethnic nationalisms to the level of cultural distinctivenesses of secondary importance, similar to the one nations had in medieval Europe.

Serbia shall border the EU with the admission of Hungary and the remaining nine candidate countries scheduled to become members in May of 2004. Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia are trying hard to follow the same path as soon as possible. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are under NATO control and de facto EU protectorates. With the upcoming US defeat in Iraq and probably a shift in its aggressive foreign policy, the EU shall probably increase its influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. If Serbia does not want to return to the status as the “black hole” in the Balkans – the status it had during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, it must adapt itself to this situation.

This adjustment requires not only the acceptance of human rights and liberties, tolerance and liberal democracy in the form of legal norms and institutions, but also in the shape of political and general culture affecting everyday life, a way of thinking and behavior etc. For instance, liberal-democratic political culture does not bar anyone from ethnically feeling as a Serb, or even to think non-Serbs are lesser beings, but does bar him from denying them their rights and liberties, persecuting them, insulting them or trying to establish an ethnically pure” Serbian state. Moreover, the liberal-democratic state does not bar anyone from being, for example, an Islamic Fundamentalist, if he’s not threatening the liberties of other citizens - and, it
should be stressed, any single citizen - the freedoms of other Muslims, the freedoms of Islamic fundamentalists, or even his personal freedom. In other words, a fundamentalist in a liberal-democratic state must accept that members of his religious community, as well as himself, have accepted this by their own free will, i.e. that they are free to give up fundamentalism and their religious community if they wish.

Such cultural adjustment is the most important condition for the establishment of confidence among the former nations of the socialist Yugoslavia. The symbolic ritual of forgiveness pleas can only be substantiated this confidence established by cultural transformation, but can not replace it.

The essential elements of the cultural adjustment to the European Union are the acceptance of the liberal-democratic political culture, the acceptance of the EU as the civil empire and the readiness for intercultural dialogue.

**Embracing the Liberal-democratic Political Culture**

In all post-Yugoslav states a fatal absence of liberal-democratic culture can be observed. Although everyone is for democracy, they often forget human liberties and rights, i.e. they accept democratically-founded, but utterly unliberal and chauvinist decisions. An example of that is the transformation of between twenty to thirty thousand immigrants in Slovenia into persons completely deprived of any rights and without citizenship. Another case is the 35-year long prevention of the building of the mosque in Ljubljana. The objective of the development of the political system and political culture mustn't be just any democracy, but liberal democracy.

The foundation of liberal democracy is political individualism. In other words, the protagonists of liberal-democratic systems are individuals that for their own interests unite in political alliances that allow them to define and to protect their rights and liberties, which would facilitate the realization of their interests. In accordance with that, the classic argumentative concept liberal-democratic systems are founded on, is the social contract uniting individuals in a political community with such a system. It should be remarked that political individualism does not implicate individualism in other domains of life. It does not exclude voluntarily belonging to communities that are founded on everything but individualistic norms and that, for example, require a high level of preparedness for sacrifice for the sake of the community.

The main purpose of political individualism and the basic interest of individuals who are joining together by means of a social contract into a political community is the guarantee of their maximum rights and liberties. The *Magna Charta Libertatum* from 1215 is largely considered as the beginning of the development of the idea of individual rights and liberties; some even think that it was started with Moses’ five books. This development has two components: the definition of an increasing number of different freedoms and rights as universal and incontestable, and legalization of these
freedoms and rights in the Laws of certain states. Today relevant and valid are primarily the following human rights documents: The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights and the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of them adopted in 1966.

Political individualism and the maximization of freedoms and rights are the foundations of the idea of political liberalism. The very concept of the social contract presumes that the structure of the political alliance be decided by everyone adhering to it i.e. that they decide about this structure in a democratic manner. In addition to that, liberalism, as a doctrine requiring the maximization of freedoms and rights and, contrary to Thomas Hobbes, starts from the assumption that political rights and liberties should too be maximized, i.e. it requires a democratic adoption of political decisions. In a nutshell, political individualism and liberalism are inseparable from democracy. Hence, although unliberal democratic systems are possible, only the ones that are liberal and democratic have shown to be coherent and stable.

As already mentioned, individuals associated in a liberal-democratic political community can, within the framework of their liberties, rights and effective laws, freely choose their way of life: the norms they shall respect; the values they will cherish; whether they will be religious or not; their traditions and customs; etc. In other words, they can choose their own beliefs, comprehensive doctrine, religion, tradition, and the culture that suits them best and to adapt their lives to its requirements. Toward that, some opt for traditional beliefs, while other use to the fullest freedoms and rights offered by liberal democracy. The majority spontaneously grows into the culture to which it belongs by birth, thus also by definition making the above choice.

The liberal-democratic state can provide its citizens with these freedoms and at the same time remain stable, only if it clearly distances itself from their beliefs, comprehensive doctrines and cultures, that is if it remains neutral and refrains from meddling in the issues of affiliation. In other words, the liberal-democratic state does not interfere in metaphysical issues and hence is neither religious, nor atheist or even agnostic. It even stays out of the secular issues of culture, tradition and customs, if they are not relevant for its stability, that is if those are not matters of political culture. Such a state is a “lay”, a “secular” one, and “separated from the church”, it is strictly divided from all religious and cultural communities. This strict separation should be doctrinaire, institutional, functional and personal.

Although many are convinced to the contrary, it is precisely as a result of this separation that neither the system nor the political culture of liberal democracy exclude fundamentalism, i.e. the strict adherence to the rules of any doctrine regulating completely all the domains of life and hence radically limiting the freedoms and rights ensured by liberal democracy; provided, of course, that all adult affiliated accept the liberal-democratic system and that they submit willingly to the restrictions of their doctrine. For example, an Orthodox Jew - who is convinced that God has with his rules regulated every detail of his life, and that for him it is vitally important to strict-
ly adhere to these rules - can be a liberal democrat, if he accepts this system and the politically founded liberty of all citizens, including his own, to freely choose whether he will be an Orthodox Jew or not. In a word, political liberalism is the foundation of political commonality only, and not of all other forms of commonality, which can be all but liberal.

On the other hand, the social foundation of the liberal democracy’s stability is not liberalism, which, in addition to politics, involves other areas of life. This foundation is tolerance: the citizens that exercise all their liberties tolerating fundamentalism; the fundamentalists tolerating such citizens and other fundamentalists of different beliefs; as well as the state tolerating them all.

One needs to endorse the development of political culture (“civil conscience”) in every area of life, and needs to do it primarily by his own behavior. The person who sees and respects him/herself as a citizen of the EU or one of its liberal-democratic members, differs radically from the person considering him/herself a biologically-determined member of this or that “nation”, which has, to make matters worse, been the victim of the “Turkish” or some other “slavery”, “occupation”, “genocide” and the like. The person of the first type is, namely, typically loyal to the political community to which it belongs, willing to work on its improvement and respecting its fellow citizens; on the other hand, the person of the second type if often lamenting over its destiny, searching for “conspiracies” and “enemies” to blame and for ways to get around this situation, “dupe the enemy” and “free” itself by destroying his political community.

Accepting the EU as the Civil Empire

From the very founding of the EU, some of its states have a bigger influence than others. The differences of influence become even more important with ten new countries joining the Union in May 2004, the majority of them economically weaker former Eastern Block states. Hence one could grasp that process as the establishment of an imperial relation between the most powerful EU members and the economically weak newcomers. For the following reasons, the EU can be rightfully deemed a political community gradually becoming an empire:

(i) The West, and consequently the EU, has prevailed in the Cold War against the Soviet Block;

(ii) The candidates for EU membership must fulfill the criteria set by the Union in order to join it;

(iii) The official and the non-official candidates for EU membership are much weaker than its strongest members - such as France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain – not only economically but also in respect to civil, economic and political culture, which is the consequence of 45 years of Communism, as well as of more ancient Central European and Eastern European traditions;
(iv) On the summit of the European Council in Nice it was decided on December 12, 2000, signed on February the 26th, 2003 and came into effect on February the 1st, 2003 that the Union replaces consensual with majority decision-making. With the admission of new members on May the 1st, 2004, the internal economic and cultural differences in the EU will be significantly increased (usp: Martin Brusis, “Von der Ost- zur Südosterweiterung?” Osteuropa, 11/2003, pages 1623-1638);

(v) The primacy of large and rich countries remains undisputed even on the level of informal agreements and inter-state pacts that precede formal decisions in EU bodies. One can often hear the remark that the well-being of the EU depends on friendly relations and preparedness for agreement between France and Germany, alongside which Great Britain is sometimes mentioned. Well-known are also the proposals that the EU be structured like a concentric circle (like an onion head) with several large and rich countries, the remaining states – members of the Union, and finally the candidates for membership;

Although the terms “empire” and “imperialism” have negative connotations, it would be wrong to judge this imperial relationship inside the EU as unacceptable and refrain from joining the Union, or again demand that equality of the member states be established. Such an empire should be clearly distinguished from colonial relations, violent occupation, plunder and occupation followed by genocide. The colonial relationship predominantly involves violence towards the colonized and their exploitation. Violence is even more pronounced in occupation and plunder, and it peaks during a genocide-related occupation of a nation.

Unlike the above, imperial centers that seek long-term stability tend to establish mutually useful contractual and partner relations with the inhabitants of the annexed territories, with the goal of gaining their respect for the empire’s power. With that aim, imperial powers are often inclined to federalize the empire and to give certain groups – “nations and ethnic groups” – a high degree of autonomy, in order to stimulate the economic development of poor areas, etc. With the same aim, they often stress the equality of all its inhabitants and groups and encourage their solidarity. To this should be added that the EU is a civil, liberal-democratic political community, which is prepared to respect the civil equality of all its members, and should be therefore considered as a civil empire.

It is not hard to identify the reasons for which the accession of post-Yugoslav states to such civil empire is in the formers’ existential interest:

(i) The acceptance of EU rules and the political influence of powerful and longstanding members of the Union would in the long term probably prevent the renewed “Balkanization” of the Balkans by the recurrence of futile and chaotic ethnic wars;

(ii) Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo would evolve from the status of current de facto EU protectorates to its full-fledged members;
(iii) By means of belonging to the Union, stabilized liberal democracy would guarantee the citizens of post-Yugoslav countries a high degree of civil and social rights and liberties;

(iv) Joining the economic flows of the EU is inseparable from the influx of capital and technical knowledge and with the ensuing growth of material prosperity;

(v) In the cultural domain, further development of liberal-democratic civil culture can be expected, as well as the universalistic way of thinking on issues of politics and morality – the very opposites of the culture of primacy of the “nations and ethnic groups” in the form of ethnic nationalism;

In short, in the current political situation in post-Yugoslav nations it is difficult to imagine the acceptance of liberal democracy without accession to the EU, that is without the espousal of the EU as the civil empire and vice versa – EU accession without the acceptance of liberal democracy. Unwelcome are the ideologies of “patriotism”, “national state”, “sovereignty” and the like, and required is the preparedness for participation in the processes of European integration, the delegation of sovereignty to EU bodies and other institutions of European integration, etc. EU should be accepted as “one’s own” political community and not as a more or less foreign master without enough consideration for the specific needs and desires of one’s own “people”.

**Willingness for Inter-Cultural Dialogue**

Globalization (the increased mobility of goods, services, money, people and information and the resulting economic and communication interconnectedness of the world), as well as religious and cultural differentiation in liberal democracies, have increased the number of contacts and the need for understanding between members of different cultures. In order for inter-cultural contacts to be successful, that is for cultural differences-related misunderstanding not to evolve into inter-cultural conflicts, their participants need to be “qualified”, i.e. inter-culturally competent and without any insoluble mutual contrariness. The acquisition of inter-cultural competence and the removal of insurmountable differences between cultures represent the utmost objective of inter-cultural dialogue.

Inter-cultural dialogue in the broader sense is every dialogue of individuals belonging to different cultures. In narrower terms, it is a dialogue of such persons or specialists for relations between cultures the very subject of which are cultural differences. Inter-cultural dialogue in the broader sense boosts the better mutual acquainting of members of different cultures, increasing thus their inter-cultural competence. Inter-cultural dialogue in narrower terms, involves more or less specialized, academic discussion about the values, norms, beliefs, traditions, customs and habits of different cultures, with the goal of bringing them closer together and reduce the probability of culturally induced conflicts.
Everyday experience and the theory of communication show that for successful managing of inter-cultural dialogue certain conditions ought to be fulfilled. The most important of those conditions is good faith. Arguments and claims are made in good faith if the one who makes them strongly believes in their soundness and truthfulness. From the recipients, good faith in turn requires the acceptance of credible arguments and their utilization in later dialogue, even if those agreements challenge their own beliefs.

The second important requirement for inter-cultural dialogue to succeed is that cultures or members of cultural groups are not defined in definite terms, but instead to be in a process of permanent change due to their inner tensions and external stimuli. This changeability allows their gradual modification, so as to reduce the potential conflict between them.

Closely linked to these conditions is the third requirement for the success of inter-cultural dialogue – the preference for freely chosen cultural identities (elective identities, elective memberships, voluntary self-ascriptions) over prescribed ones, i.e. those spontaneously embraced by growing up in a certain cultural environment, which many deem unchangeable (ascriptive identities, ascriptive memberships).

And finally, the fourth conditions for successful inter-cultural dialogue is the willingness of all parties in the dialogue to recognize each others principally identical political, social and cultural rights and liberties, regardless of the character, size and social status of the cultural groups they belong to. In other words: to mutually respect each other as autonomous, intelligent persons with equal rights.

Of many possible goals of intercultural dialogue the following three ought to be emphasized:

(i) Their cultural, educational and enlightening goal is the acquainting with hitherto unknown foreign cultures. The knowledge of foreign cultures allows their critical assessment and facilitates communication with their members. In addition, it helps the critical examination of one’s own culture, and in that process, the preparedness and capacity to improve that culture and one’s way of life.

(ii) The social function of intercultural dialogue is the prevention, resolution or at least the lessening of inter-cultural conflicts. That is achievable in different ways, out of which the most efficient is to define the conflict of interest and consensually find a compromise, as well as the similarization of cultures between which there is no danger of conflict. A particularly ambitious, and one could say even extreme goal of the similarization of cultures, is their equalization and fusion.

If those methods of prevention and lessening of intercultural conflicts fail, it might become necessary to separate cultural groups by drawing territorial borders between them or functionally dividing them.

(iii) Important political functions of inter-cultural dialogue are the resolution of political conflicts, related cultural differences and the securing of stability of culturally pluralistic cultural communities. Clearly, this political function exists with every attempt to reduce inter-cultural conflicts. The cen-
toral political function of inter-cultural dialogue is the finding of and a consensus of different cultural groups founded on political culture. This consensus would allow them to accept peaceful joint life within the political system of the states they live in. The consensus on joint life in a common state typically includes provisions on who in the state legitimately exercises political power; the most important institutions of the state; rights and duties of the holders of political power and others state servants; about who is, and who is not, and who can become its citizen; etc. In the conditions of cultural pluralism, the desirable system is liberal democracy founded on political liberalism, i.e. a system founded on relatively few joint principles, laws and institutions about which it is possible to reach an inter-cultural consensus, i.e. conclude a “social contract”

The success of inter-cultural dialogues also depends on their methods: for instance, their time and thematic constraints, the experience of the participants in the controversial argumentation and their preparedness to engage in it, to accept mediators, etc. For that reason, in the case of official, organized, politically relevant and maybe even public inter-cultural dialogue, educated, tolerant, intellectually dynamic and culturally influential persons should be assigned. Those would be persons who are, on the one hand, capable of finding points of contact with other cultures and make the necessary cultural shift, and on the other hand to convince members of their own cultural communities to accept such shifts and compromises.

It would clearly be convenient that such official dialogues be followed by similar contacts, if possible, of a large number of cultural groups, i.e. inter-cultural dialogue in the broader sense. In liberal-democratic systems, this is facilitated by the fact that in those systems everyone can talk about everything. Citizens and foreigners, members of different cultures, the young and the old, the organized and the unorganized, liberals and nationalists, all of them can exchange arguments, get acquainted with each others beliefs, norms and ways of life. Moreover, they can get engaged and cooperate over the achievement of shared goals. Other than working on the realization of a particular goal, by engaging in inter-cultural dialogue, they practice inter-cultural communication, spread the practice of deliberative democracy and reinforce civil society in the framework of which they conduct dialogue as the foundation of the liberal-democratic political system.

There is a reoccurring problem that can seriously hamper the organization and the conducting of inter-cultural dialogue. It is the already mentioned lack of content and organization of many cultural groups. The absence of content manifests itself by the fact that it is hard to clearly say what are the central features – learning, norms, language, tradition – of a given culture, and, in accordance to that, who has sufficient knowledge about that culture for competent participation in inter-cultural dialogue. The lack of organization, on the other hand, results in the difficulty to find a competent and representative member of that culture and include him in cultural dialogue.

For example, Serbs and Croats consider themselves cultural groups. Moreover, they consider themselves “nations”. It is, nevertheless, almost
impossible to answer the question “what makes someone a Serb, or a Croat?” Croats are Catholics, while Serbs are Orthodox Christians. How it is then possible to explain the fact that both Serbs and Croats arrogate themselves Bosnian Muslims, as “renegades” of their “nations” who have embraced Islam? Croats speak Croatian and Serbs the Serb language. Why do they then understand each other without major problems, why did they speak Serbo-Croatian for decades, and why are since the breakup of the joint state to date, the Croats trying hard to introduce as many new words and grammatical rules as possible with the goal to increase their differences with the Serbo-Croatian and Serb language? Croats speak the jekavian dialect, and Serbs ekavian. But Montenegrins, the majority of whom consider themselves Serbs, also speak jekavian; the same goes for Bosnian Muslims. The Kosovo Cycle of Serbian national epics was written on jekavian, while Croats from Zagorje (region of Croatia) speak using the ekavian dialect. The Croats use the Latin alphabet, and Serbs the Cyrillic one. In the former Yugoslavia, everyone had to learn Cyrillic in Croatia and Latin in Serbia. For decades Serbs gradually embraced the Latin alphabet and they will probably have to go back to learning it if they want to join “Europe”. Even on the most repulsive possible level of “culture”, war crimes between 1991 and 1995 were committed by both Serbs and Croats; moreover, Croatia and Serbia worked together on the project of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the persecution of Muslims.

So the question is who could you call from Serbia and Croatia for a competent, controversial and in-good-faith Serbo-Croatian inter-cultural dialogue; which organization or group would you turn to in quest of colloquists? To nationalists, who are probably the best representatives of their “national culture”, but who would often, instead of dialogue, wage war? Or maybe to social scientists, philosophers or experienced journalists? Nevertheless, the history of dialogues between Serb and Croat social scientists and philosophers already exists. Praxis philosophers have agreed without any problems over all important social and cultural problems; they cared little about the issue of cultural differences, but their cooperation broke down only when some Serbs philosophers replaced dialogue with currying favors with Dobrica Cosic’s Serb nationalism and the chauvinist regime of Slobodan Milosevic. How about inter-cultural dialogue between journalists? After the breakup of Yugoslavia, there are still just embryos of it. It seems that the most open for inter-cultural dialogue are business people, whose goal is to make a profit. Among them are both mafia-style war profiteers, as well as totally honest players in legal and civilian domains of the economy.

Discours de la Méthode II

The question is how to come close to achieving these goals, how to implement the above cultural changes. Germany has for example accepted liberal democracy under duress, only after having suffered a total cultural fiasco and defeat in the war. However, due to the fact that it has not been
suppressed by the nation’s own forces, German ethnic nationalism is still virulent sixty years after its defeat. It is not difficult to notice that liberal democracy in Germany is not the outcome of the Germans themselves fighting for it.

In France, liberal democracy is the result of the French Revolution and the century-long struggle of the “Third Class” to safeguard, spread and build up that revolution’s achievements. Owing to the fact that it was forged by the French themselves, in France liberal democracy is much more stable than in Germany.

In the United States, liberal democracy has been established by European immigrants who were fleeing from European feudalism, dictatorships, religious persecution, poverty, etc. Their political culture has, however, remained connected to (Christian) religion and race. That was the only way to justify the genocide of natives and slavery. However, political culture in the US has in the mean time reached a satisfying level of universalism, while the state is traditionally strictly separated from religious and other doctrinaire communities.

Post-Yugoslav states are not haunted by political liabilities from the past, such as National Socialism and slavery. Nevertheless, since ethnic nationalism remains a serious problem, one could ask how to overcome it and apply the above described cultural adjustments? From examining the experiences of Germany, France and the United States, it is obvious that this task requires the will and action of those countries’ citizens – the people who decide in what kind of system they want to live and who are ready to implement that decision in practice. The task of intellectuals and politicians who do not support ethnic nationalism with that respect, can only be to inform citizens via the mass media about the ways that lead to that goal, alternative cultural and political experiences and traditions that are close to them and that they can accept and develop as their own.

The following experiences and traditions can be considered:

(i) Probably the oldest relevant tradition of cultural pluralism and intercultural communication is the Mediterranean one. The Mediterranean Sea was the inland sea of the Roman Empire, in which the *ius gentium*, the law that was valid for all tribes and peoples in the empire, made their joint life and communication possible. In medieval times, the communication of different cultural groups living in the Eastern Mediterranean was made possible by the *lingua franca* and the might of Republic of Venice. In the XV and XVI centuries, Venice played an important role in Italian humanism, as well as in the Renaissance; we should also mention the openness and the trading spirit of the Dubrovnik Republic.

(ii) Christianity is a universalistic religion the starting point of which is the belief that God made man – and consequently all men, and not just Christians, or just Catholics or Orthodox Christians – made him in “his own image” (Genesis 1, 26). Hence the conclusion that all people should be respected as the images of God. Unfortunately, both the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches in Serbia, Macedonia, and even Montenegro,
have failed to resist to nationalist temptations. Nevertheless, while it is not hard to understand that the Church promotes its own special interests by flirting with nationalism, nothing stops intellectuals that don’t depend on the church to remind the church, as well as the remaining population, of the basic foundations of Christianity.

(iii) Until the XX century, the Balkans was divided between two powerful empires: the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires. While those were not liberal democracies, those empires managed to subsist for centuries because they were willing to accept cultural and particularly religious pluralism in their populations.

In Austro-Hungary in the XIX century, modernization was followed by increased readiness to accept and even cherish local particularities. Well-known is the concern of Austro-Hungary for the well-being of Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1878, with the construction of railway lines, stations, schools and naturally the well-known mustard colored military barracks. For example, my grandfather Stjepan Krizan, after having finished his studies in Vienna and graduation from the faculty of medicine in Prague - where he was offered the post of assistant professor - returned with his Czech wife to Bosnia-Herzegovina and worked as a doctor in Gacko for years. Austro-Hungria took care about him moving back and finding a place to live. And in the monumental illustrated monograph of Julius Laurencic Unsere Monarchie, Die österreichischen Kronländer zur Zeit des fünfhjährigen Regierungs-Jubiläums Seiner k. u. k. apostol. Majestät Franz Joseph I. (“Our Monarchy, Austrian Crown Provinces in the Time of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rule of His Imperial Apostolic Highness Franz Joseph”, published in Vienna in 1898), after a series of four larger Austrian cities (Linz, Salzburg, Graz and Innsbruck, pages 20-27), the first province to be “treated” with a larger number of pictures – a total of eighteen on twelve pages, followed by twelve pages of text, pages 28-51– is precisely Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, tolerance was based on the Islamic teaching that Christians and Jews are “People of the Book” (ahl-al-kitab) and therefore the protégés (ahl-ad-dimma) of Muslims, who also respect biblical prophets and Jesus as a prophet. Although these protégés did not have the same rights as Muslims, they were able, in their religious communities (milla, millet in Turkish), to live according to the canons of their faith. This arrangement of society could also have been observed in the structure of Ottoman cities: members of different religious communities lived in different town quarters, and in the downtown, the trading centre of the city, they met in order to trade goods, services and information.

(iv) After the destruction Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the Socialist Yugoslavia by stronger empires from the outside and by ethnic nationalisms from the inside, a large part of the population solidarized in the struggle against National Socialism and Fascism and put their cultural and other differences. National socialism has been and has remained the symbol of evil precisely because of extreme particularism, intolerance and savagery.
(iv) After World War II, the Socialist Yugoslavia promoted the utopian communist ideology of universal equality, solidarity and prosperity. “The national issue” was proclaimed resolved, i.e. it was assumed that socialist solidarity was more attractive than nationalist conflicts and cultural particularities, especially if these particularities are partially accepted. Unfortunately, Yugoslav “nations and ethnic groups” have managed to retain enough cultural narcissism and intolerance to reject the above universal values – equality, solidarity and prosperity – together with the one-party communist dictatorship and “socially-owned property”. In the meantime, some have returned to these values.

(v) Finally, we should also mention the experience of the expatriates in quest of work during their long years of stay in Western European countries. This experience is two-fold. First, these expatriates got acquainted with liberal-democratic systems and brought their experiences back to the home country, or at least, to a lesser extent, transferred them to their relatives and friends.

Second, they acquired the experience of negative discrimination and poor social status due to the environment’s intolerance, their own poor education or low incomes, which in turn facilitated for some of them the cognition of tolerance, acceptance of cultural differences and conduction intellectual dialogues.

When the citizens of post-Yugoslav countries recall these experiences and traditions and accept them as their own, they will easily be able to draw a conclusion favoring liberal democracy, a secular state, respect of human rights and liberties and tolerance, especially due to the fact that, the last few decades, these elements of the political system and political culture proved to have been appealing not just to Europeans and Westerners, but to almost all the people in the world.

Translated from Serbian by Bogdan Petrović
“Ethnic cleansing”, perpetrated within former Yugoslavia, involving numerous crimes, such as rape, murder, robbery, destruction of religious, cultural or residential buildings, was intended to provoke the mass exodus of different and other people, those that, according to the “ethnic cleanser,” did not belong within the territory he believed must be not only his, but completely his own. However, it was frequently ignored that causing fear among adversaries (enemies) in order to force them to disappear from a certain territory was prompted by the existence of fear from one’s own side, a fear of a terrible past repeating itself. The main generators of fear among “one’s own people”, i.e. politicians and their spin doctors, probably did not believe — at least not all of them did — that such fear was justified. However, these fears could be easily generated among their compatriots, especially among those living in contested territories. This was a notable characteristic of the propaganda pursued by the Serbian side, especially the propaganda used in the media controlled by Belgrade after Slobodan Milošević rose to power in 1987.

Some authors eagerly concluded that the bloody war was the result of a “centuries-old Balkan conflict”, “historical hatred” etc. Actually, until World War II there were no major clashes based on ethnic hatred. Serbs and Croats fought against each other in the armies of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, but never as Serbs or as Croats. Although all nationalist leaders, as well as the political and pseudo-intellectual elites that supported them, invoked the glorious days of a distant past, the break up of Yugoslavia was not a consequence of the distant past. War and hatred was generated by fear, stemming from the memories of the recent past or from a mythological perception of history.

Hence, dangerous nationalism had its prime source in fear. In the case of the Serbs, it was the fear of WW II crimes committed against them being repeated.

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1 The thesis on the eternal hatred among Balkan nations is widespread among certain western “Yugoslavists”. It is ridiculed by Richard Holbrooke calling it the “Rebecca West factor” and referring to the book she wrote Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. See: R. Holbrooke, To End A War, p. 22 and on. See also Brian Hall, Rebecca West’s War, New Yorker, April 15 1996.
In Serbia, the greatest intellectual figures believed that the Serbs were once again facing peril. Academy member Dobrica Ćosić, a reputable writer, former communist and partisan, that left high-ranking positions in the Party because of the danger he saw threatening the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, made the following statement in June 1992, having become aware - much before others did - that in Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs too had engaged in criminal behavior:

“The worse possible has happened to us. With the break up of Yugoslavia the results of the two-centuries long liberating struggle to allow all Serbs to live in a single country have been annulled. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, threatened by the resurrection of the Ustasha ideology and by militant Islam, terrified by a new genocide, are compelled to wage a horrible war of defense against the Chauvinist-Ustasha Croatia and the Moslem Jihad; we have been punished by expulsion from the world community; we are now condemned to a long suffering, humiliation, exodus, and assimilation. To the crimes that are perpetrated against us, we respond with crimes and dehumanize ourselves to the point of being unrecognizable...”

At the very start, neither of the two fears was rational, but they slowly started to feed on each other. The fear of crimes was generating crimes. The fact that the crimes committed during WW II had never been investigated and punished, and that true reconciliation and healing never actually took place, and that attempts had been made to overcome the injustice with ideological unity and oblivion, led to a situation where fear was always latent.

For example, the cruelest crimes committed during the war in Bosnia took place in the camps in the municipality of Prijedor, a town some 20 kilometers away from the Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac. Quite symbolically: the village of Omarska were the notorious prison camp had been set up in 1992, was a Serbian village whose inhabitants had been massacred 50 years earlier!

The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) dealt with numerous indictments concerning crimes committed in the municipality of Prijedor, the first one being the indictment against Duško Tadić. The Panel of Judges thus summarized what might be called the “historical causes” of ethnic hatred in a region where Tadić lived and operated:

“62. Many of those bitter and bloody clashes took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and many wrongdoings against civilians, particularly but not only those committed by the Ustasha forces against ethnic Serbs, also took place in the border zones between Croatia and Bosnia, where the partisans were particularly active and where Prijedor is located”.

Only one source, the book *The Serbs* authored by the British publicist Tim Judah, offers almost immediate and plentiful examples of the debilitating effects that the provocation of such a historical fear had:

Jelena, a young girl about to graduate from high school, talked about the unease and fear she felt. According to Radio Knin, Croatian doctors and nurses “were planning to murder all the Serbian patients...”.

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2 “Serbia Between Rebirth and Catastrophe “, speech delivered at the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Politika June 16 1992. (italics added)


The Serbs were told that in case that Bosnia becomes independent, they would newly fall under the laws of the Moslem landowners - the aghas, beys and pashas - and that independence would mean loosing all that they gave their lives for after 1804, if not even since 1389. (p. 177).

Even before the conflict broke out, Vox, an extremist Moslem magazine in Sarajevo, helped this Serbian propaganda by publishing a proposal for a new social game: “The best game ever! Skull Tower. Use your talent, imagination and building skills to show the world what architects the Turks were. You can play the game alone or with Croat friends. The objective is to put twenty (or more) Serbian skulls in the Tower, in alphabetical order and as quickly as possible” (p. 252).

Imbued, or - to be more precise - dazed by months and years-long TV propaganda about the “resurgence” of Ustasha accompanied by countless documentary shows about Ustasha camps, Pavelić and Hitler, the Serbs attacked first, striking hard. However, the results were not be limited to the expulsion of Croats - and later on of Moslems - from the territories that the Serbian leaders felt were rightfully theirs. The logic of war induced a response, i.e. the expulsion of the Serbs. And thus, a poorly thought-out idea about the exchange of population soon became an omen becoming a spontaneous reality. (p. 256).

The propaganda machinery reminded people of the horrors of the past conflicts and crimes, resorting to tactics such as dehumanizing people that lived as neighbors and using names from the past to label them.5

And thus, well before the war in former Yugoslavia actually broke out, the Serbian media offered alarming warnings about the new “resurrection of the Ustasha movement” in Croatia and about the conspiracy to create an “Islamic republic” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The historical review of the genocide committed against the Serbs in Croatia during World War II became part of everyday programs broadcast by the state television and circulated by other state media.6 People close to Milošević were among the first to seize control of what was until then the most reputable daily in Serbia, Politika. In fact, during that time the newspaper introduced and maintained a long running column called

5 See: Bartov, Omer, Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide and Modern Identity, Oxford University Press 2000, p. 140
6 Examples: “Genocide is one of the most inhuman, dishonorable and undemocratic actions. It was committed in Croatia in WW II (then the Independent State of Croatia), by the Ustasha against Serbs, Jews and Roma. No one can resurrect those killed in the camps of Jasenovac, Staro Sajmišta, Jadovno and other concentration camps and prisons. A small gesture of good will is all it takes... to prove once again that the Croatian authorities reject a genocide ideology” (Stojan Adašević Md, Politika, March 5 1990)… “The myth of the Ustasha movement has been born again. It is a fact that has to alarm all Yugoslavs regardless of their ethnic, religious or political definition. Croats too should be alarmed, not only Serbs in this republic. What happened in 1941 cannot be repeated, but blood can be shed again...” (Đura Slobotki-Peleš, Politika, May 22 1990). “The Serbs in Serbia have little knowledge of what is Ustasha ideology like... In fact, Serbs cannot comprehend the ideology of the Ustasha. They must know that it is based on a rather simple calculation: a third of the Serbs are to be liquidated, one third Catholicized, one third expelled...” (Ilija Petrović, member of the Serbian National Council for Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem speaking on Channel 1 of RTV Belgrade in a special news program entitled ‘Serbs in Croatia’). See also De la Brosse, Renaud, Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create ‘A State For All Serbs: Consequences of using media for ultra-nationalist ends, Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Hague, 2003, pp. 34 - 35).
“Echoes and reactions”. It was used to publish countless short articles intended to create the conviction that Serbia had been constantly neglected and that Serbs were always the victims. Such propaganda, remembered, as Greuelpropaganda - because of the Nazi psychological usage in Germany - constitutes a well-known tool for mobilizing masses based on revanchism and renewal of hatred.

The outbreak of fighting in Croatia on May 1 1990, was thus described by RTV Novi Sad: “This is what it was like last night on the blue Danube. Far from any romance, and moving ever closer to a tragedy for people whose only guilt is that their distant forefathers migrated to this region and settled here... Yesterday, similar to the recipe used in 1941, yet another day marked by deaths and news of Serbian hostages being taken. The experience of 1941 cost too dearly for us to sacrifice freedom so easily”. The war reporters of the RTS Mostar provided this report: “Immediately after the peace talks ended, on the eve of Bairam, the garrison “Severni logor” was blown up. The attack was planned by the Ustasha, and carried out by Jihad warriors, with the brutality typical of these two groups”. Dragoslav Bokan, film director and commander of the first paramilitary formation called the “White eagles”, stated in an interview published by what was then a war mongering magazine: “Twenty seven members of my family were killed during WW II. My mother grew up in an orphanage in Belgrade. I have been involved in this whole thing through the tragedy of my ancestors... I pity the young Ustashas when we bring them out before a firing squad.... But when I am out there on the front line, when I fight and see enemies die, then I am happy, because I know that people that threatened my nation are eliminated”. Throughout the war this writing style was stepped up while at the same time maintaining the pathetic tone about the Serbian people being the eternal victim, and the correlation - which was later replaced by identification - between the enemy troops and the Ustashes and Turks from Serbian history.

The media were promoting a premeditated and bizarre rerun of World War II and even of the Battle of Kosovo.

Obviously, had there not been horrible crimes committed against Serbs in 1941-1945, such propaganda would never have had that much success. It was calculated to influence existing and still very vivid memories, which opens the question of overcoming the traumas from World War II, which we shall not deal with here.

8 Among the numerous scientific and pseudoscientific works published in that particular period, particularly massive is the four volume book by Milan Bulajić, Ustaški zločini genocida i sudjenje Andriji Artukovića I-IV, (Ustasha Crimes of Genocide and the Trial Against Andrija Artukovic) Beograd, Rad, 1988 and 1989.
9 See: Lazar Lalić, Tri TV godine u Srbiji, Nezavisni sindikat medija, Beograd, 1995, pp. 63, 64
10 De la Brosse, op. cit. p. 66
11 Beli orlovi
The new national leaders, mostly former Party officials, lost their legitimate footing in Marxist-Leninist ideology and had to assume the role of priests and protectors of threatened national interests, a phenomenon that took place in other former socialist countries as well, especially in the republics of the former USSR. At the end of the 90’s these groups became aware of the power of the media and started using it. Once opened, this Pandora’s box also inspired vengeance among those that the national ideologists, spin doctors and politicians could no longer control or stop, including psychopaths that found pleasure in killing and saw it also a chance to become national heroes. Such Serbs were quite capable of interpreting propaganda calling for a preventive war against the potential return of the past as an open invitation for genocide.

The question remains whether Serbia can integrate into Europe while still bearing such a load. One should not forget that the beginning of European integration is not merely linked to the ingenious solution of economic and strategic differences between Germany and France in the form of the European Steel and Coal Community, but rather to the fact that in 1945, after nearly two centuries of warfare, French-German reconciliation started. Many Frenchmen and Germans could finally go to school and grow up together. A new conflict thus became inconceivable.

The question arises whether in our part of Europe the fear of atrocities committed in the early 1990’s can be revived, the way that cynical propaganda resurrected the worst memories of WW II.

Lamentably, sincere efforts to overcome the recent past are not very evident. It seems that this is more difficult to achieve than economic development and harmonization that everyone keeps talking about. Unless it relieves itself of the burdens of the past, Serbia and its neighbors will lack an important cultural component of true Europeanism. This should be taken into account also by those that believe that European integration is merely an economic issue independent of immeasurable and immaterial things. Economy was never only “economy”. Success or failure in that sphere greatly depends on cultural matrices and on the readiness to define political reality, a factor quintessential to good decision-making, even in the economic domain.

Translated from Serbian by Goran Kričković

PUBLIC OPINION IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO ON INTEGRATION INTO THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

After more than a half a century, public opinion is once again becoming the focus of interest for researchers on defence and security, as well as for political decision makers. Bear in mind that even in the nineteen thirties and forties, research on public opinion was directly related to issues of war and peace (Hartl : 2003). At the end of the old and beginning of the new millennium, we were faced once again with dramatic events: in Southeastern Europe, wars raged, and America, after being attacked on September 11, 2001 sought the help of its allies in its fight against terrorism. The post cold war and post communist world, with each new day, must deal with new security problems, and in this task, public opinion is often described as a strategic component. This requires additionally examining the established thesis according to which the democratic organization of a political system means, amongst other things, “that the gap between political decisions and public views is as small as possible”1. This, principally accurate assertion is based upon the supposition that political decisions are formed on the basis of previously understood and recognizable views of a well informed public. However, the aforementioned gap, even in the practice of developed democracies, is overcome by planned orchestration of the public in order to produce the “desired” views that are to justify previous decisions made, in a way that is indiscernible to the individual. Nevertheless, the amount of energy money and skill alone that is spent for this purpose shows the importance that the public has or could have in this multi-cultural, global, complex, and dangerous world of the XXI century.

For the research on public opinion in Serbia and Montenegro that the Centre for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) has been conducting since May 2003, whose results will be partially presented in this paper, there are additional reasons: the Army of the State Union, an organization having its origin in former Yugoslav Army, has enjoyed high public confidence for over a decade, and research has not been able to reveal the main reasons for this. Until now, there have been no attempts to investigate the extent to which the public is informed

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The announced and partially undertaken reforms of the Army of SCG additionally confirms the importance of researching public opinion, as it can point out to the political decision makers if not the instructions of the public, then at least give them an idea of the direction and to what extent the public is ready to support reforms. Being that reform of the Army, amongst other things, anticipates the security integration of SCG in the Euro-Atlantic community, it is very important to also measure the confidence in international institutions and organizations of the domestic public – a public that has been socialized for years under conditions of war conflicts and isolation from the international community, and to examine how widespread the support is for this integration. That is why these views of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens are actually presented in this paper, as well as their convictions directly related to actual controversial topics such as eventually dropping charges against members of NATO before the International Criminal Court in the Hague and participation of the SCG Army in international peacekeeping missions.

The central impression is that within a larger part of the population, a feeling of fear and insecurity still dominates. As an initial and maybe even dramatic illustration, we cite the result obtained in the first research round of CCMR, where in response to the question – “In your opinion, which country in the world is our best friend?” – almost one third of the citizens (29.3% of the respondents in Serbia and 28% in Montenegro) answered not even one. This feeling of fear is certainly not caused only by their feeling that is obvious from this result – that “we are alone in the world” and that “we don’t have any friends”. Citizens also are worried about other unfavorable situations – according to findings from the research that was conducted by the SEEDS Network (South East Europe Democracy Support Network)2 at the beginning of 2002, in Serbia, in response to the question “What are you presently afraid of the most” – the first answer was poverty, second, unemployment, and in third place was the poor political situation.

Perception of Threats

In the CCMR questionnaire, which was made in a way that gives the respondents a clear referential frame for topics of general security, the respondents were asked to answer the question – “What in your opinion threatens the security in our country the most?” – by choosing two answers at the most. According to the findings, citizens see the greatest threat in conflicts of multinational societies – in Kosovo and Metohija, in southern Serbia, in Sandzak and in Vojvodina. A certain difference can be seen in this response that reflects the situation in the member states of the State Union (Serbia 62.1%, Montenegro 47.9%)3, but there is a “relatively high level of public agreement in Serbia and

2 http://www.idea.int/balkans/survey.cfm
3 Results of the third research round are presented in: Glišić, J., Hadžić, M., Timotić, M., and Matić, J. (2004b), The Serbian and Montenegrin Public Military Reform, III Round
Montenegro on assessing security threats, which is important from the point of view of possible public support in defining joint principles of security policies. Answers such as organized crime (arms, people and drug trafficking...) – 33.5% (Serbia) and 28.1% (Montenegro) and economic and social conflicts and tensions – 31.1% (Serbia) and 25.1% (Montenegro) are chosen two times less. Theoretical discourse on whether the Yugoslav wars are finished or not, can also find a basis in public views, being that almost every tenth citizen of the State Union (12.3%, 9.9%) still sees the possibility of renewing wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia as one of two crucial security threats in the country. An interesting fact is also that 6.8% of the citizens in Serbia fear the possible split of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and in Montenegro, 15.3%. Finally, few citizens still feel threatened by the possible recurrence of the NATO and/or USA aggression – 10.1% (Serbia) and 6.3% (Montenegro).

Serbia, along with the Republic of Srpska and Macedonia, are a part of Southeastern Europe in which citizens fear other countries most, which was pointed out in the research conducted by the SEEDS Network. This is quite an intense fear (a feeling of intense and very powerful threats) and this from more countries than is the case with the rest of the states in the region: mostly from Albania (58%), Kosovo (45%) and USA (40%), but also from Croatia (19%), Great Britain (17%), Germany (13%), Turkey (13%) and the BiH Federation (10%). Two years later (January/February 2004), the research results of CCMR presented a very similar picture, although both studies weren’t of course comparable in every sense. The Serbian and Montenegrin public feels the greatest threat from Albania (62.6%), 56.2%) and USA (47.7%, 34.7%), and then from Croatia (26.7%, 13.6%) and Germany (14.9%, 12.6%).

According to public opinion, the USA does not present a danger only to our country. According to the results of the third research round of CCMR, in response to the question – “What most threatens security in the world?” – one of the two answers that the respondents chose the most was a US military intervention called a preventive war in 34% of the cases. These are only a few percent less than those who chose a much wider and indefinite source of threat to global security such as – conflicts over natural resources (oil, water, ores, etc...) – 32.9%. In Montenegro, the respondents see the general conflicts between the Christian and Muslim world as a more significant problem (I place 27.5%), and then conflicts between rich and poor countries (II place – 26.3%), but again, US policy of preventive wars was marked as a global security threat in a relatively high number of cases (22.1%). Although these convictions are based upon very recent memories of the bombing in 1999. It is useful to also bear in mind that in the last year, the positive image of America has been uncontrollably falling apart.

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5 Wherever there are two percents shown in parenthesis, this refers to findings for Serbia and Montenegro
6 In this project, there is no room for analysis of the differences between the results obtained in Serbia and in Montenegro. This would, as can be concluded based upon superficial insight, prove the significant between public opinion and publicly proclaimed political aims.
7 In this research, in all results shown, the formulation “country/territory” is used.
8 Amongst other things, the list of countries that the respondents were given was not the same, but they weren’t drastically different either.
also when referring to citizens of other countries, including its allies, which is a trend that has basically continued to this day\textsuperscript{9}.

What would contribute most to the security of our country? The research of CCMR confirmed that most citizens of Serbia (31.8%), but not the most in Montenegro strive for the orientation of turning toward the West and membership into the European Union. Surprisingly or not, the results of the third round clearly show that most respondents in the two member states gave priority to maintaining an independent position and relying on its own forces (25.1%), although the pro-Western orientation attracted almost one fifth polled (19.6%). In Serbia, 15% of the respondents and 13.4% in Montenegro who think in this way believe that membership in the Partnership for Peace is the best way to improve the security of the country. A correlation between the level of education of the respondents and the choice of orientation towards the West has been noted, therefore “the percent increases from 21% of the respondents with elementary school to 40% that have graduated from universities and junior colleges”\textsuperscript{10}.

**Skepticism Towards the Desired Partnership**

The majority of citizens positively responded to the direct question – “Should our country enter the Partnership for Peace program (PfP)” in all three rounds of the research of CCMR. In the third round in Serbia, 69.8% responded in this way, and in Montenegro, 54%, again showing a positive correlation with the level of education, especially in Serbia. However, this point of view does not only have one meaning. For the beginning, we will only point out the fact that considerably less people agreed with the given assertion that joining the Partnership for Peace program would be more beneficial to our country than harmful (50%, 37.4%).\textsuperscript{11} Almost one third of the citizens have an ambivalent standpoint on this issue (28.6%, 29%), and amongst the respondents that don’t agree with this standpoint (20.8%, 27.1%), there are more people who extremely oppose it.

It is difficult (and in this paper unnecessary) to discuss how the public assesses what is “beneficial” and what is “harmful” in a state that has difficulties in formulating its key positions and aims. An attempt to shed more light on part of the evaluation concerning Euro-Atlantic integration was performed through a set of questions used as an instrument for CCMR, unfortunately, not so detailed questions, being that the research was projected in such a way that it examined many public standpoints in Serbia and Montenegro on defence and military. The respondents were given different views of the roles that the “Partnership for Peace” program could play in the sense of further development of the country and its relation to neighboring and other states. According to the results, the number of those who “agree and disagree” with the assertions is indicative: the Partnership for Peace would considerably increase the expenses for the military

\textsuperscript{9} http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=175
\textsuperscript{11} Same, p. 72
(23%, 35.9%), the Partnership for Peace would increase the dependence on Western countries and threaten our national interests (31.2%, 28.3%) and the Partnership for Peace would guarantee long term peace in the country and surrounding countries (28.3%, 29.8%). This wide “gray”, neutral region within the public represents the possibility for a sudden change in direction, in the case of a turn of events, and the basis for this is probably a weak cognitive structure comprised of facts that are to a great extent insufficient or unreliable (more on this later in the paper).

Further review of the obtained results sheds more light on understanding “benefits”/“harm”. It appears that the public is especially concerned that joining the Partnership may be too costly; every second citizen in Serbia believes that this membership would increases military expenses, where this point of view is more widespread amongst the older population over 50 years of age. In Montenegro, naturally, they are less concerned with expenses of the military therefore one third of the population uses this as an explanation for their resistance towards the PfP. It is evident however that the citizens of both member states are not especially ready to invest in defence. In response to the question – “What would you first spend money on if you were to be in charge of the State budget?” – 16.2% in Serbia and 17.1% in Montenegro stated that this would be for advancing the military and defence of the country. This answer took fifth place, coming after health care, industry, school system, science, and agriculture (the order of the answers is different in Serbia and in Montenegro). This finding is confirmed by a majority opinion that military reform should be carried out, but currently there are more important things to be concerned about (51.9%, 42.2%). As priority tasks for military reform, citizens have set modernization of arms and equipment (59.7%, 41.7%) and professionalization (53.3%, 48.8%), which are projects that require providing extensive financial resources. It is clear from here why they are not too receptive to propagating urgent reforms.

The second negative aspect of the possible membership into the “Partnership for Peace” program is the danger that the citizens see in the increased dependence on the West which would threaten our national interests (36.7%, 41.1%), which is the view that is least represented in the highly educated part of the population, as well as amongst middle-aged generations. Once, the most favored object of geopolitical identification – the West (primarily referred to as Western Europe), has fallen very low on the list of group identification in the turbulent nineties of the last century, but at the beginning of 2000, the pro-Western orientation represents the dominant foreign policy preference of the citizens in Serbia and two thirds believe that the recovery of the economy and renewal of the country is only possible with assistance from abroad12. However, as for the defence sector, it seems as though the public would still like to preserve the (cold warlike) independence of the army and cannot so easily accept the new definition of relations with the “former” enemy. This can be seen by the decisive rejection of the idea that for military reform, assistance of foreign experts is needed: this assertion was rejected by 59.1% of the respondents in Serbia (even 45.8% express their view with maximal disagreement) and 55.1% in Montenegro (43.2% absolutely disagrees).

Despite all this, membership into the “Partnership for Peace” program has an advantage which is of special importance to a society with a recent past of conflict, a tense present and risky future: the opinion that SCG’s membership into this program would guarantee permanent peace in the country and neighboring countries is shared by 51.8% of the citizens in Serbia and 39.5% in Montenegro.

Along with the presented facts, it is no surprise that the final picture in which the relatively scant confidence of the Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in the PfP as an institution (program) represents an additional complication: every fifth (19.9%, 19.8%) respondent stated that they have confidence, and about a half (49.3%, 53%) does not have confidence! So, only about one fifth of the respondents (17.2%, 21.5%) were against joining this program and these results were confirmed in all three rounds of research.

It is possible to give a few explanations here. Firstly, it is evident that the figures that show the degree of confidence in the PfP and which appear disproportional in comparison with the readiness for this integration is not an absolute point of orientation for predicting other political views on this program, therefore not even the total support for integration. It is indicative to compare with other statements of those polled on the degree of confidence in certain local institutions and social systems: citizens of Serbia and Montenegro have less confidence in, for example, the judiciary system in the country (14.9%, 17.9%), and the governments of the member states have really fallen to “low levels” in the eyes of their citizens (8.1%, 18.4%). In contrast to this, it is worth taking into consideration that Serbian citizens have four times stronger confidence in the Defence Ministry (34.8%, only that in Montenegro the difference in comparison with the government is much less – 24.4%) and there is an admirable level of confidence in the SMAF General Staff (41.5%, 33.4%). From these two points, the public, for some time now, anticipates the official definition of the membership into the “Partnership for Peace” program “as a strategic and national interest, as well as the need for policies with no alternative, where there is general agreement but without any argumentation”13. It is logical, according to basic principles of persuasion, that the message sent by the source of confidence causes the recipient to take a positive attitude towards the aim of the proclaimed message.

However, this leads us toward the other part of the explanation for the contradictory results of weak confidence, on one side, and demonstrated aspirations for integration, on the other. In the research of CCMR it is shown that there are not enough elements given to the public in order to form firm judgments. The “gap” of the media frame most convincingly illustrates the fact that in the period between May 5 and 25, 2003, in “prime time” news programs of four TV stations in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the texts of four dailies and four weekly political magazines, “that affirmed official promotion of ‘joining euro-Atlantic integrations’”, which integrations were never explained to the public14. Analysis of self-assessment of the respondents on how informed they were, firstly, on issues of the military and defence (almost every fourth is mainly or completely

14 Ibid., p. 119
uninformed), and then their statements that there is not enough information in the media on the Partnership for Peace (45.1%, 45.3%) show that the public in essence is not able to cognitively base its opinions on security integration. This conclusion allows us to presume that a positive opinion on joining the PIP, as of now, does not have the consistency and steadiness that political decision makers (nor researchers) can rely on.

This supposition additionally justifies indicators that show that the pure proclamation of “Euro-Atlantic aims”, that are emitted by the heads of this government – cause a corresponding reaction in the public – declarative support. The responses of the citizens undoubtedly show that they absolutely are not in favor of taking on certain measures needed for achieving the proclaimed policies. Concretely, in the Serbian and Montenegrin public, the opinion dominates that war crime suspects should stand trial before domestic courts (74.2%, 54.4%), and the Hague Tribunal represents an institution that on the “scale of confidence” has received the lowest score (5.7%, 4.9%). NATO came in last place on this scale (4.3%, 3.2%), and according to the citizens, charges should not be dropped that were brought against its members for the aggression in 1999, before the International Tribunal in the Hague (73.3%, 65.2%). In 15-20% of the cases, the respondents would be prepared to revise their view and “approve” dropping the charges as long as it were a condition for entry into western alliances or if Croatia and BiH were to drop their charges against FRY for aggression and genocide.

**Serbia and Montenegro do not want to be in NATO**

However, the general position on joining the Alliance is not at all impressive – every other citizens opposes this idea (56.2%, 50.2%), and about every fourth accepts it (27.8%, 24.7%). It is interesting that in Serbia, resistance towards this possibility is more distinct amongst older generations (older than 50 years of age) while the situation in Montenegro is the opposite. An indirect indicator of their aversion towards NATO policies also represents the fact that the larger part of the Serbian and Montenegrin public does not want our army to be included in peacekeeping missions (48.6%, 43%), and even amongst those who support this option (34.8%, 31.2%), the absolute majority considers that our participation should be only in missions under the auspices and flag of the United Nations. Distinct mistrust and restrictiveness has, by all means, several basic results. First, research of CCMR has shown how poorly informed they are: more than half the respondents assessed that the medias did not give enough information on membership into NATO (57.8%, 51.7%), even more are dissatisfied with the representation of topics on military cooperation with the USA (65%, 59%), and information on issues related to peacekeeping missions is also not enough (57.8%, 54.4%).

However, despite all the necessary information that it (does not) receives, the Serbian and Montenegrin public is clearly against joining NATO. In Serbia, 56.2% of the citizens do not want membership into the pact and 50.2% in Montenegro, while every fourth person has a positive attitude towards this integration (27.8%, 24.7%). One fourth of the respondents in Montenegro (25.1%) should not be neglected that chose the answer I don’t know (fewer in Serbia – 16%), as this is the number that could completely change the “ratio of forces”.
In the end, in the poll, the view was expressed that there was not enough information on membership into the “Partnership for Peace” (45.2%, 45.3%), but the attitude towards this integration, nevertheless, was completely opposite.

The following tables concisely present the political-psychological “enigma” of the Serbian and Montenegrin public on integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. For its solution, for now, we can only offer parts of possible explanations.

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<th>Serbia %</th>
<th>Montenegro %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>54.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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**A. Should our country join the “Partnership for Peace”?**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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**B. Should our country become a member of NATO?**

The clearly distinct fear of citizens that live in a state with unstable borders and an uncertain expiration date, with part of its territory under an international protectorate and under the pressure of feeling threats from many countries, neighboring in a physical or symbolic sense, by all means causes a need to seek allies and establish cooperation. The “Partnership for Peace” program evidently appears in the public perception as an acceptable means of overcoming this state: analysis of the contents of the media within the research of CCMR did not reveal any significant attempt to threaten this idea of integration, nor to challenge it usefulness. Contradictions between high support of membership and little confidence in PfP seem even logical: from the highest political platforms, messages are emitted on how joining would be a great advantage and there are no emotional appeals on mutual brotherhood and friendship. Serbia and Montenegro are not ready to go further than this. Entry into NATO is a topic that politicians do not give much attention to, a topic that the media sets to the side, and that citizens do not initiate. Basic social consensus is based upon the difficult collective experience from 1999, widespread aversion towards foreign policy of the leader of the Alliance and the unclear idea of the advantage of this eventual integration. It is evident that NATO and the “Partnership for Peace” program are totally different entities in the eyes of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens. A drastic difference in the views on joining is followed by a noticeable disproportion in the amount of confidence it is given – the ratio is 1:5 to the advantage of PfP. Two facts crucially determine the actual pulse of the public: many people remain...
undecided on numerous issues examined by CCMR in this research, and, even more importantly, there is a bare minimum of information that reaches both the supporters and opponents. This public opinion is unstable and fragile, potentially dynamic and subject to situational factors and manipulation, and the prolonged state of cognitive dissonance can cause further strengthening of ambivalence, distrust, and fear.

Translated from Serbian by Theodora Pankovich

LITERATURE

Glišić, J., Hadžić, M., Timotić, M. i Matić, J. (2004a), Public Opinion of Serbia and Montenegro on Military Reform, II round
“Croatia in the Context of Southeastern Europe”, Public Opinion of Citizens from Countries of SE Europe, research available on the following internet address: www.idea.int/balkans/survey.cfm
Introduction

The wars in ex-Yugoslavia were waged in multiple forms. We may regard them as political or ethnic conflicts, as a war among neighbors, regions, as a civil war, or finally, as an international war. How should we study the war and which research method should we apply largely depends on the disciplinary division: are we political scientists, jurists, sociologists or anthropologists. However, to say that different methods imply different perspectives would not be wrong, but would be insufficient. Namely, different research practices not only discover new worlds, but create them as well. Methods have their consequences; they make the difference.

Hence, if the methods are performable, then we can no longer speak of different perspectives of the same reality, but of the creation and maintenance for different realities. Consequently no methods are innocent, they are always political, they “create”. The question is what, and which reality we wish to put forward or support, what should be included and what excluded. This question is central to the research and analysis of social memory. For, when we say memory we also say oblivion. These are two sides of one and the same process. The topic of this paper is war memories or more precisely the politics of war memories as seen in the example of the town of Vukovar.

Vukovar is interesting for our analysis for a couple of reasons. War crimes of awesome dimensions in the war in Croatia and the battle for this town lasted several months long leaving behind enormous material loss and “collateral” victims. Before the war, the town was inhabited by a relatively heterogeneous population in terms of ethnic origin, and thanks to the process of peaceful reintegration, this heterogeneity has been largely preserved.

The figures we are going to use have been compiled in the field research under the project *Perception of Justice and Social Reconstruction Processes*²,

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² Part of the Dio Communities in Crisis project, Center for Human Rights, University of California, Berkley, Association for psychological support, Zagreb Department of psychology, University in Zagreb
and during the work on the project *Social Correlates of War for the Homeland*. The field research included five visits, each a month long (June/July and November 2001, and March, July and November 2002) with a three-month pause in between.

The primary method of data compilation was observation with participation and semi-structured interviews; upgraded by the analysis of social networks, key informants’ interviews and other methods inherent in ethnographic studies. In total, 80 interviews were done, including with distinguished individuals from different spheres of social life (religion, politics, education, culture, civil scene, etc.). In addition, two focus groups were formed in high schools. One from among the students of the Croatian language, another from the classes in the Serbian language, and seven in-depth interviews with families, which mirrored different life stories and family histories.

**Context of the Area**

Vukovar is located in the easternmost of Croatia on the river Danube. On the eve of the onset of armed conflicts in 1991, Vukovar was inhabited by some 44,000 people, of whom 47.2% Croats, 32.3% Serbs and 9.8% Yugoslavs, and somewhat lesser number of other groups. Before the nineties, Vukovar was one of the industrial and cultural centers of the region, invoking several key associations: first, local companies and their products; second, the nearby archeological find of Vučedol, from the third millennium B.C., where a jar was excavated and named the Dove of Vučedol; thirdly, the old baroque city center and the castle of the Earl Eltz, and fourthly, the Second congress of the Communist Party held there in 1920. Today, its history is overshadowed by the war operations of the early nineties – the ruined factory walls as remnants of local companies, the Dove of Vučedol got a new meaning and the Second congress is no longer mentioned.

3 The project has been ongoing since 2003 at the Department of sociology, University in Zagreb, under the leadership of Prof. dr. Ozren Žunec.

4 Wertheimer-Baletić, Alica, Population of Vukovar and the Vukovar surroundings, Zagreb, Globus, 1993. Here it should be noted that the data of 1991 were often disputed among the members of the Serbian community in Croatia, above all in Vukovar, as at the time (March/April 1991) there was quite a bit of tension between ethnic communities. But, our concern in using the census data is of another kind: They significantly contribute to the national state of affairs where the communities are presented as autonomous, easily recognizable and mutually exclusive. The position that the identities can be represented by the data from the census neglects their fluid character. Thus, the categories of the census are not only administrative tools, but form and create social reality so that the national state of affairs is seen as natural. Cf.: Campbell, David, Apartheid Cartography, Political Geography, vol.19, 1999, p.395-435; Malkki, Liisa H., National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees; in: Gupta, Akhil - Ferguson, James (eds.), Culture, Power, Place. Exploration in critical anthropology, Durham & London, Duke University Press, 1997; Gellner, Ernest, Nations and nationalism, Zagreb, Political culture, 1998.
The onset of the armed conflict in those parts was marked by the murder of twelve Croatian policemen in the nearby Borovo village, 2 May 1991. Between August and November, the town was completely embattled and during the three months around 7,000 missiles poured in on average daily basis. This destroyed 80–85% of the buildings and facilities. The town was defended by 1,300 to 1,800 combatants of whom the majority were ordinary citizens just the day before. The Yugoslav National Army Forces engaged in the siege, counted at the time numbered around 45,000. Approximately 450-600 Croatian soldiers were killed defending the city, some 1,100 civilians, and after its fall around 2,600 people were missing. On the other hand, YNA had far more casualties, however no exact data have been published to this day. After the fall of the city, the Croatian nationals were expelled, most men were taken to concentration camps, and the wounded killed in hospital. The fall of Vukovar, the 18th and 19th of November 1991, was declared as the liberation on the Serbian side and kept being particularly celebrated in Vukovar until 1995, when the process of peacefull reintegration of eastern Slavonia was started with progressive Croatian rule. According to the most recent census Vukovar had in March 2001 31,670 inhabitants, of it 18,199 (57.46%) were Croats and 10,412 (32.88%) Serbs.

Today the list of the missing persons still includes some 600 individuals of Croatian nationality, and the mass grave with 200 bodies on Ovčara, several kilometers away from the town remains the largest mass grave in Croatia. Due to this vast human suffering, newly uncovered mass graves changed the countryside and the people, and as the sight of such war devastation at each and every step, we may definitively call Vukovar, in all fairness, the city of memories. Memories differ from individual to individual and between Serbs and Croats, old and young and the residents and newcomers to Vukovar. The relations among different memories, the comprehension of space and time and also different representations of the past assume here the form of the struggle for confession and focus on the public domain. In the discussion that follows we will accentuate the struggles for the placement of particular memories into

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6 Croatian estimates are that JNA lost 50 tanks, 250 infantry combat vehicles and armoured transporters, two cannon squadrons, some hundred vehicles, 29 airplanes and one chopper while between 6,000 and 8,000 troops lost their lives (Žunec, 1998). An interesting survey of responses by military dignitaries of JNA to the publication of similar data by the retired Croatian general Antun Tus may be found in the article: Sikavica, Stipe, Dead warriors lost in the political nebula, AIM, Beograd, 23.11.1997, www.aimpress.org.
7 Even at the time of the most fierce fights a significant number of civilians of Serbian nationality remained in the town, who were evacuated by JNA after the fall/liberation, and in larger numbers they started returning only in early 1992. At the time of Krajina, they were called derogatory names “Cellar people”.
the center of the cultura; world, while putting the rest on the margin and forgetting.

But prior to that, it is worth uncovering the location of Vukovar within the national state of affairs, because the national narrative has exerted influence on the shaping of the memories of the local population.

**Mapping of Vukovar**

In her analysis of the war literature Grozdana Cvitan observed that Vukovar is the "topic beyond reach", because the number of titles published and symbolism threaten to overshadow all the literature published on the theme of war in the Slavonia region. And not only in the region. Namely, Vukovar came out of Croatia “at the peak of suffering, turning even into a principle,” as one book points out.10 Thanks to the tragic war events, Vukovar got elevated above other areas and turned into the central point of the Croatian national identity. On various occasions, Vukovar was called a phenomenon, pride, hell or the Croatian knight, while notions like the “spirituality of Vukovar” and “Vukovar ethics” that emerged,11 became integral, if not an imperative, part of the Croatian national narrative. It became part of the political discourse, both at the parliamentary level and in daily debates, Vukovar serves as a “final argument” pushing the discus-
sants into a corner and forcing apologies. Vukovar has thus become omnipresent. Having acquired an extremely lofty place in the symbolic repertoire of the Croatian state. It experienced the institutional propagation exerted by the state, culture, industry and the media. Vast numbers — and they are difficult to grasp — of published memoirs, poems and testimonies, written either by victims, war-
rors or journalist is nor the only area of representation. A memorial medal, awarded to the defendants is named after Vukovar. The town and its new sym-
bol the Dove of Vučedol, are represented on a Croatian banknotes and special editions of silver and gold coins, and till today almost all the cities in Croatia devoted one of their main streets to it. In the same vein, Vukovar is the only place in Croatia whose war victims are commemorated at the level of the state by the deci-
sion of the Parliament, which declared the 18th of November as the Commemoration day of the Vukovar victims," paying tribute to all the defenders of Vukovar, a town-symbol of Croatian freedom.”12

All the enumerated events, connected to those of 1991, show how Vukovar is represented in the public narrative. Vukovar is here a place frozen in the war period and it is almost no town at all any longer. It turned into a part of the official national remembrance where its complexity is reduced to an abstract conflict.

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10 Cvitan, Grozdana, War and books, Vijenac, Zagreb, No. 97
11 The phrase “Vukovar ethics” was used for example by Ivan Rogić et al. in the book “Deportation and return: Psychosocial and developmental determinants of exile and the possibility of return for Croatian expellees.”, Zagreb, SysPrint, 1995, but for the fact that the citi-
zens of Vukovar are viewed in moral categories is testified to by the sports award Vukovarac of the Croatian association of sports journalists, awarded to the athletes for humanitarian activ-
ity and cooperation with the media. Similar terms may be found in: Jurčević, Josip (ed.), Vukovar ’91: meaning, values, identity, Zagreb, Institute of social sciences Ivo Pilar, 2000.
The reduction went so far in some cases that the real inhabitants people got almost completely lost; in 1993 and 1994 proposals surfaced and were seriously considered by the Croatian public not to rebuild Vukovar. Instead they wanted to fence it in with wire and have it serve as a museum. Thus, if the inhabitants, due to the war operations, were evacuated from Vukovar, than those processes made Vukovar evacuated by its inhabitants. It turned into a part of the collective national memory, and a person from Vukovar nothing more than a man-Vukovar.

Processes of abstraction and reduction unveil to us here a phenomenon of another sort or another level, and that is the “territorialization of memory” or creation of the “memorial places”, as Pierre Nora put it. As the products of the desire to be remembered and at the same time forgotten, the memorial places serve as a sort of external memory deprived of the vigor and strength, which the memories, as part of ourselves, used to have. On the one hand they serve as a barrier against the acceleration of history and insurance against oblivion, and on the other they contract time periods and gather the events around the meaning of which and differing circumstance tend to be forgotten as time goes by. Hence, the memorial places exist due to the fact that the memories are no longer a real part of the daily experience or at least the desire to stop being it.

Separation of memories and linking them to a certain locality, their localization, contribute to the stabilization of identity, and construct the order that helps to stabilize identity and make an order which enables one to “put the past behind”. In that way, war is attributed an exact geographic and social place that is almost regularly there, rather than here. Thus, for instance the facilities of the concentration camps of Stajićevo and Begejci, in Serbia were razed and the inhabitants of the nearby village of Begejci decided at the local referendum held in the year 2000 to change its name into Torak, which prompts oblivion and propagates the attitude that the war was “somewhere else”.

Thus, the memorial places are historical places created by means of separation and classification. They evolved as a product and expression of stabilization that make them a significant portion of the social order. On the other hand, as a pure opposition to the memorial place, Nora points to the memorial regions or anthropological places, as Marc Augé called them. Their inhabitant does not create history, he lives it. Those are the areas where the past and present simultaneously exist, and memories are absolute and spontaneous. Hence we may say that the space compared to the place of memories is the same as the event compared to the experience in Walter Benjamin, or a victims experience compared to theory as we see from the witness in Derida (Jacques Derrida).

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13 Smith, Anthony D., Culture, community and territory: the politics of ethnicity and nationalism, in: International Affairs, Sv. 72, no. 3, 1996, p. 445-458
15 “Putting the past behind” is a frequent recommendation of foreign diplomats and buzz phrase of the organizations dealing with reconciliation and reconstruction of the post-war communities. The problem with that concept lies in the fact that overcoming of traumatizing events is presented as a voluntary act, rather than a long-term process with uncertain outcome.
16 Augé, Marc, Non-places. Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, London, Verso, 2000
If Vukovar today represents in Croatia the place of remembrance and a significant portion of the Croatian national identity, the question is what is “the space of memories,” what brings the order under question to the greatest extent. Our thesis is that the very inhabitant of Vukovar is the one residing in the space of memories, and that the very man-Vukovar is that subversive element.

**Politics of War Memories**

1. The Croatian Collective Memory

It has often been said that refugees have nothing but collective memory. But this statement is not quite true. No doubt that refugees most often possess nothing but mere life, but we are not discussing that here. Namely, the question is to what extent those memories are also their memories. The inhabitants of Vukovar not only were deprived of their homes and private property, but due to traumatic war experiences, they were left without any solid support in the real world. Due to a compelling need to find the meaning, and also due to a dispersed population, the influence of the national narrative on individual memories and even more on the construction of collective local memories, has been considerable. Since the natural environment was destroyed to a large extent, and the group no longer exists in its original organic whole, individual memories of the Vukovarites, the fragments of former collective memories remained non harmonized and vague. As the horizontal links of the former community have been weakened or destroyed, the new situation became characterized by the dominance of the vertical relations and moreover with a direct, immediate contact with the central government. Despite the fact that influence was bilateral, the connection between the central government and “rootless” people is primarily the link of dependence and control.19 In such circumstances individual or common war experiences were shared to a smaller extent and communicated at the horizontal level, and that is the fundamental precondition for any memory that pretends to become collective. Only with the mediation of the central government did the local collective memory got formulated, which was structured by the national narratives and in which the defense of own home became the defense of the Republic of Croatia. So Petar, a middle aged defense fighter, a

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19 More about it in: Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 1998. Biopolitics practices on refugee population can be seen in the series of examples of real territorial strategy, such as the regeneration process by which a private home becomes at the same time the national home. Still, the most extreme example of biopolitics in Croatia is the placement of the Bosnian Croats into Serb flats and houses in the areas liberated in the military/police campaigns Bjesak and Oluja. Those campaigns of the central Croatian government were cloaked by the humanitarian principles of providing a home. There are hints that, due to reduced return of the expelled Croats to Vukovar, similar plans were developed for Vukovar, too (Đilas, Milivoj, Recorded minutes of the talk between Franjo Tuđman and Jure Radić about changing the ethnic image of Vukovar, in: Feral Tribune, No. 766, of 20 May 2000, p.6/7).
Croat from Vukovar, says: “Everyone defended his house, and the stories about
Croatism are the stories made up by boot-lickers.”

Further according to the same principle, human casualties started to acquire
an implicit meaning of sacrifices for the homeland, not a painful and meaning-
less loss. And the very symbol of the victim, characteristic of religious and
national narratives, are the most frequent in the articulations of local Croatian
memory. If we analyze monuments in Vukovar, it becomes obvious that most
of the monuments built by the Croatian agencies after the peaceful reintegration
were in the form of a cross. The cross, unlike sculpture, commemorates neither
bravery or heroism of the victims, rather the victim itself. In this case not a
futile sacrifice, but a sacrifice for the homeland, as shown by the presence of
state flags, inscriptions like “To the victims for freedom of Croatia” or the cross-
es ornate with national symbols, such as the state coats of arms or the “early
Croatian three-strand pattern”.

Photo 1. Memorial cross to the “Victims for Croatian Freedom”

Thus, the traumatic experience that skillfully escapes the possibility for
understanding has been enabled and imbued with a certain sense by these very
standardized national narratives. Therefore, the collective memory of the
Vukovarites and official articulations of primarily mythical character, however
are not testimony of false memories, rather as Liisa Malkki underscored, in the
fundamental, cosmological sense, it concerns order. In this sense, a neighbor is
primarily a traitor, and limits between friends and enemies are clear and unbridge-
able. The memories of the friends from another ethnic community remained sup-
pressed, not articulated and reduced to the circulation within the family, provid-

20 Proust, Antoine, Monuments to the Dead, in: Nora, Pierre (ed.), Realms of memory:
21 Malkki, Lisa H., Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and the National Cosmology
Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995
ed that even that private sphere had not been permeated by negative politics. These are the memories focused on the fall of the town, life in the concentration camps and victims in the mass graves.

2. Serbian Collective Memory

Similar processes of formation of collective memory were developing in the local Serb population, too. During the Republic of Serbian Krajina (1991-1995) the dominant and official memories were those of the citizens who joined the Yugoslav Army and participated in the attack against the town. So, the national narratives are in question, the narratives in which the 18th of November was called and celebrated as liberation day. The predominant understanding of the conflict was the interpretation within the terms of civil war where the local Serb population had to defend their lives from the Croatian state. The explicitly underscored time period within the official narratives was spring and summer of 1991, before a massive attack was launched on the town, where the mines blasted certain Serbian houses and cafes on the eve of the more massive attack of the town so that there were planted mines under the given Serb houses and cafes and quite a number of Serbian nationals who disappeared. On the other hand, memories of many Serbs who remained in the town and experienced devastations together with Croats, residing in cellars or city shelters were not quite represented in the official memory. There are no memories of people living under the constant threat of grenades or memories of forced evacuation after the “liberation” of the town. In the same vein, the crimes against Croats were suppressed or negated. So, for instance, a person of Serbian nationality, who was politically active in Krajina, denied the identities of the bodies of the shot patients from the Vukovar hospital buried in the mass grave “Ovčara” despite the DNA analysis of the dead. He is convinced those were the bodies the Croats buried before the town fell.

“When we were burying the bodies lying all over the town after the town-fell, we did not know there was yet another mass grave. And then sometime in 1994 it was decided to move that part, to ridicule the Croats when they came to dig out and find nothing. That part was relocated nearer to the town, but I don’t know where exactly.”

Since the Republic of Serbian Krajina existed for five years only, and existed in a state of emergency of neither peace nor war, the state of exception, the only permanent expression of collective memory was the Memorial park of the fallen military. But, it also supports the fact that the military memories were the

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22 We may ask ourselves here whether the dominance of the concept of inter-state war in the Croatian narrative, or the concept of civil war in the narrative is an attempt to ensure for oneself the status of a victim in advance. (Žunec, Ozren, Beginning of the war in Croatia: Some controversial issues, unpublished work).


24 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 1998
dominant ones, because only the Vukovar Serbs fallen in the battle for Vukovar at the side of JNA were buried at the memorial park. Similarly to the Croatian narrative, the fundamental symbol here is that of the victim. But, in this case the victim-warrior is exemplified by the shape on the upper part of the tombstone which was made to look like a Serb military cap.  

Photo 2. The Serbian military memorial park

Memories and Counter-Memories

The citizens of Vukovar lived divided along national lines and in separate worlds between 1991 and 1998, when the mandate of the transitional administration UNTAES ended. They had different war experiences, lived in different living conditions, under different educational, economic and political systems and in ethnically homogenous areas. After reintegration, the citizens started sharing the same area but not the same war. What used to be remembrance became counter resemblance and commemorations turned into counter commemorations. The questions about who was the right victim and what time period was more important became topical again, but this time the fight was waged not only along the vertical but on the horizontal level as well. The process of negotiation and fragmentation was largely replaced by the process of accentuation and marginal-

235

That understanding of victim is no surprising if we have in mind that in “mythical history” links were established and continuities built between the Austrian Military Krajina and the Krajina and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It is quite evident for instance in: Paspalj, Mile, Album from Krajina, Sarajevo, Javnost, 1996, cyr. or in: Dakić, Mile, Srpska Krajina: Istorijski temelji i nastanak (Serbian Krajina: Historical Foundations and Emergence), Knin, Iskra – Information agency of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, 1994, cyr.

ization of that struggle between different memories of the two ethnic communities.

The early years after reintegration have been marked by location of mass graves and exhumation of the buried, the citizens being faced again with the Other, and the refugees rediscovering their time and place. Regarding postponement of the future or living in the present historical terms, as Malki put it, fifty-year-old Zlata, a Croat lady returnee comments:

“I feel as if eleven years have become empty, as if I am short these years and as if I didn’t experience those eleven years. As if everything stopped in ’91. And now since I’ve returned, I expected to continue from that ’91 on. However, everything changed so much, nothing went on from that ’91, but from 2002. And this is a problem. Only now have I realized that I’ve lived as I lived and that those were war years. Till now I thought it was a void walk, but no, I lived all those eleven years.

The world implodes once more, and the categories with firm limits between friends and enemies, the clarity of which seemed unquestionable before, are slowly re-questioned. An elderly Croatian lady described her cognitive dilemma on her return to Vukovar in the following way:

“Well, all the Croats keep saying about them this or that and each of us has its own Serb. Be he the neighbor or the distant relative of whom we shall always say he is straight, and we guarantee that he is okay. At the end of the day, it turns out that they are all fine. How come?”

But, despite the fact that the order was shaken, the attempts to deal with the past were mainly halted. With the change of the central governments in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, the two countries have been making a “pact of silence”, where memories have been trodden by the forces of economic normalization, and at the local level dealing with the past mingles with the requests for cultural autonomy and the narrative about the rights of national minorities. As a result, parallel and separate institutions have evolved, like local radio stations, cultural institutions, non-governmental organizations, kindergartens, sports clubs and segregated classes in schools. The creation of separate agencies for articulation of memories prevented learning the experience of another group and strengthened collective memories and a moratorium on learning the recent history27 left the younger generation open to their influences.

Although certain changes occurred in both communities, polarization and direct confrontation among ethnic groups has survived till this day in the town life. Looking through that prism, it is interesting to note the change in the appearance of the Serb military memorial park. Following several incidents, when the tombstones were broken, the Serbian local political and religious leaders decided

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27 Moratorium on history teaching at school, concerning former Yugoslavia and its constitutive Republics in the period 1989 to 1997 took five years, since school year 1997/98 to 2002/03, and has been approved based on the agreement of the Croatian Government and administration UNTAES (“Decision of moratorium of teaching history of former Yugoslavia”, Herald of the Ministry of education and sports of the Republic of Croatia, year. I, no. 8, of 7 October 1997).
to put up new tombstones, but this time without the Serbian military cap. That change signifies at the same time the act of transformation of victims: from warriors’ who lost their to those who lost their lives for no reason. But, those victims are still the only Serbian victims that are officially recognized. Hence, the dominant and to the greatest extent, officially promoted memories by the Serbian political parties and religious leaders continue to be directly opposite to the Croatian. Crimes against Croats are still silenced, and that is why those memories constitute an extension, although in an altered version, of the official memories formulated at the time of Krajina. Actually, only those memories could be called at all collective memories, because not only are they common, but shared, communicated and harmonized. The memories of the “cellar people” irrespective of being nowadays, perhaps, individually higher in number, remained deprived of their agencies for articulation and hence not worded in the collective narratives, and not formulated in the collective accounts. Those are the memories short of any sense and therefore constitute a certain threat both for the Croatian national narratives as exclusive victims, and for the Serbian narratives of necessary self-defense.

Contradictions of those feelings and attempts to locate a meaning could be illustrated by a series of examples. Thus, Sara, a Serb whose father was killed during the siege of Vukovar, hit by a shell, said:

“It was still Yugoslavia, the military intervened. Politically it was called an insurrection in one Republic, I have no idea what was it, and I would never destroy my own town and I didn’t want to go when I saw it like that, because its wounds were painful for me. And nowadays, nobody asks us the Serbs how we survived the war, what consequences do we carry with us. Personally, I was born near the downtown, and it was painful when I saw the Workers House, the whole city destroyed. […] Then you take things from one house to the next to survive, because you have nothing. Your flat is empty and you have nothing to sleep on. Well I don’t know if that was burglary or not, but when you must do it to survive I think this is another thing. Because the military, the Chetniks or whatever you want to call them were looking for gold only, jewelry and such things. There were others, though, robbers, but not me. I took only what I needed for survival and later, when my Croat neighbors came back, I returned it.”

Kafa, a Serb woman, around fifty, testifies how the memories of the “cellar people” were under-represented:

“My daughter and I left Vukovar on 7 September ’91. We survived both the first raid and those big grenades, shells, whatever the name. I persisted in not leaving, but they told me: “Well, what are you doing here with a child”, because she was only seven. And only when I became terribly afraid did I leave. All our neighbors were in one cellar and all stuck together. Croats, Serbs and Ruthenians. We went to our family in Serbia with nylon bags, but my mother stayed behind and experienced Golgotha, like the others. I think the inhabitants of Vukovar went through the greatest tragedy one can imagine and when such a tragedy is manipulated, it is quite bad. I lived to see that the peo-
people who were in the cellars were named ‘cellar people’, so it looks as if they were there out of pleasure. These are terrible things. Well, this is how they escaped the war; they were called this in Krajina... I’ve counted in my neighborhood 20 civilian casualties from the grenades. Terrible things people went through. And then they laugh at you how you survived. The people from Vukovar went through many sorts of humiliation and Vukovar will hardly ever be what it was. [...] Talking of the Vukovar casualties, it must be stressed, and for the first time in a broadcasting by Dr. Bosanac, who said that Serbs were also the victims in Vukovar. Civilians, yes, but still victims. It was the first time I’ve heard it, and it is true. It will come to the light because it is impossible that only the Croats were dying.”

Today, such memories of the Serbs and similar ones of the Croats are in-between Croatian and Serbian official memories and the question remains whose agencies will be the first to step in that area. The memories of that particular category of people are individual but not few in number and will therefore considerably transform the collective memory if they decide to include them into their narratives.

**Conclusion**

It seems we are exposed to a paradox in dealing with the past. On the one hand, we insist on the individualization of crime, and on the other we explain the events from the perspective of national history. Here the proposal of accepting the individual approach and study of family histories seems more than desirable.

Because, as we discussed above, by territorialization of memories at the national level we are building the order which “leaves the past behind” in such a manner as to localize it and thereby ensure an exact geographical and social place. But, the question about those who become captives in the space of memories of such processes remains open. In such a space national narratives do not have the same stabilizing and organizational strengths as in the national arena. The external reality and memories of particular categories of people, like mixed marriages, “cellar people” and others, bring the basic principles of the social order into question. The resolution doesn’t lie so much in structuring the new categories of memories, but rather an individual approach. We need new methods for it or as Law and Urry formulated, a decentralization of discipline. Hence the opening of perspectives of different worlds is much more needed than strategy building.

\[
\text{You want a fresh start!!!} \\
\text{You have no job, you see no perspective,} \\
\text{you want to start your life anew (in Australia, Canada...).} \\
\text{Contact Agency} \\
\text{Text of an advertisement at the market place in Vukovar (November 2003)}
\]

Translated from Serbian by Smiljana Kijurina

\[28\text{Law, John – Urry, John, Enacting the Social, 2002}\]
ABOUT CENTRE

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239


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