An Approach to Mapping and Measuring Security Sector Reform

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A man who knows the price of everything, does not know the value of anything.
(Lord Darlington in Lady Windermere’s Fan, by Oscar Wilde, 1896)

In this paper we will present the assumptions underlying the research conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations team within the “Mapping and Monitoring Security Sector Reform in Serbia” project. The rationale for measuring Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Serbia will be explained in the first part. We will then go on to show how this rationale has influenced the shaping of the research topic, the method of measurement and the choice of criteria. For this purpose a brief overview of the method used in analysing the context of security sector reform will also be given, including a look at the effects of the findings on formulating the key research question. Next, we will describe the process of developing the Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI), including the challenges that the research team was faced with whilst testing the methods for measuring the progress of security sector reform in the case of Serbia. In addition, we will present some of the lessons learnt and dilemmas which arose while monitoring the trends and assessing the achievements of SSR in Serbia. Certain insights gained during the research are offered, as we believe they may be of use for the research and measurement of SSR in other countries. This paper concludes with an outline of the research team’s plan for further future development of the methods presented.

The Rationale for Measuring the Progress of SSR

There were several distinct sets of reasons why the Centre’s researchers decided to undertake the measurement of SSR progress. First, the intention was to make up for the lack of methods and instruments for monitoring and measuring the progress of reform across the security sector as a whole, from the perspective of the citizens of countries in transition. It was obvious that civil society organisations, not only in Serbia, lacked reliable methods and instruments for
monitoring the process and measuring the progress made in the reform of this sector. We were also inspired by the new concept of a holistic approach to security sector reform, which endeavours to treat the human/individual security and national security as equal goals of security policy, while acknowledging the contribution of both non-state and traditional state actors in the realisation of these goals. This is a relatively new concept which developed quite rapidly during the mid and late 1990s, predominantly in developed countries. The concept was developed in the developed countries of the north inspired by the need to provide development assistance to post-conflict countries, as well as to act more coherently in the context of peace missions. The concept of SSR was also inspired by the broad reforms undertaken in developed countries and known under the term of “new public management”. One of the approaches recommended in these reforms was to develop the horizontal coordination of different state actors with the aim of finding suitable and optimal answers to contemporary security challenges, risks and threats.

The other set of reasons for this research stems from the fact that the majority of methods and instruments used to assess SSR range are devised to suit donors’ needs and interests. This applies equally to individual donor countries and international organizations which endorse reform in candidate countries seeking membership (NATO, EU) or in their own member countries (OSCE, UN). This could be an explanation, at least in part, why none of these organisations

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have developed a comprehensive approach to measuring progress in security sector reform; or to be more precise, why they only draw their beneficiaries’ attention to certain parts and aspects of SSR. For example, NATO has established numerous indicators for measuring the success of military and defence system reform. Conversely, the EU, in the course of its enlargement, focuses mostly on police reform and the reform of other bodies with certain police competences. Similarly, the OSCE and the Council of Europe mostly focus on assessing the extent to which human rights of ordinary citizens and employees in security forces are observed. Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF focus on measuring good governance and progress in combating corruption across state security institutions, while the UN concentrates on security sector reform in the post-conflict context. So far, the OECD has been the only organisation which has developed, in the *Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* in 2007, guidelines and instruments for an implementation of holistic approach to SSR and for measuring its progress. However, these are primarily intended for donor countries which are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The Handbook contains guidelines that donors should follow in assisting security system reform in beneficiary countries. During the preparation of the Handbook, the authors consulted a large number of organisations and individuals from both underdeveloped countries and countries in transition. However, the fact remains that the methods and criteria described for the assessment of SSR progress are primarily tailored to donors’ needs.

For this reason the Centre’s research team has endeavoured over the past two years to develop methods first for mapping security sector reform, and then for measuring the progress of this reform in countries in transition, mostly from the standpoint of the needs and role of citizens and civil society. In accordance with this, the criteria for assessing progress in SSR were formulated with a view to monitoring the role that civil society should play in this reform. Therefore, the criteria should encompass and express the characteristics of the context in which SSR is carried out in the countries in transition.

The second important motive is to publicly advocate - based on clearly set criteria and empirical data - for greater democratic governance in the security sector, as well as for increased efficiency and effectiveness in providing national and individual security in Serbia. The guiding principle here is the claim that

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29 DAC-Development Assistance Committee is the main body within which the OECD member countries coordinate their assistance programs (www.oecd.org/dac)
“What gets measured, gets managed.”\textsuperscript{30} This claim is based on the assumption that the main problems in SSR, as well as the correlations between these identified problems, the measures undertaken and their results, can only be identified during such an evaluation process. Therefore, measuring should provide better insight into actual problems in Serbia’s SSR and assist with development of the corresponding recommendations for improving security sector governance. Another assumption is that the attention of the government and the public can only be drawn to the reform process and potential setbacks in its course once regular monitoring and assessment of progress across the entire sector has been conducted.

In accordance with the points mentioned above, we hope that the publication of the results of this research will create favourable conditions for a public debate about improving the security sector governance. The results could further be used as an empirical and objective starting point for a debate about the contribution of current agents of power to SSR progress, or about their responsibility for potential setbacks and delays in the process. This should also help reduce the scope for the politicisation and securitisation of public demands for the regular monitoring and assessment of SSR progress. This is of great importance, as SSR belongs to the domain of \textit{high politics}\textsuperscript{31}, i.e., a public policy domain which is of particular importance for the sovereignty of a state and the protection of its citizens’ national identity. It is different from so-called \textit{low politics}, i.e., public policies dealing with issues affecting citizens’ daily lives, in which the authorities are generally more willing to allow the results of their actions to be brought under public scrutiny and to accept that some of their competencies might be limited in the process of international integrations. National security and foreign affairs policies generally fall into the category of \textit{high politics}. As these deal with the preservation of the physical existence of the (political) community, they are often exempt from public scrutiny. These policies are difficult to be put under public scrutiny as they more easily trigger emotions, prejudice, beliefs and ideology laden arguments than rational evidence-based discussion. Therefore, we expect to create environment for a debate on these topics to be based on rational arguments by putting forward evidence which has been collected in a systematic manner and clear criteria for measuring the success or failure of each policy. This is particularly important for young democracies such as Serbia which do not have a long tradition of citizen participation in the control and oversight of the security sector and where traditional security actors benefit more from improved public reputation and experience than civil society

\textsuperscript{30} “What gets measured gets managed”, quoted from reviewed text on performance measurement and its shortcomings in the reform of new public administration in: Christopher Pollitt, \textit{How Do We Know How Good Public Services Are,} in Governance for the Twentz-First Century, eds., B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 121.

\textsuperscript{31} Hoffmann, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe.’ \textit{Daedalus}. No. 95, pp. 892-908.
organisations. The results of this research and the Index model could contribute to the increased visibility of civil society organisations amongst the expert and general public in Serbia. They could also, if such expert evaluation justifies their validity, instigate a public debate on the desirable goals of SSR in Serbia.

The Centre’s research team has not given up on the ambition to contribute to the academic pool of knowledge by devising and analysing methods for measuring the effectiveness of SSR. This refers particularly to findings about the multiple interconnections between the level of SSR and the processes of democratisation and economic development in a society. Academic research generally aims to identify and determine the specific features of certain processes in one state and to uncover and explain their similarities with the same processes taking place in other states, e.g., those underway in states in transition. For this reason, when methods for measuring the progress of SSR were being devised, great attention was given to analysing the specificities of this process in Serbia. Consequently, a great share of the research focused on the context analysis in order to fully examine the impact of local political events on SSR. At the same time, great attention was paid to determining whether the same procedures and instruments are applicable, i.e., verifiable (when submitted to falsification) in other countries as well. We tried, to the best of our abilities, to formulate the criteria and indicators in the SSR Index in such a way that they can be used in other country settings. The primary aim of this publication is to contribute to the development of practical policies in Serbia. However, we hope that the empirical data and insights presented in the publication will raise readers’ awareness about the potential difficulties occurring in measuring the process, as well as encourage further academic research on the SSR process in states in transition.

To sum up, the aim of devising the SSR Index was to devise a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to expose the dynamics of SSR, identify its “critical points” and provide tools for the longitudinal tracking of this process in Serbia and other countries. We opted for a two-phase methodology in order to establish a measuring system which would reflect the specificities of the reform process in the state we were analysing and enable the comparison with reforms in other states. The first phase of empirical research involves the analysis of a wider social context of SSR. The second phase involves the application of the SSRI model to the reform of this sector in Serbia.

**The Analysis of the SSR Context**

If we accept the fact that SSR is primarily a political process which has been taking place in many countries at an uneven pace, then we also need to analyse and understand the local context in which reform is being carried out. Despite the fact that both security and political dynamics in a country are largely determined by international and regional contexts, the meaning of security chal-
lenges, risks and threats, as well as the need to find potential solutions to them, is mostly defined at the level of the political community, which, in the European context, is represented by the state. As this is the first attempt at mapping and assessing SSR progress in Serbia, only the local context was analysed in the pilot-phase of the project. If the project continues, a wider (regional) context will be analysed over the coming phases, including the evaluation of the EU and NATO policy of pre-conditioning. For this reason, the model method for carrying out a SSR context analysis will be presented (based on literature review) in further text. The results of its application to the context of SSR in Serbia are presented in the text by Miroslav Hadžić^{32} which is included in this publication.

The analysis of the SSR context within a state is usually carried out on three levels. The wider socio-political context is analysed first. This is followed by an analysis of the dynamics and main characteristics of the security sector, as well as their constituting elements. The actions of key political actors are analysed last. The rationale for a three-level approach is that progress or delays in SSR cannot be measured out of context, nor solely on the basis of an ideal model of reform. The interpretation and measurement of the level of reform depend mostly on the political legacy, types of actors and their motives for selecting a specific security policy.

We would like to emphasise that our interpretation of the term ‘key political actors’ is somewhat different from Hanggi’s^{33} interpretation. He identified four groups of institutions and actors by placing them on a two-dimensional scale: state and non-state, the ones using force and the ones not using force. The Centre’s research team adopted and used this classification in measuring SSR progress in Serbia. Nonetheless, in the context analysis, and unlike Hanggi, we classified as political actors all social groups which actively participate in defining and implementing security policies – from political parties and business elites, professional stakeholders within the security sector, to organised groups which monitor their activities. This implies that all formal and informal groups which may influence political decision-making in the field of SSR, i.e., groups which may either support or obstruct reform out of their own interest, were also regarded as political actors. This is important to note, as the underlying assumption of this research was that SSR trends in Serbia were only partly influenced by the situation at the beginning of transition, which means that the local political actors were powerful enough and able to mould this situation according to their own concept of SSR.

^{32}Text M. Hadžić, p. 105.

^{33}Text F. Ej dus, p. 65.
1. Characteristics of the socio-political context

If the entire security sector and the dynamics of change within it are to be included in the measurement of SSR progress, it is necessary to first analyse the wider socio-political context in which this sector has developed and is being reformed. A list of the key features of the given context should be compiled.

on the basis of this analysis. In other words, the results of this analysis should make it possible to answer four key questions, which, once they are answered, can and should be further sub-divided:

1. What is the security context like? Is the country in question enjoying the benefits of a long period of peace or has it recently experienced an externally imposed or internal conflict? What are the consequences of that conflict on the society and how are these manifested across the security sector?

2. What is the political context (Does the state exist or is it in the making? What is the type of rule? To what extent are human rights and freedoms protected and exercised? What is the level of autonomy and development of civil society? What marginalised groups are there, etc.)?

3. What is the level of economic development (What are the obstacles to economic development? Does spending on the state bodies operating in the security sector affect the provision of other public assets? Is there widespread corruption? What are the differences in economic development across the country, etc.)?

4. Is there a “demand” for security sector reform? And if such a demand exists, what part or goal of the reform matters most to the public (citizens)?

A chronology of reform should be drawn up, based on the answers provided to the questions above, with clearly defined key phases and turning points which have influenced the current context of reform. Only a few key phases and events from the recent past, in which the political and/or public expectations of the security sector as a whole and of its constituent parts were negotiated and formulated should be defined, provided that a zero point has been determined. To determine the periodisation of the reform, “specific threshold” and “tipping points”的 marking significant changes in the perception of the local security

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35 Researchers from the Dutch Intitute of International Relations Clingendel have developed a trend analysis using 12 key indicators to determine the degree and nature of (in)stability in a society: (1) indicators of good governance: (a) state legitimacy, (b) provision of public services, (c) the rule of law and human rights, (d) leadership models – the elite; (2) security indicators: (a) security apparatus, (b) regional environment; (3) socio-economic indicators: (a) demographic pressure, (b) refugees and internally displaced persons, (c) hostility stemming from group identity (d) emigration from the country, (e) economic opportunities for all groups, (f) the state of economy. Source: Verstegen, S., van de Goor, L. and de Zeeuw (2005), The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (The Hague: Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p. 26

36 Look for a more detailed questionnaire in the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice (2007), pp. 52-56 for (a) the analysis of conflicts and political economy, (b) capacity and type of management of judicial and security institutions, (c) the need of people, especially the poor, for security and justice.

37 Terminology was borrowed from transition theories and in English these terms are as follows: specific tresholds, tipping points and critical junctures.
sector and/or in the course of national security policy - should be identified in the processes of political transformation. In identifying the tipping points, formal developments in the political system, such as peace treaties, the adoption of a new constitution or elections which marked a turning point in society are to be taken into consideration. Changes in citizens’ expectations of the security sector should also be recorded, as well as any changes in the degree of the sector’s legitimacy. Variations in the degree of legitimacy of the security sector and its actors could then be interpreted as an important indicator of change in the public demand for reform.

Changes in the “demand for reform” in a given country can be identified by analysing the results of local public opinion polls and by applying the securitisation theory (Buzan et al. 1998) to political processes. This should help determine when and how SSR became a part of the state (national) policy agenda. Consequently, based on the findings of specialised public polls and of the sections of regular public polls examining citizens’ confidence in the state institutions, it is possible to assess citizens’ attitudes about the (il)legitimacy of the security sector, what they expect from the changes and what their reactions to changes are. This approach is in keeping with the normative assumption of the SSR concept, which postulates that reform should enable the fulfilment of citizens’ rights and needs for security in accordance with the concept of human security. An analysis of the distribution of the trends and attitudes expressed in public surveys will also show what significance the respondents (citizens) give to SSR, and if they consider it as more important than reforms in other state government sectors.

The degree of the security sector’s legitimacy is also an indicator of how much “social” capital the enactors of the reform have at their disposal, that is, how much patience the public will show and how much room for manoeuvre the elites have at the beginning of the transition.

The findings collated from the public opinion research can be of great assistance in interpreting the political elites’ prioritising in SSR. Answers can be provided as to why the agents of power considered some changes in the parts of the sector as less important and therefore did not initiate them at all. For example, the indifference of the new authorities in Serbia after 2000 with regard to the civilian protection sector reform or to the legal regulation of the private security sector status can be at least partially explained by the fact that the public did not find these topics to be of great significance, nor were these issues perceived as a threat to their security. Consequently, these topics are not easily securitised, unlike the ones pertaining to the military, police or intelligence services’ reforms. During the early transition period, the Serbian public viewed the police, the intelligence services and the military top ranks as the

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38 In Serbia these include public surveys on the military reform, security issues, and Euro-Atlantic security integrations which the CCMR conducted in 2003-2005, victimological research carried out by the Serbian Victimological Society, the research conducted on the police activities which was commissioned by the OSCE in 2002 and 2008, etc.
main mechanisms of repression of the previous regime. The public thus expected and demanded that they be rapidly and radically reformed. Conversely, the area of civilian protection remained removed from public scrutiny up until great incidents and natural disasters occurred, such as the explosion in the ammunition warehouse in Paracin in 2007 or the floods in 2006.

An analysis of the dominant processes of securitisation in Serbia should be added to the findings of the public polls in order to get a valid insight into the nature and the characteristics of the context. Securitisation is understood here as a discursive process, whereby a specific situation is labelled as a security threat to the existence of the political community, which entails the need to resort to extraordinary measures (which are not applied under ordinary political circumstances)\(^39\). The analysis of the key securitising actors, types of threats and required special measures provides greater insight into the trends and mechanisms of the legitimisation of reforms, as well as into the ways some actors of the reform gain public authority.\(^40\) The fact that we are talking about a turbulent transitional period in which, in shaping a new common identity, the agents of transition lead intensive debates on numerous social norms – only adds to the importance of applying this approach. The Centre's assumption, based on all the points mentioned above, is that SSR cannot be objectively measured on the basis of visible material indicators only. To understand and measure SSR it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that both the security threats and the reform priorities are constructs which are shaped by the discursive actions undertaken by the local actors. For this reason it is difficult to measure and describe the complex political nature of this process and the contradictory trends within it by using exclusively material indicators.

Lastly, the analysis of the socio-political context should help establish which are the dominant processes to have influenced the shaping of SSR in a country. Is it mainly a post-conflict, post-authoritarian, developmental or a strong-state context?\(^41\) A combination of contexts is also possible as long as the dynamics and the mechanisms which influence these processes are explained as precisely and thoroughly as possible for the country at stake. A wider socio-political analysis should provide a brief periodisation and an analysis of the key events or tipping points from the recent past which have influenced citizens’ expectations and the capacity of political actors to guide reform at the present moment. This analysis should also shed light on the resonance of the reforms among the public, the security sector and the public discourse.

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41 For potential contexts of reform, see table SSR. For more information about Hanggi’s definition of the four possible contexts, see text about the SSR concept. For further information about the difficulties of their operationalisation in the case of Serbia, see text about SSR context.
2. Sector Analysis

In the next stage we “step away” from the socio-political level and delve into the analysis of the characteristics pertaining to the security sector and their relation to the rest of the state administration, as well as towards the analysis of the sector’s internal dynamics. This analysis should result in:

1) a list of all statutory and non-statutory actors across the security sector,
2) a description of the current state and types of relations across the sector, particularly between those who have power and its civilian counterpart\(^\text{42}\),
3) an assessment of each group of actors’ capacity,
4) an overview of each group of actors’ field of expertise and
5) an outline of the dominant patterns of sector management and the management of each separate group of actors

By analysing the existing capacity and expertise we are trying to indentify the type, scope and quality of the material, financial and human resources which the sector and its actors have at disposal. Institutional framework within which the state administration operates has to be determined as well. That should help identify both potential obstacles to and opportunities for reform. The analysis of quality of governance provides an insight into the level of democracy within the sector, as a closer examination of “the relations across security institutions, wider governmental apparatuses and the public” reveals “the level of clarity, openness and responsiveness of state apparatuses to the needs of citizens.”\(^\text{43}\)

The OECD manual\(^\text{44}\) provides additional parameters for determining the level of democracy in relations across the sector, such as: responsibility, legitimacy (trust), autonomy (de-politicisation), rule of law, system of control and balance (distribution of power), horizontal responsibility and participation (opportunity for citizens to influence the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the policy in this field).

The following step in this type of analysis is to determine the specific features of the organisation and practical management within the security sector that distinguish it from the rest of state administration. For example, the security sector in all countries is characterised by a special relation between professionals and civilian decision-makers. The reason for this is that the former have specialised knowledge and skills which the latter cannot acquire easily. Consequently, the professionals can greatly influence the process, scope and aims of SSR. This is particularly evident in a post-authoritarian reform context,

\(^{42}\) But should describe and unwritten power relations between the military and police, security intelligence agencies and the rest of the sector. This can be visually illustrated by circles of different sizes, which reflect the relative power of different parts within the security sector, which is an integral part of the mapping sector.

\(^{43}\) DFID (Safety and Accessible Justice - Putting Policy into Practice (London) p. 18

\(^{44}\) OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice (2007) p 54.73
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>DOMINANT ACTORS</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
<th>PRIORITIES</th>
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| Post-authoritarian |   Statutory actors that use force  
   Political parties or groups which participated in the change of power (so-called opposition), and the elite from the former regime  
   Actors that are less visible or developed  
   Statutory actors that do not use force (particularly those in charge of control) e.g., the judiciary and other independent institutions, legislative bodies  
   Civil society  
   Non-statutory actors that use force (paramilitary formations)  
   Political and economic elites who benefit from conflicts  
   External actors (e.g., private military companies...)  
   Crime syndicates connected to main participants in the conflict |   Danger of re-establishing the old regime  
   Illegitimacy of statutory actors that use force  
   Systemic violation of human rights  
   Ethnic/religious tensions  
   Separatist tendencies |   Primary goal: democratisation of society  
   Depolitisation of statutory actors, primarily those that use force  
   Development of institutions for control and control and oversight  
   Lustration and processing of human rights violations |
| Pre-conflict |   Non-statutory actors that use force (paramilitary formations)  
   External actors (foreign, private military companies, peace-keeping missions and intermediaries...)  
   Crime syndicates connected to main participants in the conflict |   Demonopolisation of power and the absence of rule  
   War crimes  
   Internal displacement of civilians |   Armed conflict prevention  
   Civilian rights protection  
   Demilitarization of society and provision of public safety |
| Conflict (it is disputable whether SSR can actually take place during conflict, in the absence of a democratic system) |   Non-statutory actors that use force (paramilitary formations)  
   External actors (foreign, private military companies, peace-keeping missions and intermediaries...)  
   Crime syndicates connected to main participants in the conflict |   A lot of armament in the possession of civilians  
   Mining of territories  
   Refugees and expelled persons  
   Lack of effective control over the whole territory  
   Crime related to specific groups in conflict  
   Privatisation of the security |   Termination of conflicts  
   Protection of civilian rights (refugees, displaced persons)  
   Demobilization and disarmament  
   Establishment of control |
| Post-conflict |   Statutory and non-statutory actors that use force (paramilitary formations)  
   External actors  
   Veterans (these actors lack visibility just as much as those in the post-authoritarian context) |  |   Primary goal: transition from violence and armed conflict to peace  
   Demobilization and disarmament  
   Reintegration of veterans in the civilian life  
   Demining  
   Demilitarization of the society and provision of public security  
   Increased presence of minorities and other marginalized groups among the statutory actors that use force  
   Transitional justice (war crime courts, trust committees, lustration across statutory actors) |
### Integration
- Executive bodies
- External actors such as the Council of Europe, EU, NATO - whose conditionality requires fulfilling the criteria for membership
- Civil society

- Loss of identity (vertical threats)
- Loss of democratisation and focus on ways to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of security management

- Primary goal: membership in international organisations
- Interoperability of armed forces participation in peace-keeping operations outside your own territory
- Increasingly important role of international cooperation in security policy management

### Developmental
- Statutory actors that use force
- External actors (especially the World Bank, the IMF, who condition economic support upon political criteria)

- Socio–economic problems, especially poverty issues
- Excessive military expenditure and inefficient management of statutory actors that use force, as well as insufficient provision of public security

- Primary goal: transition from an underdeveloped to a developed economy

### Strong state
- Statutory actors that do not use force
- Non-statutory actors both using and not using force

- New challenges, risks and threats (crime, terrorism, global warming...)
- Alienation of citizens from statutory actors that use force

- Introduction of reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of security management
- Reforms stemming from the need to take action outside the state territory (new generation of peace-keeping missions)
- New forms of civil-military cooperation both inside the country and (e.g., the police in the local community) and abroad (integrated peace-keeping missions)

### State building
- Elites which have “won” the status of the state
- Actors which use force and have participated in acquiring the state
- External actors (protectorate and peace-keeping missions)

- Inability to govern the entire territory
- External and internal lack of legitimacy

- Institution building (e.g., army forces or ministries that did not exist before)
- Gaining international recognition (e.g., via membership in some organisations)

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**Table 10: Characteristics of different types of SSR context**
as the entire security-related education in an undemocratic society is regulated within a closed educational and training system run by the military, the police and intelligence services. Therefore, it is to be expected that new political decision-makers in the security sector, particularly civilian heads of governmental apparatuses of power, do not always possess sufficient knowledge to manage the reform successfully. In addition, the level of transparency of statutory actors’ work in the security sector is always lower than in the rest of public administration institutions. The differences in management style in the security sector and the rest of governmental institutions are even more evident in cases where there is a combination of post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts or in the context of a weak state. It is common in such contexts that statutory actors that use power were not only exempt from public scrutiny but were also granted privileges and were highly politicised, being one of the key instruments of the non-democratic governance.

The purpose of the security sector analysis is also to identify and register differences among various entities (units) that comprise it. For this reason, the analysis should take into account both formal characteristics of the sector and its actors (such as the existence of an adequate judicial system) and the informal ones (the predominant organisational culture, the prestige of particular professional groups within the sector, etc.). For instance, the Serbian public has traditionally laid greater trust in the military than in any other segment of the security sector, greater than in some civilian institutions such as the government or the parliament. In order to understand the specific differences among the actors in this sector, it is necessary to conduct additional analysis of the institutional heritage of each of the actors within the sector, which would shed more light on their performance (the number of personnel, the level of training, equipment, legal regulations, etc.) and informal characteristics of management. A deeper insight into the “logic of an appropriate/desirable” management in these institutions will enable us to identify reasons for the internal blockade or unconsolidated reform, particularly in cases where a formal framework for the reform exists (competent institutions and legislation). For example, despite the fact that centralised decision-making within the MoI was criticised after democratic reforms had been carried out, broad administrative competencies of the MoI

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47 Administrative authorities comprise a broad range of activities: from the registration of civil society organisations and public gatherings, to the issuing of travel documents and ID cards, the maintenance of the registers of citizens and other public documents.
preserved their “logic of appropriateness”\textsuperscript{48} for quite a while after the process of democratisation had started in the successor states of SFRY. This can be explained by the corporative nature of the newly formed political communities. In all post-Yugoslav states, citizens’ view of the police as the most efficient institution of central administration which should continue with providing administrative services\textsuperscript{49} in a uniform way has “survived", instead of decentralising and delegating these services to local municipal authorities. The expectation that “legitimacy comes from above”\textsuperscript{50}, that is, from a centralised government, is a key characteristic of the continental police system and its logic in terms of organisation has been present in Serbian police to this day.

\textit{Graphic illustration of the actors’ capacity and their relations}

It should be added that all relevant and available public sources pertaining to this sector should be listed at the onset of the research, in order to identify


\textsuperscript{49} Issuing identity cards, residential registration and similar.

specific characteristics of the security sector in question. Bibliographies of the reform of each segment of the security sector should follow. Detailed bibliographies and the review of the existing literature in a given country are not only an effective way of collecting data, but also useful sources of information regarding local authors’ views of the importance of SSR. In addition, a chronology of the reform of the entire security sector should be drawn up, as well as detailed chronologies of each of its constituent parts’ reform (e.g. military reform chronology, police reform chronology, etc.). This will all make possible to determine the particularities of the narrower (micro) contexts in which reform of each of the actors was carried out. This will, in turn, facilitate the analysis of characteristic political dynamics across different segments of the security sector and the establishing of benchmarks for measuring the progress by means of utilising the SSR Index. Similarly, by examining the reform in a short historical span, we endeavoured to pinpoint the demands of the reform. There has to be a period of time before the results of the reform become evident, that is, visible to a wider public. Along the same lines, the expectations that the public has of various institutions can be dramatically altered in the periods of crises or after dramatic events. The mini-analyses of reform contexts for each of the actors will enable us to link actors’ political decisions with institutional changes.

CCMR researchers particularly focused on analysing the contexts in which reform of each of the actors had been carried out in order to gain a greater insight into the dynamics of the security sector. The purpose of this approach was to facilitate the researchers’ better understanding of different starting positions from which the actors whose progress was measured had undertaken the reform process. It is for this reason that each chapter on specific actors’ reform opens with a summary of their heritage and of the micro-context in which it had been carried out. By analysing the micro-context we tried to determine if there had been public demand for the reform of a given sector. We also tried to establish if there had been any threats that were specifically securitised in this segment of public policy and which important institutional and political changes had occurred since the beginning of the transition. Most importantly, a description of the trends and a list of the previous changes enabled the researchers to establish benchmarks against which subsequent progress would be measured for each of the actors.

3. Analysis of the SSR political actors

This analysis should encompass all key political actors who have the power of official or unofficial decision-making with regard to SSR, that is, to influence its implementation, or the absence of it. The list of political actors will of course differ from country to country, but might include political parties, churches, unions, crime syndicates, paramilitary units and various stakeholders within state apparatuses of power. For the analysis of key political actors to be valid and to
provide insight into the potential and motives for action of each actor, it should be based on the following indicators:

1) Type of actor (statutory or unstatutory)
2) Actor’s interest (political agenda) or their motivation to contribute to stability, instability or internal conflicts
3) Type of strategy and/or usual methods which the actor applies in order to achieve its goals (special attention should be paid to their tendency to use force and violate human rights of all citizens or specific groups)
4) Potential (available financial assets, armament, control over a part of territory, group cohesion, type of leadership, type of expertise, possibilities for networking, etc.)
5) Main relations with other actors (who are the allies/opponents, ability to gain support or politically mobilize certain groups of citizens, what their social and political base is)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Potential</th>
<th>Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government, political system</td>
<td>Political orientation (socialist, neo-liberal, etc.)</td>
<td>Methods of political action and governance</td>
<td>The size of support base</td>
<td>Main allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation (E.g. economic gain)</td>
<td>Respect of human rights</td>
<td>Group cohesion</td>
<td>Main opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic credentials</td>
<td>Material resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity to stop, slow down or delay reform</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Analysis of political actors

By using the results of such analysis, it will be possible to determine whether and in what manner the inherited state (citizens’ expectations, material and human resources, good governance models) was changed as a result of intervention of different political actors. Consequently, when creating lists of actors, it is important to determine if any of the actors have been omitted or excessively

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present on the list. It should further be determined if any of them can be a “veto player”, that is, which of them are “agents of change”. Finally, it is also realistic to assume that a number of actors and the extent of their influence can at certain point indicate the presence or absence of difficulties in the reform process. For example, it is often said that without civil society organisations which have the know-how and skills to carry out public control and oversight over the security sector, there can be no adequate democratic control. It is also often believed that some interest groups, comprised of members of governmental apparatuses that have the right to use power, might constitute “veto players” in the reform process, since they hold the power and knowledge. Some authors claim that intelligence circles had the greatest influence over political decision-makers before and after the fall of Milosevic’s regime, and were thus in a position to block reforms.52

However, such claims are not easily substantiated with hard evidence. That is why the biggest obstacle for researchers in carrying out their analysis is the lack of solid and publicly available data on actors’ actions as well as an insufficient timeframe. Consequently, this part of the analysis usually ends with a list of actors and descriptions of their potential, based on the opinions and findings of general public and experts.

The Key Research Question

The results obtained from the analysis of the wider socio-political and security sector contexts, as well as from the analysis of key political actors should facilitate the precise identification of the dominant context in which SSR is carried out. Once that context is identified it then becomes possible to determine with certainty which generation of reform is being undertaken in a given country.53 For this purpose we will adopt Timothy Edmunds’s theory that there are a first and a second generation of SSR. According to Edmunds, the first generation includes putting in place constitutional norms, basic laws and structures necessary for putting security sector under the control of democratically elected civil authorities. However, this is just one of the first steps in the democratisation process. The focus of the reform in the first generation is on the establishment of formal structures of civilian control as well as on a clearer division of competencies among different actors within the security sector, which would also result in


setting the foundation for democratic control within the sector. In addition, the
demilitarisation and depoliticisation of the security sector governance should
also take place during the first generation. These steps seek to remove the po-
tential danger arising from the fact that the state or non-state using force might jeopardise the democratic functioning of the political community in question.

The second generation of reforms coincides with the process of democratic consolidation. Of course, this only applies if the process of state creation is completed in the given community, that is, that all threats to its sovereignty have been removed. If that is the case, it is expected that during the second generation civil society, which has been empowered, will become an active participant of democratic civilian control and control and oversight, alongside politicians. This would considerably contribute to the social legitimisation of security institutions in society. It is equally expected that the first generation reforms will be consolidated at lower levels of management and that the mid-managers will identify with the reform. Fundamental democratic values should in effect become part of the organisational and professional culture of state actors using force. These organisations should act on the principles of political and interest neutrality in the future. The key question in this phase is not whether the security sector should be reformed or why, but how to accomplish reform in the most efficient and effective way. It is therefore necessary, in order to consolidate the first generation reforms, to build the so-called administrative capacities of state agencies for the management of resources within the security sector during the second phase. The pre-requisite here is that civil servants and institutions are trained in effective planning, budgeting, programming, monitoring, overseeing and implementing reform policies.

It becomes evident from the above-mentioned outline of ideal-type SSR phases that the second generation of SSR does not have a clearly defined end-point. This phase corresponds to the consolidated democracy model, whose coming into being requires not only the establishment of new structures but also changes in the behaviour and attitudes of security sector personnel. The conclusion is that only after such change occurs can democratic and effective security sector governance become “the only game in town”.

In keeping with this, SSR in Serbia was analysed from the perspective of the process of democratisation and post-conflict recovery. The underlying assumption was that the broader context in which SSR in Serbia began was influenced by the need for a simultaneous four-fold transition: from a non-democratic to a democratic political system; from a planned to a market-led economy; from

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54 Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1998), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, (Belgrade:Filip Višnjić), p. 6 state five arenas of democracy: (1) an autonomous and valued political society, (2) conditions for the development of a free and lively civil society (3) the rule of law (4) an institutionalized economic society, and (5) a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government

55 The paraphrased definition of a consolidated democracy by Linz&Stepan.
monotype social relations to pluralistic ones; from conflict to a period of post-conflict normalisation, stabilisation and reconstruction. It was, therefore, necessary to examine carefully how the trends of such a complex transition had affected the security sector reform. Only after this examination was it possible to determine with certainty whether the first generation of reforms had been completed and consolidated and whether it had progressed into the second phase. The research findings should provide the CCMR team with an answer to the key question of their research, that is, to assess whether SSR in Serbia has finally crossed “the point of no return” after which this sector and/or some of its actors will not be able and will not want to jeopardise the democratic functioning of the state and/or of the political community.

**Development of methods for measuring progress in SSR**

As the issue of measuring SSR progress has not been researched enough, and that the topic in question is a complex phenomenon, it was decided that the *grounded theory approach* would be used in planning the research. This approach implies that the theory is developed in the course of research, by means of “continuing interaction between analysis and the obtained data.”56 The findings of Silverman57 about the three stages in theory building (developed by Glazer and Strauss in 1967)58 were our starting point.

1) In the first step, categories which will shed light on data and give them meaning must be defined. In our case it meant that the definition of the reformed security sector had to be operationalised into relevant criteria for assessing the level of realisation of three aspects of reform: democratic governance, efficiency and effectiveness of providing national and human security. The criteria were further developed into indicators, which resulted in the creation of the Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI). A special category within the Index which we wanted to analyse was the holisticness, that is, the degree of integratedness within the national security sector.

2) In the second step, content is added to the categories in order to examine their relevance. In the case of Serbia, it meant that the SSR Index was to be applied to four distinct types of actors (according to Hanggi’s classification). However, it immediately became apparent that the application of the same

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criteria to the four distinct groups of actors would create difficulties. This was resolved by fine-tuning the methods of measurement and the instruments so that the specificities of the different types of organisations within the sector could be identified. The next step was to develop the methods and criteria for analysing the social context of the reform in order to uncover its specificities in the case of Serbia. During the context analysis a zero point has to be determined against which the progress of the reform would be measured.

3) Once the previous steps have been carried out successfully, the chosen categories should be fitted into a larger analytical framework so that they can also be applied outside the original context. On the basis of experience gained from the application of SSRI, the original instrument and measuring tools were further fine-tuned and major trends in Serbian SSR were identified.

1. Devising Measuring Tools

Before the gathering of empirical data started, the researchers had to find an answer to the question of “what a reformed security sector meant”. According to Timothy Edmunds\(^59\), the answer can be found from three perspectives: a) from the perspective of an ideal type of reformed sector, b) on the basis of regional standards of reform and c) on the basis of the reform process assessment in a given state.

The first approach requires a previously defined generic framework or an ideal type of a reformed sector. Hanggi’s definition was used for that purpose in this research, from which three aggregate dimensions of SSR emerged: 1) democratic governance, 2) efficient security provision and 3) effective provision of human and national security. These dimensions can also be interpreted as final goals of any SSR but these have not yet been achieved even in developed democracies. As Wilfried von Bredow and Wilhelm N. Germann\(^60\) observe, the issue here is “success without a clearly defined end: the protective role of the security sector should be increased to a maximum, while reducing the risk of resorting to coercive measures which endanger democratic culture”. Success is usually measured in situations of crisis and avoiding these is also one of the goals of the reform.

In understanding SSR as a process, the CCMR team’s standpoint was that it is only possible to measure with certainty the level of SSR at a specified point

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in time and that this is only achievable by using a previously determined scale based on the model of a reformed sector. To develop the measurement scale, it was necessary to further define the criteria and their content for each of the dimensions of reform. Each dimension had to be operationalised into criteria and the criteria were further to be developed into a list of specific indicators for each of the four groups of actors. For example, the participation of citizens and civil society organisations in security policy was adopted as one of the criteria to be used under the democratic governance dimension. That criterion was then further divided into two sub-criteria: a) the participation of citizens in policy-making, b) the participation of citizens in policy implementation and evaluation. Consequently, different indicators were established within the first sub-criterion, such as: setting up consultative meetings with citizens on the topic of security in their neighbourhood (indicator for the police), or setting up focus groups to check the effects of new policies before they are introduced (indicator for both the police and the military).

It was also taken into consideration that the three dimensions contained in the SSR definition were not absolute nor that they manifested themselves in the same way in different countries. Therefore, they were open to researchers’ subjective interpretation in the process of their operationalisation and transformation into specific criteria and indicators. In addition, the general definition of SSR builds on the normative assumption of the existence of a democratic political system or on the aspiration of developing such system. However, how this norm will be implemented will mainly depend on the dominant political culture, as well as the public administration tradition in a given country. For example, the same norm of democratic control and oversight over security intelligence agencies has been “operationalised” differently in different countries, depending on the relations among the executive, legislative and judiciary authorities and their relations with the civil society. Consequently, the control and oversight over security-intelligence agencies carried out by the government-appointed committee (UK) is as democratic and legitimate as that carried out by the parliamentary committee (Germany) or by the security and defence committee which also oversees the police and the military (Serbia), or when a special body, consisting of civil society representatives, is included in the parliamentary control and oversight, as is the case of the Civic Control and oversight Committee in Croatia.

There is no value-neutral measuring. The tools chosen for measuring are based on certain values and norms, usually those of the actual researcher or of the party on whose behalf the measuring is undertaken. It is therefore important to know what logic of appropriateness the CCMR team was guided by in defining the criteria for each dimension and in determining the indicators. The Index model used in this research was developed according to the normative assumption that the reformed security sector is based on the principles of democracy, which thus makes the measuring of its progress against the achieved level of democracy possible. In addition, this Index model relies on the conti-
nternational legal and public administration legacy, as well as on standards set by international organisations, particularly from the European region. Since the idea of a state as a desirable model of social organisation is presupposed here, this model will probably not be applicable in parts of the world where the concept of the state was imposed from the outside and has not yet been embedded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>SUB - CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>Representation of Women</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of Ethnic Minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>General Transparency</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation of Citizens and Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>Participation in Policy - Making</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in Implementation and Evaluation of Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability – Democratic Civil Control and Public Control and oversight</td>
<td>Control by the Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary Control and Control and oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial Control</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Control and oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Rechstaat (Legal state)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFICIENCY</td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>Integratedness of System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy of the sector or actors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Ratio between Aims, Resources and Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: dimensions, criteria and sub-criteria of the level of reform of the security sector

This is the reason why the operationalisation of the various dimensions of an ideally reformed security sector was done in line with the standards of the
UN and European regional organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO). This was in line with the so-called regional approach to the measurement of reform. However, the disadvantage of the aforementioned approach is that it did not provide the right tools for measurement of the holistic progress of SSR and assessment of the achievements of each specific reform. Nonetheless, the list of basic analytical units was derived from the analysis of minimum common standards and the units were then turned into the criteria of SSR across separate dimensions. This was how the first version of the SSR index was created - it comprised a list of 22 relatively differentiated criteria. After this, the relevance of different criteria was debated in workshops held in the Centre, and with participation of foreign experts. Later on, their number was reduced so that the collection of data could start during the first year of project implementation. After seven versions of the index, the selection was narrowed down to five groups of criteria, which were seen as key for assessment of the level of democratic governance in Serbia’s security sector. The following criteria were chosen: (1) representation of women and ethnic minorities, (2) general and financial transparency, (3) participation of citizens and civil society organisations in the making, implementation and evaluation of policy, (4) accountability, i.e., democratic civilian control and public control and oversight, and (5) the rule of law. The starting point was the conviction that the mentioned above criteria could be applicable to all the states where security sector reforms were taking place in accordance with democratic principles.

After this process, most criteria were further operationalised into sub-criteria, which function as an auxiliary analytical units used to assess the success of the reform in fulfilling each criterion’s requirements. To illustrate this, it was decided that representativeness was to be assessed only on the basis of the representation of women and ethnic minorities in the security sector, that is, the number of their actors. It was estimated that, in the initial phase of the project, these sub-criteria could provide at least a partial picture of the level of repre-

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61 Apart from the contribution by the Centre researchers, and the presence of associates such as Mr. Djordje Vukovic (CESID), Mr Bogoljub Milosavljevic and Mr. David Love, who were all included in the process of operationalisation of the Index, we received useful comments from Ms. Helene Ziherl from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, researchers from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs after the presentation held in May 2008, and from the group of students attending the Master’s programme on International Security at the Faculty of Political Sciences and also, from the participants of the Young Faces programme with whom, during their exercises, we partially tested this instrument.

62 An interesting tool for determining the level of importance of each criterion was designed by the team from the Institute for Democratisation which worked on the development of the Index of ‘open society’. Within the framework of this research, two questionnaires were given to the experts containing the list of criteria for the society openness. The first questionnaire was used to access the level of implementation of the criteria for openness in Croatian society. The second one was a scale of importance, on which the experts judged the importance of each criterion for achieving an ideal level of openness in any society. For more details, see Goldstein, Simon (2006) Index of Open Society, Croatia 2006 (DEMO: Zagreb)
sentation of certain social groups in state institutions belonging to the security sector. It was also decided that in this phase, data collection related to the representation of other social groups—such as religious minorities or minority groups based on sexual orientation—should be omitted. The reason for this was partly the lack of available data and partly because these are not priority areas in the current phase of reform Serbia.

In the next phase a consensus was reached regarding the scope of working definitions of the sub-criteria. The intention was to avoid the danger of measuring the same events several times under the different criteria. In accordance with this, under the “public control and oversight” sub-criterion, the results of the work by the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance were omitted, because this had already been assessed under the “transparency” criterion. Furthermore, we agreed to exclude the control and oversight practiced by citizens and/or civil society organisations from the same criterion, as this was measured under the “participation”. The longest debate ensued regarding the operational definition of the “legitimacy” criterion. For the purpose of this research it was decided that the observation and evaluation of the level of democracy at elections was to be excluded from the scope of the “legitimacy” criterion. We focused instead on the level of public trust in the state security institutions and their leadership as well as on the public perception of threats to safety of Serbia and its citizens. Within this criterion we also analysed whether there were any significant differences in the level of trust or perception of threats between various social groups (such as ethnic minorities, youth or women) and the majority of the citizens. In the following phases of the research this could provide a basis for determining potential security threats stemming from such differences in opinion.

The process of selecting and shaping of optimal procedure was - temporarily - finalised by devising a two-dimensional scale for measuring the SSR progress. On the vertical axis, under label “dimensions”, general (ideal-typic) characteristics of democratic security sector have been listed. These have been then grouped under separate criteria and sub-criteria on a horizontal axis for each of the security sector elements. However, as Jane Chanaa reminds, “while it is relatively easy to draw up a check-list for the SSR agenda, it is much more difficult to see how that summary can be implemented.” For this reason the indicators were selected and listed, which were meant to be used in analysing the collected materials and data in order to find out which actors, if any, and to what extent, had applied and fulfilled the criteria. During this phase, the CCMR researchers spent most of their time developing indicators which would encompass and express both a specific function and different - professional, institutional, social, ethical, cultural - characteristics of each actor in the security sector.

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sector. Attention had to be paid that selected indicators were applicable to at least the majority of actors in one group in order to make the obtained findings comparable and measurable. This was not an easy task, which is best illustrated by the following example: it is an indisputable fact that an equal representation of women in the operational units of the military and police is not expected. The Beijing Declaration sets forth a standard according to which up to 30% of the operational police force should comprise women, whilst 10% women in operational military units is considered a considerable achievement even in developed democracies.

Because of the aforementioned differences, each researcher had a task, based on defined dimensions and criteria of reforms, to develop indicators for the actors whose reform he or she was monitoring. During this process, an assumption was confirmed that general dimensions and reform criteria were not of equal importance for all the actors, and they could not be equally applied to all of them. For example, it cannot be expected that the transparency of work and management is the same in private security companies and in statutory actors that use force and which are authorised by the Constitution. Similarly, it would be pointless to expect that citizens will participate in creating and implementing the security policies of private security companies as the latter are commercial non-governmental agencies. However, from the point of view of national and human security, it makes sense to research whether these companies are integrated into the security system. It is even more important, to find out if and how the use of means and methods that can jeopardise citizens’ human rights has been regulated and whether there is any control and oversight over that implementation. The comparison of the activities of the parliament, civil society organisations and the judiciary within the security sector would result in similar findings. As these entities have different roles, competencies and sources of power, it was possible to establish only if and to what extent each of them participates in the control and control and oversight of the statutory actors in the security sector.

As a result of preliminary analysis of collected data and insights gained, it was concluded that progress in SSR with all four groups of actors could be measured only against three common criteria: integrity, transparency and legitimacy. As other criteria could not be applied without making serious mistakes and problems, it was decided that instead of one index model, three models would be developed which should take into consideration different functions of the actors. Separate indexes were developed for (1) government institutions that use force (2) non-statutory actors that use force and (3) both statutory and non-statutory actors which have supervisory and controlling roles in the security sector. A list of nine actors was created, followed by a separate list for each of them of specific indicators and questionnaires for assessing their progress in reform.

The list of chosen criteria indicates clearly that measurement was undertak-
en from the perspective of local civil society and that the focus was on obtaining better insight into the level of democracy reached in Serbia's security sector. This is the reason why the indicators and methods for measuring of efficacy and effectiveness of security sector actors’ actions, and of statutory actors in particular, have not been fully developed yet. There were two more important reasons for this. The first stems from the fact that for a serious evaluation of efficiency of actions of statutory actors that use force (the police, the military and intelligence services) to be carried out, it is essential to possess specialised knowledge and technical expertise. For example, in order to measure the efficiency of police actions, that is, in order to define adequate indicators of its efficacy in the suppression of crime, it is necessary to have a profound criminal expertise. However, this kind of expertise can hardly be achieved without years of work in the police force. The second reason stems from the unavailability of authentic and valid data which would enable a more precise measurement of each actor’s efficiency in providing, for instance, physical safety to citizens of Serbia. Internal assessments of combat readiness of militarised police sectors, or of the military itself, are even less available. Quite understandably so, as such data are deemed classified in any country. Hence, it was decided that within the “efficiency” dimension only the aspects of efficiency pertaining to all Serbian public administration institutions should be measured. In accordance with this, the management of human and material resources was assessed, as well as the procedures for creating and implementation of policies (planning, budgeting and assessment). Intelligence services, due to the type of their activities, have escaped any serious measuring of efficiency, even after additional narrowing has been carried out.

To define and then measure the effectiveness of security sector actors proved to be the most difficult task. This even more so as the same reasons which created difficulties in measuring efficiency appeared here as well. Lastly, the effectiveness of certain statutory actors, such as the military or intelligence services, can be measured with great difficulty under regular (peaceful) circumstances. In other words, the effectiveness of any armed forces can be evaluated with greater certainty only in the state of war or after it. However, then it might be too late or even pointless, in case of a defeat. Similarly, the effectiveness of intelligence services can be assessed in principle only on the basis of information publicly released by their civilian superiors or expert officials, that is, after some damage (the prevention of which falls under their jurisdiction) has been done. This largely applies to state institutions with certain police powers as well. For instance, only customs officers and maybe the police can make a roughly accurate estimate as to how much smuggling over state border has been done over a period of time. Similarly, only tax police can, to some extent, estimate the damage done to the state by the so-called “black market” or “grey economy” whereas the Anti-Laundering Administration can estimate the amount of money “laundered” in Serbia and at what price.
Therefore, the effectiveness was measured in this research only against three criteria: legitimacy, integratedness and the relation between goals, means and results. Necessary clarification of the “legitimacy” criterion has already been given in the previous text. Within the integratedness criterion, “integratedness upwards” was measured first. It should demonstrate if and to what extent each actor was included in the integrated sector, namely the national security system and whether such system existed at all. Parallel to this, the so-called “integratedness downwards” was considered, which should show the level of internal integration of each of the actors. Strategic and legislative acts that should determine the elements of the sector (system) and the roles of all actors were also analysed in order to check the vertical axis. It was necessary to determine whether the National Security Strategy existed at all and whether the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia mentions and/or regulates in a holistic manner at least some segments of the security sector. We also had to determine the manner in which the roles of different actors in the security sector were defined and distributed in these acts. The team also checked if minor acts were in accordance with the Constitution and Strategy Outline. In addition, we were looking for defined procedures and instances for horizontal coordination and cooperation within the sector, such as cooperation between the military and the police in the state of emergency. “Integratedness downwards” was analysed in the same way, i.e., we analysed if the horizontal communication and coordination within each of the actors had been arranged appropriately.

When we tried to develop indicators for assessing the relation among goals, means and results, problems occurred similar to the ones we had been dealing with when efficiency had been considered. First, the data on invested resources and results achieved are not available. This applies especially to security-intelligence services as information about their operations are well hidden from the public eye. Even when the results of some of their activities are released, the public cannot find out about the costs or whether these operations have been carried out successfully and effectively. This is how the problem of defining and measuring the effectiveness of the security sector and its actors arose. Is the effective sector the one which through preventive measures and actions manages to prevent or diminish the violence in the country, or the one which successfully reacts to violence or any other security threat (E.g., natural disasters). Whatever the answer may be, the problem remains how to assess if, say, too much was spent on solving some security problem. This further requires that we also take into consideration how security goals are ranked in the political arena or in the public. If, on the other hand, we assess effectiveness solely on the basis of public expectations and current political priorities, it can turn out later that such effectiveness has had negative consequences on other parts of public administration or on the entire society.

In the end, decision was made that in this phase of research the focus would be on measuring only if and to what extent the achieved results were in keeping
with the reform goals formulated in the country’s strategic papers and politicians’ speeches at the onset of the transition. The assessment of effectiveness was additionally hampered by the fact that, in Serbia, only defense sector possessed the strategic document, which was, in all fairness, a relic of the previous state. The fact that Serbian society was deeply divided regarding the perception of goals for future development, including the goals and costs of the security sector reform – presented even a greater problem. That is why there is no consensus on the future effective national security system and its traditional actors. For example, a part of society advocates a big conscript army whose main task would be to defend the territorial integrity of the country. This would require greater budget expenditure for the military, probably at the expense of other parts of the sector or state administration. Another part of the society advocates a smaller, professional army which would defend the country in cooperation with other international actors. However, there are no data available regarding the costs of such an army.

2. Narrowing the research scope

The aforementioned problems forced the research team to harmonise its measuring criteria with the importance given to them in providing human and national security and to harmonise the planned scope with their own resources. For this purpose, foreign influences on the SSR in Serbia were excluded from the context analysis first. The effectiveness of providing security was then evaluated only on the national level, and according to the requirements for the respect and protection of human rights, whereas the evaluation at the level of providing local security was excluded. Only in the case of the police it was evaluated whether its reform was in line with the requirements for providing security in the local community. As all reform criteria imply some of the basic human rights, we are convinced that the offered index model is in accordance with the human security concept.

It was also decided that the pilot phase of the project would not include all actors who, according to a broader definition, could belong to the security sector. The progress in the reform of several groups of actors was measured instead. It is our estimate that the fate of the first generation of SSR in Serbia depends on the success of their reform. The groups are as follows: (1) statutory actors that use force – the police, the military, intelligence services and state institutions with certain police powers; (2) statutory actors that do not use force – The National Assembly and the judiciary; (3) non-statutory actors that use force - private security companies and (4) non-statutory actors that do not use force - civil society organisations. Due to limited research resources and difficulties in accessing data, we gave up on analysing the impact of the media and academol (non-statutory actors that do not use force), the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other parts of the government which participate in the security sec-
tor management (statutory actors that do not use force) as well as on analysing the paramilitary formations and crime syndicates (non-statutory actors that use force). The research of other organisations and civil society forms, such as local initiatives and marginalised groups, was left out as well.

In accordance with the aforementioned, the aims were narrowed and as a result the scope of this research was limited. In addition, the quality of the findings depended largely on the availability of relevant data and the level of previous research of the security sector in Serbia. Despite this, the researchers paid attention that all four groups of actors were represented in the research sample. The actors whose activities had not been explored sufficiently until then were also included in the sample. They were marked as state institutions with certain police powers (such as customs, tax police and Anti-Laundering Administration), due to the fact that all of them have some powers to apply coercive measures or other measures which can affect the citizens’ rights to privacy.

The choice of the reform starting point, against which all subsequent progress was to be measured, represented a special challenge for the research team. This choice, even more importantly, determines the manner in which the success of the reform is defined. In case of Serbia, we decided to measure the SSR reform in the period from 2006, when Serbia became an independent state, until the end of 2008, when this research was completed. However, the researchers were asked to keep in mind the previous state of affairs as well, and to include in their analysis and findings the scope of changes which had occurred in this sector or in its actors after the toppling of Milosevic’s regime in October 2000. Consequently, they had to keep in mind, when calculating the SSR Index, the context analysis results, the heritage of the security sector and some of its institutions and the expectations of the citizens from the SSR. As a result, the findings obtained in this phase can be used as parameters for further measuring of the SSR in Serbia, which, in turn, would facilitate the development of tools for measuring progress in the unit of time and identifying the key reform trends.

3. Assessment method

Once the object of assessment was redefined and the list of dimensions, criteria and reform indicators for the selected security sector actors confirmed, a decision on the measurement procedure had to be made. After various procedures had been discussed, we opted for a SSR scale with (1) as the lowest and (5) as the highest grade, a model similar to the annual World Freedom Index64 applied by the American organisation Freedom House. It was defined that the lowest grade would indicate the complete absence of SSR, that is, the security sector in a given country was unreformed. Conversely, the highest grade meant that the

64 For more details visit: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
second generation of SSR was accomplished successfully, and that the reformed sector was now democratically governed. We opted for this model because it requires fewer indicators whose accomplishments is based on the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data.

This assessment model was adapted to every actor. We measured their respective levels of reform first, and then the trends in the whole security sector. In the final stage of measurement, the researchers had to transform the earlier collected data and grades given against each criterion into a final (cumulative) grade for the reform in relation to each dimension and for each actor. In the next stage, the researchers added up all grades and then divided the total number with the number of dimensions. In this way, the average grade was created for the level of reform progress for each actor. Following the same principle, the researcher then calculated the average grade of SSR progress for each group of actors.

This means that the Reform Index of each actor was derived from the grades given on the basis of a set of indicators for each sub-criterion first, and then for the criteria. For example, on the basis of the analysis of indicators of female representation in the police, it was estimated which grade, from (1) (the worst scenario) to (5) (the best scenario), would accurately depict the representation of women in Serbian police. Then, the average grade for each criterion was calculated, based on the average value of the given grades according to each sub-criterion. For example, in order to grade the police against the representativeness criterion, the grades for the representation of women and representation of the minorities were added up first, and then the sum was divided by two. Following the same procedure, the Reform Index was calculated for each individual dimension. This means that it was obtained from the average of the grades of the level of reform, which had been given previously for every criterion within certain dimension. For example, the grade for democratic management of statutory actors that use force, is in fact, the mean value of all grades given according to the following criteria: (1) the representation of women and ethnic minorities (2) transparency (3) participation of the citizens and their organisations in policy-making, implementation and evaluation of policy (4) democratic civil control and public control and oversight and (5) rule of law. Along the same lines, the grade given to the effectiveness dimension was calculated on a basis of mean value of the grades given for the management of (1) human and (2) material resources. Accordingly, the grade for effectiveness dimension is the mean value of the grades given by the criteria of (1) legitimacy, (2) integratedness and (3) the ratio between aims, resources and outcomes. The Reform Index of each actor was also obtained by calculating the average grade, which, in turn, was calculated from the grades given to this Index for each of the three dimensions. The military Reform Index, for example, was calculated on a basis of the mean value of the grades given to the dimensions of democratic governance, efficiency and effectiveness.
In order to avoid mistakes, the possibility was given to allocate a half grade (0.5) for each of the values from 1-5. The researchers were also obligated to submit a brief rationale in written form for the grade given according to each criterion, explaining in more detail why the grade had been allocated. This explanation was to further clarify how the inherited situation had affected the progress and what indicators, international standards and practices had been used in formulating the grades. Roughly, the grades 1 -3 were usually given based on the indicators of existence or lack of formal rules (rules-based indicators) for the actions of particular actors. On the other hand, grades 4-5 implied that the actors were in the second generation of reforms, they were using newly-adopted regulations in practice and that there were positive changes in the public perception of security sector and/or its actors. Under that, it meant that in practice, the newly adopted norms are in use, and that there are positive changes in the public perception of security, and/or security sector and its actors, as well as the proof that the organisational culture and the system of governance were based on new (democratic) values. These indicators are called the outcome-based indicators.

After assessing individual actors, average grades were calculated for the groups of actors. However, the plan to calculate the Reform Index of the whole SSR was abandoned. In the course of the research it became evident that to simply add up the grades of each of the groups of actors and then divide them by the number of groups would be not only incorrect in terms of methodology, but also impossible. The security sector is not just a total sum of four groups of actors. Furthermore, each group is comprised of different individual actors. In the end, separate reform indexes were calculated only for (1) statutory actors that use force, (2) non-statutory actors that use force and (3) statutory and non-statutory actors that are empowered to control and monitor the actions of the actors that use force. Despite the fact that the attempt at devising a unique Index based on the quantitative indicators of the SSR has failed so far, the applied assessment method has provided some valuable insights:

1) The main trends in the SSR can be identified and it is possible, at least in principle, to rank the key actors according to the level of their reform. For example, the comparative analysis of the groups of actors’ indexes has revealed that the work of the majority of the actors still lack transparency and that the financial trends and budget allocating are hidden (unknown). The absence of a systematic and meaningful parliamentary control and control and oversight over the governmental power-holders in the Serbian security sector is also evident.

2) It is also possible to identify the actors whose reform is least known of or those with, according to the available data, the slowest pace of the reform. In the case of Serbia, such actors are the intelligence agencies and private security sector.

3) The holistic approach to the reform and the measuring of the SSR can be
justified and confirmed by applying several identical criteria on all actors, such as transparency, democratic civil control and public control and oversight and integratedness.

4. Applicability of the measuring tools and the lessons learned

In this phase of the research, our measuring tool, compared to the indicators that are used to assess the work practice, is largely based on formal norms (E.g., the existence of laws and bylaws). Most of the indicators are the so-called “process” indicators (indicating whether certain standards have been adopted), but they do not indicate the outcome of the change. This shortcoming of our tool can result in proposing solutions which would consequently lead to the overregulation of the security sector. Being aware of this problem, we believe it is important to explain how these indicators have been selected. The selection was pre-determined by the key research question; has the first generation of the SSR reforms been completed and are the established norms necessary for the subordination to the democratic civilian authorities?

More often than not, the grades indicate the level of transparency in the work of the actors and the effectiveness of their public relations departments. In other words, the institutions which granted the researchers access to the required data had an opportunity to make the potential progress in their reform known to the public and therefore assessed more objectively. On the other hand, non-transparent institutions were risking that even the changes they had actually made would pass unnoticed by the general public and that they would receive lower grades due to the lack of available data. For example, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, the intelligence agencies, the judiciary and prisons all failed to provide the lists of their employees, nor did they provide any data on human resources management. The researchers tried to overcome this problem by collecting data from secondary sources and by triangulation with media sources. Consequently, the grades for these actors were formulated only after all available data had been collected.

Despite the shortcomings, the Research team firmly believes that the given Index can be very useful for determining and measuring whether the first generation of SSR in a given country, in this case Serbia, has been completed. In other words, if all constitutional and legal regulations which guarantee an effective subordination of primarily state apparatuses of power to democratically elected and legitimate civilian authorities have been put in place.

It should also be mentioned that the final grades do not reveal anything about the intentions, even the best ones, of the actors in question. They do reflect, to an extent, the current state of affairs in a given area of practical policy.

It seems that the applied grading system is not representative enough of the reform dynamics, i.e., the rate at which the public perception of security
threats changes. As the SSR is a “moving target”, when interpreting the numerical score one should bear in mind that the SSR progress was measured for the 2006-2008 period.

5. The next phase of the research

The findings of this research will be additionally checked in the course of the next year. For that purpose, the Centre will try to present its findings to the public and to organise consultations with different groups from the security community in Serbia, such as employees of the governmental institutions competent for the security, the authorities in charge of the sector governance and control over the work of its actors, as well as other civil society organisations. Consultations will be held also with owners and employees of private security companies. The researchers also expect that the presented analytical concept and the accompanying tools and procedures will be further tested and improved in the course of the comparative research of the SSR progress in the countries of the Western Balkans. This research is already under way. It should contribute to determining the similarities and differences among the countries in question and result in preparing a set of recommendations that could be useful to both the governments in the region and international actors. Moreover, the research will be an opportunity for further standardisation of the tools and procedures for measuring the SSR progress.