PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRITY BUILDING IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Katarina Đokić

Vladimir Erceg
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRITY BUILDING IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Katarina Đokić         Vladimir Erceg

Belgrade
August 2014
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRITY BUILDING IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Publisher
Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku
Đure Jakšića 6/5, Beograd
Tel: 011 3287 226
Email: office@bezbednost.org
Web: www.bezbednost.org

Authors
Katarina Đokić i Vladimir Erceg

Editor
Predrag Petrović

Design and layout
Marko Marinković

Printing
UNAGRAF

Copies
500

ISBN
978-86-6237-095-2

This publication is made possible by the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the "Civil Society Forward" program, implemented by the Institute for Sustainable Communities. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISC, USAID or the United States Government.

COBISS.SR-ID 209441292
Contents

Introduction 8

The National Assembly’s Oversight of the Security Sector 9

Obstacles to effective oversight 11

Issues with legal framework 11

Reporting to committees is not systematic and comprehensive 12

Application of special investigative measures in the work of the MoI/ CID without oversight 16

Committees hardly achieve continuity from one parliament to another 19

Too wide definition of powers and responsibilities of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs 20

Weaknesses noted in conducting direct oversight of security services 22

Other instruments of parliamentary oversight remain unused 23

Problems in practice 25

Government’s dominance over the National Assembly 25

Regular reports do not provide the MPs with all the necessary information 27

Passiveness of the MPs and passiveness of the opposition 30

Culture of discretion – “cherishing non-transparency” 32

Information leaks 35

MPs are insufficiently prepared and competent and without support in their work 36

Establishment of good practice: Committee for Control of Security Services 39

Recommendations for establishment of effective oversight 44

Sources 46

PARTNERSHIP FOR INTEGRITY IN SECURITY SECTOR 51

About the Project 51

About the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 52

About the Authors 54
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABPK</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCBP</td>
<td>Belgrade Centre for Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCSP</td>
<td>Belgrade Centre for Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Produce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Security Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRI</td>
<td>State Audit Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>General service inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GŠ</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Defence Inspectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNOB</td>
<td>Defence Sector Public Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUP</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>Defence and security sector procurement subject to the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVO</td>
<td>Arms and military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKSB</td>
<td>Security Service Control Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOUUP</td>
<td>Defence and Internal Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverenik</td>
<td>Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PU</td>
<td>Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republic of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAD</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBPOK</td>
<td>Organised Crime Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNB</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUKP</td>
<td>Internal Affairs Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJN</td>
<td>Public Procurement Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKP</td>
<td>Criminal Force Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBA</td>
<td>Military Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGC</td>
<td>Military Construction Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZJN</td>
<td>Law on Public Procurement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Integrity building in security institutions implies existence of effective external oversight, conducted by the National Assembly, independent state bodies\(^1\), judiciary, media and civil society. Since it is particularly characteristic of the security institutions that some aspects of their work are not available to the public, the responsibility of the institutional actors who oversee them is quite high. Due to this the improvement of work of oversight institutions is of paramount importance for effective external oversight and achievement of general objectives of the security institutions.

Out of all the enlisted institutional actors who are tasked with oversight of the security institutions, the National Assembly was the one that was most poorly assessed in 2012.\(^2\) It is, however, clear that the Parliament is an essential oversight actor that cannot be avoided for several reasons. The control function is one of the basic functions of the Parliament which should contribute to the greater accountability of the executive power institutions. Given that the Parliament is the body that is directly elected, the parliamentary oversight should also contribute to the increased legitimacy of the institutions. The parliamentary oversight is done primarily through the working bodies, committees specialized in oversight of specific institutions, or in implementation of specific policies, which ensures that the oversight is systemic and continuous.

This research is focusing on the role of the Parliament in the oversight of those aspects of the security institutions’ work where the corruption risks are particularly prominent: budgeting and management of finance, public procurements, material resources management, human resources management, application of special procedures and measures for secret intelligence gathering. The initial overview of the Parliament’s activities in this area indicates that the Parliament, as an external oversight actor, is yet to get involved effectively in the fight against corruption and integrity building in the security institutions. In the previous Parliament (2012-2014) there were some improvements; for the first time ever the State Audit Institution’s report on annual financial report of a security service was discussed in the Parliament. However, the general impression is that the oversight has not been established yet in the aspects of security institutions’ work where there is the

---

1 The independent state bodies who at the moment oversee the security sector institutions are: State Audit Institution, Anti-Corruption Agency, the Ombudsman (Protector of Citizens), Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, Commissioner for Protection of Equality, Public Procurement Administration and Republic Commission for Protection of Rights in Public Procurement Procedures.

most prominent corruption risk; furthermore, the MPs failed to react to a number of affairs that over the past years indicated that there were examples of systemic corruption in some security institutions.

In this paper we will provide an overview of the mechanisms that the Parliament has at its disposal in control and oversight of the security institutions and we will assess to which extent those mechanisms have been used so far, especially in the areas which are in the focus of our interest. The central part of the analysis aims at indicating at the problems which hinder effective parliamentary oversight. Finally, we will analyze an example of good practice, i.e. of an improvement which was noted during the oversight by the Committee for Control of Security Services; this will be done in order to establish which factors could contribute to the improvement of parliamentary oversight and a more active role of the Parliament in integrity building in the security sector. It also needs to be underlined that in the further text when we talk about the Committee for Control of Security Services we will refer to the one from 2012-2014 Parliament; the same applies to the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs.

The National Assembly’s Oversight of the Security Sector

The main part of parliamentary oversight of the security sector institutions is done through the responsible committees – the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs (CDIA) and the Committee for Control of Security Services (CCSS). Both committees have the authority to consider regular reports from the institutions they oversee – the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, i.e. the security and intelligence services. Apart from these two committees, we need to mention the Committee for Finance, State Budget and Control of Public Resources, which is, among other things, in charge of controlling the execution of the state budget and appropriate financial plans in the aspects of lawfulness, purposefulness and efficiency in the use of public resources. The MPs, regardless of their membership in these committees, can get informed on the work of the institutions through MPs’ questions, as well as through requesting information and explanations. In case of events that indicate systemic corruption, the National Assembly has the possibility to establish temporary working bodies, investigative committees and commissions, in order to get an overview of the situation in a certain area and to establish the facts on certain phenomena and events. The MPs have another instrument to serve similar purpose – MPs’ questions on the current issue, when any caucus can propose a current topic and ask the line minister or other responsible official to
come and answer the questions on this specific topic in a designated parliamentary session.

The Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs was not particularly proactive: between July 2012 and February 2014 there were 17 sessions, and the agenda was often limited to adopting the laws on ratification of international agreements. There was only one thematic session. On only one occasion were the regular reports of the Ministry of Interior discussed, whereas the regular reports of the Ministry of Defence were not discussed at all. This committee also never discussed the proposed budgets of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, the Committee for Control of Security Services held 20 sessions by the end of 2013; the decisions were adopted to govern the sessions in which confidential data were discussed, as well as the oversight visits to the security services. This committee regularly discussed reports submitted by the services, the report of the Inspector General for the military security services, the State Audit Institution’s report on the review of annual financial report of the Security and Intelligence Agency. It also conducted oversight visits to all the security services. The Committee for Finance, State Budget and Control of Public Resources has not been particularly involved in control of utilization of resources in specific institutions, including the security institutions. In 2012-2014 Parliament, this Committee was dedicated to the legislative tasks. Given the wide scope of responsibilities of the Committee and the expected intensive legislative activities in the area of finance, it is doubtful whether it would be able to get involved in the oversight of the security institutions in the upcoming period.

The ongoing activities in the security institutions have never been a topic that featured in the MPs’ questions within the current issues, nor did the investigative committees or commissions focused on it. In the previous Parliament (2012-2014), the MPs had only 19 questions for the security institutions, which is only 2.3% of the total of 832 MPs’ questions. During the same timeframe there was only one investigative committee established.

---

3 14th session of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs was held together with the Committee for Control of Security Services on 13 November 2013. Both committees invited the representatives of the following institutions to attend: Ministry of Interior (MoI), Security and Intelligence Agency, Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency. The representatives of the MoI and the security services informed the members of the committee on the activities of the extremist sports fans groups and extremist organizations at the territory of the Republic of Serbia.


5 Investigative committee to establish the facts on the utilization of the Republic of Serbia’s budget resources at the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija between 2000 and 2012.
Obstacles to effective oversight

Issues with legal framework

Despite the improvements made over the past few years, the prerogatives of the control and oversight of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (NARS) of the security sector institutions are still not sufficient, and the existing ones are not consistently utilized in our legal framework. On one hand the control prerogatives refer to specific powers that the National Assembly has regarding the control and oversight of the security sector institutions, and on the other they refer to the responsibilities these institutions have towards the National Assembly.

Although there was a gradual improvement over the past eight years in the legal framework in this area, it was incomplete and unsystematic, which created gaps that prevented the National Assembly from fully performing its control function, which further created the space for corruptive and unjustifiable actions within the security sector institutions.

Efficiency of the oversight performed by the parliamentary committees depends largely on the authorities and powers they have. As it has already been underlined, these responsibilities and powers are defined through the legal enactments that govern the work of the National Assembly, but also of the state institutions whose work the committees oversee. Apart from the Law on the National Assembly, the responsibilities and powers of the parliament have been defined in principle in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, whereas the Standing Rules and Procedures further specify those powers and responsibilities and define the procedure for their implementation. Whether the Parliament would effectively control and oversee the security sector institutions or it would do so only figuratively, depends largely on the quality of provisions of the legal enactments.

In further text we will analyze the most problematic points of the legal framework for the implementation of parliamentary control and oversight and we will offer the solutions. Since many legal framework problems cause the problems in practice in this area, we would like to underline that the classification used in this paper – legal framework problems and practice problems – is only conditional and is based more on the focus on the problems causes, rather than their precise and final definition.

---

Reporting to committees is not systematic and comprehensive

Consistency of responsibilities when it comes to the reporting to the parliamentary committees would contribute to the committee members’ clearer picture of situation in the security institutions, whereas extension of this reporting responsibility to other actors would improve the control of security institutions.

Majority of relevant actors from the security sector are legally obliged to report to the Parliament and its relevant committees about their work. What is most often criticized in regulations that govern this reporting is the incoherence of the legislation, different treatment of equally important actors, and the fact that some actors are left out of the reporting process. A particular problem lies in the fact that the regulations do not prescribe what type of information the reports must contain.

Regarding the incoherence of regulations, one of the examples is the provision of the Standing Rules and Procedures which envisages that the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs considers “the activity report of the ministry in charge of internal affairs on the security situation in the Republic of Serbia, submitted to the National Assembly at its request”.

According to this provision, it is not clear whether this is one report or two – one on the activities of the ministry and the other one on the security situation. In the section of the Standing Rules and Procedures that governs the Government’s reporting on its work to the Parliament, another provision defines that the minister informs the relevant committee on the work of the ministry once in three months. Both of these (incoherent) provisions of the Standing Rules and Procedures are inconsistent with the provision of the Law on Police which defines the duty of the minister to report to the National Assembly once a year, and not by the Parliament’s request, as stipulated in the Standing Rules and Procedures. Reporting of the Security and Intelligence agency was more sensibly divided into Activity report and the report on security situation in the Republic of Serbia, both submitted twice a year. According to the Standing Rules and Procedures, the Ministry of Defence is due to report once in three months, but there is no such provision in the Law on Defence. Such an inconsistency and different obligations of the actors from this sector lead to the situation in which the Ministry of Defence is submitting the report on its work every three months, the Security and Intelligence Agency two bi-annual reports and the Ministry of Interior...
one very extensive annual report.\textsuperscript{12} Even at the first glance it is clear that some of these solutions are not aligned with the size and the significance of these institutions. The practice of reporting should be resolved in a systematic way. It would be desirable to introduce the same rules of reporting and clear distinction between the types of reports. The time schedule for submission of the reports is also something to pay attention to, in order to avoid the committees having too many reports on their agenda in a very short timeframe, which could affect the thoroughness of their consideration.

Among the security sector institutions there are several very important bodies which should also be obliged to report to the National Assembly. One of the aspects that has been emphasized is the problematic position of the Head of Bureau for Coordination of Security Services\textsuperscript{13}, as well as the lack of oversight of this body. The powers and responsibilities of the Committee for Control of Security Services fully justify the obligation to be introduced for the Bureau to report to the Committee. Besides, it would be justified to envisage the participation of the Committee Chair in the Bureau’s sessions. When it comes to the National Security Council, the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs should be familiar with its work, if not participate or be represented in its sessions. It would make sense if the CDIA was familiar with the reports of the Defence Inspectorate, which are already submitted to the President of the Republic and to the Minister of Defence. Furthermore, based on the risks identified by the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection\textsuperscript{14}, it is obvious that there is a need to introduce additional mechanism for control of security services and their work. It is necessary to establish the practice of reporting to the CCS on the records of requests for access to electronic data\textsuperscript{15}; this is in order to strengthen the oversight of application of measures of security services’ access to the data retained by the

\textsuperscript{12} At the session of the CDIA on 12 December 2012 two three-monthly reports on the MoI’s work (April-September 2012) were considered at the same time. This indicates that the provisions of the Standing Rules and Procedures are applied in practice, and not of the Law on Police.

\textsuperscript{13} This function was introduced in 2007 in the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services and by establishment of the National Security Council. The Secretary of the Council also acts as a Head of the Bureau for Coordination of Security Services, and until 2012 this was by default a Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic of Serbia. After the amendments to the Law were adopted in June 2012, the Secretary of the Council is appointed by the President of the Republic of Serbia. Aleksandar Vucic, a Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister at the time, was appointed in 2012 as Secretary of the National Security Council (and at the same time a Head of the Bureau for Coordination of Security Services). After the new Government was formed in 2014 and after Aleksandar Vucic became the Prime Minister, he remained at the post of the coordinator of security services. Such a practice implies serious concentration of power in one figure from the top level of the executive; since the new Government was formed this has meant that the laws and the principle of division and balance of power have been breached. In case of coordination of security services this balance should be ensured through the National Security Council as the body which is under the leadership of the President of the Republic.

\textsuperscript{14} 14 proposals of Šabić and Janković for personal data protection.

\textsuperscript{15} According to the Law on Electronic Communications, Art. 130a.
Furthermore, the committees should pay particular attention to the situation regarding protection and safety of data in electronic communication network of the operators, as well as the data retained by the operators. The existing practice indicates that the oversight in this area has been completely neglected. When we take into consideration that the safety of electronic data is one of the greatest security challenges in the world, it is hard to justify the failure to introduce the oversight in this area as well.

Table 1: Reports of the state security sector actors to the National Assembly and its relevant committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State body</th>
<th>Report</th>
<th>How often?</th>
<th>Who is considering it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Activity report from previous year</td>
<td>Not later than 60 days before adopting the final balance account of the budget</td>
<td>NARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and its members</td>
<td>Activity report</td>
<td>Upon the NARS request</td>
<td>NARS or its responsible committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>Report on the Ministry’s activities and the security situation in the RS</td>
<td>Once a year, or more often at the NARS’ request or when needed</td>
<td>CDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mol</td>
<td>Report on the issues that fall under the responsibility of the CDIA</td>
<td>At the CDIA’s request</td>
<td>CDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence activity report</td>
<td>Three-monthly during the sitting</td>
<td>CDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry in charge of foreign trade</td>
<td>Report on foreign trade of controlled goods</td>
<td>Annual report</td>
<td>NARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Report on export and import of dual use goods</td>
<td>Annual report submitted to the NARS</td>
<td>NARS – without deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Report on the implementation of the annual plan of the use of the Armed Forces and other defence forces in the international operations</td>
<td>Annual report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Intelligence Agency (BIA)</td>
<td>Report on the Agency’s activities / Report on the Agency’s activities and security situation in the RS</td>
<td>Regular report once during the sitting; additional reports at the request of responsible committee</td>
<td>CCSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Operator is a legal term for a person who performs or is authorized to perform electronic communications. (Law on Electronic Communications, Art. 4. Para. 1. Item 30)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Report on the Agency’s activities</th>
<th>Regular report once during the sitting; additional reports at the request of responsible committee</th>
<th>CCSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Security Agency (VBA)</td>
<td>Report on the Agency’s activities</td>
<td>Regular report once during the sitting; additional reports at the request of responsible committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Agency (VOA)</td>
<td>Report on the Agency’s activities</td>
<td>Regular report once during the sitting; additional reports at the request of responsible committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Report on the control of GI</td>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>CCSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Activity report on enforcement and control of enforcement of the Law on Data Confidentiality</td>
<td>Annual report</td>
<td>CDIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


c. Law on Police, Ar. 9; Standing Rules and Procedures of NARS, Art. 49. Para. 1. Item 8.

d. Law on Police, Ar. 9;


g. Law on Security and Intelligence Agency, Art. 17.


Additional weakness in the reporting practice is the lack of a direct communication and reporting channel in all important control bodies within the security institutions the National Assembly and its responsible committees. The possibility to approach the National Assembly directly is envisaged in the Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency; Inspector General for the agencies, the head of internal control and individual members of the agencies can approach the National Assembly. Introducing the practice of reporting (even if it is not regular, but at the request of a committee) to the internal control bodies and the possibility of their direct approach to the National Assembly, would significantly improve the autonomy of the internal control bodies and increase the integrity of security institutions’ work.

Apart from the activities of the actors, another aspect that should be strengthened is the oversight role of the Parliament in the areas such as import and export of weapons, military equipment and dual-use goods. The current Law on Foreign Trade of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods from 2005 envisages

---

17 The situation in the MoI is particularly problematic, since its Internal Affairs Sector controls the work of more than 40,000 police officers and it is entirely accountable only to the minister.

that the Government (Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro) adopts the annual report on the foreign trade of controlled goods; the report is prepared by the ministry in charge of foreign trade which informs the Assembly (Serbia and Montenegro). The proposed law on export and import of weapons and military equipment, which is currently in the parliamentary procedure, is to a certain extent more specific: it envisages that the Government would send the report to the Assembly after first adopting it. However, the new law should go even further and stipulate explicitly that the Assembly should consider and discuss this report. The Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly should clearly resolve the potential dilemma on which committee is responsible for oversight of foreign trade in weapons, military equipment and dual-use goods. The most sensible solution is the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs, since it already has responsibility to debate the issues regarding the trade and transport of weapons, i.e. armament and military equipment.

The committees should also monitor the progress that the security institutions achieve in fight against corruption and in implementation of their integrity plans. The achieved and planned progress in this area should be subject to dedicated reports or dedicated chapters within regular activity reports.

**Application of special investigative measures in the work of the MoI/ CID without oversight**

*Extending the committee’s oversight responsibilities to the application of special investigative techniques in the work of the MoI/ CID would ensure a more complete oversight in this area.*

Due to rapid technological development and increased availability of the technologies for secret surveillance of electronic communications, it has never been more justified to control the lawfulness of the work of security services. On the other hand, along with the oversight it is necessary to maintain the efficiency of the services in order to enable them to achieve their tasks and objectives. Due to nature of the task they perform, especially when special procedures and measures for secret intelligence gathering are applied, it is not defensible to insist on full transparency of the security services’ work. Non-transparent work increases the possibility for abuse and it makes the possibility of detecting irregularities much

---

19 Law on Foreign Trade in Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods, Art. 28. Para. 3.
21 Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly of the RS, Art. 49. Para. 1. Item 1.
22 Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly of the RS, Art. 49. Para. 1. Item 2.
more difficult. Therefore the judicial control and parliamentary oversight are crucial for preserving the legality and the purposefulness of the services’ work. The Committee for Control of Security Services was established for this reason, and its members have the right of access to confidential data regarding their oversight and control function\(^{23}\). However, apart from the security services, the Crime Investigation Directorate of the Ministry of Interior also applies the measures that encroach on privacy of citizens. The Committee does not oversee the legality of application of these measures, although the Standing Rules and Procedures give that right in principle\(^{24}\). It is our belief that the Committee did not oversee the measures applied by the CID due to unclear responsibilities and competences of the two committees. The Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs controls and oversees the work of the MoI, but the Committee for Control of Security Services is in charge of overseeing the legality of application of special measures and procedures for secret intelligence gathering. This has led to the situation that even the MPs who are more familiar with the issue are uncertain which committee should be in charge of overseeing these measures as applied by the MoI\(^{25}\). Additional confusion is caused by the different terms that are used in legal documents to denote the procedures and measures which encroach on the inherent civic rights\(^{26}\). Such a semantic inconsistency should certainly be removed from the future amended laws, so that the control mechanisms can have the same and unambiguous interpretation of those measures and procedures\(^{27}\).

There is no need to elaborate on the need to extend the oversight to the CID as well. It would be sufficient to look at the following fact: according to the report of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, between June 2011 and June 2012 the state bodies had over 270,000 accesses to the retained data related to the activities of electronic communication users, and this with only one out of six operators. By far the largest number of requests for access to the data was submitted by the MoI\(^{28}\). Non-existing oversight of these measures contributes to the increased possibility for corruptive or illegal activities. The specialists in this domain

---

23 Law on Data Confidentiality Art. 39.
24 Standing Rules and Procedures of the NARS, Art. 66. Para. 1. Item 4: “The Committee) oversees the legality of application of special procedures and measures of secret intelligence gathering”.
25 Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
26 See Table 2.
27 One of possible solutions can be putting all the measures and procedures that encroach on privacy of citizens under one term, e.g. as it was done in the Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency – “special procedures and measures for secret intelligence gathering”. We believe that the simplest and most accurate term would be “special measures”.
say that the adopted Amendments to the Law on Electronic Communication\textsuperscript{29} create preconditions to have efficient dual record keeping of accesses – both with the services (including the CID) and the operators; these records could be made available to the oversight and control bodies, which would be a concrete measure that would significantly improve the safety in this domain\textsuperscript{30}.

A comprehensive parliamentary oversight in this area is also needed because the Parliament not only oversees the application of special measures from the perspective of protection of citizens’ rights, but also from the perspective of increased efficiency of institutions which apply these measures. Unjustified tapping or secret surveillance requires the engagement of people and equipment that could be used otherwise, and all these expenses fall on the tax payers. This issue should certainly be resolved in all the laws that govern the application of these measures by the security institutions.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Legislation} & \textbf{Term} & \textbf{Note} \\
\hline
Law on Security and Intelligence Agency (2003), Art. 13 & (special) Measures that deviate from the inviolability of secrecy of correspondence and other forms of communication & The most dated piece of legislation, the measures in question are least specified. \\
\hline
Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency (2007), Art. 12 & Special procedures and measures of secret intelligence gathering from within the responsibility of the Military Security Agency & Wider category than the measures which deviate from the principles of inviolability of secrecy of correspondence and other forms of communication. All measures are specified. \\
\hline
Criminal Procedure Code (2011) & Secret surveillance of communication; Secret surveillance and recording & Within special evidence-gathering measures. \\
\hline
Law on Police & Special investigative techniques & Techniques specified in the law that governs the criminal procedure. \\
\hline
Legislation establishing SSIM & Special investigative methods & Including conventional and electronic surveillance. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Different terms for secret intelligence gathering measures that deviate from the guaranteed citizens’ rights}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{29} Amendments to the Law on Electronic Communications, adopted in June 2014.
\textsuperscript{30} Conclusions from the expert consultations “Partnership for integrity in security sector”, held at Fruska gora from 9-11 July 2014.
Committees hardly achieve continuity from one parliament to another

Introducing the possibility for the committees to adopt bye-laws that would stay in force from one parliament to another would facilitate the process of internal organization and strengthen the authority and continuity of the work of the parliamentary committees.

According to the members of both committees, the work of the committees is somewhat hindered by the fact that neither the law nor the Standing Rules and Procedures envisage the possibility to adopt internal bye-laws that would permanently govern their work and define the procedures for performing the tasks from their area of competence. The members of the committee have to manage with the existing powers and competences that are not always adequate in order to establish some form of internal organization. The Committee for Control of Security Services within 2012 parliament established an internal working group that had the task to develop a form of SOP that would regulate direct oversight of security services. The SOP has been developed, but it has been adopted in the form of the Committee’s decision, which is according to its members, not practical solution and its duration is unknown, given that each new committee has to adopt that decision again if they still want to enforce it. By adopting permanent internal by-laws the committees would be able to clearly regulate certain procedures they undertake in order to fulfil their responsibilities – e.g. in the areas of handling confidential data, conducting oversight visits, conducting joint sessions in which the confidential data are discussed, etc. Given that the members of the committees change every time the new parliament is elected, such a practice would certainly facilitate the work of every new committee, it would save time and strengthen the authority and the power of the committee.

---

31 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP. Interview with Miomir Stojanović, an MP.
32 Members of the Committee for Control of Security Services at the second session in 2014 (held on 12 June 2014), voted again on these decisions.
33 E.g. “Committee’s Standing Rules and Procedures”
Too wide definition of powers and responsibilities of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs

More precise definition of the powers and responsibilities of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs would raise the level of activity of the committee and the quality of oversight it performs.

By the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006), apart from other powers and responsibilities, the National Assembly has a clearly defined responsibility to conduct control and oversight of the security services. The Law on the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2010) defines four equal functions of the National Assembly: legislative, representative, control and elective. The Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly from 2010 split the Defence and Security Committee into two – Committee for Control of Security Services and Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs. This much needed change revealed all the weaknesses of the regulations, and the effects of the change indicate to which extent the precision of the legal provisions could influence the fulfilment of the purpose of the given institution. Namely, the old Committee had very wide scope of responsibilities; it covered all the issues from the field of security, which in practice often resulted in lack of focus or inertia in the Committee's work. Control of the security services was under the responsibility of this Committee, but the approach was formalistic and extremely superficial. The Defence and Security Committee visited the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency only twice in 2009, and not for the oversight purpose, but to get familiar with

Predicative of the responsibilities of the CCSS and CDIA as stipulated by the Standing Rules and Procedures of the NARS, as an illustration of level of precision in defining the responsibilities *indicated in the brackets how many times the predicative has been used

CCSS:
- oversees (5)*
- considers (4)
- adopts (1)
- initiates (1)
- proposes (2)
- informs (1)
- establishes facts (1)
- adopts conclusions (1)
- reports (1)
- performs other tasks in line with the law and these Standing Rules and Procedures

OOUP:
- considers (31)
- controls (1)
- performs other tasks in line with the law and these Standing Rules and Procedures

---

35 For some reason the legislator put the responsibilities of the committee over the security services under the legislative function, whereas the oversight of the Government is under the control function. This is, in our opinion, more a formal rather than a fundamental inconsistency, but certainly the one that should be amended in the law.
36 Interview with a source close to the CCSS (2).
the agencies’ work. The Committee also delayed the discussions on the reports submitted by the security services. After the new Standing Rules and Procedures were adopted, the responsibilities of these committees were more precisely defined. Still, when it comes to the scope of work, the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs was de facto successor of the old Defence and Security Committee and it continued with weak results in oversight of the institutions under its responsibility. Unlike the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs, the Committee for Control of Security Services had very significant results compared to previous practice, which can partly be due to more precise definitions of its responsibilities and tasks. This is additionally corroborated by a comment of one of the Committee’s associates, who said that the efficiency of the sessions is definitely related to the fact that all the MPs have many responsibilities. The provisions of the Standing Rules and Procedures clearly illustrate the said difference between the two committees: the CDIA considers the proposed laws in the area of defence, other issues related to the Armed Forces, as well as the issues of public safety and state security. This concept leaves the Committee with the possibility to consider a vast numbers of significant issues, but on the other hand, they do not lead the members of the Committee towards concrete solutions that could be used in consideration of the said issues, which often leaves them without such solutions. Furthermore, the CDIA does not have an explicit responsibility to control utilization of financial resources. On the other hand, the Committee for Control of Security Services considers the reports and proposed laws, regulations and budget proposals, initiates and proposes the laws from within the area of security services’ competence, oversees the legality of utilization of resources and oversees the implementation of political neutrality policy, establishes the facts on the irregularities in the work of services and adopts conclusions on this matter, etc. Precisely defined responsibilities of the Committee for Control of Security Services (CCSS) facilitate the work of the Committee members in a way that their responsibilities that they need to fulfil during the sessions are much more specific. We believe that this distinction, along with all the other favourable factors during the 9th elected NARS, made the CCSS much more operational and efficient than its “older brother” – the CDIA.

37 It is important to emphasize here that the activeness of the committee and the exercise of given powers and responsibilities are also under strong influence of the personality of the committee chair, the political parties composition of the committee and the expert support to their work.

38 Interview with a person close to the CCSS (2).

Weaknesses noted in conducting direct oversight of security services

In order to have the procedure of direct oversight become a really effective control instrument, certain norms and regulations that govern it need to be changed.

Direct oversight is governed by the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services. The law obliges the directors of the services to allow to the members of the committee, at the Committee's request, the access to the official premises, and insight in the documents, to provide information on the service's activities and answer their questions. Enforcement of this in practice is of paramount importance because it enables the committee members to have a much more concrete contact with the service's work, thus a greater degree of control of the service's work. However, as it is the case with reporting, it is not sufficient that there is a practice in place in order to have effective oversight; it is also important to look into the nature of that practice. The members of the Committee for Control of Security Services in the 9th elected parliament adopted the decision which governs direct oversight. However, in spite of this achievement, there are still visible problems in conducting such an oversight.

The CCSS' decision on the way in which direct oversight would be conducted did not establish how the delegation would be selected for the oversight visit and there is no obligation to include the committee members from the opposition parties. This obligation should be introduced in order to improve the credibility of the oversight visits.

The Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services has some problematic provisions that are imposing limitations to the MPs during their oversight visits in the form of ban to ask for the data on: a) methods of obtaining intelligence and security data; b) method in which special procedures and measures are applied; c) data and information obtained through the exchange with the foreign services and international organizations. According to these provisions, the members of the CCSS are, among other things, denied the possibility to gain insight in how the operational work is done. It is not clear why the confidentiality of the operational work methods is more important than the confidentiality of all the other data available to the committee members, especially given that the greatest risk of abuse of power lies in the operational work methods. Although knowledge of operational work methods is not necessary for exercising parliamentary control, the

42 It is important to note here that the access to the operational work methods does not mean access to the ongoing operations or to the information on the persons who are related to the operational work of the service (Ibid, Art. 19. Para. 2. Item 5)
members of the CCSS should definitely have the possibility to see whether there are control mechanisms and procedures that reduce the possibility of abuse in the operational work. The provisions that were mentioned deny the committee members such right. Furthermore, it does not make sense that the data and information obtained through exchange with foreign services and international organizations are treated differently than the data obtained through the national services. Those provisions of the law should be reviewed and if necessary specified in a way which would protect a legitimate interest of operational and safe work of the services, and at the same time enable realistic insight in implementation of this significant oversight and control mechanism.

It is necessary to define the procedure of random selection of cases from the services’ archives. As testified by the Committee members who participated in oversight visits\textsuperscript{43}, the case in which the legality of the procedures would be checked was selected from among the cases available in the archive. Such a method of selection reduced the effectiveness of this measure to a certain degree, since it would be hypothetically possible to physically remove dubious cases from the archive. In order to reduce the abuse to minimum, the committee members should select the cases exclusively by the number under which they were recorded.

Other instruments of parliamentary oversight remain unused

By improving and precisely defining the instruments for control of the Government’s work, their efficiency can be improved and the control role of the parliament strengthened.

The MPs have a wide spectrum of available instruments to question the work of security institutions and formulate the recommendations on how to improve their work at the level of laws and policies. A large portion of these instruments is not being sufficiently used, but there are obvious problems in how the instruments are regulated.

MPs’ QUESTIONS: The right to ask MPs’ questions us one of the fundamental rights that the MPs have at their disposal for control of the Government’s work\textsuperscript{44}. The MPs’ questions can be asked in a day designated for that purpose, in writing and by seeking information or explanation. The MPs also have the possibility to ask questions to specific Government members on the current issues. Each of these

\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Jadranka Joksimovic, an MP.
\textsuperscript{44} Law on the National Assembly, Art. 56. Para. 2.
mechanisms of MPs’ questions has its weaknesses, which make them a less powerful instrument of control than they should be.

Every last Thursday of a month, during the ongoing session, the regular work on the agenda is suspended between 4PM and 7PM and the members of the Government come to the Parliament to answer the MPs’ questions. According to the records, in average one third of the Government members do not attend these sessions, there is no mechanism to regulate their presence and even in the Standing Rules and Procedures there is no explicitly stated obligation to participate. Furthermore, their absence is not explained, which is also hard to justify. A major weakness in the procedure stipulated in the Standing Rules and Procedures lies in the obligation to have these sessions only on the last Thursday in a month (during a regular sitting of the parliament), “at the ongoing session”45. Such an inflexible provision means that the MPs and the Government members may not meet if there is no session scheduled on that Thursday. The practice showed that this used to happen and some MPs objected because of the issue. If it would be defined that the day for the MPs’ questions is the last day of the month in which the parliament is sitting, this would ensure presence of the Government members in front of MPs once a month. Another significant problem is the lack of provision in the Standing Rules and Procedures which would set the time limit for the Government member’s speech. It used to happen that some ministers take so much time in providing their answers that they prevent any further questions. The lack of this provision is difficult to understand given that the provision that governs answers to the MPs’ questions on the current issues strictly limits the time for the Government members’ answer to five minutes46.

When the MPs’ questions are submitted in writing, there is the problem of obtaining the answer. The Government is obliged to answer the MPs’ questions47, but the existing legislation does not envisage any accountability if the answer is not provided. Around 40% of MPs’ questions remain unanswered. It is necessary to explicitly prescribe the obligation of the state institutions to answer the MPs’ questions and envisage the sanctions or other measures in case there is no answer.

PUBLIC HEARINGS: Public hearings are organized in order to obtain information and expert opinion on the laws in procedure, but also with the aim to fulfil the control function of the National Assembly.48 However, the Standing Rules and Procedures do not set any expectations form the public hearings. There is no obligation

of the members of the committee which is organizing a public hearing to attend\textsuperscript{49}, nor is there the obligation of the committee to subsequently consider the report from the public hearing. In practice this has meant that some public hearings resembled “talk shops” – the events that are almost always without any concrete results. In that sense one can hardly hold it against the CCSS and the CDIA for not having any public hearings during the previous parliament. By introducing the obligation to consider the report from the public hearing at the following session of the committee, the significance of this instrument would be increased and it would lead to having the conclusions at the end of every hearing.

INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEES: Numerous affairs in the security institutions gave reason in the past to establish an investigative committee which would systematically question the irregularities in the work of the institutions and it could offer the recommendations for resolving those irregularities. However, this did not happen nor was the possibility even mentioned. This is above all the issue of common practice and the lack of will among the MPs to obtain answers related to the topics that are significant for security. Partly, the problem is also in the fact that this instrument has not been defined precisely enough. The Standing Rules and Procedures do not explicitly stipulate how many MPs it takes to initiate establishment of an investigative committee or an investigative commission\textsuperscript{50}.

**Problems in practice**

**Government’s dominance over the National Assembly**

The National Assembly is the supreme representative body and the pillar of constitutional and legislative power in the Republic of Serbia. The National Assembly elects the Government and oversees its work. The Government is accountable to the National Assembly for the policies and politics of the Republic of Serbia, for enforcement of the laws and other general enactments of the National Assembly and for the work of the state administration bodies.\textsuperscript{51} From these provisions of the Serbian Constitution it is clear what the position of the Government is in relation to the National Assembly as the most supreme body of sovereignty in the state.

In practice the National Assembly does not give the impression of an institution of such an authority. Majority of the public and a number of MPs agree with this

---

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, Art. 83. and 84.

\textsuperscript{50} Standing Rules and Procedures of the NARS, Art. 68. and 69.

\textsuperscript{51} Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 98; Art. 99. Para. 2. Item 1; Art. 124.
statement. A former member of the Security and Defence Committee and of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs believes that the work of the committees is not serious enough in its essence and that it is reduced to mere fulfilment of the obligations which all come down to adoption of the laws and reports. An MP is autonomous in his/her work, but the system is set in a way that the MP would not get what he/she asks for in an adequate way. He/she is not expected to ask relevant questions", said our interviewee. Others from the Parliament say that there is little more that the committees could do within their control function than considering the reports and occasionally reacting to the current events. The passiveness of the opposition MPs in the previous parliament indicates that they do not see the parliament as the space where they could get political points. Such a practice has survived even after the direct live streaming of all the committees sessions. The problem of the MPs’ passiveness is one side of the coin which explains the perception of the domination of the executive power over the legislative.

On the other hand, the behaviour of the executive power towards the institution of the parliament reveals the lack of accountability towards the National Assembly and the space for informal influence on the MPs. The ministers often fail to participate when invited to the committee sessions, they do not all show up on the day designated for the MPs questions, they prevent the questions to be asked, despite being formally present, by leaving the room several times during the session, or they do not fully answer the questions. The security institutions that the Parliament should oversee hesitate to share confidential data with the authorized members of the relevant committees. Many big affairs remain without public

In case of information on confidential procurements, there is again the conflict between the need to protect the data on sensitive procurements, the release of which could jeopardize security, and the need to prevent unjustified procurements and abuse. There are examples of procurement where confidentiality could in no way be justified. Often goods, works and services that are not of a sensitive kind or whose protection could be achieved in another way, are included in these types of procurements.

52 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.
53 Conclusion from the expert consultations “Partnership for integrity in the security sector” held in Fruska gora from 9-11 July 2014.
54 Source: NARS. In average, every time one third of the total number of ministers miss the sessions.
55 E.g. Minister of Defence left the MPs questions session on 29 May 2014, which can be seen in the transcript of the session available at this webpage: http://goo.gl/SbUrXO
56 40% of questions submitted in writing remain unanswered, Erceg, Poslanička pitanja, 29.
57 Jadranka Joksimovic, an MP, pointed out in an interview that the services were afraid to share the information with the members of the Committee, but that this situation was improved by holding the sessions that were closed for the public.
58 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.
reactions of the MPs. When the newspapers were writing for months about the corrup-
tion at the top levels of the police, the responsible committee never considered
asking the Minister for a special report on this issue. When the President of the
Republic twice said that his communication was tapped, none of the MPs asked
the directors of the security agencies, relevant ministers or the Head of Bureau for
Coordination of Security Services to explain how that would be even possible and
who is responsible. If we accept an impression that one of our interviewees shared,
that there is a serious coordination among the party leaders and the prominent
MPs who are mostly members of important committees, such as CCSS and CDIA,
one may ask oneself whether the MPs are suggested not to create the fuss in such
situations. For the National Assembly to reach the status in practice that is envis-
aged in the Constitution, it is necessary for a start to strengthen and improve the
procedures for fulfilling the control function, as well as to provide sufficient train-
ing and education to the MPs on how to use them.

**Regular reports do not provide the MPs with all the necessary information**

One of basic instruments of oversight of security institutions is consideration of
regular reports that the line ministers and directors of services submit to the re-
sponsible committees. In practice, consideration of regular reports does not enable
effective oversight of implementation of anti-corruption policies and measures, for
two reasons. Firstly, neither the laws on the security institutions nor the bye-laws
nor the Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly, define which are-
as should be covered by those reports, i.e. what data they should provide. Secondly,
there is still no established practice of regular consideration of the reports – this
primarily refers to the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs.

In practice, regular reports of the Ministry of Defence do not contain complete in-
formation on management of human and material resources: namely, the reports
do not contain the data on property sales or leases, or the data on calls for ap-
lications for vacant posts and disciplinary procedures. The Ministry of Interior's
reports do not contain the information on how the budget was utilized, on public
procurements or management of human and material resources. Furthermore, the
Ministry of Interior's reports do not contain the data on the number of special
evidence-gathering measures (according to the CPC) applied during the report-
ning period. This can be explained to a certain extent by the fact that the MoI's
reports to the responsible committee have not been clearly defined, which was
discussed above. When it comes to the regular reports of the security services, they

---

59  Response of the Ministry of Defence to the questionnaire sent by BCSP on 5 March 2014.
60  Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP. Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
do not contain the information on confidential procurements, which participate significantly in the total amount of resources available to the procurement departments, but the MPs have the possibility to ask the directors of the services at the sessions in which their reports are being considered. Regular reports of the services contain the number of special procedures and measures for secret intelligence gathering applied during the reporting period, but regular reports of the services do not present the statistics on the access to the data retained by the operators.

After the CCSS was established as a separate committee there has been a timely consideration of regular reports of the security services; at the same time the practice of the CDIA in 2012-2014 parliament was quite different. In only one out of 17 sessions did the CDIA consider regular three-monthly reports of the MoI (two at the same time). Regular reports of the Ministry of Defence were not considered at all, although the MoD regularly sent the reports to the committee. Based on the interviews with the MPs, as well as based on the statements that could be heard in the Committee session, the impression is that the members of the CDIA blame the ministers for not having considered the reports, given that they did not respond to the invitation to come to the session of the committee and present the report. We have to take into consideration a specific position of those ministers in the previous Government: Minister of Interior was at the same time the Prime Minister, whereas the Minister of Defence until 2013 was at the same time First Deputy Prime Minister and coordinator of security services. Thus the ministers could use only a portion of their time to do the job and had an excuse of being too busy to come to the sessions of the Committee. The question remains whether the Committee should have considered the reports even without the ministers present. The Standing Rules and Procedures stipulate that the CDIA considers the report of the Ministry of Defence “which is submitted three-monthly by the Minister to the Committee, during the sitting of the National Assembly”; on the other hand, it is not explicitly said that the MoI’s report to the Committee should be submitted by the Minister in person. This leads to the conclusion that the regulations do not stipulate rigidly that the minister’s presence is necessary for the report to be considered. In case that the minister does not come to Committee session, the Committee should certainly make the absence public and criticize it, but at the same time there should be a possibility for one of the assistant ministers or state secretaries to present the report in lieu of the minister in question. This could be regulated

61 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
62 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
63 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
64 Response of the Ministry of Defence to the questionnaire sent by the BCSP on 5 March 2014.
65 Notes from the 13th session of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs.
66 Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly of RS, Art. 49. Para 1. Item.
based on the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services, which stipulates that in case the director of the security service could not attend the session, he/she is obliged to send his/her deputy or another authorized official. The way in which the regular reports are considered is one of the areas that could be regulated in more detail through internal bye-laws (e.g. decisions) of the committee.

It also needs to be mentioned here that apart from the regular reports, the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs has the authority to request from the MoI extraordinary reports from the scope of its responsibility. The Committee can also ask the Minister of Interior to submit the report on the work of the Internal Affairs Sector. In the previous parliament, the CDIA did not consider any extraordinary reports of the MoI.

Finally, apart from the MoD’s and MoI’s reports, the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs could also consider annual reports of the ministry in charge of foreign trade of weapons, military equipment and dual-use goods. So far those reports were submitted to the National Assembly with a significant delay: the 2011 report was submitted to the NA in June 2013; the 2010 report in April 2012, and the 2009 report in June 2011. Since the Law on Foreign Trade in Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods (2005) came into force, not a single annual report on foreign trade of controlled goods was considered in the sessions of the committees in charge of defence and internal affairs.

Weak and not clearly defined reporting prevents the MPs from getting the insight in those aspects of work of institutions in which there is the highest risk of corruption and abuse. Without information the MPs cannot conduct effective oversight, and given that very often it is the case of confidential information, the MPs do not have other channels to obtain them. The MPs’ questions as the only remaining instrument to obtain the information proved in practice as insufficient – the analysis of the BCSP showed that the MPs relatively rarely ask questions, and the institutions have limited capacities to answer the MPs’ questions. In that regard, it is necessary to strengthen the instrument of consideration of regular reports through a more precise definition of what they should contain and making it mandatory for the committees to consider those reports in the set timeframe.

67 Law on Police, Art. 9.
68 Law on Police, Art. 179.
69 National Assembly. Response to questionnaire of the BCSP, 30 April 2014.
70 National Assembly. Response to questionnaire of the BCSP, 30 April 2014.
Passiveness of the MPs and passiveness of the opposition

One of the serious issues is the MPs’ inertia in exercising their powers and fulfilling their obligations. The MPs often do not attend the sessions of the committees of which they are members, they rarely ask MPs’ questions and they do not show initiative to start the debate on the burning issues. The consequence is that the Parliament controls and oversees the security sector only pro forma and that it fails to react to the obvious and serious cases of systemic corruption (see the inset). During the last two elected parliaments there was only one session of the committee scheduled after one third of its members requested it. There are three factors that contribute to this situation. Firstly, at the most basic level, there are no sanctions if the MPs do not attend the committee sessions. Secondly, the MPs are often overburdened by the responsibilities outside the Parliament, as well as by responsibilities related to their membership in other parliamentary bodies, delegations, parliamentary assemblies of international organizations, etc. Finally, it seems that the MPs are not motivated to exercise their powers.

There is the question why the MPs are not motivated for the oversight of the security institutions. Above all, there is belief that they will achieve nothing with their efforts, since they are lacking systemic support. “The system is set in a way that whatever an MP seeks, he will not get it in the way that is adequate”; that is why “he is not expected to ask relevant questions”. As the perception is that the whole political system is flooded with inertia, individual MPs feel discouraged to exercise their powers. We also noted that the MPs are disappointed by the poor situation in the institutions (e.g. in the MoI), but they do not see that they individually can put

---

72 Having reviewed official minutes from the nine sessions of the CDIA, we noted that there were five permanent members of the committee who did not attend at least two thirds of the sessions. One of those MPs did not even attend a single session. Only on three occasions those MPs were replaced by their alternates. The situation seems much better with the sessions of the CCSS, at least based on the minutes of the (six) sessions open for public and information from the sources close to the Committee. The members of the committee were regular in attendance or at least they sent the alternates to the sessions.

73 During 2013 250 MPs asked the total of 593 questions (written, oral and requests for information); 17 questions were related to the security. For a more detailed analysis of MPs’ questions mechanism see: Erceg (2014).

74 This was the 43rd session of the Security and Defence Committee in 2008-2012 parliament, held on 30 September 2011. http://goo.gl/fplJLz

75 Standing Rules and Procedures stipulate that the member of the committee is obliged to participate in the committee sessions (Art. 73, Para. 1), that he/she is obliged to inform his/her alternate and the chair of the committee in a timely manner if he/she is unable to attend (Art. 73, Para. 2), as well as that the alternate is obliged to substitute the member of the committee who cannot attend (Art. 73, Para 2). However, it is important to note that the Standing Rules and Procedures do not envisage sanctions in case these obligations are not fulfilled.

76 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.

77 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.
When it comes to the possible pressure of the political parties that would hinder individual initiative of the MPs, the findings are contradictory. On one hand, there are complaints that the MPs act exclusively in their party interest and that makes the function of an MP pointless and prevents individual initiative. On the other hand, the MPs we interviewed said that they were autonomous in their work within the committees, i.e. that they did not receive instructions from their caucuses on what to say and that nobody prevented them from asking the questions they wanted to ask.

The dynamics of the committees' work – or at least of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs in 2012-2014 parliament, was certainly affected by the inactivity of the opposition MPs: those MPs were more absent, spoke less and they were less likely to initiate the discussion on certain topics. This seems a bit surprising, since it is generally expected that the control function is more in favour of the opposition, who can "fish for mistakes" of the ruling majority. The only possible explanation for such an attitude of the opposition is the inability to score politically on the topics related to security policies and security institutions. Judging by the findings of the “Open Parliament” project (2013), the MPs from the ruling coalition apparently showed little interest in the ideas of the opposition, which discourages the opposition MPs; also, the opposition is more interested to get engaged in the plenary, “where they can be heard”, rather than in the committees. During 2013 the online live streams of the committees' sessions were introduced (apart from the sessions closed for public). Everyone we talked to, officially and unofficially, agreed that introduction of the online streaming affected the work of the committees, but it is still not clear in what way, i.e. whether the online broadcasting improve or worsen the quality of the committees' work.

The factor that could influence the motivation of the MPs to effectively oversee the work of the security institutions is the fear of possible retribution. “No one is doing the security vetting of the people who are to become MPs”, said Momir Stojanovic.
an MP, a member of the CDIA in 2012-2014 parliament and a former director of the Military Security Agency. “Not even the MPs are without sins... I personally do not have such a problem, but I am just speaking figuratively, as a possibility that is there.” 84

**Culture of discretion – “fostering non-transparency”**

PMonitoring of parliamentary practice and talking to people who are involved in it, a certain “culture of discretion” is noted when it comes to the security institutions; this is present among the MPs from all caucuses. Not only that the MPs have a lot of understanding for the needs of the security institutions, but they are convinced that consistent oversight could jeopardize their work, and consequently the national security. The result is that they do not fully use the powers that are bestowed on them by the laws and by the Standing Rules and Procedures.

The example for this is the avoidance to conduct budgetary control and oversight, which is the responsibility that was explicitly given to the Committee for Control of Security Services and partly (related to the expenses for the Armed Forces) to the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs. In 2012 plan, the CCSS had envisaged the session on considering the proposed budgetary resources necessary for the work of security services, but this session was never held. This was explained by the fact that the sessions in which the regular security services’ reports were discussed were held after the National Assembly received the Proposed Budget Law for 2013, so at the sessions of the Committee the directors of security services stated that “the resources that were allocated for the work of the services were modest, but that they were fully aware of the economic situation in the country and that they therefore accepted the Government’s proposal.” 85 The directors also stated that “despite modest resources, the services would be able to fulfil their fundamental tasks”, therefore there was no dedicated session of the committee with this topic on the agenda. 86 Neither there was one in 2013. The CCSS did not have a dedicated session in which they discussed the proposed budget for security services for 2014. We have to notice that for the members of the committee the consideration of the proposed budget comes down to asking the opinion of the security services’ directors. Members of the CCSS in the 2012-2014 parliament held sessions in which they discussed regular reports of the security services, including the financial reports. They asked questions regarding the transparency of the budgets – indicating that the budget of the security services should not be shown

---

84 Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
85 Report of the Committee for Control of Security Services on conducted oversight of security services in 2012: 7.
at the level of appropriations, i.e. in line with the standard classification framework and layout of chart of accounts, since in this way the information on the operational and functional capacities of the security services may be revealed, which could be against the interest of national security. While on one hand it is clear that the budgets of the security services cannot be equally transparent as budgets of some other institutions, the members of the committee in this situation acted as the spokespersons of the security services, without any professional distance towards the institutions whose work they should oversee.

We should also mention the position of the CCSS towards the involvement of the Ombudsman regarding the irregularities in the actions of the Military Security Agency towards some of its members, which was shared during one of the visits of the Committee to the Agency. Namely, the members of the Committee shared that they were “reserved towards part of the conclusion and recommendations of the Ombudsman in one of the cases”, supporting it with the opinion that “transfers of professional army officers, in principle, come with the military profession, therefore they should not be the predominant foundation to approach the Ombudsman and other control bodies”. Given that a member of the Military Security Agency from the case in question had exhausted all the appeal instances before approaching the Ombudsman (inspector general of military services) and that the Headquarters of the Serbian Armed Forces finally acted upon the recommendations of the Ombudsman, it is unclear why the members of the CCSS found it appropriate to publicly criticize the Ombudsman’s involvement in the case. Besides, it seems as if the CCSS out of respect towards the Agency failed to use the opportunity to look into possible irregularities in the work of the service.

Another example of the culture of discretion is the position of the chair of the CCSS (2012-2014) that it is justifiable that the confidential procurements are not visible in the regular reports of the security services, although, at the same time, she was aware that the confidential procurements carried higher corruption risk. In order to better understand such a position, we should take into consideration the fact that the reports are considered in closed sessions, their contents is revealed only to the members of the committee, who are, by the Law on Data Confidentiality, en-

---

88 See the Ombudsman’s recommendations: Recommendation 17-1441/11 from 14.03.2012, Recommendation 118-3890/12 from 23.05.2013. and Recommendation 110-268/12, from 24.06.2013.
91 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
titled to the access to confidential data. It is also indicative what one source close to the Committee for Control of Security Services said, that “there was a pretty high consensus in the committee that the services should be protected” . There is no difference in the position of the MPs from different political parties (ruling or opposition, or parties of different ideological profiles) towards the security services. This can be an indication of a problem recognized in theory – “regulatory capture”, when the committee members identify with the institutions whose work they oversee, to an extent that they lose critical perspective. This problem is particularly obvious in the oversight of security services, which is explained by the fact that the MPs receive an abundance of confidential data from the services, which “wins them over” and makes them part of the power structures, which they in fact should oversee. This is further corroborated by the fact that the proposed decision of the CCSS on the method of conducting direct oversight was done in agreement with the Security and Intelligence Agency and the Military Security Agency. In one speech at the plenary, Nenad Popovic, a member of the CCSS in the previous parliament and a member of the Committee’s working group which drafted the proposal of the decision on direct oversight, said that not only that the services had been very cooperative, but they “helped us in the committee with their advice”. Finally, previous career path of an MP can also influence the relationship towards the institutions. While previous working experience in the security institutions could be a big plus for the MPs in terms of their knowledge of the practice in the institutions, it can also cause empathic attitude during the oversight. It was a significant insight we got during the research that the greatest challenge for the MPs who are entering the committee that oversees the security institutions, is not how to get familiar with the work of the institutions, but the learning “what can and what cannot be done”.

---

92 Law on Data Confidentiality, Art. 39.
93 Interview with an anonymous source close to CCSS (2).
95 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
96 The working group consisted of the CCSS members, the following MPs: Igor Bečić (SNS), Nenad Milić (LDP) and Nenad Popović (DSS).
97 Third session of the first regular sitting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2013). http://www.otvoreniparlament.rs/2013/05/15/475940/page/2/
98 Interview with the source close to the CCSS (2).
Information leaks

One of the problems in the current parliamentary practice was inadequate handling of confidential data, i.e. the information leaks. Reasons that may lead to this problem are the incomplete or inconsistent legal framework and failure to enforce the existing regulations, but also the lack of knowledge or integrity among the MPs. The information leaks can reduce the effectiveness of the oversight, since the security institutions do not trust the MPs, therefore they do not fulfil all their obligations towards the Parliament.

During the oversight of the security institutions, the members of relevant committees receive from these institutions the data of classified in line with various degrees of confidentiality. In current practice it has happened that the data shared in closed sessions become public. However, the responsibility for disclosing confidential information was never established. Although the information leaks do not necessarily come from the MPs, even suspicions could affect the security institutions to have no trust in the MPs and to not fulfil the obligations towards the Parliament. Representatives of the security institutions occasionally share their dilemma on how exhaustive the reports they submit to the committees should be, since they believe that the confidential data may leak to public. The MPs are most likely aware of the distrust the security institutions have towards them. A former member of the Security and Defence Committee and the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs said that he understood why the security institutions refused to share confidential data with the responsible committees, given how the MPs treat the data.

Inadequate handling of confidential data does not have to be an indicator of political corruption – it can be a consequence of lack of technical preconditions or low level of security culture of the MPs. In the CCSS’ report on oversight of security services for 2012 it was pointed out that one of the obstacles in the Committee’s work was the lack of adequate premises where the sessions could be held and handling of the confidential data. Still, at the end of 2012 it was announced that the National Assembly would get technically safe meeting room for the meetings in which the confidential data are shared and for the committees’ sessions. Since


100 This dilemma was shared by the members of the MD with the representatives of the BCSO on 16.06.2014.

101 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.

Building the security culture is a much more demanding task. In other words, the MPs need to learn what the confidential data are and how to handle them, but also how to inform the public on conducted oversight without disclosing confidential data. At the same time, the MPs must not be discouraged to communicate with the public out of fear that they may disclose confidential data. In the previous parliament (2012-2014) there were examples of training and awareness raising on this issue\textsuperscript{103}, and it is important that the training for the MPs continues after the new parliament has been constituted.

Additional problem in confidential data handling is the lack of bye-laws that would provide more specific regulations for the matter laid out in the Law on Data Confidentiality from 2009. The current legislation is not even semantically harmonized with the Law on Data Confidentiality\textsuperscript{104}, and the Standing Rules and Procedures do not specifically the way of handling confidential data. The outdated rulebook on handling the confidential materials from 1995 is still in use. This rulebook envisaged unfortunate solutions regarding distribution of confidential materials to the MPs via regular mail.\textsuperscript{105} Without clear legal framework, it is more difficult for the MPs to work with confidential data. Despite this, it is not known that any of the committees in charge of security institutions ever reacted to this problem.

**MPs are insufficiently prepared and competent and without support in their work**

Even if the MPs are willing and aware of importance of oversight, they do not have sufficient knowledge, time or support to conduct oversight and be fully active in the committee’s work. This is particularly obvious on specific topics, such as oversight of financial management and public procurements. In order to have an MP successfully oversee financial dealings of the security institutions, it is not sufficient that they have a financial report in front of them; they also need to know how to read them and spot potential irregularities – or at least have expert support at their disposal.

\textsuperscript{103} In October 2012 the members of the CCSS participated in the conference on data confidentiality, organized by the OSCE. (Report of the Committee for Control of Security Services on conducted oversight of services for 2012: 16).

\textsuperscript{104} As an example, the Law on Serbian Armed Forces in the Art. 149. Item 15. One of the enlisted breaches of discipline is the “violation of professional or military secret”. The Law on the National Assembly in the Art. 45. Para. 2. Item 3. prescribes that the MPs are obliged even after the term in office has expired not to disclose “the date that represent the state, military or professional secret”. The categories of military or professional secret ceased to exist when the Law on Data Confidentiality was adopted in 2009.

\textsuperscript{105} Rulebook on handling materials classified as the state, official or military secret and protection of those materials
In current parliamentary practice, the caucuses had different ways of choosing what MPs they would propose to certain committees. The MPs can apply themselves to participate in the committees, they can be proposed by the fellow MPs or the chief of caucus decides in agreement with the party president on who is going to be appointed to which committee. The latter was a common practice on the SNS caucus in the last elected parliament (2012-2014). Their member Momir Stojanovic shared his surprise that despite his extensive work experience in military security he was not appointed to the CCSS. On the other hand, we learned from him that the SNS caucus had the practice in which the MPs who were experienced in a certain area shared their knowledge and prepared the MPs without experience. Still, Stojanovic believed that the selection of the committee members was crucial for the quality of oversight.106

Out of 39 MPs who in 2012-2014 parliament were members or alternate members of the CDIA, 8 had some experience in security sector, either through the work in security institutions or through education in the area of security and related policies. Furthermore, seven members (permanent or alternates) had some formal education in economics (BA or MA), whereas nine of them had law degrees. Regarding the CCSS, out of 23 members (permanent and alternates), the three of them had some previous knowledge on the security sector – one as a former minister of defence, one as a former police inspector and one alternate member as a teacher in safety and security. Furthermore, four members had a formal education in economy (one alternate member and one permanent member who left the Committee after its 3rd session), whereas seven members (permanent and alternate) were layers by education. While formal education does not have to result in a more effective oversight, it is still an advantage in terms of easier understanding of financial reports or less effort that an MP may need to assess the legality of the institutions’ work. What is perhaps more problematic that the lack of formal education is the lack of specialization in certain policies, which is notable among many MPs. The overview of parliamentary practice in 2008-2012 and 2012-2014 shows that the members of committees in charge of oversight of security institutions, were rarely the ones who asked the MPs’ questions on security topics, and often they were even less active in proposing the amendments to the laws than their colleagues who participated in the committees not particularly close to security policies (i.e. Committee for Health and Family Issues). It is clear that the MPs who divide their time between different policies cannot be the most efficient in oversight of the security institutions.

What is also noticeable is the issue of changing the representatives of certain caucuses in the committees during one parliament. The CDIA has 17 permanent

106 Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
members, according to the Standing Rules and Procedures, and in the previous parliament there were *de facto* 16 posts, occupied by 20 MPs in total. This is even more problematic when we take into consideration that the previous parliament was dissolved because the extraordinary elections were called, which means that there was less than 20 months since the previous Committee was constituted. Given that each MP takes some time to “learn the ropes”, replacement of MPs during the sitting parliament is something that additionally hinders the work of the committee.

Additional difficulty for the MPs is the fact that they do not have associates who would conduct necessary analyses for them and prepare them for the sessions. In the absence of personal assistants, the MPs have no habit of relying on the professional services of the National Assembly, although they have nothing but praise for them. Furthermore, the number of staff employed in the professional service specialized in security issues is insufficient for providing comprehensive support to the members of the CCSS and CDIA. Apart from two secretaries, the committees have two other staff members at their disposal, who are not formally part of the two committees’ secretariat, but they belong to the Department for defence and national issues. The MPs are preparing for the sessions on their own, relying on the publications of international and national think tanks and consultations with the experts from the civilian sector, or relying on personal contacts in security institutions, from whom they can get additional explanations on certain topics. Even when the MPs have the opportunity to hire associates, the assistance they get is limited, since the associates do not have access to confidential data. The issue of access to confidential data may be a problem with potential involvement of experts, who according to the Standing Rules and Procedures, can be invited to participate in the committees’ sessions. That is how it is difficult for the Committee for Control of Security Services to get an independent analysis of proposed budget, so it does not come totally unexpected that they rely only on the assessments given by the directors of security services. It should be considered how to best

---

107 Not counting Aleksandar Vulin from SNS, who transferred to the executive power after first session.
108 The Committee was constituted on 24 July 2012. The elections were held on 16 March 2014.
109 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP. Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP. The study of Open Parliament shows more thoroughly towards this trend (Open Parliament: 19).
110 Department for defence and national issues has 16 staff members, who were divided among four committees during 2012-2014 parliament (apart from CCSS and CDIA those were the Committee for Diaspora and the Serbs in the region, and the Committee for Kosovo and Metohija) (Infobil, October 2013: 15 and http://www.parlament.gov.rs/народна-скупштина/организација-и-стручна-служба/генерални-секретар-народне-скупштине.1482.html#6198). The MPs have at their disposal a library with three librarians and six researchers. (Infobil, May 2013: 15).
111 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP. Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
112 Standing Rules and Procedures of the NARS. Art. 74. Para. 5.
regulate the status of MPs’ associates and independent experts, who could be involved in the committees’ work, so that they could apply for the security certificate.

**Establishment of good practice: Committee for Control of Security Services**

The Committee for Control of Security Services was first constituted during the 2012-2014 parliament, since in the new Standing Rules and Procedures (2010) the Security and Defence Committee was split into CCSS and CDIA. The Committee has 9 members. Very quickly it has managed to establish practice that was noted even the European Commission’s Country Progress Report for Serbia for 2013. The following improvements in control and oversight were noted:

The CCSS regularly considered three-monthly reports of the security services (including the period from April to October 2013), and with the exception of the Military Intelligence Agency’s report for April-October 2013. For the sake of comparison, the Security and Defence Committee in the previous parliament did not manage to achieve regularity in consideration of reports. The annual report of the Military Intelligence Agency for 2008 was not considered until March 2010, and during 2011 there was no consideration on any of the regular reports submitted by the institutions that this committee oversaw. According to the Committee’s data, the regular reports of the security services also include financial reports.

The source close to this committee said that in the sessions in which the regular reports were considered, the questions on utilization of financial resources and public procurements were asked.

Within nine months since it was constituted the CCSS managed to adopt the decision that more precisely defined the direct oversight of security services’ work. After that, the members of the committee paid oversight visits to the Security and Intelligence Agency, Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency,

---


114 According to the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services, Art. 18, a director of a security service submits an activity report to the responsible committee at least once in a regular sitting of the National Assembly. This would mean that there are at least two regular reports per year. In practice, the security services submitted three-monthly reports to the Committee, but often two three-monthly reports were considered together, for organizational reasons (reports covering the periods when the Parliament is not in sitting are considered during regular sessions).

115 Report of the Committee for Control of Security Services on conducted oversight of services for 2012: 7.

116 Interview with anonymous source close to the CCSS (2)
which were planned to be the first in line for the annual oversight visits. Just for comparison, the Defence and Security Committee dedicated one session to the discussion and agreement on how to conduct oversight of the security services, but this did not result in adoption of any internal procedures or standards. According to the report from this session it is evident that the Committee refused a proposal of one member to develop the protocol on control of all services. The members of the Security and Defence Committee from 2008-2012 parliament paid one visit to each service, but their purpose was not oversight.

Important advancement was achieved in the practice of parliamentary control and oversight when the cooperation with independent state bodies was established, including the State Audit Institution, and when their report on auditing of the Security and Intelligence Agency’s financial report. At the 8th session of the Committee, held at the end of December 2012, the participants included the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and the president of the State Audit Institution. This session was an opportunity to exchange opinion and to inform each other – both the Committee and the officials in the independent state bodies. The first result was obvious on the very same day, when the chair of the Committee, Jadranka Joksimovic, asked MPs’ question during the plenary about the inadequate premises of the independent state bodies. The initiative for

### Oversight visits

According to the CCSS’ decision, direct oversight of security services is conducted, among other reasons, with the aim to oversee the legality of application of special measures for secret intelligence gathering and to oversee the utilization of budgetary and other resources. The official record of the oversight is considered at the next closed session of the Committee, and the Committee can decide, with the consent of the director of security service, to consider the record in a session that is open for public. However, what is surprising is that the Decision, although very detailed, does not specify the method in which the case that is to be controlled is selected. This is important since the prescribed method increases the predictability of oversight visits, thus increasing the citizens’ trust in the MPs. Besides, pre-defined method enables the members of the Committee to better manage their field visits.

In July 2013 the CCSS had one oversight visit in each of the services – Security and Intelligence Agency, Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency. Security and Intelligence Agency, Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency. During the oversight visits to the Security and Intelligence Agency, the CCSS members also controlled the cash box with financial resources for special operational needs, and they got familiar with the work of the recruitment commission.

---


---
auditing of the annual financial report of one of the services came from this session, according to the report of the CCSS. During 2013 the State Audit Institution conducted the audit of the Security and Intelligence Agency’s financial report for 2012, and the CCSS considered the State Audit Institution’s report in a timely manner. Given that the Security and Defence Committee in the previous parliament never considered the reports of the State Audit Institutions on audit of the financial reports of the MD and the MoI (audit done for the 2010 financial reports), this was the first time that a parliamentary committee considered a report of the State Audit Institution on the audit conducted in a security institution.

It is very significant that for the first time at the session of a committee in charge of security services control, the report of the Inspector General of the Military Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency was considered.\textsuperscript{118} The Inspector General, among other issues, oversees legality of application of special measures for secret intelligence gathering, the legality of budget utilization and utilization of other resources, and it established the facts about irregularity or illegality on in work of the two agencies or their members.\textsuperscript{119} Through consideration of the Inspector General’s report, the link is established between the internal and external oversight of security services, and especially in those aspects of their work where the risk of corruption is particularly prominent.

In 2013 it was the first time that the annual report on control and of enforcement of the Law on Data Confidentiality from 2009 was considered; in line with the Art.97 of the Law, the report is submitted by the Minister of Justice and State Administration.\textsuperscript{120}

There are several factors that could explain the progress that was achieved. Primarily, it is clear that by separating the committee in charge of defence and internal affairs from the CCSS became the committee with relatively narrow scope of responsibility, so it was objectively (timely) possible to achieve not only a more consistent, but also a wider oversight than it was the case with the Defence and Security Committee. Besides, the powers and responsibilities of this committee were already precisely stipulated in the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services

\textsuperscript{118} 12\textsuperscript{th} session of the Committee for Control of Security Services 17.04.2013. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/12._седница_Одбора_за_контролу.18311.43.html.

\textsuperscript{119} Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency Art. 54. Para. 1. Item 2, 3. and 5. At least once a year, the Inspector General has the obligation to submit the report on conducted control to the relevant committee of the National Assembly (Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency Art. 54. Para. 5).

\textsuperscript{120} 16\textsuperscript{th} session of the Committee for Control of Security Services, 27.06.2013. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/16._седница_Одбора_за_контролу.19017.43.html.
The significance of this is even more obvious when we look at the responsibilities of the CDIA and specific authorities that stem from the nature of the oversight of security institutions, which were still not precisely defined, which certainly hinders if not entirely prevents oversight of some aspects of the MD's and MOI work.

Jadranka Joksimovic, a chair of the CCSS had a significant impact on its proactive attitude. This is best illustrated by the fact that even the members of the opposition showed respect for “great personal effort she is investing in the committee” 122. According to a source familiar with the work of the CCSS, Jadranka Joksimovic brought systematic and serious work back to the agenda of the committee. In the institutional framework in which the frequency of sessions and the agenda of the committee largely depend on the chair’s will, dedication of the committee chair is crucial for effectiveness and efficiency of the committee's work. This can again be clearly seen through the contrast with the CDIA, whose work was significantly hindered by the fact that its chair was at the same time a director of a large public company (Srbijagas). 123 Jadranka Joksimovic contributed also through establishment of good relations with the security services, which facilitated the committee’s access to the institutions whose work it oversees and it made its work more efficient. In order to increase the effectiveness of oversight through this increased efficiency, it is necessary to keep the professional distance in relation to the institutions whose work is overseen, i.e. reduce the risk of the so called “regulatory capture”.

The other members also showed commitment in the CCSS’ work. Unlike the Defence and Security Committee, where the MPs were often absent from the sessions, the members of the CCSS were attending regularly or they at least sent their alternates. 124 Available records indicate that all the members participate in the committee’s work; unlike in CDIA the members of the opposition were not passive. We learned that one MP postponed his official travels because of the CCSS’ sessions, which he did not do for the other committees in which he participated. Judging by the findings of the BCSP, there was a certain atmosphere of elitism in the committee, which most likely motivated the MPs to commit to their responsibilities. Such elitism can be interpreted as “desire of the MPs to participate in something new” 125.

121 In fact Art. 66. Of the Standing Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly was copied from Art. 16. of the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services.
122 Interview with Konstantin Samofalov, an MP.
123 Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP.
124 According to the minutes of (six) sessions open for public.
125 Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
One of the factors of success of the Committee, according to those who are familiar with its work, is the fact that most of the sessions were closed for public, which prevented digressions and made the work of the MPs constructive and efficient.\textsuperscript{126} Regarding the efficiency of the Committee, already mentioned consensus of values regarding the method of control and oversight of security services certainly played a significant role.

Despite certain circumstances in the CCSS’ work that act as obstacles in effective oversight (discretion culture which inhibits use of all the power; lack of alternative analysis, e.g. of financial reports), this committee has set the standards of good oversight practice that the committees in the future parliaments should try to reach and overcome. At the same time, there is the issue of how to sustain good practice. For example, the internal enactments of the committee (decision on direct oversight) are not based on the Standing Rules and Procedures. According to the information from the CCSS, the decision adopted by the previous committee remain mandatory for the upcoming committee, unless decided differently\textsuperscript{127}, but it is unclear on which legal enactment this is founded. Besides, formally keeping the existing regulations does not mean that they would be enforced. Jadranka Joksimović points out that even when there is adequate legislation, the oversight does not happen automatically, but it depends on the human factor.\textsuperscript{128} Ensuring continuity of practice in the new CCSS will be a significant challenge because of the composition changes as well. Only 5 out of 18 previous members (permanent and alternates) remained in the Committee, and 11 previous members were not elected to the parliament at all. New members will take time to “learn the ropes” and they will need new training on control and oversight of security sector, including the oversight of specific areas of work with prominent corruption risk, such as finances, public procurements and application of special procedures and measures. Judging by the current experience in both CCSS and CDIA, it will be particularly important for the MPs to learn “what they can, and what they cannot do”, i.e. what their powers are and how they could use them in the most effective way, without any risk for the work of the institutions or for the integrity of the MPs.

\textsuperscript{126} Interview with anonymous source close to CCSS (1).
\textsuperscript{127} Information obtained from previous secretary of CCSS Katarina Terzić, during interview with Jadranka Joksimović.
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP.
Recommendations for establishment of effective oversight

1. Envisage in the Law on Police that the National Assembly can conduct oversight of application of special evidence-gathering measures in the police work and introduce the mechanism for such an oversight (by extending the powers of the Committee for Control of Security Services or by giving explicit powers to the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs to conduct direct oversight).

2. Through the amendments to the Law on Police enable the Internal Control Service of the police to approach the National Assembly directly.

3. Introduce obligation for the Bureau for coordination of security services, National Security Council, Defence Inspectorate to directly report to the National Assembly on their work. Also, envisage participation of the Speaker of the National Assembly in the sessions of the NSC and participation of the CCSS chair in the sessions of the Bureau.

4. Define in a more specific way in the Standing Rules and Procedures the powers and responsibilities of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs and introduce more explicit powers regarding control of budget utilization and direct oversight.

5. Envisage special reports or special chapters in regular reports on the activities of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and the services, referring to the implementation of the integrity plans.

6. Regulate what areas of institutions’ work should be covered by their activity reports and what type of data they need to submit. Pay special attention to the areas in which the risk of corruption is high.

7. Regulate the area of confidential data handling in the National Assembly by enactment of the appropriate rulebook, amendments to the Standing Rules and Procedures or amendments to the Law on Data Confidentiality.

8. Standing Rules and Procedures should enable the committees to adopt permanent internal enactments that would regulate their work.

9. Envisage the possibility that an authorized official can submit reports on behalf of ministers so that the absence of ministers would not be the obstacle to hold the sessions in which their reports are considered.
10. **Implementation of training for the MPs** should continue and all the MPs, and in particular the new ones, should be enabled to participate in the training. The training should pay particular attention to confidential data handling, but they should also show the MPs how to use their powers correctly in order to ensure effective oversight without jeopardizing efficiency of the security institutions.

11. The MPs should be educated and stimulated to **use more actively the instruments** of MPs’ questions, public hearings, and as needed, investigative committees or commissions.

12. The MPs should **use more actively external experts**, alternative information sources on the issues from their area of responsibility, as well as strengthen cooperation with foreign parliaments. The aim is not to be fully dependant on those whose work their committee oversees.

13. Strengthen caucuses through allocation of a portion of the NARS’ budget **for hiring parliamentary officers and for their education** and specializations at the level of caucuses in the areas relevant for the committees.
Sources

Interviews and answers to questionnaires:

1. Interview with an anonymous source close to the CCSS (1), conducted on 8.10.2013.

2. Interview with an anonymous source close to the CCSS (2), conducted on 27.11.2013.

3. Interview with Jadranka Joksimović, an MP, conducted in Belgrade, 08.04.2014.


5. Interview with Momir Stojanović, an MP, conducted in Niš, 06.03.2014.


Literature:


Legal enactments:


21. National Assembly of Republic of Serbia. Rulebook on handling materials classified as the state, official or military secret and protection of those materials. 31.5.1995.


**National Assembly:**


32. „Odbor za kontrolu službi bezbednosti obavio prvu nadzornu posetu Vojnoobaveštajnoj agenciji“, http://goo.gl/h4AVHB.
The Ombudsman


34. Ombudsman. Recommendation 118-3890/12 from 23.05.2013. Available at: http://goo.gl/lvsRdG.


Media


Other sources


44. Notes from the 13th session of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs. Followed via live stream at the National Assembly's website, 31.10.2013.

45. Notes from the expert consultations “Partnership for integrity in security sector”, held in Fruška gora from 9-11 July 2014.
PARTNERSHIP FOR INTEGRITY IN SECURITY SECTOR

About the Project

In 2013 the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy launched its most ambitious ever project in the fight against security sector corruption. The project combines research and advocacy efforts the end goal of which is the establishment of a “Partnership for Integrity in the Security Sector of Serbia”.

The BCSP aims to enable the harmonisation of complex processes and efforts on the part of the government, independent state bodies and society directed at integrity building and the fight against corruption in three key security sector institutions: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Security Information Agency.

In order to achieve such ambitious goals, the BCSP team will undertake a series of activities, each of which relates to a specific anti-corruption policy priority and contains a robust advocacy component:

- Research of risks that threaten the integrity of the security sector institutions and oversight of policies and measures designed to buttress the integrity of security sector institutions;
- Supervision of the execution of public procurements conducted under the new Law on Public Procurement;
- Reporting on the performance of oversight and control by the three relevant National Assembly committees – the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee, the Security Sector Control Committee and the Committee on Finance, State Budget and Control of Public Spending – and especially in terms of strengthening anti-corruption measures and building integrity in the Serbian security sector;
- Communicating with the public via interactive products in order to inform them about the integrity of the security institutions and to receive information from the public on corruption in the institution with which they have the most contact – the police. This is why the Corruption Risk Map website has been extensively updated and expanded to include a map of police corruption in Serbia and a virtual profile representing the ‘ideal police officer’.

Successful research depends on well established methodology. This is why a special methodological framework has been developed on the basis of previous research projects, such as Mapping and Monitoring of the Security Sector of the Republic of Serbia, the Corruption Risk Map and A-COP: Civil Society Against Police Corruption.

The Partnership for Integrity in the Security Sector project is supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of the Civil Society Forward project coordinated by the Institute for Sustainable Communities.
About the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP or, in Serbian, BCBP) is an independent research centre that devotes its efforts to improving the security of individual citizens and society as a whole. The focus of the Centre’s interests are policies aimed at the improvement of human, national, regional, European and global security. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy realises its objectives through research, analysis and practical policy proposals, advocacy, education, publishing and specialist support for security sector reform in Serbia. The Centre also supports the networking of all stakeholders in the security community. BCSP’s research efforts are focused primarily on security policy in Serbia but include the security dynamic in the Western Balkan region, Europe and beyond. On the basis of research outputs, BCSP develops policy proposals that contribute to the development of human security, the consolidation of security sector reform, the strengthening of security cooperation and the European integration of the Western Balkans.

The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy was founded as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in 1997 as a civil society organisation dedicated supporting the democratisation of Serbia and advocating for radical reform of its security sector. During the 17 years of its existence the CCMR produced more than 300 printed and electronic publications and completed dozens of projects. The CCMR focused on highly significant subject areas in the fields of security sector reform and security studies such as, amongst others, democratic and civilian control of the state’s means to apply force; legal regulation of the security sector in Serbia; protection of the human rights both of civilians and those employed in the security sector; and also security cooperation and integration in Serbia. During this period the CCMR tackled and raised awareness of new and thus far under-researched subject matter such as private security companies, the interaction of economic and security issues and public oversight of the application of special measures and procedures by the security services. In order to better reflect the broader scope of its research orientation; in 2010 the Centre for Civil-Military Relations changed its name to the Belgrade Centre for Security Studies.

BCSP is a member of, and has initiated, many national and international civil society networks. BCSP is, for example, a founding member of the prEUgovor coalition of civil society organisations that has since 2013 engaged in monitoring the implementation of policies in the rule of law (Chapter 23) and freedom, security and justice (Chapter 24) and that makes practical policy recommendations for the further democratisation of Serbia by using the EU integration process as a framework. BCSP is also one of the leading organisations in the internal affairs group of SEKO, a sector-based organisation of civil society actors, and a coordinating member of the working group for Chapter 24 of the National Convention on the European Union. BCSP also participates in the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.
BCSP has signed memoranda of understanding that formalise its cooperation with a number of organisations and institutions which include: the Serbian Ministry of Defence; the Serbian Government office for EU Integration; the Institute of Comparative Law; the National Democratic Institute; the Association for Euro-Atlantic Integration (Jagello 2000) in the Czech Republic; the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs in Slovakia; the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) in Montenegro; the Centre for Security Cooperation in South Eastern Europe (RACVIAC); the Institute for International Relations in Croatia; the Centre for Security Studies in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Analitika in Macedonia; and the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Albania.

BCSP launched its research programmes focusing on the accountability and integrity of security sector institutions with the “Mapping and Monitoring of the Security Sector of the Republic of Serbia”¹, which was the first project in Serbia to methodically and comprehensively analyse the current state of and progress made by reforms of the country's security sector. The research outputs of this project and the recommendations they fostered were published as the “Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia 2008” (DanGraf/CCMR 2012). In 2012 BCSP, supported by the Anti-corruption Agency, executed a systematic mapping project relating to corruption risk in the security sector and published its findings in book form, “Corruption in the Security Sector of Serbia” (BCSP, 2013), and online, www.korupcija.bezbednost.org. As part of the A-COP: Civil Society Against Police Corruption project BCSP produced an assessment of corruption in the Serbian police (“Assessment of Police Corruption in Serbia”², BCSP, 2014) and formed an A-COP working group of ten civil society organisations from across Serbia in order to enhance civil society participation in fighting police corruption. Finally, Transparency International UK has twice selected BCSP to evaluate the integrity of the defence sector in Serbia for the international research project, the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index.

¹ Donors: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Fund for an Open Society
² Donors: The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia and the Office for Cooperation with Civil Society of the Government of the Republic of Serbia
About the Authors

Katarina Đokić graduated in Journalism at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade and gained a Masters in Political Science from the University of Freiburg. She became a member of the BCSP research team in March 2012. In 2013 she spent five months at the German Bundestag as part of the International Parliamentary Stipend programme. Her primary research interests are: oversight of security sector institutions, integrity building in the defence sector and public opinion of security matters.

Vladimir Erceg is a graduate of International Relations from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He was a member of the Centre’s thirteenth generation of interns and in 2013 he became a Research Associate on the Partnership for Integrity of Security Sector in Serbia project. His research interests focus on parliamentary control of the security sector and the problems of security sector corruption - particularly with regards to public procurement processes – but also include transparency issues and cyber security.
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
AND INTEGRITY BUILDING
IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
Katarina Đokić
Vladimir Erceg