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        • Serbia and Hungary: Hammering Democracy
          • Publications

          • Autor: Marko Drajić
          • Serbia and Hungary: Hammering Democracy

          • Hungary is currently Serbia’s closest international partner. Bilateral relations between the two countries are no longer marred by any disputes and their political and economic interests increasingly coincide. The values underpinning the administrations of both countries have converged to ...

        • The Security Sector in a Captured State
          • Publications

          • Autor:
          • The Security Sector in a Captured State

          • Report on state capture in Serbia is BCSP genuine and pioneering work aiming to document and deconstruct ongoing process of state capture in the security sector through presentation of mechanisms, actors and consequences of this process.

        • The Security Sector in the State of Emergency: Testing Democracy
          • Publications

          • Autor: Isidora Stakic, Jelena Pejic Nikic, Katarina Djokic, Marija Ignjatijevic, Sasa Djordjevic
          • The Security Sector in the State of Emergency: Testing Democracy

          • This analysis by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) concludes that during the 52 days it spent in a state of emergency, Serbia failed the test of democracy, thanks to a series of failings and irregularities in the conduct and control of the security sector.

        • The Masks Have Slipped: Serbia in a Geopolitical Pandemic
          • Publications

          • Autor: Isidora Stakic, Maja Bjelos, Marko Drajić
          • The Masks Have Slipped: Serbia in a Geopolitical Pandemic

          • Masks have slipped and the interests of Serbia’s foreign policy were exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. These interests are not based on the principles of common goods, but on mechanism for preserving the existing internal order. This is one of the conclusions in the foreign policy analysis ...

        • Crime in the Western Balkans Six at the Time of Coronavirus: Early Findings
          • Publications

          • Autor: Sasa Djordjevic
          • Crime in the Western Balkans Six at the Time of Coronavirus: Early Findings

          • Did organized crime groups continue with their activity at the time of Coronavirus, which trends in the criminal activities in the Western Balkans can be noticed in the first six weeks of the pandemic and which scenarios can be envisaged for the future, analyzed BCSP Researcher Sasa Djordjevic.

        Serbia and Hungary: Hammering DemocracyThe Security Sector in a Captured StateThe Security Sector in the State of Emergency: Testing DemocracyThe Masks Have Slipped: Serbia in a Geopolitical PandemicCrime in the Western Balkans Six at the Time of Coronavirus: Early Findings
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          • Year: 2005
          • Building Up the Foundations Defence Development in Serbia and Montenegro in, 2005

          • 29. january 2005. Major General Jd Moore-Bick CBE MA

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          I am delighted to be asked to contribute to the series of "Reč stručnjaka", and to be of some continued assistance to the process of defence reform in Serbia and Montenegro. I must point out that views expressed are personal ones and not those of the Government of the United Kingdom. I have been asked to provide some comment on the role of the various key documents on which we have all worked in 2004 and how I see them developing during this next year. There are many other authorities and I would not for one minute pretend to have all of the answers. In particular the framework of laws of Serbia and Montenegro is a closed book to me as I think it will be to many other friends of the country. Those of you who work in that field should point out to us why some of the things which we think straight forward become more complicated in the legislative framework of the State Union.

          With the adoption of the Strategy of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro on the 18th November 2004, the New Year opens up the prospect of significant progress in defence development assembled on the Strategy's foundation. It will be important to continue the debate on defence planning in political circles, but to keep the forthcoming key documents within the bounds of political agreement so painstakingly achieved. To submit these papers to the test of formal political adoption unnecessarily will delay progress and sap the morale of both authors and the armed forces.

          Following the Strategy, three strands of work are enabled by it and either in progress or anticipated. These are the Defence White Paper, the Military Doctrine and the Defence Review.

           

          The White Paper

          The White Paper is as important for international as for national use. At the moment, whilst it does not, and should not, aim to be prescriptive or to make a detailed, costed plan for reform and development, it does lay out intentions and aspirations. For neighbours and allies, locally, regionally and internationally, intentions are the foundation for confidence building after turbulence and war. Future aspirations and directions will be keenly read at international level as markers for alliance and friendship, joint training, operations and longer term cooperation, all of which are eagerly sought by Serbia and Montenegro. It is the White Paper’s aspirations in terms of outline force structures, readiness postures, training systems and institutions, and a description of doctrinal approach which are the appropriate areas for the forthcoming political, academic, military and media debate. It would, however, be harmful to such debate if there should be any premature political veto or deadlock. Its formal parliamentary adoption seems to me to be unnecessary, its aim is consultative not prescriptive, and it forms the background or supporting framework for both higher level doctrine and a Defence Review. As to the longevity of its relevance, with the current draft and my now possibly overtaken knowledge of its contents, I suggest it will be superseded in year's time by the next issue. This will be necessary to reflect the results of the Defence Review and to provide an updated statement of intention by any new governmental constellation in either partner of the State Union. That next issue will, if the Defence Review is conducted rigorously, have a fairly detailed plan of development for the armed forces. It can only be valid if parliamentary approval to the resource demands is given, which does point to formal adoption after protracted debate. So, there is no single rule about what does and what does not need political authority in terms of White Paper work. It is the contents which decide; no adoption while plans are germinating, formal adoption when plans are made and must be funded. It is very much the Minister of Defence’s key document and should, whenever possible, be issued under his authority.

           

          "Military" Doctrine

          I have mentioned above higher level doctrine. Those working on the current military doctrine draft know my unease at the title and content of this. I think it is unfortunately worded and that a better approach would be to have higher level doctrine, "defence" or "strategic military", from which true military doctrine should flow and should then be the precursor for tactical doctrine, standard operating procedures, and field manuals with detailed instructions for training and operation of soldiers in the field. Some of the normal content of higher doctrine is not, or was not, in the draft and this is explained by its being part of other documents, chiefly the Strategy and the White Paper. Nevertheless, I repeat the view that a comprehensive higher doctrine paper issued under the authority of the Supreme Defence Council and authored in the policy areas of the Ministry of Defence, naturally with the advice of the General Staff, would be more appropriate. It would certainly be preferred by allies to whom it will be important for cross training, interoperability and joint exercises, especially those at the ministry level. At this level, other nations will need to see clearly how the defence leadership of Serbia and Montenegro plans to do its business in times of crisis or war, and will not wish this top level doctrine to be cluttered with lower level instructions as to how to conduct operations with troops at unit level.

          Unlike the White Paper, the higher doctrine is a more durable document. It must carry weight and probably the authority of the Supreme Defence Council. It should not be changed lightly or frequently, since it is the ultimate source document from which other doctrine is derived, on how to fight and how to work in the armed forces. The so called hierarchy or pyramid of doctrine thus assembled becomes the core of teaching and learning in all military schools training and operational units. One of the roles of this doctrine is to conserve stability in training, set military standards and guide instructors.

           

          The Defence Review

          This leaves us with the Defence Review! This binds all the other work together if properly done. The process has had a false start or two and there are some parallel processes running which cover the ground but without adherence to the accepted methodology. Other experience shows that this will not stand up to scrutiny later when the claim for resources is made. Contemporary defence planning culture does not recognise any "right" to a set proportion of national financial resources for the armed forces needs, only the sound logic with some degree of international assurance will be recognised.

          What are the essential actions of the defence review? The starting point must be the three missions and five tasks laid out in the Strategy. Despite the broad granularity of these it is possible to break them down into much more detailed tasks. Ultimately, every unit must be assigned to one or more of these tasks, or its existence comes into question and its claim to financial resources ceases.

          Having defined the missions, tasks and allocation of units to tasks in the first iteration, which requires much military judgement, then the degree to which tasks may coincide or be separate in time and place must be considered. Will task X and task Y happen at the same time? If they will, troops are needed for both. If they are unlikely to coincide, then a judgement must be made that one set of troops will cover for both, unless geography precludes a move from one to the other. These judgements are again military but also diplomatic and political in nature. And it is this area of allotting troops to tasks and missions which is at the heart of the defence review process. The table of troops needed will nearly always be more than the financial parameters allow, so tasks and troops need to be re-assessed in further iterations; some risk must be entered into, some chances taken and then some hard choices made. This is the stage when the defence review requires political leadership in the form of making well informed decisions on the hard choices, scrapping some well cherished systems and abilities, paring down capabilities, setting true priorities - all this is the stuff for the Minister’s office supported by the Chief of the General Staff. The better the quality and the intellectual rigour of the review, the fewer choices there will be to make, but the harder will be those choices. It is at this point that leading defence planners, civilian and military, must recognise that to fail in making those hard choices will mean that the review will just have to be done again in a couple of years time when the plans are found not to work, and Ministers of Finance will not allow flexibility. There is more than enough experience of this latter unsatisfactory state of affairs in many European countries and not only those in transition.

           

          Conclusion

          This short article has attempted to bring into context the various documents, their authorship and the relevance of each. Development of the armed forces of any country can never be stalled awaiting plans. But such development must eventually be brought into the planning cycle of the Defence Review. The Review is never a singular process. As soon as it is finished and encapsulated in a White Paper the cycle repeats itself, with a re-examination of the Strategy, missions and tasks, the matching of troops to tasks and the assessment of concurrency and overlap. By this means change and reform is never completed, but also, never sudden or unexpected. Above all it is important to consider the level of the units and institutions that must react to the change and implement it, understanding the cycle and tempo which they can operate at and recognising when the rate of change causes confusion rather than evolutionary development.

        • Tags: military, reform, Defence, Serbia, Montenegro, Security
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