Since it emerged from the donor and academic communities in the 1990s, the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been through numerous transformations. SSR can be defined as “the process through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organizational demands of transformation.” The aim of SSR is “the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance.” This definition of SSR has five main elements. First, efficiency which can be seen as the match between achieved results and means. Second, effectiveness can be defined as harmony between aims and achieved outcomes. Third, human security refers to freedom from fear and protection of human rights. Human security has two further aspects: freedom from chronic threats, such as murder, hunger, illness and repression; and protection from sudden and damaging disruptions in all aspects of life, either at home, in work or in the community. Fourth, national security is defined as the preservation of territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and the political stability of government institutions. Fifth, democratic governance within the concept of SSR refers to legitimacy, representativeness, transparency, participativeness (participation of citizens), legality and accountability in the governing of the security sector. Thus, given the criteria of democratic governance SSR is not an easy, simple technical process of the reorganisation of the security sector. The concept of SSR also incorporates the values of liberal democracy and the efforts invested in the adoption of those values.

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4 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform (Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, 2003).
The Elements of the Concept

Security sector reform is comprised of three elements. These elements, which are analysed in detail below, are actors, context, aims and dimensions. Actors of SSR are the organisations which are responsible for the protection of the state and society. The researchers adopted an holistic approach to SSR actors and divided them into four groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Statutory actors who have the right to use force</th>
<th>c. Non-statutory actors who have the right to use force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>military, police, intelligence service etc.</td>
<td>private security companies, paramilitary units, etc.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>b. Statutory actors that do not have the right to use force</th>
<th>d. Non-statutory actors that do not have the right to use force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parliament, judiciary, independent bodies, etc.</td>
<td>civil society organisations, media, universities, etc.</td>
</tr>
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The first group includes statutory actors that have the right to use force, such as the military, the police, the intelligence services and other governmental bodies which are authorised to use some police powers. These governmental apparatuses which have a monopoly over the legitimate use of power form the "hard core" of the security sector. The second group are statutory actors that do not have the right to use power, and are directly in charge of managing the security sector. These include parliament, government, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the judiciary. These institutions are at the same time in charge of democratic civilian control and control and oversight of government apparatuses of power, and therefore have a central role for SSR. The third group of actors in the security sector are non-statutory actors who have the right to use power. These include private organisations which legitimately use force, such as private security companies, intelligence services

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and military companies. Finally, the fourth group includes all civil society institutions which do not use force, but are involved in public control and oversight and discourse on security issues. These are civil society organisations (CSOs), the media, universities and social movements.

The authors believe that a holistic approach has several advantages over one that analyses only the statutory actors directly in charge for providing security services (A and B in Table 1). Firstly, in practice, by not conceptualising SSR with civil society and the private security sector, it is impossible to fully capture the extent of demand for security in a pluralistic society, which consequently impacts upon the development of policies for reform. Secondly, the holistic approach creates better preconditions for a security system in which a coherent and consistent security policy is implemented. However, this approach has its flaws. The biggest challenge is to clearly define actors and clearly draw boundaries in order to avoid an approach which is too broad.

Context is the second important element in Security Sector Reform (SSR). In the literature, three types of contexts are discussed - post-authoritarian, post-conflict and developmental. Further, there is also SSR in developed countries. Each context provides its own set of particularities and problems. In the post-authoritarian context, the most important is the democratisation of the security sector, which includes the introduction of civilian and democratic control of the armed forces, the opening of secret files and lustration of former members of security sector directly involved in human rights abuses. Such issues were faced, for instance, by countries in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. In the post-conflict context, the key task is the gradual pacification of the security sector, an issue that involves demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration, demining and prevention of proliferation of small and personal weapons. Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina are examples of states which are facing such post-conflict problems. The developmental context is characteristic of economically under-developed countries. Under these circumstances, SSR is mostly focused

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12 Here, to an extent, we can include those private actors which use force illegally, such as organised criminal groups and terrorist groups, etc. These groups represent part of the so called ‘unsecured sector’ of the security sector and pose a threat to the state and individual security. We believe these should be singled out for special attention. These groups should be studied according to the degree they interact with the legitimate security system within the third group of the aforementioned actors (for example the connection of state security service and organised crime, integration of ex-terrorist organisations into the political system and so on).

13 For the more detailed information, see Directory of Organizations and Institutions interested for security topics/issues (Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations 2008.)

14 For example, the boundaries of the sector, could in theory include sexual education in elementary schools, because the health of the nation is also a part of the security sector.

on the reduction of the security apparatus and a reallocation of funds.\textsuperscript{16} In reality, many states, including those in the Western Balkans, face a combination of these problems. Serbia is no exception. Previous authoritarian systems - predecessors of the parliamentary democracy in Serbia - have left the country with a weak parliament, hidden centres of power within the security sector, and the infiltration of organised crime in the state. A further set of problems can be attributed to the legacy of four wars during the 1990s. First, there are unsolved security issues which, due to a lack of political will, threaten to further destabilise the region, including the unresolved status of Kosovo and Metohija and potential ‘flare’ points in south Serbia and the Sandzak region. Further, there are the problems with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, of both regular units and paramilitary units such as the Special Operations Unit and the so called ‘Scorpions’. Members of the security community also have to confront past actions and war crimes. Finally, important questions remain over Serbia’s integration in Euro-Atlantic alliances.

The fourth context of transformation concerns economically developed countries. New, asymmetrical threats to security, such as global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have precipitated a transformation process of the armed forces in developed states. However, this research does not concentrate on these states. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the security sector in Serbia in terms of the technological gap between the capacity and compatibility of the Serbian Armed Forces and NATO and (established) EU member states, some of which are also undergoing a transformation process in military affairs.\textsuperscript{17}

The next element of SSR can be described according to three principal aims: enlargement of security capacities; democratisation; and, economic development. However, these aims have the potential to be in conflict with each other. For example, the expansion of security capacities requires enormous material and social resources, which can be detrimental to economic development. Alternatively, a reduction of security capacities can accelerate economic development, but at the same time leave the security sector without adequate responses to deal with internal and external threats. Also, democratisation can temporarily weaken a state’s security capacity. For example, in societies where

\textsuperscript{16} State distribution of security to all its citizens corresponds with standards developed within the concept of ‘good governance’. Incapability of the state to fulfil this function in distributing security as a public good, generates new security problems, because the state (in this case defined as ‘weak’ or ‘ruined’) endangers the security of all of its citizens and becomes the source of insecurity.

\textsuperscript{17} In established democracies, the problem of executing democratic civilian control over the armed forces is still an issue, especially in the context of the use of domestic armed forces in missions under international authority (for example missions in Afghanistan and Iraq)
institutions are extremely weak\textsuperscript{18}, and civil society is undeveloped, opportunities can arise for domestic or foreign actors to abuse the main principles of democratic control. On the other hand, increasing the number of actors who have powers to gather security-related data, can actually reduce transparency, responsibility and legality of the security sector, and narrow the scope of human rights, endangering the process of democratisation. Thus, it is necessary to create adequate and specific priorities to achieve these aims. These priorities must be based on valid and objectively founded assessments of internal and external security challenges and risks, material and human capacities, as well as assessments of political processes in the broader social context. The authors believe that such a holistic approach to SSR is the most appropriate for such assessments and for describing a ‘broader picture’ about security sector.

**Levels of analysis**

In this research, the focus of SSR analysis is at the state and individual levels.\textsuperscript{19} Local, regional and trans-regional analysis is not considered in this research.\textsuperscript{20} The state level includes the security dynamics connected to the stability of institutions and the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia. The individual level includes security dynamics related to individuals who live or are based on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. This level of analysis has several advantages. First, it gives clear demarcation of the research topic. Second, it provides the potential for influencing policy formation processes and decision-making at the state level. However, by focusing on the individual, the research also underlines the fact that individuals must be the primary referential object of security. The state, or region, will not be safe unless all individuals present there are safe. However, the authors are aware that the security and political dynamics of the security sector in Serbia cannot be understood without reference to regional dynamics.\textsuperscript{21} Certain security threats facing Serbia and its citizens exist at the regional level, and countries in the region need to cooperate in order to tackle such security issues. Thus, upon completion of the mapping of the secu-

\textsuperscript{18} This refers to low levels of public trust in the institutions and the lack of socio-political cohesion between citizens and governmental institutions.


\textsuperscript{20} During 2009 CCMR in cooperation with DCAF and consortium of research organizations from the region of the Western Balkan, will conduct regional mapping and control and oversight of the SSR, using the methodology which is presented in this Yearbook

rity sector in Serbia (phase one), the authors will apply the same instruments and methods to the regional level of the Western Balkans (phase two). The sub-national level (south of Serbia, Sandzak, etc) and the trans-regional level (the Euro-Atlantic region; EU, NATO and PfP) will be included in the research phases as a secondary level of analysis.22